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853a–853b

Athenian: The method of our legislation requires us to deal next with the judicial proceedings connected with all the transactions described so far. We have already stated some of the matters that call for such proceedings (namely, those concerning farming and all the industries that depend on it), but we have not yet stated the most important of them. So our next step must be to state them in full, setting out in detail what penalty must attach to each offense and before what court it must be tried.

853b

Clinias: True. Athenian: In a sense, it is a shameful thing to make all the laws we are now proposing to make in a State like ours, which, as we say, is to be well managed and supplied with everything that is right for the practice of virtue. In such a State, merely to suppose that some citizen will grow up to share in the worst forms of depravity practiced in other States, so that one has to forestall and denounce by law the appearance of any such character, and to enact laws against such people to warn them off or punish them, as though they were certain to appear, is, as I said, shameful in a sense. But we are not now legislating as the ancient lawgivers did, for heroes and sons of gods, when, as the story goes, both the lawgivers themselves and their subjects were men of divine descent. We, on the contrary, are only mortal men legislating for the seed of men, and so we may be permitted to fear that one of our citizens might turn out horn-hearted, with a temper so hard that it is beyond melting; and just as those horn-struck beans cannot be softened by boiling on the fire, so such men would remain unaffected by laws, however powerful. So, for the sake of these gentlemen, the first law we shall state, concerning temple robbery, will be no very gentle one, in case anyone dares to commit this crime. We should neither wish nor expect that a rightly raised citizen would catch this disease; but their servants, and foreigners and foreigners’ slaves, might often make such attempts.

853d–854e

Athenian: Chiefly on their account, then, but also as a precaution against the general weakness of human nature, I will state the law about temple robbery and about all other crimes of a similar kind that are hard, if not impossible, to cure. And in keeping with the rule we have already approved, we must place before all such laws preludes that are as brief as possible. By way of argument and admonition, one might speak in the following terms to the man whom an evil desire urges on by day and wakes at night, driving him to rob some sacred object: “My good man, the evil force that now moves you and prompts you to go robbing temples is neither of human nor of divine origin. It is some impulse bred in men long ago from ancient, unexpiated wrongs, which goes around wreaking ruin, and you must guard against it with all your strength. Now learn how you must guard against it. Whenever any such intention comes over you, go to the rites that avert guilt; go as a suppliant to the shrines of the gods who lift curses; go and keep company with the men who are reputed to be virtuous. And in this way learn, partly from others and partly by teaching yourself, that every man is bound to honor what is noble and just. But shun the company of evil men completely, and do not turn back. And if, by acting this way, you find your disease grows less, well and good; but if not, regard death as the nobler course, and rid yourself of life.” As we chant this prelude to those who intend all these unholy deeds that destroy civic life, we must leave the law itself unspoken for the man who obeys; but for the man who disobeys, we must let the law, following the prelude, chant aloud as follows: Whoever is caught robbing a temple, if he is a foreigner or a slave, shall have his curse branded on his forehead and on his hands, and he shall be flogged with as many lashes as the judges decree, and he shall be cast out naked beyond the borders of the country; for after paying this penalty he might perhaps be disciplined into a better life. For no penalty imposed by law aims at harm; as a rule, it produces one of two results: it makes the person who suffers it either better or less bad. But if any citizen is ever convicted of such an act (that is, of committing some great and infamous wrong against the gods, his parents, or the State), the judge shall regard him as already incurable, considering that, despite all the training and upbringing he has had from childhood, he has not held back from the worst iniquity.

854e–855e

Athenian: For him, then, the penalty is death, the least of evils; and besides, by serving as an example, he will benefit others when he himself is disgraced and removed from sight beyond the borders of the country. But his children and family, if they shun their father’s ways, shall be honored, and honorable mention shall be made of them, since they have done well and bravely in leaving the ways of vice for those of virtue. It would not be fitting for the property of any such criminal to be confiscated in a State in which the allotments must always remain the same and equal in number. Anyone judged to have committed a wrong that deserves a money fine must pay the fine imposed, so long as it falls within the surplus he has left over once his allotment has been equipped, but not anything beyond that. In such cases the Law-wardens must find out the precise facts from the registers and inform the judges of the true state of each case, so that no allotment ever falls out of cultivation for lack of money. And if anyone is judged to deserve a larger fine, then, if none of his friends are willing to stand bail for him or to club together to pay the sum and set him free, we must punish him with a long imprisonment of a public kind and with measures of degradation. But no one shall be completely outlawed for any single crime, even if he is banished from the country. The punishments to be inflicted, where such punishments are required, shall be death, imprisonment, flogging, degrading forms of sitting, standing, or exposure at temples or at the outermost boundaries of the country, or money fines of the kind we have stated. In cases where the penalty is death, the judges shall be the Law-wardens together with the court made up of last year’s magistrates selected by merit. For these cases, the younger lawgivers must attend to the indictments and summonses and all such matters, and the procedure involved, while it is our task to regulate by law the method of voting. The votes shall be cast openly. Before the vote, our judges shall be seated facing the plaintiff and the defendant, in a closely packed row in order of seniority, and all the citizens who have the leisure shall attend and listen attentively to the trials. The plaintiff shall make one speech first, and the defendant one speech second. After these speeches, the oldest judge shall begin with his examination of the case, reviewing in detail what has been said; and after the oldest, each of the other judges in turn must go through every point he has noticed in which either of the litigants has in any way left something out or made a mistake in his statement; and any judge who has no such criticism to make shall pass the task of examination on to his neighbor;

855e–856e

Athenian: and when the judges have confirmed those of the statements they have pronounced relevant, by affixing the seals of all the judges to the documents, they shall deposit them at the altar of Hestia. On the next day they shall assemble again at the same place and examine the case, make their pronouncements in the same way, and again set their seals on the statements. And after they have done this three times (paying full attention throughout to the evidence and the witnesses), each of the judges shall cast a sacred vote, promising by Hestia to judge justly and truly to the best of his ability; and in this way they shall bring this kind of trial to an end. After cases that concern religion come those that concern the overthrow of the constitution. Whoever enslaves the laws by making them subject to men, and makes the State subject to a faction, and acts illegally in doing all this by violence and in stirring up civil strife, must be regarded as the worst enemy of the whole State. And the man who takes no part in any of these doings but, while holding a share in the chief offices of the State, either fails to notice them or, though he notices them, fails out of cowardice to defend his country and punish them, must be counted a citizen second in badness. Every man who is worth anything at all shall inform the magistrates by bringing the plotter to trial on a charge of violent and illegal revolution. These cases shall have the same judges as the temple robbers had, the whole trial shall be conducted just as it was in their case, and the death penalty shall be imposed by a majority of votes. As a general rule, the disgrace or punishment of a father shall not pass on to his children, except in a case where not only the father but his father and grandfather before him have all been condemned on a capital charge. In such a case the State shall deport the children to their original country and State, while they keep their own property, except only the allotment with its full equipment. And from among the sons of those citizens who happen to have more than one son at least ten years old, ten shall be chosen by lot from those whom the father or the paternal or maternal grandfather has put forward, and the names of those chosen shall be sent to Delphi; and the one whom the oracle names shall be installed as holder of the allotment in the house of those who have departed—may it be with better fortune!

856e

Clinias: Very good. Athenian: Furthermore, a third general law shall be laid down concerning the judges to be employed and the manner of trial in cases where one man prosecutes another on a charge of treason. Likewise, regarding whether the offspring are to remain in their country or be expelled, this one law shall apply to the three cases of the traitor, the temple robber, and the man who destroys the laws of the State by violence. For the thief, too, whether he steals a large thing or a small one, a single law and a single legal penalty shall be enacted for all alike. First, if he loses his case and has enough property over and above his allotment to pay with, he must pay twice the value of the stolen article; if not, he must be imprisoned until he has either paid the sum or been let off by the prosecutor. And if a man loses a suit for theft from the State, he shall be released from prison once he has obtained pardon from the State or paid double the amount stolen.

857b

Clinias: How is it, Stranger, that we are ruling that it makes no difference to the thief whether what he steals is large or small, or whether the place it is stolen from is sacred or unconsecrated, or whatever other differences there may be in the way a theft is committed? Surely the lawgiver ought to match the punishment to the crime by imposing different penalties in these varying cases. Athenian: Well said, Clinias! You have run into me while I was charging full steam ahead, so to speak, and have woken me up. You have reminded me of something I had reflected on before: that none of the attempts at legislation made so far have ever been carried out correctly, as in fact we may infer from the case before us. What do I mean by this remark? It was no bad comparison when we compared all existing legislation to the doctoring of slaves by slaves. For we should note carefully that if one of the doctors who practice medicine by purely empirical methods, without any theory, were to come upon a freeborn doctor conversing with a freeborn patient, using arguments much as a philosopher would, tracing the illness from its origin and surveying the natural constitution of the human body, he would immediately burst into loud laughter, and the language he would use would be just what always comes ready to the tongue of most so-called doctors. “You fool,” he would say, “you are not doctoring your patient but schooling him, so to speak, as though what he needed was to be made not a healthy man but a doctor.”

857e

Clinias: And in saying so, wouldn’t he be right? Athenian: Perhaps, provided he also took the view that anyone who treats laws the way we are now doing is schooling the citizens rather than legislating. Wouldn’t he seem to be right in saying that, too? Clinias: Probably. Athenian: How fortunate we are in the conclusion we have now reached! Clinias: What conclusion? Athenian: This: that there is no need for us to legislate, but only to become students ourselves and try to discern, with regard to every constitution, how the best form might come about, and how the least elaborate form possible might. In fact, it seems we are now free to study, if we choose, the best form of legislation, or, if we choose, the least elaborate. So let us choose between these two.

858a–858c

Clinias: The choice we are proposing, Stranger, is an absurd one. We would be acting like legislators driven by some overpowering necessity to pass laws on the spot because they cannot do so tomorrow. But for us (God willing) it is quite possible to do what bricklayers do, or men beginning any other kind of construction: that is, to gather material piece by piece, from which we can select what suits the building we intend to put up, and, what is more, select it at our leisure. Let us assume, then, that we are not now building under compulsion, but are still at leisure, partly gathering material and partly putting it together, so that we may rightly say that our laws are in part already being built and in part still being gathered.

858c

Athenian: In this way, Clinias, our survey of laws will at any rate follow the course of nature more closely. Now, I beg you by the gods, let us consider the following point about legislators. Clinias: What point? Athenian: In our States we have not only the writings and written speeches of many other people, but also the writings and speeches of the lawgiver. Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Are we, then, to pay attention to the compositions of the others (the poets, and all who, with or without meter, have composed and recorded their advice about life) but pay no attention to those of the lawgivers? Or should we not pay attention to them above all others?

858d

Clinias: Yes, far above all. Athenian: But surely we do not mean that the lawgiver alone of all writers is not to give advice about what is noble, good, and just, teaching what these things are and how those who intend to be happy must practice them. Clinias: Of course he must do so.

858e

Athenian: Well then, is it more disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and the rest of the poets to lay down bad rules in their writings about life and its pursuits, and less disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and all the legislators who have put things in writing? Athenian: Or rather, isn’t it right that, of all the writings that exist in States, those concerning laws should be found, when unrolled, to be by far the finest and best, and all other writings should either follow their model or, if they disagree with them, be held in contempt? Should we think that the written laws in our States should resemble persons moved by love and wisdom, such as a father or a mother, or that they should command and threaten like some tyrant and despot, who writes his decree on the wall and is done with it? So let us now consider whether we are going to try to discuss laws with this intention, showing zeal at any rate, whether or not we turn out to be successful; and if, in following this course, we have to meet with some mishap, so be it. Yet we pray that all may go well with us, and if God wills, it shall go well.

859b

Clinias: You are right; let us do as you say. Athenian: First of all, since we have started on it, we must examine closely the law about temple robbers and about all forms of theft and wrongdoing. And we should not be troubled by the fact that, although we have enacted some points in the course of legislating, other points are still under consideration; for we are in the process of becoming lawgivers, and may perhaps become so, but we are not lawgivers yet. So if we agree to consider the matters I have mentioned in the way I have mentioned, let us consider them that way.

859c

Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: With regard to goodness and justice as a whole, let us try to discern this: how far we now agree with ourselves and how far we differ (for we would certainly say that we want, if nothing else, at least to differ from the majority of men), and also how far the majority agree or differ among themselves.

859d

Clinias: What differences of ours do you have in mind? Athenian: I will try to explain. Concerning justice in general, and just men, things, or actions, we all agree that they are all beautiful, so that no one would be thought to be saying anything wrong even if he insisted that just men, however ugly in body, are thoroughly beautiful in respect of their supremely just character.

859e

Clinias: Wouldn’t that be right? Athenian: Perhaps. But let us observe this: that if all things that belong to justice are beautiful, then for us that “all” includes what is suffered nearly as much as what is done. Clinias: Well, what of it? Athenian: Every just action, insofar as it shares in justice, partakes of beauty in practically the same degree. Clinias: Yes. Athenian: It is also agreed, if our argument is to be consistent, that a suffering that shares in justice becomes, to that extent, beautiful.

860a

Clinias: True. Athenian: But if we agree that a suffering, though just, is shameful, then justice and beauty will be at odds, since just things will be called most shameful. Clinias: What do you mean by that? Athenian: It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to command the exact opposite of what we are now saying. Clinias: What statements?

860b

Athenian: We laid it down that it is just to put to death the temple robber and the enemy of rightly enacted laws; and then, when we were about to enact a great many similar rules, we held back, because we saw that such rules involve sufferings infinite both in number and in magnitude, and that, although they are supremely just, they are also supremely shameful. So the just and the beautiful will seem to us at one moment wholly identical and at another utterly opposed, won’t they? Clinias: I am afraid so.

860c

Athenian: That is how the many come to fling the beautiful and the just apart and to speak about them inconsistently. Clinias: It certainly seems so, Stranger. Athenian: Then, Clinias, let us look again at our own view and see how consistent it is on this point. Clinias: What kind of consistency do you mean, and with respect to what? Athenian: I believe I stated expressly in our earlier discussion—or, if I did not do so before, please assume that I now assert— Clinias: What?

860d

Athenian: That all bad men are, in every respect, bad against their will; and since this is so, our next statement must agree with it. Clinias: What statement do you mean? Athenian: This: that the unjust man is indeed bad, but the bad man is bad against his will. But it makes no sense to suppose that a voluntary act is done involuntarily; so, in the view of anyone who holds that injustice is involuntary, the man who commits an unjust act does so against his will. And I too must now accept this conclusion, for I agree that all men do unjust acts against their will. Since I hold this view, and do not share the opinion of those who, out of contentiousness or arrogance, assert that while some men are unjust against their will, there are also many who are unjust willingly, how am I to be consistent with my own statements? Suppose you two, Megillus and Clinias, put this question to me: “If this is how things stand, Stranger, what advice do you give us about legislating for the Magnesian State? Shall we legislate or not?” “Legislate by all means,” I shall reply.

860e–861a

Athenian: “Will you, then, distinguish between voluntary and involuntary wrongs, and are we to enact heavier penalties for the offenses and wrongs that are voluntary and lighter ones for the others? Or shall we enact equal penalties for all, on the view that there is no such thing as a voluntary act of injustice?”

861a

Clinias: What you say is quite right, Stranger. So what use are we to make of the arguments we are now presenting? Athenian: A very proper question! The first use we shall make of them is this— Clinias: What? Athenian: Let us recall how, a moment ago, we rightly said that on the subject of justice we are suffering from the greatest confusion and inconsistency. Keeping this fact in mind, let us question ourselves again. We are perplexed about these matters: we have neither cleared up our perplexity nor defined the point of difference between those two kinds of wrongdoing, the voluntary and the involuntary, which every legislator who has ever appeared treats as legally distinct in every State. Given this, is the statement we made just now to stand like a divine oracle, as a mere ex cathedra pronouncement unsupported by any proof, and to serve as a kind of master enactment? That is impossible. Before we legislate, we are bound first to make it clear somehow that these wrongs are of two kinds, and in what their difference consists, so that when we impose the penalty on either kind, everyone may follow our rules and be able to form some judgment about whether our enactments are suitable or not.

861c–861d

Clinias: What you say, Stranger, seems excellent to us. We ought to do one of two things: either not assert that all unjust acts are involuntary, or else first make our distinctions and then prove that this assertion is correct.

861d

Athenian: Of these alternatives, the first, not asserting what I hold to be the truth, is quite intolerable to me, for that would be neither lawful nor pious. But as for the question of how such acts are of two kinds: if the difference does not lie in the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary, then we must try to explain it by some other distinction. Clinias: Well, certainly, Stranger, there is no other plan we can possibly adopt on this matter.

861e

Athenian: So it shall be. Come now: in the dealings and interactions of citizens with one another, injuries committed by one against another happen often, and there is plenty of the voluntary as well as of the involuntary in them. Clinias: Of course! Athenian: No one should classify all injuries as acts of injustice and then regard the unjust acts involved as being of two kinds in the way described, namely, partly voluntary and partly involuntary (for the involuntary injuries, taken all together, are no fewer and no smaller than the voluntary ones). Instead, consider whether what I am about to say makes sense or is complete nonsense. What I assert, Megillus and Clinias, is not that if one man harms another involuntarily and without wishing to, he acts unjustly, though involuntarily. Nor shall I legislate in that way, declaring this to be an involuntary act of injustice. Rather, I shall declare that such an injury is not an injustice at all, whether the injury is greater or smaller. And if my view prevails, we shall often say that a man who confers a benefit in the wrong way commits an injustice. For as a rule, my friends, neither when a man gives some material object to another, nor when he takes it away, should one call such an act simply just or unjust. What matters is whether a man of just character and disposition benefits or injures another; that is what the lawgiver must look at. He must consider these two things, injustice and injury. The injury inflicted he must make good by legal means as far as possible: he must preserve what is lost, restore what has been knocked down, and make whole what has been wounded or killed. And when the various injuries have been atoned for by compensation, he must always try, by means of the laws, to bring those who have inflicted them and those who have suffered them from a state of discord into a state of friendship.

862c

Clinias: He will be right to do that. Athenian: As for unjust injuries and gains (as when one man causes another to gain by acting unjustly toward him), all such cases as are curable we must cure, regarding them as diseases of the soul. And we should declare that our cure for injustice points in this direction— Clinias: What direction?

862d–862e

Athenian: In this: that whenever anyone commits an unjust act, great or small, the law shall instruct him and absolutely compel him, in addition to paying for the injury, either never again to dare to do such a deed willingly or else to do it very much less often. To achieve this, whether by action or by speech, by means of pleasures and pains, honors and dishonors, money fines and money gifts, and in general by whatever means one can use to make men hate injustice and love justice (or at any rate not hate it)—this is precisely the task of the noblest laws. But for all those whom the lawgiver perceives to be incurable in these respects, what penalty and what law shall he enact?

862e–863a

Athenian: The lawgiver will recognize that in all such cases it is not only better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but that they will also be of double benefit to others by departing from life, since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly and rid the State of wicked men. So in cases of this kind, and of this kind only, he will necessarily impose death as the punishment for their sins.

863a

Clinias: What you have said seems very reasonable; but we would be glad to hear a still clearer explanation of the difference between injury and injustice, and of how the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary applies in these cases. Athenian: I must try to do as you ask and explain the matter. No doubt, when you talk with one another, you say and hear at least this much about the soul: that one element in its nature (whether it is an affection or a part) is passion, an inborn quality of a contentious and combative kind, which overturns many things by its irrational force.

863b

Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Moreover, we distinguish pleasure from passion, and we say that its mastering power is of the opposite kind, since it accomplishes whatever its will desires by a mixture of persuasion and deceit. Clinias: Exactly.

863c–863d

Athenian: Nor would it be untrue to say that the third cause of sins is ignorance. The lawgiver, however, would do well to divide this cause into two. Ignorance in its simple form he should count as the cause of minor sins. Its double form arises when a man’s folly comes from being gripped not only by ignorance but also by a conceit of wisdom, as though he had full knowledge of things he knows nothing at all about. When this is joined with strength and might, he should count it as the cause of great and brutal sins; when it is joined with weakness, as the cause of the sins of children and old men. These last he will count as sins, and he will enact laws for those who commit them as for sinners, but laws that will be the mildest and most merciful of all.

863d

Clinias: That is reasonable. Athenian: And practically everyone speaks of one man as being superior, and another as inferior, to pleasure or to passion; and so they are. Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: But we have never heard anyone say that one man is superior, and another inferior, to ignorance.

863e

Clinias: Quite true. Athenian: And we say that all these things often drive each man to go against the actual bent of his own inclination. Clinias: Very often. Athenian: Now I will define for you, clearly and without complication, what I mean by justice and injustice. The domination of passion, fear, pleasure, pain, envies, and desires in the soul, whether or not it does any injury, I call injustice in every case. But as for the belief in the highest good, in whatever way either States or individuals think they can attain it: if this prevails in their souls and governs every man, then even if some harm is done, we must say that everything done in this way is just, and that the part of each man that is subject to this rule is also just and best for the whole life of mankind, although most people suppose that such harm is an involuntary injustice. But we are not concerned now with a dispute over words. Since, however, it has been shown that there are three kinds of sin, we must first recall these to mind still more clearly. One kind, as we know, is painful, and this we call passion and fear.

864b

Clinias: Quite so. Athenian: The second kind consists of pleasure and desires; the third, which is a distinct kind, consists of hopes and untrue belief about the attainment of the highest good. And when this last kind is divided into three, five classes result, as we now say; and for these five classes we must enact distinct laws of two main types.

864c

Clinias: What are they? Athenian: One type concerns acts done in each case by violent and open means; the other, acts done secretly under cover of darkness and deceit, or sometimes acts done in both these ways. For acts of this last kind the laws will be most severe, if they are to be adequate. Clinias: Naturally. Athenian: Let us next go back to the point from which we digressed, and continue enacting our laws. We had, I believe, laid down the laws dealing with those who rob the gods and with traitors, and also with those who destroy the laws with the intent of overthrowing the existing constitution. A man might commit an act of this kind while insane, or while suffering from some disease or from extreme old age, or in a state of childishness that makes him no better than a madman. If any case of this kind is ever brought to the attention of the selected judges, either on the information of the person who did the act or of someone pleading on his behalf, and if it is judged that he was in this state of madness when he broke the law, then he shall certainly pay for the damage he has done, but only the exact amount, and he shall be cleared of the other charges—unless he has killed a man and has not cleansed his hands of the blood. In that case he shall go away to another country and place and live there in exile for a year; and if he returns before the time fixed by the law, or sets foot anywhere at all in his own country, the Law-wardens shall put him in the public jail for two years, and he shall not be released from jail until after that time.

865a–865e

Athenian: Now that we have made a beginning, we need not hesitate to enact laws on similar lines about every class of homicide. First we shall deal with the cases that are violent and involuntary. If a man unintentionally kills a friend in a contest or in public games, whether death is immediate or follows later from the wounds; or similarly, if he kills him in war or in some military training exercise, whether practicing javelin work without armor or engaged in some warlike maneuver in heavy armor, then once he has been purified as the Delphic rule on this matter directs, he shall be regarded as pure. So too with all doctors: if a patient dies against the will of his doctor, the doctor shall be regarded as legally pure. And if one man kills another with his own hand, but involuntarily—whether with his own unarmed body, or with a tool or a weapon, or by giving a drink or solid food, or by applying fire or cold, or by depriving him of air, and whether he does it himself with his own body or by means of other bodies—in all cases it shall be regarded as his own personal act, and he shall pay the following penalties. If he kills a slave, he shall protect the master from damage and loss, treating the matter as though it were a slave of his own that had been destroyed; or else he shall be liable to a penalty of double the value of the dead man, and the judges shall assess that value. He must also use purifications greater and more numerous than those used by persons who kill a man at the games, and the interpreters whom the oracle names shall be in charge of these rites. But if it is a slave of his own that he has killed, he shall be cleared after the legal purification. And if anyone kills a free man involuntarily, he shall undergo the same purifications as the man who has killed a slave; and there is an ancient tale, told long ago, which he must not fail to heed. The tale is this: that the man slain by violence, who has lived with a free and proud spirit, is angry with his slayer when newly slain; and being filled also with fear and horror on account of his own violent end, he is horror-stricken when he sees his murderer going about in the very places he himself used to frequent; and being disturbed himself, he takes conscience as his ally and with all his might disturbs his slayer, both the man himself and his doings. That is why it is right for the slayer to withdraw before his victim for a full year, through all its seasons, and to vacate all the places he owned in every part of his native land;

865e–866e

Athenian: and if the dead man is a Stranger, the slayer shall also be barred from the Stranger’s country for the same period. If a man willingly obeys this law, the nearest relative of the dead man, who oversees the performance of all these rules, shall pardon him and live at peace with him, and in doing so he will be acting with perfect propriety. But if a man disobeys, and first of all dares to approach the altars and offer sacrifice while still unpurified, and further refuses to complete the appointed periods of exile, then the nearest relative of the dead man shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and if he is convicted, all the penalties shall be doubled. And if the nearest relative fails to prosecute for the crime, it shall be as though the pollution had passed over to him, since the victim is demanding atonement for his fate; anyone who wishes shall bring a charge against him and compel him by law to leave his country for five years. And if a Stranger involuntarily kills a Stranger who is living in the State, anyone who wishes shall prosecute him under the same laws. If he is a resident alien, he shall be exiled for a year; while if he is altogether a Stranger, then, whether the man slain is a Stranger, a resident alien, or a citizen, in addition to the purifications imposed, he shall be barred for life from the country that ordains these laws. If he breaks the law and comes back to it, the Law-wardens shall punish him with death, and if he has any property, they shall hand it over to the nearest relative of the victim. And if he comes back unwillingly, then if he is shipwrecked off the coast of the country, he shall camp with his feet in the sea and watch for a ship to take him away; or if he is brought in forcibly by some people over land, the first magistrate of the State who comes across him shall release him and send him out over the border unharmed. If a person kills a free man with his own hand, and the deed is done in passion, we must begin in a case of this kind by distinguishing two varieties of the crime. For murder is committed in passion by those who suddenly, and without intending to kill, destroy a man by blows or some such means in an immediate attack, when the deed is at once followed by remorse; and it is also murder done in passion whenever men who have been insulted by shameful words or actions seek revenge, and end by killing a man with the deliberate intent to kill, and feel no remorse for the deed.

866e–867c

Athenian: It seems we must lay it down that these murders are of two kinds, both generally done in passion, and most properly described as lying midway between the voluntary and the involuntary. Nevertheless, each kind tends to resemble one or the other of these opposites. The man who nurses his passion and takes revenge, not suddenly on the spur of the moment but after some time has passed and with deliberate intent, resembles the voluntary murderer; whereas the man who does not hoard his rage but gives way to it at once, on the spur of the moment and without deliberate intent, is like the involuntary murderer. Yet even he is not wholly involuntary; he only bears a resemblance to the involuntary. So murders done in passion are hard to define, as regards whether one should treat them in law as voluntary or involuntary. The best and truest way is to classify both as resemblances, to distinguish them by the mark of deliberate intent or its absence, and to impose more severe penalties on those who kill with intent and in anger, and milder penalties on those who do so without intent and suddenly. For what resembles a greater evil must be punished more heavily, and what resembles a lesser evil more lightly. So our laws, too, must do likewise.

867c

Clinias: They must, most certainly. Athenian: Returning, then, to our task, let us make this pronouncement: If a man kills a free man with his own hand, and the deed is done in anger without deliberate intent, he shall suffer the other penalties that are appropriate for a man who has killed without passion, and he shall be compelled to go into exile for two years, and in this way chastise his own passion. And the man who kills in passion and with deliberate intent shall be treated in other respects like the former, but shall be exiled for three years instead of the other’s two, receiving a longer period of punishment because of the greatness of his passion. As for the return home in such cases, it shall be as follows. (It is a difficult matter to legislate for precisely; for sometimes, of the two murderers, the one the law treats as more dangerous may prove the gentler, and the gentler one the more dangerous, and the latter may have committed the murder more savagely and the former more gently; although as a rule things turn out the way we have stated. So the Law-wardens must act as supervisors in all these matters.) When the period of exile in each case has ended, the Law-wardens must send twelve of their number to the borders of the country to act as judges, after they have made a still closer investigation in the meantime into the conduct of the exiles;

867e–868e

Athenian: and these men shall also act as judges on the question of granting them pardon and readmitting them; and the exiles must abide by the verdicts of these magistrates. And if either of them, after his return, again gives way to rage and commits the same act, he shall be exiled and never return again; and if he does return, he shall suffer the same fate as the Stranger who returns. Whoever kills a slave of his own shall purify himself; and if he kills another man’s slave in rage, he shall pay the owner twice the damage. And if any of these kinds of killers disobeys the law and, while unpurified, defiles the market, the games, and the other sacred gatherings, anyone who wishes shall prosecute both the member of the dead man’s family who permits this and the killer himself, and shall compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, double the amount of the money fines and of the other penalties; and the prosecutor shall keep the sum so paid for himself, as the law directs. If a slave kills his own master in rage, the relatives of the dead man may treat the killer however they please—except that they must not in any way let him live—and they shall be held guiltless. And if a slave kills a free man other than his master in rage, the slave’s masters shall hand him over to the relatives of the dead man, and they shall be required to put the criminal to death, in whatever manner they choose. If in a fit of rage a father or mother kills a son or daughter by blows or some other kind of violence (something that happens rarely, but does sometimes happen), the killer must undergo the same purifications as the other killers and be exiled for three years. When the killers have returned, the wife must be separated from the husband and the husband from the wife, and they must never again have a child together; nor shall they ever share a home with those whom the killer has robbed of a child or a brother, nor take part in their worship. Anyone who is disobedient and impious in this matter shall be liable to a charge of impiety brought by anyone who wishes. And if a husband in a fit of rage kills his wedded wife, or a wife does the same to her husband, they must undergo the same purifications and remain in exile for three years. And when one who has committed such a crime returns, he shall never take part in worship with his children or sit at table with them; and if either the parent or the child disobeys, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety brought by anyone who wishes.

868e–869e

Athenian: And if in rage a brother kills a brother or a sister, or a sister kills a brother or a sister, let it be declared that they must undergo the same purifications and banishment as have been prescribed for parents and children: namely, that the killer shall never share a home or worship with those brothers or parents whom he has robbed of brothers or of children. And if anyone disobeys, he will rightly and justly be liable under the law laid down concerning such cases of impiety. If any man falls into such an uncontrollable rage against his parents that he actually dares to kill one of them in the madness of his rage, then, if the dead person, before dying, voluntarily releases the culprit from the charge of murder, he shall be held pure once he has purified himself in the same way as those who have committed an involuntary homicide and has done as they do in all other respects. But if the dead person does not release him in this way, then whoever has done such a deed is liable under many laws: he will be liable to the heaviest penalties for outrage, and likewise for impiety and temple robbery, since he has robbed his parent of life. So if it were possible for one man to die a hundred deaths, it would be a most just fate for a parricide or a matricide who committed the deed in rage to suffer a hundred deaths. For every law will forbid a man to kill his father or mother, the very authors of his existence, even to save his own life, and will require that he suffer and endure anything rather than commit such an act. In what other way, then, can such a man be fittingly dealt with by law and receive what he deserves? Let it be enacted, therefore, that for the man who in rage kills his father or mother, the penalty is death. If a brother kills a brother in a fight during a civil war, or in some similar way, acting in self-defense against the other, who started the fight, he shall be regarded as one who has killed an enemy and shall be held guiltless; so too when a citizen kills a citizen in the same way, or a Stranger a Stranger. And if a citizen kills a Stranger in self-defense, or a Stranger a citizen, he shall be regarded as pure in the same way. So also if a slave kills a slave; but if a slave kills a free man in self-defense, he shall be liable to the same laws as one who kills his father. And what has been said about releasing a man from the charge in the case of the murder of a father shall hold equally good in all such cases: if anyone voluntarily releases any culprit from this charge, the purifications for the culprit shall be performed as though the homicide were involuntary, and one year of exile shall be imposed by law. Let this be taken as an adequate statement about homicides that involve violence and are involuntary and done in passion. After these, we must state the regulations concerning such acts when they are voluntary, involve iniquity of every kind, and are premeditated—acts caused by giving in to pleasure, desire, or envy.

869e

Clinias: You are right. Athenian: First, let us once more state, as best we can, how many these causes are likely to be. The greatest is desire, which masters a soul made savage by cravings. It arises especially in connection with the object for which the most frequent and intense longing afflicts the majority of people: the power that wealth has over them, owing to their bad nature and lack of culture, to breed in them countless cravings for its insatiable and endless acquisition. And the cause of this lack of culture lies in the false praise of wealth in the common talk of both Greeks and barbarians; for by exalting it as the first of goods, when it should come only third, they ruin both their descendants and themselves. The noblest and best course of all, in every State, is to state the truth about wealth: namely, that it exists for the sake of the body, and the body for the sake of the soul, so that, while the things for which it naturally exists are goods, wealth itself will come third, after excellence of body and of soul. So this statement will serve as an instructor, teaching that the man who intends to be happy must seek not to be wealthy, but to be wealthy in a just and self-controlled way; and if this were so, no murders requiring purification by murders would occur in States. But as things now stand, this love of riches is, as we said when we began this subject, one cause, and a very great one, that produces the most serious trials for willful murder. A second cause is the disposition of the ambitious soul, which breeds envies that are dangerous companions, first for the man who feels the envy himself, and then also for the best citizens in the State. Third, fears bred of cowardice and iniquity have caused many murders, in cases where men are doing or have done things they want no one to share the secret of; so if there are any who might reveal their secret, they get rid of them by death whenever they cannot do so by any other means. Concerning all these matters, let the preludes mentioned be pronounced; and, in addition to them, the story that many believe when they hear it from those who seriously relate such things at their mystic rites: that vengeance for such acts is exacted in Hades, and that those who come back to this earth are bound to pay the natural penalty—each culprit, that is, the same penalty he inflicted on his victim—and to end their life on earth by meeting a similar fate at the hands of another.

870e–871e

Athenian: For the man who obeys and fully dreads such a penalty, there is no need to add the law on the subject to the prelude; but for the disobedient, let this law be stated in the written code: Whoever, with deliberate intent and unjustly, kills any of his fellow tribesmen with his own hand shall, in the first place, be barred from the lawful gatherings, and shall not defile temples, market, harbors, or any other place of assembly, whether or not anyone warns the doer of such deeds away; for the law warns him away, and it does so, and always will continue to do so, publicly on behalf of the whole State. And any relative of the dead man, on either the male or the female side, no more distant than a cousin, who fails to prosecute him when he ought to, or fails to warn him that he is barred in this way, shall, first, take upon himself the pollution and the anger of the gods, since the curse of the law brings upon him the curse of the divine voice as well; and, second, he shall be liable to prosecution by anyone who wishes to punish him on behalf of the dead man. And whoever wishes to punish him shall duly perform everything concerning the observance of the purifications proper for these cases, and whatever else the god prescribes as lawful in them, and he shall recite the proclamation of warning; and then he shall go and compel the culprit to submit to the execution of the penalty according to law. It is easy for the lawgiver to show that these proceedings must be accompanied by certain prayers and sacrifices to those gods whose concern it is that murders should not occur in States. Who these gods are, and what method of bringing such prosecutions would be most correct in point of ritual, the Law-wardens shall ordain together with the interpreters and seers and the god; and so they shall bring these prosecutions. And the judges in these cases shall be the same persons who, as we described, form the court of final decision for temple robbers. Whoever is convicted shall be punished with death, and he shall not be buried in the victim’s country, because of the shamelessness as well as the impiety of his act. If the culprit flees and refuses to stand trial, he shall be exiled forever; and if any such person sets foot in the murdered man’s country, whichever of the dead man’s relatives or of the citizens first comes across him shall kill him with impunity, or else bind him and hand him over to the magistrates who judged the case, to be put to death. The prosecutor in a murder charge must at once demand bail from the defendant, and the defendant shall provide three substantial sureties, approved by the court of judges for such cases, who guarantee to produce him at the trial; and if a man is unwilling or unable to provide these sureties, the court must take him, bind him, and keep him in custody, and produce him at the trial of the case.

872a–872e

Athenian: If a man does not kill another with his own hand, but plots his death, and after killing him by design and plotting goes on living in the State, being responsible for the murder and not innocent or pure of heart in respect of it, then the prosecutions on this charge shall proceed in the same way in his case, except in the matter of bail. The convicted person shall be allowed burial in his own country, but everything else shall be carried out in his case in the same way as in the case just described. And these same regulations shall govern all cases where Strangers go to law with Strangers, or citizens and Strangers with each other, or slaves with slaves, concerning both actual murder and plotting to murder, except as regards bail. As to bail, just as it has been said that those who kill with their own hand must provide guarantors, so these persons too must provide security to the person who proclaims the murder. If a slave willfully kills a free man, either with his own hand or by plotting, and is convicted at the trial, the public executioner of the State shall drag him toward the tomb of the dead man, to a spot from which he can see the tomb, and there flog him with as many lashes as the prosecutor prescribes; and if the murderer is still alive after the beating, the executioner shall put him to death. And if anyone kills a slave who has done nothing wrong, out of fear that the slave might expose his own foul and evil deeds, or for some other such reason, he shall be liable for the death of such a slave in the same way that he would have been liable to a charge of murder for killing a citizen. Suppose cases occur for which it is a terrible and most unwelcome task to legislate, and yet impossible not to legislate: murders of kinsfolk, whether by a man’s own hand or by plotting, that are wholly willful and wicked—crimes that occur mostly in States where government and upbringing are bad, but may occasionally occur even in a country where one would not expect them. In such cases we must again recite the story we told a moment ago, in the hope that someone who hears us may, as a result, become more inclined to abstain voluntarily from murders of the most impious kind. The myth or story (or whatever one should call it) has been clearly handed down from ancient priests: that Justice, the avenger of kindred blood, acting as overseer, employs the law just mentioned and has ordained that whoever does such a deed must necessarily suffer the same thing he has done. If a man has ever killed his father, he must in time to come endure suffering the same violent fate at the hands of his own children; or if he has killed his mother, he must necessarily be born sharing in the female nature, and once born, be deprived of life at the hands of his offspring in later days;

872e–873e

Athenian: for there is no other purification for the pollution of shared blood, and the stain of pollution cannot be washed away until the soul that committed the act pays back murder for murder, like for like, and by this atonement lays to rest the anger of the whole family. So a man should restrain himself out of dread of such vengeance from Heaven. If, however, any should be overtaken by a misfortune so wretched that they have the audacity, deliberately and of their own free will, to tear the soul from the body of a father, mother, brothers, or children, then in such cases the ordinance of the law of the mortal lawgiver stands as follows: The warnings of exclusion from customary places, and the sureties, shall be the same as those prescribed for the earlier cases. And if anyone is convicted of such a murder, that is, of having killed any of the persons named, the officers of the judges and the magistrates shall kill him and cast him out naked at an appointed crossroads outside the city; and all the magistrates, acting on behalf of the whole State, shall each take a stone and throw it at the head of the corpse, and so make atonement for the whole State; and after this they shall carry the corpse to the borders of the land and cast it out unburied, according to law. Now what penalty should a man suffer who kills the one who is, as people say, nearest and dearest of all? I mean the man who kills himself, violently robbing himself of his share of life ordained by Fate, when this is not legally ordered by the State, and when he is not compelled to it by being struck by some intolerable and inescapable misfortune, nor by falling into some disgrace that is beyond remedy or endurance, but who simply imposes this unjust penalty on himself out of sloth and unmanly cowardice. In this case, the remaining matters, concerning the rules for rites of purification and burial, fall within the knowledge of the god, and on these the nearest relatives must seek information from the interpreters and from the laws dealing with these matters, and act in accordance with their instructions. But for those who have perished in this way, the tombs shall, first, be set apart, with not even one grave beside them; and, second, they shall be buried in those border areas of the twelve districts that are barren and nameless, without honor, with neither headstone nor name to mark the tombs. If a mule or any other animal kills anyone—except when it does so while taking part in a public competition—the relatives shall prosecute the killer for murder, and such land-stewards, and as many of them, as the relatives appoint shall decide the case; and the convicted beast they shall kill and cast out beyond the borders of the country.

873e–874e

Athenian: If a lifeless thing deprives a man of life—unless it is lightning or some other bolt from heaven—if it is anything other than these that kills someone, either by his falling against it or by its falling on him, then the relative shall appoint the nearest neighbor to pass judgment on it, and so make atonement on behalf of himself and his whole family; and the thing convicted they shall cast beyond the borders, as was stated in the case of animals. If anyone is found clearly dead, and his killer is unknown and cannot be discovered after a careful search, the warnings shall be the same as in the other cases, including the warning of death to the doer of the deed; and the prosecutor, once he has proved his claim, shall give public warning in the marketplace to the killer of So-and-so, convicted of murder, not to set foot in holy places or anywhere in the victim’s country, since, if he appears and is recognized, he shall be put to death and cast out of the victim’s country without burial. Let this stand, then, as one section of our code of law dealing with murder. So far we have dealt with crimes of the kind described; in what follows we shall describe the cases and circumstances in which the killer will rightly be declared guiltless. If a man catches and kills a thief who is entering his house at night to steal goods, he shall be guiltless; and if a man kills a street robber in self-defense, he shall be guiltless. Whoever rapes a free woman or boy may be killed with impunity by the person so violently outraged, or by that person’s father, brothers, or sons. And if a man discovers his wedded wife being raped and kills the rapist, he shall be guiltless before the law. And if a man kills anyone while warding off death from his father (when the father is doing no wrong), or from his mother, children, brothers, or the mother of his children, he shall be wholly guiltless. Let this be laid down by law, then, concerning the nurture and training of living souls—training which, when gained, makes life livable, and when missed, unlivable—and concerning the punishments that ought to be imposed in cases of violent death. The regulations regarding the nurture and training of the body have been stated; but what comes next, namely acts of violence, both voluntary and involuntary, done by one person to another, we must define as clearly as we can, stating their character and number and what punishment each duly deserves. Such enactments, it seems, will rightly follow those that came before. Next after cases of death, even the least competent of those who attempt legislation would place cases of wounds and maiming. Wounds, just like murders, must be classified under several heads: the involuntary, those done in passion, those done in fear, and all those that are voluntary and deliberate.

874e–875e

Athenian: Concerning all such cases we must make a preliminary pronouncement to this effect: It is truly necessary for men to make laws for themselves and to live according to laws; otherwise they will differ in no way from the most savage of beasts. The reason for this is that no man’s nature is naturally capable both of perceiving what benefits the civic life of human beings and, having perceived it, of being both able and willing to put the best into practice. For, in the first place, it is difficult to perceive that a true political art must necessarily care for the public interest, not the private (for the public interest binds States together, while the private interest tears them apart), and to perceive also that it benefits both the public and the private interest alike when the public interest, rather than the private, is well established. And, second, even if a man fully grasps the truth of this as a principle of the art, should he afterward gain control of the State and become an unaccountable autocrat, he would never be able to abide by this view and go on always fostering the public interest in the State as the thing of first importance, with the private interest following as secondary. Instead, his mortal nature will always drive him toward greed and self-interested action, irrationally avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure; it will put both these ahead of justice and goodness, and by creating darkness within itself it will fill both itself and the whole State to the utmost with every kind of evil. Yet if a man should ever arise who was competent by nature, and by a birthright of divine grace, to take on such an office, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for no law or ordinance is more powerful than Knowledge, nor is it right for Reason to be subject or enslaved to anything; it should be master of all things, if it is truly genuine and really free by nature. But as it is, such a nature exists nowhere at all, except to a small degree; so we must choose what is second best, namely ordinance and law, which see and discern the general principle but are unable to see every instance in detail. This declaration has been made for the sake of what follows. Now we shall ordain what a man who has wounded another, or injured him in some way, must suffer or pay. And here, of course, anyone may interrupt us on any case, and quite properly, with the question, “What wounds has the man you speak of inflicted, and on whom, and how, and when?” For cases of wounding are countless in their variety and differ enormously from one another. So it is impossible for us either to entrust all these cases to the law courts for trial or to entrust none of them.

875e–876a

Athenian: Yet in all of them there is one point that we must necessarily entrust to the courts for decision: the question of fact, whether or not each of the alleged acts took place. And it is practically impossible for the lawgiver to refuse in every case to entrust to the courts the question of what penalty or fine the culprit should suffer or pay, and to legislate himself on all such cases, great and small.

876a

Clinias: What, then, is our next statement to be? Athenian: This: that some matters are to be entrusted to the courts, while others are not to be entrusted to them but enacted by the lawgiver. Clinias: Which matters are to be enacted, and which are to be handed over to the law courts for decision? Athenian: The best thing will be to say the following next. In a State where the courts are worthless and voiceless, and decide their cases in secret, concealing their own opinions, or (what is still more dangerous) where they make their decisions not in silence but full of uproar, like theaters, roaring out praise or blame of each speaker in turn—then, as a rule, the whole State faces a grave situation. To be compelled by some necessity to legislate for law courts of this kind is no happy task; but when one is so compelled, one must entrust to them the right to fix penalties in only a very few cases, and deal with most cases oneself by express legislation, if indeed one ever legislates at all for a State of that description. On the other hand, in a State where the courts are as well constituted as possible, and those who are to be judges are well trained and very strictly tested, there it is right, and most fitting and proper, to entrust to such judges the decision of most questions about what penalties convicted criminals should suffer or pay. On the present occasion we may well be pardoned if we refrain from laying down by law for them the most important and most numerous points, which even poorly educated judges could discern, assigning to each offense the penalty merited by the wrong as suffered and as committed. And since we suppose that the people for whom we are legislating are likely to become by no means the least capable judges of such matters, we must entrust most of them to them. Nevertheless, the course we frequently adopted, in both word and deed, when laying down our earlier laws—stating an outline and typical cases of punishment, and giving the judges examples, so that they would never overstep the bounds of justice—was a perfectly right course then, and we ought to adopt it now as well, as we return at last to the task of legislation.

876e–877e

Athenian: So let our written law concerning wounding run as follows: If anyone, deliberately intending to kill a person who is friendly (other than one against whom the law sends him), wounds him but is unable to kill him, the man who has so intended and inflicted the wound does not deserve pity; rather, he is to be regarded exactly as a killer and must be compelled to stand trial for murder. Yet out of respect for his escape from sheer misfortune, and for his guardian spirit, which in pity both for him and for the wounded man kept the wound of the one from proving fatal and the fortune and crime of the other from proving accursed—in gratitude to this spirit, and in compliance with it, the wounder shall be spared the death penalty, but shall be deported for life to a neighboring State, while enjoying the income of all his own possessions. If he has done damage to the wounded man, he shall pay for it in full to the injured party; the damage shall be assessed by the court that decides the case, and that court shall consist of those who would have tried the culprit for murder if the man had died of the wound he received. If, in the same way, a son deliberately wounds his parents or a slave his master, the penalty shall be death; and if a brother similarly wounds a brother or sister, or a sister wounds a brother or sister, and is convicted of deliberate wounding, the penalty shall be death. A wife who has wounded her husband, or a husband his wife, with intent to kill, shall be exiled for life. If they have sons or daughters who are still children, the guardians shall manage their property and take charge of the children as orphans; but if the children are already grown men, they shall be compelled to support their exiled parent, and they shall possess his property. If anyone overtaken by such a calamity is childless, the relatives of the exile on both sides, male and female, as far as cousins’ children, shall meet and appoint an heir for the house in question, the 5040th in the State, in consultation with the Law-wardens and priests. And they shall keep in mind this principle: that no house of the 5040 belongs, by either private or public right, so much to its occupant or to his whole family as it belongs to the State; and the State must keep its own houses as holy and happy as possible.

877e–878e

Athenian: So whenever a house is both unfortunate and unholy, in that its owner leaves no children but dies, whether unmarried or married but childless, after being convicted of willful murder or of some other offense against gods or citizens for which death is the penalty expressly laid down in the law; or if any man without male offspring is exiled for life; then, in the first place, they shall be obliged to perform purifications and expiations for this house; and next, the relatives, as we said just now, must meet and, in consultation with the Law-wardens, consider which family in the State is preeminent for goodness, prosperous as well, and has several children. From the family selected they shall adopt one child as a son for the dead man’s father and ancestors, and name him after one of them for the sake of the omen, with a prayer that in this way he may become for them a father of offspring, a keeper of the hearth, and a minister of holy and sacred things, and be blessed with better fortune than his (official) father. They shall establish him legally as holder of the allotment in this way, and the offender they shall leave nameless, childless, and without a share, whenever such calamities overtake him. It is not the case, it seems, that with all things one boundary directly adjoins another; where there is a neutral strip lying between the two boundaries and touching each, it will be midway between both. And that is exactly how we described action done in passion: as lying midway between involuntary and voluntary actions. So let the law concerning wounds inflicted in anger stand as follows: If a person is convicted, in the first place he shall pay double the damage if the wound proves curable, and four times the damage for incurable wounds. And if the wound is curable but causes great shame and disgrace to the wounded person, the culprit shall pay three times the damage. And whenever a person, in wounding someone, damages not only the victim but also the State, by making him incapable of helping his country against its enemies, such a person shall, in addition to the other damages, pay for the damage done to the State as well: besides his own military service, he shall also serve as a substitute for the disabled man and carry out the military duties in his place; or if he fails to do so, he shall be liable by law to prosecution for evading military service by anyone who wishes. The proper proportion of the damages payable, whether two, three, or four times the actual amount, shall be fixed by the judges who voted on the case. If a kinsman wounds a kinsman in the same way as the person just mentioned, the members of his clan and his relatives, both men and women, as far as cousins’ children on both the male and the female side, shall meet and, after reaching a decision, shall hand the case over to the natural parents to assess the damages; if the assessment is disputed, the relatives on the male side shall have authority to make a binding assessment; and if they themselves are unable to do so, they shall finally refer the matter to the Law-wardens.

878e–879e

Athenian: When wounds of this kind are inflicted by children on their parents, the judges must be men over sixty years of age who have real, not merely adopted, children of their own; and if a person is convicted, they shall assess the penalty: whether such a person should be put to death, or suffer some other punishment still more severe, or perhaps one a little less severe. But none of the culprit’s relatives shall act as judge, not even if he is of the full age stated in the law. If a slave wounds a free man in rage, his owner shall hand the slave over to the wounded man to treat however he pleases; and if he does not hand the slave over, he shall make good the damage in full himself. And if anyone alleges that the deed was a trick concocted by the slave in collusion with the wounded party, he shall contest the case; if he fails to win, he shall pay three times the damage, but if he wins, he shall hold the man who devised the trick with the slave liable for kidnapping. Whoever wounds another involuntarily shall pay simple damages for the harm (since no lawgiver can control fortune), and the judges shall be those designated for cases of children wounding parents; and they shall assess the proper amount of damages. All the cases we have now dealt with involve suffering caused by violence, and the whole class of cases of outrage involves violence. Regarding such cases, everyone—man, woman, and child—should hold this view: that the older is greatly more revered than the younger, both among the gods and among people who intend to live safely and happily. An outrage committed by a younger person against an older one is a shameful thing to see happening in a State, and a thing hateful to God; when a young man is beaten by an old man, it is fitting in every case that he should quietly bear the old man’s anger, and so store up honor for his own old age. Therefore let the law stand as follows: Everyone shall show reverence to his elders in both deed and word. Anyone, man or woman, who is twenty years older than himself he shall regard as a father or mother and keep his hands off that person; and he shall always refrain, for the sake of the gods of birth, from laying hands on anyone of the generation old enough to have borne or fathered him. So likewise he shall keep his hands off a Stranger, whether long resident or newly arrived; he shall never venture to correct such a person with blows, either as aggressor or in self-defense. If he believes that a Stranger has shown insolent audacity in beating him and needs correction, he shall seize the man and take him before the board of city-stewards, but refrain from beating him, so that the Stranger may be far from ever daring to strike a native. And the city-stewards shall take charge of the Stranger and examine him, with due respect for the God of Strangers; and if he really appears to have beaten the native unjustly, they shall give the Stranger as many lashes of the whip as he himself inflicted, and put a stop to his foreign insolence; but if he has not acted unjustly, they shall threaten and rebuke the man who arrested him, and dismiss them both.

879e–880e

Athenian: If a man beats someone of his own age, or someone older than himself who is childless—whether it is an old man beating an old man or a young man beating a young man—the man attacked shall defend himself with his bare hands, as nature dictates, and without a weapon. But if a man over forty ventures to fight anyone, whether as aggressor or in self-defense, he shall be called a lout and a boor, and if he finds himself incurring a degrading sentence, he will be getting what he deserves. Anyone who readily listens to such exhortations will prove easy to manage; but the one who is intractable and pays no attention to the prelude will readily accept a law to this effect: If anyone beats a person who is twenty or more years older than himself, then, in the first place, whoever comes upon them, if he is neither the same age as the fighters nor younger, shall try to separate them, or else be regarded as a coward in the eyes of the law; and if he is the same age as the man assaulted or still younger, he shall defend the one who is being wronged as he would a brother or a father or an even older ancestor. Furthermore, the one who dares to strike the older man in the way described shall also be liable to a charge of outrage, and if he is convicted, he shall be imprisoned for at least a year; and if the judges set a longer period, the period so set shall be binding on him. And if a Stranger or a resident alien beats a man who is twenty or more years older than himself, the same law about help from bystanders shall be equally binding; and anyone who loses a suit of this kind, if he is a non-resident Stranger, shall be imprisoned for two years and serve out this sentence; and a resident alien who disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years, unless the court sets his penalty at a longer period. And any bystander in any of these cases of assault who fails to give help as the law prescribes shall be fined a mina if he belongs to the highest property class, fifty drachmae if he belongs to the second class, thirty drachmae if to the third, and twenty drachmae if to the fourth. And the court for such cases shall consist of the generals, taxiarchs, phylarchs, and hipparchs. Laws, it seems, are made partly for the sake of good people, to instruct them in the kind of dealings with one another that will best allow them to live together in friendship, and partly for the sake of those who have avoided education and who, being of a stubborn nature, have had no softening treatment to keep them from turning to every kind of wickedness. It is because of these people that the laws that follow have to be stated—laws the lawgiver must enact out of necessity on their account, though he wishes that the need for them may never arise.

880e–881e

Athenian: Whoever dares to lay hands on his father or mother, or on their ancestors, and to use outrageous violence, fearing neither the anger of the gods above nor that of the so-called Avengers of the underworld, but scorning the ancient and universal traditions (thinking he knows what he does not know at all), and in this way breaks the law—for such a man some extremely severe deterrent is needed. Death is not the most severe penalty; and the punishments we are told of in Hades for such offenses, although more severe than death and described with the greatest truth, nevertheless fail to deter souls like these; otherwise we would never find cases of matricide and of impiously audacious assaults on other ancestors. Consequently, the punishments inflicted on these men here, during their lifetime, for crimes of this kind must, as far as possible, fall in no way short of the punishments in Hades. So the next pronouncement shall run as follows: Whoever dares to beat his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers, unless he is afflicted with madness—in the first place, the bystander shall give help, as in the earlier cases. A resident Stranger who helps shall be invited to a front-row seat at the public games, but one who fails to help shall be banished from the country for life. A non-resident Stranger shall receive praise if he helps and blame if he does not. A slave who helps shall be set free, but if he fails to help he shall be beaten with 100 lashes of a whip by the market-stewards, if the assault occurs in the market; if it occurs in the city but outside the marketplace, the punishment shall be inflicted by the city-steward in residence; and if it occurs anywhere in the country districts, by the officers of the country-stewards. And a bystander who is a native, whether man, woman, or boy, shall in every case drive off the attacker, crying out against his impiety; and anyone who fails to drive him off shall be liable by law to the curse of Zeus, guardian god of kinship and parentage. And if a man is convicted on a charge of outrageous assault on his parents, in the first place he shall be banished for life from the city to other parts of the country, and he shall keep away from all sacred places; if he fails to keep away, the country-stewards shall punish him with lashes and in any other way they choose, and if he comes back again he shall be punished with death. And if any free man voluntarily eats or drinks or has any similar dealings with such a person, or even merely greets him when he meets him, he shall not enter any holy place, the market, or any part of the city until he has been purified, but shall regard himself as having incurred a share of contagious guilt;

881e–882c

Athenian: and if he disobeys the law and unlawfully defiles sacred things and the State, any magistrate who notices his case and fails to bring him to trial shall have this omission counted as one of the gravest charges against him at his audit. If it is a slave who strikes a free man, whether a Stranger or a citizen, the bystander shall help, or else pay the penalty fixed according to his property assessment; and the bystanders, together with the person assaulted, shall bind the slave and hand him over to the injured person; and he shall take charge of him, bind him in fetters, and give him as many lashes of the whip as he pleases, provided he does not reduce his value to the loss of his master, to whose ownership he shall then hand him over according to law. The law shall stand as follows: Whoever, being a slave, beats a free man without an order from the magistrates, his owner shall take him over in bonds from the person assaulted and shall not release him until the slave has convinced the person assaulted that he deserves to live free of bonds. The same laws shall apply to all such cases when both parties are women, or when the plaintiff is a woman and the defendant a man, or the plaintiff a man and the defendant a woman.

Book 10

About this book

Laws, Book 9

Tradition
Classical
Author
Plato
Written
350 BCE
Text
Based on the translation by R. G. Bury (1926) · Public domain

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