884a
Athenian: After cases of outrage, we shall next lay down for cases of violence a single, universally inclusive principle of law, to this effect: No one shall carry or drive off anything that belongs to others, nor shall he use any of his neighbor’s goods unless he has obtained the owner’s consent. All the evils mentioned above, past, present, and to come, spring from conduct of this kind. Of the remaining offenses, the gravest are the licentious and outrageous acts of the young. Outrages are most serious when they are directed against sacred things, and they are especially serious when directed against objects that are both public and holy, or partly public, being shared by the members of a tribe or of some other similar community. Athenian: Second in order, and second in gravity, come offenses against sacred objects and tombs that are private; and third, offenses against parents, when someone commits outrage against them in ways other than those already described. A fourth kind of outrage occurs when a man, in defiance of the magistrates, drives off, carries off, or uses any of their things without their consent; and a fifth kind will be an outrage against the civic rights of an individual private citizen, which calls for redress in court. To all of these, each in turn, one all-embracing law must be assigned. As for temple robbery, whether committed by open violence or in secret, we have already stated in summary what the punishment should be. But for all the outrages of word or deed that a man commits against the gods, whether with his tongue or with his hand, we must state the punishment he should suffer, after first delivering our admonition. It shall be as follows: No one who believes in the existence of the gods, as the laws prescribe, has ever yet done an impious deed voluntarily or uttered a lawless word. Anyone who acts this way is in one of three states of mind: either he does not believe in what I have just said; or, second, he believes that the gods exist but do not care about human beings; or, third, he believes that they are easy to win over when they are bribed with offerings and prayers.
885c
Clinias: Then what should we do or say to such people? Athenian: My good friend, let us first listen to what I imagine they say mockingly, in their contempt for us. Clinias: What is that? Athenian: In derision they would probably say this: “Strangers from Athens, Lacedaemon, and Knossos, what you say is true. Some of us do not believe in gods at all, while others of us believe in gods of the kinds you describe. So we now claim, just as you claimed in the matter of laws, that before you threaten us harshly, you should first try to convince and teach us, by producing adequate proofs, that gods exist, and that they are too good to be coaxed by gifts and turned aside from justice. For as things stand, this is the kind of account of them that we hear, along with others like it, from those who are reputed to be the best poets, orators, seers, and priests, and from thousands upon thousands of others. As a result, most of us, instead of trying to avoid wrongdoing, do the wrong and then try to make amends. Now from lawgivers like you, who claim to be gentle rather than severe, we ask that you deal with us first by way of persuasion. If what you say about the existence of the gods is not much better than what others say, but is at least better in truth, perhaps you might convince us. So, if you think this reasonable, try to meet our challenge.”
885e–886a
Clinias: Surely, Stranger, it seems easy to state truthfully that gods exist?
886a
Athenian: How so? Clinias: First, there is the evidence of the earth, the sun, the stars, and the whole universe, and the beautiful ordering of the seasons, marked out by years and months; and then there is the further fact that all Greeks and barbarians believe that gods exist. Athenian: My dear friend, these bad men alarm me (for I will never call it awe), for fear that they may somehow scoff at us. The cause of the corruption in their case is one you are not aware of, since you imagine that it is only their lack of self-control with regard to pleasures and desires that drives their souls toward that impious life of theirs.
886b
Clinias: What other cause could there be besides this, Stranger? Athenian: One that you, who live elsewhere, could hardly know about or notice at all. Clinias: What is this cause you are now speaking of? Athenian: A very serious kind of ignorance, which is reputed to be the height of wisdom. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: We in Athens have accounts preserved in writing (though I am told that such things do not exist in your country, because of the excellence of your political system), some of them in a kind of meter and others without meter, that tell about the gods. The oldest of these accounts relate how the first substance of Heaven and of everything else came into being, and shortly after the beginning they go on to give a detailed theogony, telling how the gods, once they were born, associated with one another. Whether these accounts are good or bad for their hearers in other respects, it is hard for us to criticize them, because they are so ancient. But as regards the care and respect owed to parents, I certainly would never praise them or say that they are either helpful or entirely true. Such ancient accounts, however, we may pass over and dismiss; let them be told in whatever way is most pleasing to the gods. It is rather the novel views of our modern scientists that we must hold responsible as the cause of the harm. For the result of these people’s arguments is this: when you and I try to prove the existence of the gods by pointing to these very objects, the sun, moon, stars, and earth, as instances of deity and divinity, people who have been converted by these scientists will claim that these things are simply earth and stone, incapable of paying any attention to human affairs, and that these beliefs of ours are dressed up with specious arguments to make them plausible.
886e
Clinias: The claim you mention, Stranger, is indeed a dangerous one, even if it stood alone; but now that such claims are countless, the danger is still greater. Athenian: What then? What shall we say? What must we do? Are we to make our defense as if before a court of impious men, where someone had accused us of doing something dreadful by assuming in our legislation that gods exist? Or should we rather dismiss the whole subject and turn back to our laws, so that our prelude does not turn out to be actually longer than the laws? For our discussion would grow to no small length if we were to give those men who wish to be impious an adequate demonstration, by means of argument, of the subjects that they claimed ought to be discussed, and so convert them to fear of the gods, and then finally, once we had made them shrink from irreligion, proceed to enact the appropriate laws.
887b–887c
Clinias: Even so, Stranger, we have often (considering how short a time we have been talking) made this very statement: that on the present occasion we have no need to prefer brevity of speech to length (for, as the saying goes, no one is chasing at our heels); and that to show ourselves choosing the briefest course in preference to the best would be contemptible and ridiculous. And it is of the highest importance that our arguments showing that the gods exist, and that they are good and honor justice more than human beings do, should by all means carry some degree of persuasiveness; for such a prelude is the best we could have in defense, so to speak, of all our laws. So without any reluctance or undue haste, and with all the ability we have to make such arguments persuasive, let us set them out as fully as we can, holding nothing back.
887c–887e
Athenian: This speech of yours seems to me to call for a prayer as a preface, since you are so eager and ready; nor can we put off our statement any longer. Come, then: how can one argue for the existence of the gods without anger? For we cannot help being vexed and indignant with the men who have been, and still are, responsible for laying on us this burden of argument. They do not believe the stories they used to hear, while they were still infants at the breast, from the lips of their nurses and mothers, stories chanted to them, as it were, in lullabies, whether in play or in earnest. They heard the same stories repeated in prayers at sacrifices, and they saw spectacles that illustrated them, of the kind the young most delight to see and hear when they are performed at sacrifices. They saw their own parents showing the utmost zeal on behalf of themselves and their children as they addressed the gods in prayers and supplications, as though the gods most certainly existed. And at the rising and setting of the sun and moon they heard and saw the prostrations and devotions of all the Greeks and barbarians, under every condition of misfortune and prosperity, directed to these heavenly lights, not as though they were not gods, but as though they most certainly were gods beyond the shadow of a doubt—
887e–888d
Athenian: all this evidence these people despise, and for no adequate reason, as everyone with a grain of sense would affirm; and so they are now forcing us to take up our present argument. How, I ask, can anyone possibly use gentle language in admonishing such men, and at the same time teach them, to begin with, that the gods do exist? Yet one must bravely attempt the task; for it would never do for both sides to be enraged at once, the one through greed for pleasure, the other through indignation at men like these. So let our prefatory address to men whose minds are corrupted in this way be free of anger in tone; and, quenching our anger, let us speak gently, as though we were conversing with one particular person of the kind described, in the following terms: My child, you are still young, and as time goes on it will lead you to reverse many of the opinions you now hold. So wait until then before passing judgment on matters of the gravest importance; and the gravest of all, though at present you think it worth nothing, is whether you hold a right view about the gods and so live well, or the opposite. Now, first of all, I would be saying what is irrefutably true if I pointed out this striking fact to you: neither you alone nor your friends are the first and foremost to adopt this opinion about the gods. Rather, people who suffer from this disease are always springing up, in greater or smaller numbers. And I, who have met many of these people, would tell you this: not a single man who adopted in his youth this opinion, that the gods do not exist, has ever yet remained constant in that view until old age. The other two false notions about the gods, however, do persist, not in many people, it is true, but still in some: namely, the notion that the gods exist but pay no attention to human affairs, and the other notion that they do pay attention but are easily won over by prayers and offerings. If you take my advice, you will wait for a doctrine about them that will prove to be the truest you can possibly form, considering in the meantime whether the truth stands this way or otherwise, and making inquiries not only of all other men, but especially of the lawgiver; and in the meantime do not dare to commit any impiety toward the gods. For the one who is making laws for you, both now and in the future, must try to teach you the truth about these matters.
888d
Clinias: What we have said so far, Stranger, is excellent. Athenian: Very true, Megillus and Clinias; but without realizing it we have plunged into an astonishing argument. Clinias: What do you mean?
888e
Athenian: The argument that most people consider the most scientific of all. Clinias: Explain more clearly. Athenian: Some people say that all things that are coming into existence, have come into existence, or will come into existence do so partly by nature, partly by art, and partly by chance. Clinias: Is that not a correct statement? Athenian: It is likely enough, of course, that what men of science say is true. In any case, let us follow them up and consider what the people in their camp actually mean.
889a
Clinias: By all means, let us do so. Athenian: It is evident, they claim, that the greatest and most beautiful things are the work of nature and chance, and the lesser things the work of art. For art receives from nature the great and primary works already in existence, and itself molds and shapes all the smaller ones, which we commonly call artificial. Clinias: What do you mean?
889b–889e
Athenian: I will explain it more clearly. Fire, water, earth, and air, they say, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art; and by means of these, which are entirely without soul, the bodies that come next, namely those of the earth, sun, moon, and stars, have been brought into existence. All these elements move by chance, through the interplay of their respective powers; and according as they happen to meet and combine in a fitting way, hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard, along with all the necessary mixtures that result from the chance combination of these opposites, in this way and by these means they have produced the whole Heaven and everything in the Heaven, and all animals and plants as well, after all the seasons had arisen from these elements. And all this, as they claim, came about not through reason, nor through any god or art, but, as we have said, through nature and chance. Art, as a later product of these, comes later; and, being mortal itself and of mortal birth, it produces later playthings that share very little in truth, images of a sort akin to the arts themselves, such as the images that painting produces, and music, and the arts that accompany these. The arts that really produce something serious are those that share their power with nature, such as medicine, agriculture, and gymnastics. Politics too, they say, shares to a small extent in nature, but mostly in art; and in the same way all legislation is due not to nature but to art, and its assumptions are untrue.
889e
Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: The first claim these people make about the gods, my dear friend, is that they exist by art and not by nature, by certain legal conventions that differ from place to place, according to what each tribe agreed on when it framed its laws. They claim, moreover, that there is one class of things that are beautiful by nature and another class that are beautiful by convention; and as for things just, these do not exist by nature at all, but people are constantly disputing about them and continually altering them, and whatever change they make at any given time is authoritative at that time, though it owes its existence to art and the laws and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views that young people absorb from men of science, both prose writers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to win by force. As a result, the young are struck by a plague of impiety, as though the gods were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and because of this, factions also arise, as these teachers draw them toward the life that is right according to nature, which consists in actually being master over others instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention.
890b
Clinias: What a horrible doctrine you have described, Stranger! And what widespread corruption of the young, both in private families and publicly in the states! Athenian: That is indeed true, Clinias. What, then, do you think the lawgiver ought to do, given that these people have been armed in this way for a long time? Should he simply stand up in the city and threaten all the people? Should he declare that unless they affirm that the gods exist and conceive them in their minds to be such as the law maintains, and likewise with regard to the beautiful and the just and all the greatest things, as many as relate to virtue and vice, they must regard and perform these things in the way the lawgiver prescribes in his writings; and that whoever fails to show himself obedient to the laws must either be put to death or else be punished, in one case by flogging and imprisonment, in another by loss of civic rights, in others by poverty and exile? And as for persuasion, should the lawgiver, while enacting laws for the people, refuse to blend any persuasion with his statements, and in this way tame them as far as possible?
890d
Clinias: Certainly not, Stranger. On the contrary, if persuasion can be applied to such matters even in the smallest degree, no lawgiver of the slightest worth must ever grow weary; he must (as they say) leave no stone unturned in supporting by argument the ancient law that gods exist, and everything else you recounted just now. He must also defend law itself and art, as things that exist by nature, or by a cause not inferior to nature, since according to right reason they are the offspring of mind, as you, I think, are now asserting; and I agree with you. Athenian: What now, my most eager Clinias? Are not statements made in this way to the masses hard for us to follow through in argument, and do they not also involve us in arguments of enormous length?
890e–891a
Clinias: Well, Stranger, if we were patient with ourselves when we talked at such length about drinking and music, shall we not be patient in dealing with the gods and similar subjects? Besides, such a discussion is of the greatest help to intelligent legislation, since legal ordinances, once written down, remain entirely unchanged, as though ready to submit to examination for all time. So one need not be afraid if they are hard to listen to at first, since even the slowest learner can come back to examine them again and again; nor if they are long, provided they are beneficial. Consequently, in my opinion, it could not possibly be either reasonable or pious for any man to refuse to support such arguments to the best of his ability.
891a–891b
Megillus: What Clinias says, Stranger, seems to me excellent.
891b
Athenian: It certainly is, Megillus, and we must do as he says. For if the claims I mentioned had not been sown broadcast over nearly the whole human race, there would have been no need for counterarguments defending the existence of the gods; but as it is, they are necessary. For when the greatest laws are being destroyed by wicked men, who has a greater duty to come to their rescue than the lawgiver? Megillus: No one. Athenian: Come now, Clinias, you answer me again too, for you also must take part in the argument. It appears that the person who makes these claims holds fire, water, earth, and air to be the first of all things, and that it is precisely these things that he calls nature, while he claims that soul is a later product derived from them. In fact, he probably does not merely appear to do this, but actually makes it clear to us in his account.
891c
Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: In Heaven’s name, then, can it be that we have now discovered, as it were, the very fountainhead of irrational opinion in all the men who have ever yet taken up investigations of nature? Consider, and examine each statement. For it is a matter of no small importance if it can be shown that those who take up impious arguments, and lead others after them, use their arguments not only badly but erroneously. And this seems to me to be the state of affairs.
891d
Clinias: Well said; but try to explain where the error lies. Athenian: We will probably have to take up a rather unusual argument. Clinias: We must not shrink from it, Stranger. I see that you think we will be crossing foreign ground, outside legislation, if we take up such arguments. But if there is no other way for us to affirm the truth of what the law now says about the gods, except this way, then this is the way, my good friend, that we must speak.
891e
Athenian: Then it seems that I may proceed at once with an argument that is somewhat unusual. It is this: the arguments that have produced the soul of the impious declare that what is the first cause of the coming into being and perishing of all things is not first but was generated later, and that what is later is earlier. And because of this they have fallen into error about the real nature of divine existence.
892a
Clinias: I still do not understand. Athenian: As regards the soul, my friend, nearly everyone appears to be ignorant of its real nature and its power, and ignorant not only of other facts about it, but especially of its origin: that it is among the first of existing things, prior to all bodies, and that it, more than anything else, governs all the changes and modifications of bodies. And if this is really the case, must not the things that are akin to soul necessarily be prior in origin to the things that belong to body, since soul is older than body?
892b
Clinias: Necessarily. Athenian: Then opinion and reflection and thought and art and law will be prior to things hard and soft and heavy and light. And further, the great and primary works and actions will be those of art, while the things that are natural, and nature itself, which they wrongly call by this name, will be secondary and will derive their origin from art and reason.
892c
Clinias: How are they wrong? Athenian: By “nature” they mean the production of the primary things. But if soul is shown to have come into being first (not fire or air, but soul first and foremost), it would most truly be described as natural in the highest degree. This is how matters stand, provided one can prove that soul is older than body, but not otherwise. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Shall we, then, turn next to the task of proving this?
892d
Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Let us be on our guard against an utterly deceptive argument, so that it does not somehow seduce us old men with its plausible youthfulness, and then slip away from us and make us a laughingstock, so that we get a reputation for missing even small things while aiming at big ones. Consider, then. Suppose the three of us had to cross a river in violent flood, and I, being the youngest of the party and having often had experience of currents, were to suggest that the proper course is for me to make an attempt first by myself, leaving you two in safety, to see whether it is possible for you older men to cross as well, or how matters stand. Then, if the river proved clearly fordable, I would call you and help you across by my experience; while if it proved impassable for men like you, the risk would be mine alone. Such a suggestion on my part would have sounded reasonable. So too in the present case: the argument now in front of us is too violent, and probably impassable, for such strength as you possess;
892e–893a
Athenian: so, to keep it from making you faint and dizzy as it rushes past and confronts you with questions you are not used to answering, and so causing an unpleasant lack of grace and decorum, I think that I ought now to act in the way described. I will question myself first, while you remain listening in safety, and then give myself the answer, and in this way go through the whole argument until it has discussed the subject of soul in full and demonstrated that soul is prior to body.
893a–893b
Clinias: We think your suggestion excellent, Stranger; so do as you suggest.
893b–893e
Athenian: Come then: if ever we ought to call on God for help, now is the time to do it. Let the gods be called on with all earnestness to aid in the demonstration of their own existence. And let us hold fast, so to speak, to a secure cable as we embark on the present discussion. It seems to me safest to adopt the following method of reply when questions like this are put on these subjects. For instance, suppose a man asks me, “Stranger, do all things stand still, and nothing move? Or is the exact opposite the truth? Or do some things move and some remain at rest?” My answer will be, “Some things move, and others remain at rest.” “Then do not the things that stand still stand, and the things that move move, in some place?” “Of course.” “And some will do this in one location, and others in several.” “You mean,” we will say, “that those that have the property of being at rest at the center move in one location, as when the circumference of circles that are said to stand still revolves?” “Yes.” “And we observe that motion of this kind, which in this revolution turns both the largest circle and the smallest at the same time, distributes itself proportionally to small and great, altering its own quantity in proportion. In this way it serves as the source of all the marvels that result from its supplying great and small circles at the same time with harmonizing rates of slow and fast speed, a state of things that one might suppose to be impossible.” “Quite true.” “And by things moving in several places you seem to me to mean all things that move by locomotion, continually passing from one spot to another, sometimes resting on one axis and sometimes, by revolving, on several. And whenever one such object meets another, if the other is at rest, the moving object is split apart; but if they collide with others moving to meet them from the opposite direction, they form a combination midway between the two.” “Yes, I affirm that these things are so, just as you describe.”
893e–894b
Athenian: Further, things increase when they combine and decrease when they separate, in all cases where the established constitution of each persists; but if it does not remain, then both these processes cause them to perish. And what is the condition that must occur in anything to bring about its coming into being? Obviously, it occurs whenever a starting point, having received increase, passes to the second change, and from this to the next, and on reaching the third becomes perceptible to those capable of perceiving. Everything comes into being through this process of change and alteration; and a thing truly exists whenever it remains fixed, but when it changes into another constitution it is utterly destroyed. Have we now, my friends, named all the forms of motion that can be classified by number, except for two?
894b
Clinias: Which two? Athenian: The two, my good friend, for whose sake, one might say, our whole present inquiry was undertaken. Clinias: Explain more clearly. Athenian: It was undertaken for the sake of soul, was it not? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: As one of the two, let us count the motion that is always able to move other things but unable to move itself; and the motion that is always able to move both itself and other things, by way of combination and separation, increase and decrease, coming into being and perishing, let us count as another separate unit in the total number of motions.
894c
Clinias: Agreed. Athenian: So we will count as ninth on the list the motion that always moves another object and is moved by another; while the motion that moves both itself and another, which is harmoniously suited to all forms of acting and being acted upon, and is called the real change and motion of all that really exists, this, I suppose, we will call the tenth.
894d
Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: Of our ten motions in all, which shall we most correctly judge to be the most powerful of all and superior in effectiveness? Clinias: We are bound to say that the motion that is able to move itself is infinitely superior, and that all the rest come after it. Athenian: Well said. Must we, then, correct one or two of the wrong statements we have just made? Clinias: Which do you mean? Athenian: What we said about the tenth seems wrong. Clinias: How? Athenian: Logically it is first in origin and in power; and the next one is second to it, although a moment ago we absurdly called it ninth.
894e
Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: This: when we find one thing changing another, and that in turn changing another, and so on, will we ever find among these a first cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever itself be the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible. Athenian: But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion spreads in this way through thousands upon thousands of things, will the primary source of all their motions be anything other than the change of that which has moved itself?
895a
Clinias: Excellently put, and we must agree with your argument. Athenian: Further, let us question and answer ourselves in this way: Suppose the whole of things were to unite and stand still, as most of these thinkers dare to maintain; which of the motions we have mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? The self-moving motion, of course; for it will never be shifted beforehand by something else, since no shifting force exists in things beforehand. Therefore we shall assert that, since the self-moving motion is the starting point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is necessarily the oldest and most powerful change of all, while the motion that is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second.
895b
Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Now that we have reached this point in our discussion, here is a question we may answer.
895c
Clinias: What is it? Athenian: If we were to see this motion arise in something made of earth, water, or fire, whether separate or combined, what condition should we say exists in such a thing? Clinias: You are asking me whether we are to say that a thing is alive when it moves itself? Athenian: Yes. Clinias: It is alive, of course. Athenian: Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive? Clinias: We must.
895d
Athenian: Now stop a moment, in Heaven’s name! Would you not want to observe three points about every object? Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: One point is the substance, one is the definition of the substance, and one is the name; and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked. Clinias: What two? Athenian: Sometimes each of us puts forward the name by itself and asks for the definition; at other times he puts forward the definition by itself and asks for the name. Clinias: Is it something of this kind that we now mean to convey? Athenian: Of what kind?
895e
Clinias: There are things divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere. In arithmetic the name of this is “even,” and the definition is “a number divisible into two equal parts.” Athenian: Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object that we describe, is it not, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition, describing one and the same object by the name “even” and by the definition “a number divisible into two halves”? Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: What is the definition of the thing whose name is “soul”? Can we give it any definition other than the one just stated, “the motion able to move itself”?
896a
Clinias: Do you assert that self-movement is the definition of that very same substance which has “soul” as the name we all apply to it? Athenian: That is what I assert. And if this is really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and will be, and of all that is opposite to these, since it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?
896b
Clinias: We make no such complaint. On the contrary, it has been proved quite sufficiently that soul is the oldest of all things, since it is the first principle of motion. Athenian: Then is not the motion that arises in one thing because of another, and never gives anything the power to move itself, second in order, or indeed as far down the list as anyone cares to put it, since it is the change of a body that truly has no soul? Clinias: True. Athenian: Truly and finally, then, it would be a most accurate and complete statement to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and later, with soul governing and body being governed according to the order of nature.
896c
Clinias: Yes, most accurate. Athenian: We remember, of course, that we previously agreed that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things belonging to soul would also be older than those belonging to body. Clinias: Certainly we do.
896d
Athenian: Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth, and strength, if soul is prior to body. Clinias: Necessarily. Athenian: Must we, then, necessarily agree next that soul is the cause of things good and bad, noble and shameful, just and unjust, and of all the opposites, if we are to take it to be the cause of all things? Clinias: Of course we must. Athenian: And since soul in this way controls and dwells in all things everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily say that it controls Heaven as well?
896e
Clinias: Yes. Athenian: One soul, or several? I will answer for you: several. In any case, let us assume no fewer than two, the beneficent soul and the one capable of producing results of the opposite kind. Clinias: You are perfectly right. Athenian: Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, whose names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are primary motions. These, taking over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease, separation and combination, and, following on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all the qualities that soul uses, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in union with reason, and when, in association with unreason, it produces results that are in every respect the opposite. Shall we take it that this is so, or do we still suspect that it may possibly be otherwise?
897b
Clinias: Not at all. Athenian: Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circuit? The one that is wise and full of goodness, or the one that has neither quality? Shall we answer this as follows?
897c
Clinias: How? Athenian: If, my good friend, we are to assert that the whole course and motion of Heaven and of everything it contains has a motion like the motion, revolution, and calculations of reason, and proceeds in a kindred way, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it along its course, which is of the kind described. Clinias: You are right.
897d
Athenian: But if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way, then it is the bad soul. Clinias: That is also right. Athenian: Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we reach a question that is hard to answer wisely; so it is only fair that you should now call me in to help you with the answer. Clinias: Very good. Athenian: In giving our answer, let us not bring on night at midday, as it were, by looking straight into the eye of the sun, as though we could ever see reason with mortal eyes and know it fully. The safer way to see the object our question concerns is to look at an image of it.
897e
Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: Let us take as our image the one of the ten motions that reason resembles; I will recall it together with you, and so give our answer. Clinias: You will probably put it admirably. Athenian: Do we still remember this much about the things described then: that we assumed that, of the whole number, some were in motion and others at rest? Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And further, that of those in motion, some move in one place and others in several places?
898a
Clinias: That is so. Athenian: And that, of these two motions, the one that moves in one place must necessarily always move around some center, being a copy of wheels turned on a lathe; and that this has the closest possible kinship and resemblance to the revolution of reason? Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: If we described both of them, namely reason and the motion that spins in one place (likened to the spinning of a globe turned on a lathe), as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, around the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system, we would never be in danger of being thought unskilled at crafting beautiful images in words.
898b
Clinias: Very true. Athenian: On the other hand, will not the motion that is never uniform or regular, never in the same place, nor around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order or system or rule, will not this motion be akin to complete unreason?
898c
Clinias: It will, most truly. Athenian: So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating explicitly that, since soul is what we find driving everything around, we must say that this circuit of Heaven is necessarily driven around under the care and ordering of either the best soul or its opposite. Clinias: But, Stranger, judging by what has just been said, it is actually impious to make any other claim than that these things are driven around by one or more souls possessing every kind of goodness. Athenian: You have followed our argument admirably, Clinias. Now pay attention to this further point.
898d
Clinias: What is that? Athenian: If soul drives around the whole sum of sun, moon, and all the other stars, does it not also drive each single one of them? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Then let us construct an argument about one of these stars that will clearly apply equally to them all. Clinias: About which one? Athenian: Everyone sees the sun’s body, but no one sees its soul. The same is true of the soul of any other body of living beings, whether alive or dead. There is, however, strong reason to suppose that this kind of thing, which is entirely imperceptible to the senses, has grown around all the senses of the body and is an object of reason alone. So by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it:
898e
Clinias: What fact? Athenian: If soul drives the sun around, we will be fairly sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things. Clinias: What things? Athenian: Either it exists everywhere inside this visible spherical body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in every way; or, having provided itself with a body of fire or air (as some argue), it pushes forcibly, body against body, from outside; or, third, being itself free of body but possessing other surpassingly marvelous powers, it guides the body.
899a
Clinias: Yes, it must necessarily be the case that soul acts in one of these ways when it propels all things. Athenian: Stop here, please. This soul, whether it brings light to us all by riding in the sun as in a chariot, or from outside, or in some other way, every man is bound to regard as a god. Is that not so?
899b
Clinias: Yes, at least everyone who has not reached the farthest limit of folly. Athenian: Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all the seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same one? Namely, that since it has been shown that one soul or several souls are the cause of all of them, and that these souls are good with every kind of goodness, we shall declare them to be gods, whether they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the manner and method. Is there anyone who agrees with this view who will put up with hearing it denied that all things are full of gods?
899c
Clinias: There is no one, Stranger, so out of his mind as that. Athenian: Then, Megillus and Clinias, let us lay down limiting terms for the man who until now has not believed in gods, and so be done with him. Clinias: What terms? Athenian: Either he must teach us that we are wrong in laying down that soul is the first of all things to come into being, along with all the statements we made that follow from this; or, if he cannot give a better account than ours, he must believe us and live the rest of his life in reverence for the gods. So let us consider whether our argument for the existence of the gods, addressed to those who do not believe in them, has been stated adequately or deficiently.
899d
Clinias: Anything but deficiently, Stranger. Athenian: Then let our argument end here, insofar as it is addressed to these men. But the man who holds that gods exist but pay no attention to human affairs is the one we must now admonish. Let us say to him: My good friend, the fact that you believe in gods is probably due to a divine kinship that draws you toward what is of a nature like your own, to honor it and to recognize its existence. But the fortunes of evil and unjust men, both in private and in public, which, though not truly happy, are excessively and improperly praised as happy by public opinion, drive you to impiety by the wrong way in which they are celebrated, not only in poetry but in stories of every kind.
899e–900c
Athenian: Or again, when you see men reaching the goal of old age and leaving behind them grandchildren in the highest offices, very likely you are disturbed when you find among them, whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation, some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, precisely because of these, have risen from a humble position to tyrannical power and the highest rank. Then the clear consequence of all this is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship with them, and since on the other hand you are driven by faulty reasoning and by your inability to repudiate the gods, you have arrived at your present diseased state of mind, in which you believe that the gods exist but despise and neglect human affairs. So, in order that your present opinion may not grow into a still greater disease of impiety, and that we may succeed in warding off the approach of its pollution by argument (if we somehow can), let us try to attach our next argument to the one we set out in full at the start for the man who utterly disbelieves in gods, and in this way make use of that one as well. And you, Clinias and Megillus, take the young man’s part in answering, as you did before; and if anything difficult comes up in the course of the argument, I will take over and answer for you, as I did just now, and carry you across the stream.
900c
Clinias: A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out, and you do the same. Athenian: Well, it will probably not be difficult to prove to this man that the gods care for small things no less than, indeed more than, for things of surpassing greatness. For of course he was present at our recent argument and heard that the gods, being good with every kind of goodness, have such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.
900d
Clinias: He certainly heard that. Athenian: Next let us inquire together what that goodness of theirs is, in virtue of which we agree that they are good. Come now: do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and their opposites parts of badness? Clinias: We do say so. Athenian: And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice part of badness? Clinias: Certainly.
900e
Athenian: And shall we say that some of these are shameful and others noble? Clinias: Necessarily. Athenian: And shall we say that all the worthless ones belong to us, if to anyone, while the gods have no share in any such things, great or small? Clinias: Everyone would agree to this too. Athenian: Well then, shall we count neglect, idleness, and indolence as goodness of soul? Or what do you say? Clinias: How could we? Athenian: As the opposite, then? Clinias: Yes.
901a
Athenian: And their opposites as belonging to the opposite quality of soul? Clinias: To the opposite quality. Athenian: What then? Will the man who is indolent, careless, and idle be, in our eyes, what the poet described, a man most like stingless drones? Clinias: A very true description. Athenian: We must certainly deny that God has such a character, since he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so. Clinias: We could not possibly allow that. Athenian: When a person whose special duty is to act on behalf of some object and to care for it has a mind that cares for great things but neglects small ones, on what principle could we praise such a person without the greatest impropriety? Let us consider the matter this way: the conduct of someone who acts like this, whether he is a god or a man, takes one of two forms, does it not?
901b
Clinias: What forms? Athenian: Either he thinks that neglecting the small things makes no difference to the whole, or else, though he thinks they do make a difference, he neglects them out of laziness and indolence. Or is there some other way in which neglect comes about? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person, whether a god or an ordinary man, fails to care for things he lacks the power and capacity to care for.
901c
Clinias: Of course not. Athenian: Now let these two men answer us three, both of whom agree that gods exist, but one of whom claims that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect small things. First, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things, and that nothing apprehended by the senses or the sciences can escape their notice. Do you say that this is so, or what?
901d
Clinias: That is what we say. Athenian: And further, that they can do everything that can be done by mortal or immortal beings? Clinias: They will of course admit that this too is so.
901e
Athenian: And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the gods are good, indeed supremely good. Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: Since they are such as we agree they are, then, is it not impossible to allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent way? For certainly among us mortals idleness is the child of cowardice, and laziness the child of idleness and indolence. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Then none of the gods is neglectful out of idleness and laziness, since none has any share in cowardice. Clinias: You are quite right.
902a
Athenian: Further, if they do neglect the small and slight things of the All, they will do so either because they know that there is no need at all to care for any such things, or else... well, what other alternative is there except the opposite of knowing? Clinias: There is none. Athenian: Then, my most worthy and excellent friend, shall we take you to be saying that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care? Or that they do know what is needed, yet act as the worst of men are said to act, who know that there are other things better to do than what they are doing, yet fail to do them because they are somehow overcome by pleasures or pains?
902b
Clinias: Impossible. Athenian: Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is not man himself also the most god-fearing of all living creatures? Clinias: That certainly seems likely. Athenian: We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of the gods, to whom the whole heaven also belongs. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: That being so, it makes no difference whether someone says that these things are small or great in the eyes of the gods; for in neither case would it be fitting for those who own us to be neglectful, since they are most careful and most good. For let us note this further fact:
902c
Clinias: What is it? Athenian: As regards perception and power, are not these two naturally opposed to each other with respect to ease and difficulty? Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: It is harder to see and hear small things than great ones; but everyone finds it easier to move, control, and care for things that are small and few than for their opposites.
902d
Clinias: Much easier. Athenian: When a physician is entrusted with curing a whole body, if, while he is willing and able to care for the large parts, he neglects the small parts and members, will he ever find the whole in good condition? Clinias: Certainly not. Athenian: Nor will pilots or generals or household managers, nor statesmen or anyone else of this kind, find that the many and great things thrive apart from the few and small; for even masons say that big stones are not laid well without little stones.
902e
Clinias: They cannot be. Athenian: Let us never suppose that God is inferior to mortal craftsmen, who, the better they are, the more precisely and perfectly they carry out their proper tasks, small and great, by one single art. Nor let us suppose that God, who is most wise, and both willing and able to care, does not care at all for the small things, which are the easier to care for, like someone who shirks the labor because he is idle and cowardly, but cares only for the great.
903a
Clinias: Let us by no means accept such an opinion of the gods, Stranger; that would be to adopt a view that is neither pious nor true in any way. Athenian: And now, I think, we have argued quite sufficiently with the man who loves to accuse the gods of neglect. Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And we did it by forcing him, through our arguments, to acknowledge that what he says is wrong. Still, it seems to me, he also needs some words of counsel to act on him like a charm.
903b
Clinias: What kind of words, my good friend? Athenian: Let us persuade the young man by our argument that all things are systematically ordered by Him who cares for the World, all with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole, of which each part also, as far as it can, does and undergoes what is proper to it. Over each of these parts, down to the smallest fraction, rulers of its action and passion have been appointed, who bring about fulfillment even to the last fraction. Your own portion, perverse man, is one of these, and so, tiny as it is, it always strives toward the All. But you fail to perceive that all partial generation takes place for the sake of the Whole, so that a blessed existence may be secured for the life of the World-all: it is not generated for your sake, but you for its sake. For every physician and every trained craftsman always works for the sake of a whole and strives after what is best in general; he produces a part for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part. But you are resentful, because you do not know how what is best for the All in your case turns out best for you as well, in accordance with the power of your common origin. And since soul, joined now with one body and now with another, is always undergoing changes of every kind, either through itself or through another soul, there is no further task left for the player of the board game except to move the character that grows better to a better place, and the worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that each may receive its appropriate destiny.
903e
Clinias: In what way do you mean? Athenian: The way I am describing is, I believe, the one in which supervising all things is easiest for the gods. For if someone were to shape all things without constantly keeping the Whole in view, by transforming them (turning fire into water, for instance), instead of merely making many out of one or one out of many, then once things had shared in a first, a second, or even a third generation, they would be countless in number in such a system of transformations. But as things are, the task before the Supervisor of the All is wonderfully easy.
904a
Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: This: Our King saw that all actions involve soul and contain much good and much evil; that body and soul, once generated, are indestructible but not eternal, as the gods established by law are (for if either soul or body had been destroyed, there would never have been any generation of living creatures); and He perceived that all soul that is good naturally tends always to benefit, while bad soul tends to injure. Observing all this, He devised a place for each of the parts where it might secure the victory of goodness and the defeat of evil in the Whole most completely, easily, and well. For this purpose He has devised the rule that prescribes what kind of character should be set to dwell in what kind of position and in what regions; but the causes of the generation of any particular kind He left to the wills of each one of us. For according to the direction of our desires and the nature of our souls, each one of us generally becomes of a corresponding character.
904c
Clinias: That is certainly likely. Athenian: All things that share in soul change, since they possess within themselves the cause of change; and in changing they move according to the order and law of destiny. The smaller the change of character, the less the movement across the surface of space; but when the change is great and toward great wickedness, they move toward the depths and the so-called lower regions, about which, under the names of Hades and the like, people are haunted by the most fearful imaginings, both while they are alive and after they have been separated from their bodies. And whenever the soul acquires a specially large share of either virtue or vice, through the force of its own will and the influence of its associations growing strong, then, if it is united with divine virtue, it becomes in this way exceptionally virtuous and moves to an exceptional region, being carried along a holy road to another and better place; whereas if the opposite is the case, it shifts the dwelling place of its life to the opposite region.
904e–905d
Athenian: “This is the just decree of the gods who inhabit Olympus” (Homer, Odyssey 19.43), you child and youth who think you are neglected by the gods: the decree that as you become worse, you go to the company of the worse souls, and as you become better, to the better souls; and that, both in life and in every form of death, you both do and undergo what it is fitting for like to do to like. Neither you nor any other unfortunate person will ever boast of having escaped this decree of Heaven; for the gods who established it have established it above all others, and it is fitting that it be observed most strictly. For you will never be neglected by it: not if you should dive, small as you are, into the depths of the earth below, nor if you should soar up to the height of Heaven above; but you will pay the gods the penalty due from you, whether you remain here on earth, or have passed on to Hades, or are carried off to a place more fearsome still. And the same rule, let me tell you, will also apply to those whom you saw rising from small beginnings to great fortune after committing impious acts or other evils of this kind. You thought that they had risen from misery to happiness, and so you imagined that in their actions, as in mirrors, you could see the gods’ complete neglect, not knowing how they make their joint contribution and how it contributes to the All. And surely, boldest of men, you cannot help supposing that this is something you must learn. For if a man does not learn it, he can never see even an outline of the truth, nor will he be able to contribute any account of life with regard to its happiness or its unhappy fortune. If Clinias here and this whole gathering of elders of ours succeed in convincing you of this fact, that you do not know what you are saying about the gods, then God Himself will graciously help you; but if you still need further argument, listen to us as we argue with the third unbeliever, if you have any sense at all. For we have proved, I would maintain, by fairly sufficient argument that the gods exist and care for human beings. The next claim, that the gods can be won over by wrongdoers when they receive bribes, is one that no one should admit, and we must try to refute it by every means in our power.
905d
Clinias: Admirably spoken; let us do as you say. Athenian: Come now, in the name of these gods themselves I ask: in what way would they come to be seduced by us, if they were seduced? What would they have to be in their essence and character? They must necessarily be rulers, if they are to be in continual control of the whole heaven.
905e
Clinias: True. Athenian: But which kind of rulers do they resemble? Or which rulers resemble them, among those we can fairly compare with them, as small with great? Would drivers of competing teams resemble them, or pilots of ships? Or perhaps they might be likened to commanders of armies; or possibly they might be compared to physicians watching over a war against bodily disease, or to farmers anxiously awaiting the seasons that are usually difficult for the growth of plants, or else to masters of flocks. For since we have agreed among ourselves that heaven is full of many things that are good, and also of things of the opposite kind, and that those not good are the more numerous, such a battle, we affirm, is undying and needs wonderful watchfulness. The gods and daemons are our allies, and we are the possession of the gods and daemons. What destroys us is wickedness and insolence combined with folly; what saves us is justice and self-control combined with wisdom, which dwell in the animate powers of the gods, and of which some small trace may clearly be seen residing here in us as well. But there are certain souls that live on earth and have acquired unjust gain, which, being plainly bestial, fall at the feet of the souls of the guardians, whether these are watchdogs or herdsmen or the most exalted of masters, trying to convince them by flattering words and prayerful incantations that (as the tales of evil men relate) they can profiteer among men on earth without any severe penalty. But we assert that the sin now mentioned, profiteering or grasping for more, is what is called disease in bodies of flesh, pestilence in seasons and years, and, in states and political systems, by a change of word, this same sin is called injustice.
906c
Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Such must necessarily be the account of the matter given by the man who says that the gods are always merciful to unjust men and to those who act unjustly, provided one gives them a share of one’s unjust gains. It is just as if wolves were to give small bits of their prey to watchdogs, and the dogs, softened by the gifts, were to let them go ravaging among the flocks. Is this not the account given by the man who claims that the gods are open to bribes?
906d
Clinias: It is. Athenian: To which of the guardians mentioned earlier could anyone compare the gods without making himself ridiculous? Is it to pilots who, turned aside themselves by libations of wine and the savor of sacrifices, capsize both ships and sailors?
906e
Clinias: By no means. Athenian: And surely not to drivers lined up for a race, who are seduced by a gift to throw the victory to other teams? Clinias: If that were the account you gave of them, it would indeed be a horrible comparison. Athenian: Nor, surely, to generals or physicians or farmers or herdsmen; nor yet to dogs charmed by wolves? Clinias: Hush! That is quite impossible.
907a
Athenian: Are not all the gods the greatest of all guardians, and over the greatest things? Clinias: Yes, by far. Athenian: Shall we say that those who guard the most beautiful things, and who are themselves exceptionally good at guarding, are inferior to dogs and ordinary men, who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts impiously offered by unjust men?
907b
Clinias: By no means. It is an intolerable thing to say, and whoever holds such an opinion would most justly be judged the worst and most impious of all the impious men who practice impiety in all its forms. Athenian: May we now say that we have fully proved our three propositions, namely, that the gods exist, that they are caring, and that they are wholly incapable of being seduced into violating justice? Clinias: Certainly we may; and in these statements you have our vote. Athenian: And indeed they have been made in rather vehement terms, my dear Clinias, because of our desire to win against those wicked men; and our desire to win was due to our fear that if they gained the upper hand in argument, those men who wickedly hold all those false notions about the gods might suppose they had gained the right to act as they please. For this reason we have been eager to speak with unusual vehemence; and if we have produced any good effect, however small, toward persuading these men to hate themselves and to feel some love for the opposite kind of character, then our prelude to the laws concerning impiety will have been well spoken.
907d
Clinias: Well, there is hope; and if not, at any rate the lawgiver will not be blamed for the nature of the argument. Athenian: After the prelude it will be proper for us to have a statement suited to serve as the interpreter of the laws, warning all the impious in advance to leave their own ways for those of the pious. For those who disobey, this shall be the law concerning impiety: If anyone commits impiety, whether by word or by deed, whoever encounters it shall defend the law by informing the magistrates; and the first magistrates who hear of it shall bring the man before the court appointed to decide such cases, as the laws direct. And if any magistrate, on hearing of the matter, fails to do this, he himself shall be liable to a charge of impiety brought by anyone who wishes to punish him on behalf of the laws.
907e–908e
Athenian: And if a man is convicted, the court shall assess one penalty for each separate act of impiety. Imprisonment shall be imposed in every case. There are three prisons in the state: one public prison near the marketplace for most cases, to secure the persons of the ordinary criminals; a second, located near the meeting place of the officials who hold nightly assemblies, and called the reformatory; and a third, located in the middle of the country, in the wildest and loneliest spot possible, and named after retribution. And since men are involved in impiety from the three causes we have described, and two forms of impiety result from each such cause, those who sin in matters of religion fall into six classes that need to be distinguished, since they require penalties that are neither equal nor alike. For some, though they utterly disbelieve in the existence of the gods, have by nature a just character: they hate the wicked, and because of their dislike of injustice they cannot be induced to commit unjust actions, but they shun unjust men and love the just. Others, on the other hand, besides holding that the world is empty of gods, are afflicted by a lack of self-control with regard to pleasures and pains, and also have powerful memories and sharp wits. Though both these classes share alike in the disease of atheism, yet in the amount of ruin they bring on other people, the latter class would do more evil and the former less. For the one class will be entirely outspoken in its language about the gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and by ridiculing other people it will probably convert others to its views, unless it meets with punishment. The other class holds the same opinions as the former, yet is specially gifted by nature and full of craft and guile; it is the class out of which many diviners and experts in every kind of trickery are manufactured, and from it there also spring at times tyrants and demagogues and generals, and those who plot by means of private mystery rites of their own, and the devices of those who are called sophists. There may be many kinds of these; but those that call for legislation are two. Of these, the ironic kind commits sins that deserve not merely one death or two, while the other kind requires both admonition and imprisonment.
908e–909e
Athenian: Likewise, the belief that the gods are neglectful produces two other kinds of impiety, and the belief that they are open to bribes another two. With these kinds distinguished in this way, those offenders who suffer from folly, but are free of evil disposition and character, the judge shall place in the reformatory according to law for a period of no less than five years. During this time no other citizen shall associate with them except those who take part in the nightly assembly, and these shall associate with them to care for the salvation of their souls by admonition. When the term of their imprisonment has expired, if any of them seems to be reformed, he shall live among those who are reformed; but if not, and if he is convicted again on a similar charge, he shall be punished with death. But as for all those who have become like ravening beasts, and who, besides holding that the gods are negligent or open to bribes, despise men, charming the souls of many of the living and claiming that they charm the souls of the dead, and promising to persuade the gods by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers, and incantations, and who in this way try to ruin utterly not only individuals but whole families and states for the sake of money: if any of these men is found guilty, the court shall order him to be imprisoned according to law in the prison in the middle of the country, and shall order that no free man shall ever visit such criminals, and that they shall receive from the servants a ration of food fixed by the Law-wardens. And when one of them dies, he shall be cast out beyond the borders unburied; and if any free man helps to bury him, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety brought by anyone who chooses to prosecute. And if the dead man leaves children fit for citizenship, the guardians of orphans shall take them too under their care from the day of their father’s conviction, just as much as any other orphans. For all these offenders one general law must be laid down, such as will cause most of them not only to offend less against the gods in word and deed, but also to become less foolish, because they will be forbidden to trade in religion illegally. To deal comprehensively with all such cases, the following law shall be enacted: No one shall possess a shrine in his own house. When anyone is moved in spirit to offer sacrifice, he shall go to the public places to sacrifice, and he shall hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses whose duty it is to consecrate them; and he himself, together with any associates he may choose, shall join in the prayers.
909e–910d
Athenian: This procedure shall be followed for the following reasons. It is no easy task to found temples and gods, and doing it rightly requires much deliberation. Yet it is customary for all women especially, and for sick people everywhere, and for those in danger or distress (whatever the nature of the distress), and conversely for those who have had a stroke of good fortune, to dedicate whatever happens to be at hand at the moment, and to vow sacrifices and promise to found shrines to gods and demigods and children of gods. And through terrors caused by waking visions or by dreams, and in the same way as they recall many visions and try to provide remedies for each of them, they are in the habit of founding altars and shrines and filling every house and every village with them, and open places too, and every spot that was the scene of such experiences. For all these reasons their conduct should be governed by the law now stated. A further reason is this: to keep impious men from acting fraudulently in these matters too, by setting up shrines and altars in private houses, thinking to win the favor of the gods secretly by sacrifices and vows, and so increasing their own wickedness infinitely. In this way they make both themselves and the better men who permit them guilty in the eyes of the gods, so that the whole state reaps the consequences of their impiety to some degree, and deserves to reap them. The lawgiver himself, however, will not be blamed by the god; for this shall be the law laid down: No one shall possess shrines of the gods in a private house. If anyone, whether man or woman, is shown to possess and worship at any shrine other than the public shrines, and if he is guilty of no serious act of impiety, whoever notices the fact shall inform the Law-wardens, and they shall order the private shrines to be removed to the public temples; and if the owner disobeys the order, they shall punish him until he removes them. And if anyone is shown to have committed an impious act that is not the venial offense of children but the serious irreligion of grown men, whether by setting up a shrine on private ground or by sacrificing on public ground to any gods whatever, he shall be punished with death for sacrificing in a state of impurity. And the Law-wardens shall judge what is a childish or venial offense and what is not, and shall then bring the offenders before the court and impose on them the due penalty for their impiety.
About this book
Laws, Book 10
0 connections
No connections in this book yet.