913a–913d
Athenian: Next, our business dealings with one another will need proper regulation. A comprehensive rule like this will serve: as far as possible, no one shall touch my goods or move them in the slightest, if he has not obtained my consent in any way at all; and I must act the same way regarding the goods of everyone else, keeping a prudent mind. Let us mention treasure as the first of such things. If a man has stored up treasure for himself and his family (if he is not one of my parents), I must never pray to the gods to find it. Nor, if I do find it, may I move it, and I may never tell the so-called soothsayers about it, who may advise me in one way or another about taking up what has been deposited in the ground. For I would never gain as much financial profit by removing it as I would gain growth in virtue of soul and in justice by not removing it. By preferring to acquire justice in my soul rather than money in my purse, I would be gaining a greater possession in place of a lesser one, and in a better part of myself as well. The rule “You shall not move the immovable” rightly applies to many cases, and the case before us is one of them. People ought also to believe the stories told about these matters, that such conduct harms the begetting of children. But suppose a man proves to be both careless of children and neglectful of the lawgiver. Without the consent of the depositor, he takes up a treasure that neither he himself nor any of his ancestors deposited. In this way he breaks a most excellent law, and that most comprehensive ordinance of the noble man who said, “Do not take up what you did not lay down.” This man despises these two lawgivers and takes up what he did not lay down himself, and it is no small thing but sometimes an enormous quantity of treasure. What penalty should such a man suffer?
913d–914e
Athenian: What he should suffer at the hands of the gods, God knows. But the man who first notices an act of this kind shall report it. If it happens in the city, he shall report it to the city-stewards; if it happens in the city’s public market, to the market-stewards; and if it happens in the countryside outside, he shall declare it to the rural stewards and their officers. When such reports are made, the State shall send to Delphi, and whatever the god pronounces about the goods and about the man who moved them, the State shall carry out, acting as agent for the oracles of the god. If the informer is a free man, he shall gain a reputation for virtue, but a reputation for vice if he fails to inform. If he is a slave, it will be right for him to be set free as a reward for informing, with the State paying his price to his master; but he shall be punished with death if he fails to give information. Next after this, to reinforce it, should come a similar rule about matters great and small. If a man leaves any of his goods behind anywhere, whether willingly or unwillingly, whoever comes upon them shall let them lie, believing that the Goddess of the Wayside guards them, since such things are dedicated by the law to her divinity. If anyone breaks this rule, disobediently picks up such things and carries them home, and he is a slave and the article is of small value, then the person who meets him, being at least thirty years old, shall whip him with many lashes. But if he is a free man, he shall not only be regarded as ungentlemanly and as a rebel against the laws, but he shall also pay ten times the value of the article moved to the man who left it behind. If one man charges another with possessing any of his goods, whether much or little, and the man so charged admits that he has the article but denies that it belongs to the other man, then, if the article in question has been registered with the magistrates according to law, the plaintiff shall summon its possessor before the magistrate, and the possessor shall produce it in court. Once the article has been displayed in this way, if the records clearly show to which of the disputants it belongs, that person shall take it and go. But if it belongs to some third party who is not present, whichever of the two claimants provides an adequate guarantor shall take it away on behalf of the absent party, exercising that party’s right of removal, in order to hand it over to him. But if the disputed article is not registered with the magistrates, it shall be kept in the custody of the three senior magistrates until the trial. If the article held in pledge is an animal, the party who loses the case concerning it shall pay the magistrates for its keep, and the magistrates shall decide the case within three days. Anyone of sound mind may, if he wishes, seize his own slave, to use him for any lawful purpose; and on behalf of another person, one of his relatives or friends, he may seize a runaway slave in order to keep him safe. If someone tries to claim as free a person who is being led off as a slave, the man leading him off shall let him go, and the claimant shall take him only after providing three adequate sureties, and not otherwise;
914e–915e
Athenian: and if anyone takes a slave away contrary to these conditions, he shall be liable for violence, and if convicted he shall pay the man deprived double the damages stated in the charge. A man may also arrest a freedman if he fails to attend, or to attend adequately, on those who freed him. This service shall consist in the freedman coming three times a month to the home of the man who freed him, and offering there to do whatever duties are both just and feasible; and in matters of marriage, too, he shall act as his former master approves. The freedman shall not be permitted to become wealthier than the man who freed him; if he does, the excess shall be made over to his master. A man who has been set free shall not remain in the country more than twenty years. He shall leave, like all other foreigners, taking all his property with him, unless he obtains the consent of the magistrates and also of the man who freed him. If a freedman, or any other foreigner, acquires property exceeding the amount of the third property class, then within thirty days from the day on which he acquires this excess he shall take his own property and leave, and he shall have no further right to ask the magistrates for permission to stay. If he disobeys these rules, is brought to court and is convicted, he shall be punished with death, and his goods shall be confiscated. Such cases shall be tried before the tribal courts, unless the parties first settle their charges against one another before neighbors or chosen jurors. If anyone claims as his own an animal belonging to another man, or any other of his possessions, the man who holds it shall refer the matter back to the person who sold it to him, gave it to him, or made it over to him in some other way, as its substantial and lawful owner. He shall do this within thirty days if the reference is made to a citizen or a metic in the city, or, in the case of a delivery from abroad, within five months, of which the middle month shall be the one that includes the summer solstice. When one person makes an exchange with another by buying or selling, the exchange shall be made by handing over the article in the place appointed for it in the market, and nowhere else, with payment of the price on the spot, and no purchase or sale shall be made on credit. If anyone makes an exchange with another in any other way or in other places, trusting the person he is dealing with, he shall do so on the understanding that no lawsuits are allowed concerning things not sold in accordance with the laws now prescribed. As for club collections, anyone who wishes may collect contributions as a friend among friends; but if any dispute arises about the collection, they must act on the understanding that no legal actions at all are possible in these matters.
915e–916e
Athenian: If anyone receives a price of not less than fifty drachmas for the sale of any article, he shall be compelled to remain in the city for ten days, and the buyer shall be informed where the seller lives. This is because of the complaints usually brought in connection with such transactions, and because of the returns of goods that the law permits. Such legal return, or refusal of return, shall be as follows. A man may sell a slave who suffers from consumption, or stone, or strangury, or the so-called sacred disease, or from any other ailment, mental or physical, that most people would fail to notice even though it is long-lasting and hard to cure. If the buyer is a doctor or a trainer, he shall not be able to obtain restitution in such a case; nor shall he if the seller told the buyer the facts beforehand. But if a professional sells any such slave to a layperson, the buyer shall claim restitution within six months, except in the case of epilepsy, for which he shall be permitted to claim within twelve months. The case shall be tried before a panel of doctors nominated and chosen jointly by both parties, and the party that loses shall pay double the price at which the slave was sold. If a layperson sells to a layperson, there shall be the same right of restitution and trial as in the cases just mentioned, but the losing party shall pay only the selling price. If a man knowingly sells a murderer to a buyer who is aware of the fact, the buyer shall have no claim to restitution for such a purchase. But if the buyer is unaware of it, he shall have the right of restitution as soon as he discovers the fact, and the trial shall take place before a court of the five youngest Law-wardens. If it is decided that the seller acted knowingly, he shall purify the buyer’s houses as the interpreters prescribe, and he shall pay the buyer three times the selling price. Whoever exchanges money for money, or for anything else, living or not living, shall give and receive every such article unadulterated, in conformity with the law. Regarding all dishonesty of this kind, as with other laws, let us listen to a prelude. Every man should regard adulteration as belonging to the same class as falsehood and fraud. About this class of actions the masses commonly say, wrongly, that any such action will often be right if it is done at the right moment; but they leave that right moment, the when and the where, unprescribed and undefined, so that by this saying they often bring harm both on themselves and on others. But the lawgiver may not leave this matter undefined. He must always state clearly the limits, whether broader or narrower, and that shall be done now:
916e–918a
Athenian: No one who does not intend to be most hateful to the gods shall commit any falsehood, fraud, or adulteration, in word or deed, while calling on the gods as witnesses. Such a person is, first, the man who swears false oaths with no regard for the gods, and, second, the man who lies in the presence of his superiors. Now the better are the superiors of the worse, and, generally speaking, the older of the younger; and so parents are superior to their offspring, men to women and children, and rulers to the ruled. It will be proper for everyone to revere all these classes of superiors, both in other positions of authority and above all in offices of State; and this is the very point from which our present discussion has arisen. For everyone who adulterates any goods in the market lies and deceives, and, calling on Heaven as witness, swears an oath in defiance of the laws and cautions of the market-stewards, neither respecting people nor revering gods. It is certainly a good practice not to defile divine names lightly, and to behave with the purity and holiness that most of us generally show in matters of religion. If, however, this rule is disobeyed, the law runs as follows: Whoever sells any article in the market shall never name two prices for what he is selling. He shall name one price only, and if he does not get it, he may rightly take the article away again; but on that same day he shall not set any other price on it, higher or lower. And there shall be no talking up of anything offered for sale, and no swearing of oaths about it. If anyone disobeys these rules, any townsman who is present and not under thirty years of age shall punish the seller who swears by beating him, and he shall do so with impunity; but if he disregards the rule and fails to do so, he shall be liable to criticism for betraying the laws. If a man is selling an adulterated article and cannot obey our present instructions, anyone present who knows the facts and is able to expose him shall expose him before the magistrates. If that person is a slave or a metic, he shall take the adulterated article for himself. But if he is a citizen, he shall be declared wicked, as one who robs the gods, if he fails to expose the guilty man; while if he does expose him, he shall dedicate the article to the gods who preside over the market. The man found selling any such article, in addition to being deprived of the adulterated article, shall be whipped in the marketplace, one lash for every drachma of the price he asks for the article, after the herald has first proclaimed the offenses for which the seller is to be beaten. Concerning frauds and wrongful acts by sellers, the market-stewards and the Law-wardens, after inquiring from experts in each trade, shall write out rules about what the seller must do and must avoid doing. They shall post these on a pillar in front of the market-stewards’ office, to serve as written laws and clear guides for those doing business in the market.
918a–918c
Athenian: The duties of the city-stewards have already been fully stated. If any addition seems necessary, they shall consult the Law-wardens and write out what seems to be missing, and they shall post on the pillar at the city-stewards’ office both the primary and the secondary regulations relating to their office. Close on the heels of adulteration come the practices of retail trade. On this subject as a whole, we shall first offer advice and argument, and then impose a law on it. By nature, all retail trade arises in a State not for the sake of harm but for exactly the opposite. For how can a man be anything but a benefactor if he makes even and proportionate the distribution of any kind of goods that was previously disproportionate and uneven? We must say that this is the effect produced by the power of money, and we must declare that the merchant is appointed for this purpose. The hired worker, the innkeeper, and the rest, some more and some less respectable occupations, all serve this function: to provide everyone with full satisfaction of their needs and with evenness in their possessions. Let us see, then, why trade is thought to be neither noble nor even respectable, and what has caused it to be disparaged, so that we may remedy at least parts of it by law, if not the whole. This is apparently no trivial undertaking, and one that calls for no small virtue.
918c
Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: My dear Clinias, it is only a small class of people, few by nature and trained with an exceptional training, who, when they fall into various needs and desires, are able to hold out firmly for moderation, and who, when they have the chance to take a great deal of wealth, stay sober and choose what is within due measure rather than what is large. The disposition of the mass of mankind is the exact opposite. When they want something, they want it without limit, and when they could make moderate gains, they prefer to gain insatiably. That is why all the classes engaged in retail trade, commerce, and innkeeping are disparaged and subjected to violent abuse. Now suppose someone did what never will be done (Heaven forbid!), though I shall make the supposition, ridiculous as it is. Suppose he compelled the best men everywhere to keep inns for a time, or to peddle, or to carry on any such trade, or even compelled women by some necessity of fate to take part in such a way of life. Then we would learn that each of these occupations is friendly and desirable; and if all of them were carried on by a rule free from corruption, they would be honored with the honor one pays to a mother or a nurse.
919a–919e
Athenian: But as things are now, a man sets up his house for retail trade in a deserted place, with long roads leading from it in every direction. In this welcome lodging he receives travelers in distress, providing quiet and calm to those battered by fierce storms, or restful coolness after scorching heat. But then, instead of treating them as companions and offering friendly gifts along with his hospitality, he holds them for ransom as if they were captured enemies in his power, demanding enormous sums of unjust and unclean ransom money. It is crimes such as this, in all these trades, that give grounds for complaint against this way of relieving distress. For these evils, then, the lawgiver must in each case provide a remedy. It is an old and true saying that it is hard to fight against two enemies attacking from opposite directions, as with diseases and many other things. Indeed, our present fight in this matter is against two enemies, poverty and wealth: wealth corrupts people’s souls with luxury, while poverty, through pain, drives them into shamelessness. What remedy, then, can be found for this disease in a State endowed with understanding? First, to make use of the trading class as little as possible; second, to assign to that class people whose corruption would be no great loss to the State; and third, to find a means by which the characters of those engaged in these occupations may not so easily become infected with shamelessness and meanness of soul. After what has now been said, let our law on these matters (Heaven prosper it!) run as follows: Among the Magnesians, whom the god is restoring and founding anew, none of the landholders who belong to the 5040 households shall, either willingly or unwillingly, become a retail trader or a merchant, or perform any menial service for private persons who do not make an equal return to him. The only exceptions are his father and mother, and those of still earlier generations, and all who are older than himself, provided they are gentlemen and his service is a gentleman’s service. It is not easy to fix by law precisely what befits a gentleman and what does not; but it shall be decided by those who have won public distinction for their aversion to what is ungentlemanly and their devotion to what is gentlemanly.
919e–920e
Athenian: If any citizen engages, through some craft, in ungentlemanly peddling, anyone who wishes shall indict him for disgracing his family before a panel of those judged to be first in virtue. If he is found to be defiling his ancestral hearth by an unworthy occupation, he shall be imprisoned for a year and so restrained from it. If he repeats the offense, he shall be imprisoned for two years, and with each further conviction the term of imprisonment shall continue to be doubled. Now comes a second law: Whoever intends to engage in retail trade must be a resident alien or a foreigner. And third, this third law: so that such a person, residing in our State, may be as good as possible, or as little bad as possible, the Law-wardens must keep in mind that they are guardians not only of those who, being well trained by both birth and upbringing, are easy to guard from lawless and evil ways, but also of those who are not, and who follow pursuits that strongly tend to push them toward vice; these they must guard all the more. Accordingly, retail trade is a many-sided occupation that includes many callings of a similar kind. With respect to it—I mean, with respect to as many branches as are allowed to remain because they are judged absolutely necessary to the State—the procedure shall be the same as that previously prescribed for the related matter of adulteration. The Law-wardens must meet in consultation with experts in every branch of retail trade, and at their meetings they must consider what ratio of receipts to expenses yields a moderate profit for the trader. They must prescribe in writing the standard of receipts and expenses arrived at in this way, and it must be enforced by the market-stewards, the city-stewards, and the rural stewards, each in their own sphere. In this way, perhaps, retail trade would benefit all classes and do very little harm to those in the States who practice it. Regarding agreements: a man may undertake an agreement and fail to fulfill it. Excluded are agreements forbidden by the laws or by a decree, or made under forcible and unjust compulsion, and cases in which he is involuntarily prevented from fulfilling it by some unforeseen accident. In all other cases of unfulfilled agreements, actions may be brought before the tribal courts, if the parties cannot first reach a settlement before arbitrators or neighbors. The class of craftsmen who have equipped our life with the arts is sacred to Hephaestus and Athena; and those who safeguard the products of these craftsmen by other, defensive arts belong to Ares and Athena; rightly is this class, too, sacred to these deities. All of these continually serve both the country and the people: the one class as leaders in the contests of war, the other by producing tools and works for pay;
920e–921e
Athenian: and it would be improper for these men to lie about their crafts, since they revere the gods who are their ancestors. A craftsman may fail, through baseness, to finish his work within the time agreed, showing no reverence for the god who gives him his livelihood, but supposing in his blindness of mind that the god will be lenient because he is his kinsman. Such a man shall, first, pay a penalty to the god; and, second, a law shall be enacted to fit his case: He shall owe the price of the work about which he has deceived the person who ordered it, and within the stated time he shall do it all over again free of charge. Just as the law advised the seller, so it advises the contractor who undertakes a work not to put too high a price on it, but to value it as simply as possible at its real worth. The law, I say, gives this same instruction to the contractor, for as a craftsman he certainly knows what it is worth. In States made up of free people, a craftsman must never use his art, which is by nature clear and truthful, to try to get the better of laypeople by trickery; and in such cases the wronged party shall be entitled to sue the wrongdoer. On the other hand, a man who has given an order to a craftsman may fail to pay him his wages properly according to the lawful agreement, and so dishonor Zeus, the Patron of the State, and Athena, who are partners in the constitution, dissolving great partnerships out of love for a little gain. In that case, with the help of the gods, the following law shall come to the aid of the bonds that hold the State together: Whoever has already received the work he ordered and does not pay the price within the agreed period shall be required to pay double the price. If a year has passed, then, although all other money lent out bears no interest, this man shall pay as interest one obol on each drachma for every month of arrears; and actions in these cases shall be held before the tribal courts. Now that we have mentioned craftsmen in general, it is right to refer in passing to those whose craft is military security, that is, generals and all experts in such matters. As with the former craftsmen, so with these men, who are craftsmen of another kind. Whenever any of them, either voluntarily or under orders, undertakes any public work and carries it out well, the law will never tire of praising the man who duly pays them the honors that are the soldier’s wages;
921e–922c
Athenian: but if a man has already received some noble work of war and fails to pay for it, the law will blame him. So, on this matter, let this law be laid down, combined with praise. It advises rather than compels the mass of citizens to honor in the second rank of merit those brave men who protect the State, either by bold deeds or by military devices. For the first rank of merit belongs to those who must receive the greatest reward, namely those who have proven exceptionally able to honor the written code of the good lawgivers. We have now regulated most of the more important business dealings between people, except those concerning orphans and the care of orphans by their guardians; so after the matters now dealt with, these must necessarily receive some kind of regulation. All these matters originate either in the wishes of those about to die to dispose of their property, or in the chance circumstances of those who die without making any will at all. It was in view of how complex and difficult these cases are, Clinias, that I used the word “necessarily.” Indeed, it is impossible to leave them unregulated. Suppose any will a man makes, whatever his state of mind at the end of his life, were simply granted absolute and unconditional validity. Then individuals might set down many wishes that conflict with one another and run counter both to the laws and to the dispositions of the living, as well as to their own earlier dispositions, in the days before they set about making a will. For most of us are in a somewhat dull and enfeebled state of mind when we think we are about to die.
922c
Clinias: What do you mean by this, Stranger? Athenian: A man who is about to die, Clinias, is a difficult subject, and full of talk that is very alarming and troublesome for a lawgiver. Clinias: How so? Athenian: Since he insists on being master of everything he has, he tends to speak angrily.
922d
Clinias: What will he say? Athenian: “Good heavens,” he cries, “what a monstrous outrage it is if I am not allowed at all to give my own things, or not give them, to whomever I wish, and more to one and less to another, depending on whether they have proven good to me or bad, when they were thoroughly tested in times of sickness, or in old age, and in all kinds of other circumstances!” Clinias: And don’t you think, Stranger, that what they say is right?
922e
Athenian: What I think, Clinias, is this: the old lawgivers were weak, and they made laws with a short view and slight consideration of human affairs. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: It was out of fear of that angry speech, my good sir, that they made the law allowing a man to dispose of his goods by will without any condition, exactly as he pleases. But you and I will give a more fitting answer to those in your State who are about to die.
923a
Clinias: In what way? Athenian: “Friends,” we will say, “you who are truly creatures of a day, it is hard for you at present to know your own possessions, and your own selves as well, as the inscription at Delphi declares. So I, as lawgiver, make this ruling: neither you yourselves nor this property of yours belong to you. You and it belong to your whole family, both past and future; and still more truly, all your family and its property belong to the State. That being so, if anyone flatters you and attends on you when you are afflicted by disease or age, and persuades you to make a will contrary to what is best, I will not willingly consent. Instead, I will legislate with a general view to what is best for your whole family and for the State, justly treating the interest of the individual as of lesser importance. May you feel kindly and at peace with us as you journey toward the destination to which, by the natural law of our human life, you are now traveling. The rest of your affairs shall be our concern, and we will watch over them all, without exception, to the best of our ability.” Let this serve, Clinias, both as consolation and as prelude for the living and the dying, and the law shall run as follows: Whoever writes a will disposing of his property shall, if he is the father of children, first write down the name of whichever of his sons he judges worthy to be his heir; and if he offers any of his other children to another man to be adopted by him, he shall write this down as well. He may also have a further son who has not been adopted into any lot, and whom he expects to be sent out to a colony by law. To that son the father shall be allowed to give as much of his other property as he wishes, except the ancestral lot and all the equipment of that lot; and if there are several more sons, the father shall divide among them, in whatever way he chooses, the property that remains beyond the lot. If a son already has a house, the father shall not assign him any goods; and the same applies to a daughter: if she is betrothed to a husband, he shall not assign her any goods, but if she is not betrothed, he shall. If, after the will is made, it turns out that one of the sons or daughters owns a lot in the country, that person shall give up his legacy in favor of the heir of the man who made the will. If the testator leaves no male children but only females, he shall leave to whichever daughter he chooses a husband, and to himself a son, and shall write him down as his heir;
923e–924e
Athenian: and if a man has a son, whether his own or adopted, who dies in childhood before reaching manhood, then in this case too the man making the will shall state in writing who is to succeed as his son, with better fortune. If any testator is entirely childless, he may take out a tenth of his surplus property and give it to anyone he chooses; but all the rest he shall hand over to his adopted heir, and he shall make him his son, with mutual goodwill and the blessing of the law. When a man’s children need guardians, he may die after making a will and naming which persons, and how many, he wishes to act as guardians to his children. If they are willing and consent to act, then the choice of guardians made in this document shall be final. But if a man dies either entirely without a will or having left the choice of guardians out of his will, then the nearest relatives on both the father’s and the mother’s side, two from each side, together with one of the friends of the deceased, shall act as official guardians, and the Law-wardens shall appoint them for each orphan who needs them. Everything concerning guardianship and the orphans shall be supervised by fifteen of the Law-wardens, who shall be the eldest of the whole body. They shall divide themselves into groups of three by seniority, three acting one year and another three the next, until the five yearly periods have gone around in rotation; and this process shall continue, as far as possible, without a break. If a man dies entirely without a will, leaving children who need guardianship, his unprovided-for children shall share in these same laws. And if a man meets with some unforeseen misfortune and leaves daughters, he shall forgive the lawgiver if he arranges the betrothal of the daughters with an eye to two points out of three, namely closeness of kinship and the security of the lot, and leaves out the third point, which a father would take into consideration: choosing, from among all the citizens, someone suited by character and conduct to be a son to himself and a husband for his daughter. He shall forgive him, I say, if the lawgiver passes this over because it is impossible for him to consider it. Accordingly, the law we shall enact on such matters, the best within our power, will be this: If a man dies without a will and leaves daughters, the brother born of the same father, or the brother born of the same mother who has no lot, shall take the daughter and the lot of the deceased. If there is no brother but there is a brother’s son, the procedure shall be the same, provided the two are of suitable ages for each other. If there is none of these, the same rule shall apply to a sister’s son; then, fourth, to the father’s brother; fifth, to that man’s son; and sixth, to the son of the father’s sister.
925a–925e
Athenian: In the same way, if a man leaves female children, the right of kinship shall always proceed by degrees of blood relationship, going up through siblings and their children, first the males and then the females of the same line. The judge shall decide by inspection whether the time is suitable for marriage or not, viewing the males naked and the females naked down to the navel. If the family has no relatives as far as a brother’s grandchildren, and likewise as far as a grandfather’s children, then whichever of the other citizens the girl chooses with the help of her guardians shall, if both he and the girl are willing, become the heir of the deceased and the husband of his daughter. But obstacles often arise, and there may be times when there is an unusual shortage of such men in the city itself. So a girl, at a loss to find a husband on the spot, may see someone who has emigrated to a colony and want him to become heir to her father’s property. If he is a relative, he shall proceed to the lot according to the order prescribed by law. But if he is outside the family, and there is no near relative in the State, he shall be entitled, by the choice of the guardians and of the daughter of the deceased, to marry her and to take the lot of the man who died without a will when he returns home. When someone dies without a will, having no children at all, male or female, all other matters in his case shall be governed by the previous law. In each such instance a man and a woman from the family shall go into the deserted house as joint occupants, and their claim to the lot shall be made valid. The women’s claims to the inheritance shall come in this order: first, a sister; second, a brother’s daughter; third, a sister’s daughter; fourth, a father’s sister; fifth, a father’s brother’s daughter; sixth, a father’s sister’s daughter. These women shall share the home with the male relatives according to degree of kinship and right, as we enacted earlier. Now we must not overlook how burdensome such a law may prove. Sometimes it harshly orders the next of kin of the deceased to marry his kinswoman, and it seems to ignore the thousands of obstacles in human life that make people unwilling to obey such orders and lead them to prefer any other alternative, however painful, in cases where either of the parties ordered to marry suffers from diseases or defects of body or mind. Some might suppose that the lawgiver pays no attention to these considerations, but they would be wrong.
925e–926a
Athenian: Therefore, on behalf of both the lawgiver and those to whom the law applies, let a sort of general prelude be spoken. It asks those to whom the order is given to forgive the lawgiver, because in caring for the public interest he cannot also manage the private misfortunes that happen to individuals; and it also asks forgiveness for those subject to the law, since they are naturally unable at times to carry out the ordinances that the lawgiver laid down without knowledge of their circumstances.
926a
Clinias: In that case, Stranger, what would be the most reasonable course to take? Athenian: For laws of this kind, Clinias, and for those whom they affect, it is necessary to choose arbitrators. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: It might happen that a nephew with a rich father would be reluctant to marry his uncle’s daughter, putting on airs and having his mind set on a grander match. Or again, when what the lawgiver commands would be a terrible calamity, a man might be compelled to disobey the law; for instance, when the law would force him to marry into madness or some other dreadful affliction of body or soul, the kind that makes life unbearable for the person so joined. Let this statement of ours now be laid down as a law in the following terms: Some people may have a complaint against the established laws concerning wills on some point, especially those relating to marriage, and may swear that the lawgiver himself, if he were alive and present, would truly never have compelled the parties to act as they are now being compelled to act in marrying and in being given in marriage. If, on the other hand, some relative or guardian supports the compulsion of the law, we declare that the lawgiver has left us the fifteen Law-wardens to act for the orphans, male and female, as both arbitrators and parents. All who dispute about any such matters shall go to them for judgment, and their decisions shall be carried out as final. If, however, anyone thinks that this gives the Law-wardens too much power, he shall summon his opponents before the court of select judges and obtain a decision on the disputed points. On the one who loses, the lawgiver shall impose condemnation and disgrace, a penalty heavier than a large fine in the eyes of a man of sound mind. Accordingly, orphaned children will undergo a kind of second birth. We have already described how each of them should be reared and educated after their first birth. Now we must devise some means by which, after their second birth, in which they are left without parents, their orphaned condition may be as free as possible from pitiful misery for those who have become orphans. First, we must legally appoint the Law-wardens to take the place of those who fathered them, as parents in no way inferior; and we instruct three of them each year to care for the orphans as their own, having already given both these men and the guardians a suitable prelude of directions concerning the upbringing of orphans.
926e–927e
Athenian: The account we gave earlier was timely, I think: how the souls of the dead have a certain power after death by which they care for human affairs. The stories that contain this doctrine are true, though long. And while it is right to believe the other traditions about such matters, which are so numerous and extremely old, we must also believe those who lay it down by law that these things are so, unless they plainly appear to be utter fools. So if this is really how things are, the guardians shall fear, first, the gods above, who take notice of the loneliness of orphans; second, the souls of the dead, whose natural instinct is to care especially for their own offspring, and to be well disposed toward those who respect them and hostile toward those who disrespect them; and third, the souls of the living who are old and held in the highest esteem. For where the State flourishes under good laws, their grandchildren revere them with affection and live in happiness. These old people have sharp eyes and sharp ears for such matters; they are gracious toward those who deal justly in them, but they are very angry with those who abuse orphans and the abandoned, regarding these as a most solemn and sacred trust. To all these authorities the guardian and official, if he has even a spark of sense, must pay attention. He must take as much care over the upbringing and education of the orphans as if he were contributing to his own support and that of his own children, and he must do them good in every way to the utmost of his power. So the man who obeys the story placed before the law, and does no wrong whatever to an orphan, will have no direct experience of the lawgiver’s anger against such offenses. But the disobedient man, and whoever wrongs anyone who has lost a father or mother, shall in every case pay double the penalty owed by the man who offends against a child whose parents are both living. As for further legal directions, either to guardians concerning orphans or to magistrates concerning the supervision of the guardians: if they did not already have a model for raising free children in the way they raise their own children and manage their own household property, and if they did not also have laws governing these same matters in detail, then it would have been reasonable enough to lay down laws on guardianship as a separate and distinct branch of law, marking off the life of the orphan from that of the non-orphan with special regulations of its own. But as things stand, in all these respects the condition of orphanhood among us does not differ much from that of being under a father’s control, although, as a rule, in public esteem and in the care given to the children, the two stand on quite different levels.
928a–928e
Athenian: Therefore, in its regulations concerning orphans, the law has stressed this very point, both by encouragement and by threat. Moreover, a threat of the following kind will be very timely: Whoever is guardian of a boy or a girl, and whichever of the Law-wardens is appointed to supervise a guardian, shall show as much affection for the child whom Fate has made an orphan as for his own children, and shall care for his ward’s property as zealously as for his own, or rather more so. Every guardian shall observe this one law in carrying out his office. If anyone acts in such matters contrary to this law, the magistrate shall punish him if he is a guardian; and if he is a magistrate, the guardian shall bring him before the court of the select judges and fine him double the penalty the court assesses. If the child’s relatives, or any other citizen, consider a guardian guilty of neglecting or mistreating his ward, they shall bring him before the same court, and he shall pay four times the damages assessed, half of which shall go to the child and half to the successful prosecutor. When an orphan has come of age, if he thinks he has been badly cared for, he shall be allowed to bring an action concerning the guardianship within five years after it has ended. If the guardian loses his case, the court shall assess his penalty or fine. If it is a magistrate who is judged to have harmed the orphan by neglect, the court shall assess what sum he shall pay the child; but if the harm was due to unjust dealing, then in addition to the fine he shall be removed from his office of Law-warden, and the public authority of the State shall appoint another in his place to serve as Law-warden for the country and the State. Between fathers and their children, and between children and their fathers, greater differences arise than is right. In these, fathers are apt to think that the lawgiver should give them legal permission, if they wish, to have a herald proclaim publicly that their sons have legally ceased to be their sons; and sons, for their part, claim permission to indict their fathers for insanity when illness or old age has put them in a shameful condition. Such things tend to happen among people whose characters are wholly bad; for where only half of them are bad, where the son is bad and the father not, or the reverse, such hostility does not lead to calamitous consequences.
928e–929e
Athenian: Now, under a different constitution a disinherited son would not necessarily cease to be a citizen; but in our State, of which these are to be the laws, the fatherless man must necessarily emigrate to another country, since not a single household can be added to our 5040. Consequently, the person who is to suffer this punishment legally must be disinherited not by his father alone but by the whole family. Such cases should be handled under a law like this: If any man is driven by a most unhappy impulse of anger to want, rightly or wrongly, to expel from his family a son he has fathered and raised, he shall not be permitted to do this casually or immediately. First, he shall assemble his own relatives as far as cousins, and likewise his son’s relatives on the mother’s side, and in their presence he shall accuse his son, showing why he deserves to be expelled from the family by all of them. He shall give the son an equal amount of time to argue that he does not deserve to suffer any such treatment. If the father convinces them and wins the votes of more than half the family, the votes being cast by all the other adults of both sexes except the father, the mother, and the son who is the defendant, then in this way and on these conditions, and in no other way, the father shall be permitted to disinherit his son. As for the disinherited man, if any citizen wishes to adopt him as a son, no law shall prevent him from doing so (for the characters of young people naturally undergo many changes during their lives). But if no one has offered to adopt the disinherited man within ten years, then the officials in charge of the surplus children destined for emigration shall take charge of these persons too, so that they may be properly included in the same scheme of emigration. Again, a man may become unusually deranged through illness, old age, or bad temper, or a combination of these afflictions, while his condition goes unnoticed by everyone except those who live with him. If he regards himself as master of his own property and squanders his estate, while his son is at a loss and hesitates to indict him for insanity, then a law shall be enacted on the son’s behalf. First, he shall go to the eldest Law-wardens and report his father’s condition to them. After a full inquiry, they shall advise whether or not he ought to bring an indictment; and if they advise him to bring one, they shall act for him, when he brings it, as both witnesses and advocates. A father who is convicted shall from then on have no power to dispose of even the smallest bit of his property, and he shall be treated as a child in the house for the rest of his life.
929e–930e
Athenian: If a husband and wife, because of unhappy temperaments, cannot agree at all, it is right that they should be under the constant supervision of ten middle-aged members of the Board of Law-wardens, together with ten of the women in charge of marriage. If these officials can bring about a reconciliation, that arrangement shall stand; but if their passions run too high for harmony, the officials shall, as far as possible, look for other suitable partners for each of them. Since such people are probably not of a gentle disposition, the officials must try to pair them with partners of a more gentle and settled character. If those who quarrel are childless, or have only a few children, they must form new unions with a view to children; but if they have enough children, then the purpose of both the separation and the new union should be companionship and mutual support in old age. If a man’s wife dies, leaving both male and female children, there shall be a law, advisory rather than compulsory, directing the husband to raise the children without bringing in a stepmother; but if there are no children, the widower must marry, until he has fathered enough children for both his household and the State. If the husband dies leaving enough children, the children’s mother shall remain there and raise them. But if she is judged too young to be able to live in good health without a husband, her relatives shall report the case to the women in charge of marriage, and they shall take whatever action seems good to those women and to themselves; and if there is a shortage of children, they shall also act with a view to providing children. The law shall fix the bare sufficiency of children at one of each sex. Sometimes it is agreed who a child’s parents are, but a decision is needed as to which parent the child should follow. The rule is this: in all cases where a slave woman has had relations with a slave, or with a free man or a freedman, the child shall belong to the slave woman’s master; but if a free woman has relations with a slave, the offspring shall belong to the slave’s master. If the child is a master’s by his own slave woman, or a mistress’s by her own slave, and the facts of the case are quite clear, then the women officials shall send the woman’s child, together with its father, away to another country, and the Law-wardens shall send the man’s child away together with its mother. Neither any god nor any sensible person would ever advise anyone to neglect his parents. One should recognize how fittingly a prelude of the following kind, dealing with the worship of the gods, would apply to the honors and dishonors paid to parents:
930e–931b
Athenian: The ancient laws of all people concerning the gods are twofold. Some of the gods we honor we see clearly; of others we set up statues as images, and we believe that when we worship these, lifeless as they are, the living gods beyond them feel great goodwill and gratitude toward us. So if anyone has a father or mother, or one of their fathers or mothers, laid up in his house, bedridden with age, let him never suppose that, while he has such a figure as this at his hearth, any statue could be more potent, provided that its owner tends it duly and rightly.
931b
Clinias: And what do you say the right way is? Athenian: I will tell you; for truly, my friends, matters of this kind deserve a hearing. Clinias: Go ahead. Athenian: Oedipus, as our story goes, when he was dishonored, called down curses on his children, curses that, as everyone says, were heard and fulfilled by Heaven. We also tell how Amyntor in his anger cursed his son Phoenix, and Theseus cursed Hippolytus, and countless other parents cursed countless other sons; and it has been clearly proved that the gods grant such curses of parents on their sons. For a parent’s curse laid on his children is more potent than any other person’s curse against anyone else, and most justly so. When a father or mother is dishonored by the children, God naturally pays special attention to their prayers. Are we to suppose, then, that when the parent is honored and highly pleased, and earnestly prays the gods to bless his children, the gods do not listen equally to prayers of this kind and grant them to us? For if not, they could never be just distributors of blessings; and that, we assert, would be most unfitting for gods.
931d
Clinias: Most unfitting indeed. Athenian: Let us hold, then, as we said a moment ago, that in the eyes of the gods we can possess no image more worthy of honor than a father or an ancestor laid low by old age, or a mother in the same condition. When a person honors them with gifts, God is well pleased, for otherwise He would not grant their prayers. For the shrine that is an ancestor is marvelous to us, far beyond one that is lifeless. The living ones pray for us when we tend them and pray against us when we dishonor them, while the lifeless images do neither. So if a man treats his father and his ancestors and all such kin rightly, he will possess images more potent than any others for winning him a lot blessed by Heaven.
931e
Clinias: Excellent! Athenian: Every sensible person fears and respects the prayers of parents, knowing that they have proven effective many times and in many cases. Since nature has ordered things this way, aged ancestors are a heavenly treasure to good people while they live, up to the very last hours of life, and when they depart they are deeply missed; but to the wicked they are truly fearsome. Therefore let everyone, obeying these counsels, honor his own parents with all the honors the law prescribes. If, however, report shows that anyone is deaf to such preludes, the following law will rightly be enacted to deal with them: If anyone in this State is more neglectful of his parents than is right, and fails to defer to them in all things and to fulfill their wishes more than those of his sons or any of his offspring, or even his own, the parent who suffers any such neglect shall report it, either in person or through a messenger, to the three eldest Law-wardens and to three of the women in charge of marriage. These shall take the matter in hand and shall punish the wrongdoers with lashes and imprisonment if they are still young: men up to the age of thirty, while women shall suffer the same punishment up to the age of forty. If, after passing these age limits, they do not give up the same neglect of their parents, but some of them even mistreat them, they shall be brought before a court of 101 citizens, who shall be the oldest citizens of all. If a person is convicted, the court shall assess what fine or punishment he must undergo, ruling out no penalty that a human being can suffer or pay. If a parent who is mistreated is unable to report it, any free person who hears of it shall inform the magistrates; if he fails to do so, he shall be considered base and shall be liable to an action for damages brought by anyone who wishes. If a slave gives information, he shall be set free. He shall be freed by the Board of Magistrates if he is a slave of either the injured party or the offenders; but if he belongs to any other citizen, the State Treasury shall pay his owner his price; and the magistrates shall make sure that no one harms such a man in revenge for giving information. We have already dealt fully with cases in which one person harms another with poisons so that death results; but we have not yet dealt fully with any of the lesser cases in which willful and deliberate harm is done by means of drinks, foods, or ointments. Our treatment of poisoning cases requires a division, since, given the nature of humankind, they are of two distinct kinds.
932e–933e
Athenian: The kind we have just expressly mentioned is the one in which bodies harm bodies according to the laws of nature. Distinct from this is the kind that works by sorceries, incantations, and so-called binding spells. It convinces those who attempt to cause harm that they really can do so, and it also convinces their victims that they are certainly being harmed by people who have the power of bewitchment. In all such matters it is neither easy to perceive the real truth, nor, if one does perceive it, easy to convince others. And it is futile to approach the souls of people who regard one another with dark suspicion about such things, if they happen to see molded wax figures at doorways, or at crossroads, or perhaps at the tomb of some ancestor, and to tell them to make light of all such portents, when we ourselves have no clear opinion about them. Consequently, we shall divide the law on poisoning into two parts, according to the way in which the attempt is made. As a preliminary, we shall plead, urge, and advise that no one should attempt to commit such an act, or frighten the mass of people, as if they were children, with bogeymen, and so compel the lawgiver and the judge to cure people of such fears. For, first, the man who attempts poisoning does not know what he is doing, either with respect to bodies, unless he is a medical expert, or with respect to sorceries, unless he is a prophet or diviner. So let this statement stand as the law on poisoning: Whoever poisons anyone so as to cause harm that is not fatal, either to that person himself or to his household servants, or so as to cause harm, fatal or not, to his flocks or his hives, shall be punished with death if he is a doctor and is convicted of poisoning; but if he is a layperson, the court shall assess in his case what he shall suffer or pay. If a man is judged to be acting like one who causes harm through binding spells, enchantments, incantations, or any such form of poisoning, then, if he is a prophet or diviner, he shall be put to death; but if he has no knowledge of the prophetic art and is convicted of poisoning, he shall be treated the same way as a layperson convicted of poisoning. That is, the court shall assess in his case too what seems right to them for him to suffer or pay.
933e–934e
Athenian: In all cases where one person causes damage to another by theft or violence, he shall pay the damaged party a large sum in compensation if the damage is great, and a small sum if it is small. As a general rule, everyone shall in every case pay a sum equal to the damage done, until the loss is made good; and in addition, everyone shall pay the penalty attached to his crime as a corrective. The penalty shall be lighter for one who has done wrong through another’s folly, having been overpersuaded because of his youth or for some similar reason. It shall be heavier when a person has done wrong through his own folly, because of his lack of self-control regarding pleasures and pains, or under the overpowering influence of cowardly fears, or of incurable desires, envies, and rages. He shall pay the penalty not because of the wrongdoing, for what is done can never be undone, but so that in the future both he himself and those who see him punished may either utterly loathe his wrongdoing or at least largely give up such lamentable conduct. For all these reasons, and with a view to all these aims, the law, like a good archer, must aim in each case at the amount of the punishment, and above all at its fitting amount. The judge must help the lawgiver in this same task whenever the law entrusts him with assessing what the defendant must suffer or pay, while the lawgiver, like a painter, must sketch in outline cases that illustrate the rules of the written code. That, Megillus and Clinias, is the task we must now carry out as finely and as well as we can. We must state what penalties should be ordained for all cases of theft and violence, as far as the gods and the sons of gods allow us to ordain them by law. If anyone is insane, he shall not appear openly in the city. The relatives of such people shall keep them at home, by whatever means they know, or else they shall pay a penalty. A person of the highest property class shall pay one hundred drachmas, whether the person he is neglecting is a free man or a slave; one of the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina; one of the third class, three-fifths; and one of the fourth class, two-fifths. There are many different forms of madness. In the cases just mentioned it is caused by disease, but there are also cases in which it results from a naturally bad temper, reinforced by upbringing, that leads people in the course of a trivial quarrel to slander one another with loud shouting, a thing that is improper and entirely out of place in a well-ordered State. Concerning abuse there shall be this one law covering all cases: No one shall abuse anyone. If one person is disputing with another in argument, he shall either speak or listen, and he shall refrain entirely from abusing either his opponent or the bystanders.
934e–935e
Athenian: For from words, those light things, come in fact the heaviest of burdens, hatreds and feuds, when people begin by cursing one another and hurling foul abuse at each other like fishwives. The man who utters such words is gratifying a most ungracious thing, his passion, and gorging it on foul fare. By turning savage again the part of his soul that was once tamed by education, he makes a wild beast of himself through his bitter life, and wins only gall as thanks from his passion. In such disputes everyone commonly tends to go on to ridicule his opponent; but everyone who has ever made a habit of this has either failed to attain a virtuous character or else has lost much of his former nobility of mind. Therefore no one shall ever, in any way, utter such words in any holy place, or at any public sacrifice or public games, or in the market, the court, or any public assembly. In every such case the magistrate in charge shall punish the offender; if he fails to do so, he shall be disqualified from any public distinction, for disregarding the laws and failing to carry out the lawgiver’s commands. If in other places anyone does not refrain from such language, whether he is the aggressor or is defending himself, any older person who meets him shall uphold the law by driving off with blows the man who indulges his passion, that evil companion; if he fails to do so, he shall be liable to the appointed penalty. We are now saying that a man caught up in the habit of abuse cannot help trying to resort to ridicule, and this is what we condemn when it is uttered in passion. What, then? Are we to accept the eagerness of comic writers to ridicule people, provided that in their comedies they use this sort of language about citizens without any show of passion? Or shall we divide ridicule into jest and earnest, and allow anyone to ridicule another in jest and without passion, but forbid anyone, as we have already said, to do so in real earnest and with passion? We must by no means go back on what we said; but we must determine by law who is to be granted this permission and who is to be refused.
935e–936e
Athenian: A composer of comedy, or of any iambic or lyric song, shall be strictly forbidden to ridicule any of the citizens, either in words or by mimicry, whether with or without passion. If anyone disobeys, the Presidents of the Games shall banish him from the country entirely on the same day; if they fail to do so, they shall be fined three minas, to be dedicated to the god whose festival is being held. Those who, as we said earlier, have been given permission to write songs about one another shall be allowed to ridicule others in jest and without passion, but not with passion and in earnest. The task of making this distinction shall be entrusted to the official in charge of the general education of the young. Whatever he approves, the composer shall be allowed to present in public; but whatever he rejects, the composer shall be forbidden either to perform himself before anyone or to be found teaching to anyone else, slave or free. If he does so, he shall be considered a base man and disobedient to the laws. The one who deserves pity is not the person who suffers from hunger or something similar, but the one who, while possessing self-control or some other virtue, or a share of it, suffers misfortune as well. So it would be a strange thing indeed if, in a constitution and State that is even moderately well ordered, a person of this kind, whether slave or free, were so completely neglected as to fall into utter beggary. Therefore the lawgiver will be safe in enacting for such cases a law something like this: There shall be no beggar in our State. If anyone tries to beg, gathering a livelihood by endless entreaties, the market-stewards shall expel him from the market, the Board of city-stewards from the city, and from any other district the country-stewards shall drive him across the border, so that the land may be wholly cleansed of such a creature. If a slave, male or female, does any damage to another person’s goods, when the injured person himself has had no share in causing the damage through his own clumsy or careless handling, then the master of the one who did the damage shall either make good the damage in full or hand over the offender himself. But the master may bring a countercharge, claiming that the complaint was made by secret agreement between the offender and the injured party in order to rob him of his slave. Then he shall prosecute the person who claims to have been injured on a charge of conspiracy. If he wins his case, he shall receive double the value at which the court assesses the slave; but if he loses, he shall both make good the damage and hand over the slave. If a mule, horse, dog, or any other animal damages any property belonging to a neighbor, its owner shall pay compensation in the same way.
936e–938a
Athenian: If anyone is unwilling to serve as a witness, the person who needs his testimony shall summon him, and the person summoned shall attend the trial. If he knows the facts and is willing to testify, he shall testify; but if he denies knowing them, he shall swear by the three gods, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, that he truly has no knowledge, and once he has done so, he shall be dismissed from the case. If a person summoned as a witness does not appear with the one who summoned him, he shall be legally liable to an action for damages. If one of the judges is summoned as a witness, he shall not vote in the case after giving evidence. A free woman over forty years old shall be allowed to give evidence and to support a plea, and, if she has no husband, to bring an action; but if her husband is alive, she shall be allowed only to give evidence. A slave, male or female, and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and support a plea in murder cases only, provided they furnish adequate security that they will remain until the trial if their evidence is challenged as false. Either party in a lawsuit may challenge all or part of the evidence, provided he claims that false testimony has been given before the case is finally decided. The magistrates shall keep the challenges, sealed by both parties, and shall produce them at the trial for false testimony. If anyone is twice convicted of false testimony, no law shall compel him to testify any longer; and if three times, he shall not be allowed to testify any longer. If, after three convictions, a man dares to testify, anyone who wishes shall report him to the magistrates, and they shall hand him over to the court; and if he is found guilty, he shall be punished with death. Some people’s evidence may be condemned at the trial, since they are judged to have given false testimony and so to have brought victory to the winner. In all such cases, if more than half of their evidence is condemned, the case lost because of them shall be annulled, and there shall be a dispute and a trial on whether or not the case was decided on the evidence in question; and the verdict then given, whichever way it goes, shall finally determine the outcome of the earlier lawsuits. Although there are many fine things in human life, most of them have a kind of blight growing on them that poisons and corrupts them. No one would deny that justice among people is a fine thing, and that it has civilized all human affairs. And if justice is fine, how can we deny that advocacy is also a fine thing? Yet these fine things are brought into disrepute by a kind of foul practice that cloaks itself under the fine name of an art. It claims, first, that there is a technique for handling lawsuits, and further, that this technique, by pleading one’s own case and helping another to plead, is able to win the victory, whether the matters at issue in each case are just or unjust;
938a–938c
Athenian: and it also claims that both this art itself and the arguments that come from it are a gift available to anyone who gives money in return. This art, whether it is really an art or merely an artless knack acquired by habit and practice, must if at all possible never arise in our State. The lawgiver asks for compliance and for no speaking against justice, or else for such practitioners to leave for another country. If they comply, the law for its part shall keep silent; but if they do not comply, its pronouncement shall be this: If anyone is judged to be trying to turn the force of just pleas the other way in the minds of the judges, or to be multiplying lawsuits unduly or helping others to do so, anyone who wishes shall indict him for malicious litigation or for aiding malicious litigation, and he shall be tried before the court of select judges. If he is convicted, the court shall determine whether he appears to be acting from greed or from ambition. If from ambition, the court shall determine for how long such a person shall be barred from bringing an action against anyone or helping anyone to do so. If greed is his motive, then, if he is an alien, he shall be sent out of the country and forbidden to return on pain of death; but if he is a citizen, he shall be put to death because of his unscrupulous devotion to the pursuit of gain. And anyone who has twice been found guilty of committing such an act from ambition shall be put to death.
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Laws, Book 11
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