City of God, Book 12

It has already been shown in the preceding book how the two cities originated among the angels. Before I speak of the creation of man, and show how the cities arose as far as the race of rational mortals is concerned, I see that I must first, as far as I can, bring forward what may show that it is not inconsistent or unsuitable to speak of a society composed of angels and men together; so that there are not four cities or societies — two, namely, of angels, and as many of men — but rather two in all, one composed of the good, the other of the wicked, whether angels or men. It is impossible to doubt that the contrary inclinations in good and bad angels have arisen, not from a difference in their nature and origin, since God, the good Author and Creator of all essences, created them both, but from a difference in their wills and desires. While some steadfastly continued in what was the common good of all, namely, in God Himself, and in His eternity, truth, and love; others, being in love rather with their own power, as if they could be their own good, fell away to this private good of their own, from that higher good that gives blessedness, which was common to all, and, bartering the lofty dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, the most certain truth for the slyness of vanity, uniting love for factious partisanship, they became proud, deceived, envious. The cause, therefore, of the blessedness of the good is clinging to God. And so the cause of the others' misery will be found in the contrary, that is, in their not clinging to God. Therefore, if when the question is asked, why are the former blessed, it is rightly answered, because they cling to God; and when it is asked, why are the latter miserable, it is rightly answered, because they do not cling to God — then there is no other good for the rational or intellectual creature except God alone. So, though not every creature can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, and things of that kind do not have this capacity), still the creature which has the capacity cannot be blessed of itself, since it is created out of nothing, but only by Him by whom it has been created. For it is blessed by the possession of that whose loss makes it miserable. One, then, who is blessed not in another, but in himself, cannot be miserable, because he cannot lose himself. Accordingly we say that there is no unchangeable good but the one, true, blessed God; that the things which He made are indeed good because they are from Him, yet mutable because they are made not out of Him, but out of nothing. Although, therefore, they are not the supreme good, for God is a greater good, yet those mutable things which can cling to the immutable good, and so be blessed, are very good; for so completely is He their good, that without Him they can only be wretched. And the other created things in the universe are not better on this account, that they cannot be miserable. For no one would say that the other members of the body are superior to the eyes, because they cannot be blind. But as the sentient nature, even when it feels pain, is superior to the stony, which can feel none, so the rational nature, even when wretched, is more excellent than that which lacks reason or feeling, and can therefore experience no misery. And since this is so, then in this nature which has been created so excellent, that though it is itself mutable, it can still secure its blessedness by clinging to the immutable good, the supreme God; and since it is not satisfied unless it is perfectly blessed, and cannot be blessed in this way except in God — in this nature, I say, not to cling to God is plainly a fault. Now every fault injures the nature, and is consequently contrary to the nature. The creature, therefore, which clings to God, differs from those who do not, not by nature, but by fault; and yet by this very fault the nature itself is proved to be very noble and admirable. For a nature whose fault is justly blamed is certainly praised. For we justly blame the fault because it mars the praiseworthy nature. As, then, when we say that blindness is a defect of the eyes, we prove that sight belongs to the nature of the eyes; and when we say that deafness is a defect of the ears, hearing is proved by this to belong to their nature;— so, when we say that it is a fault of the angelic creature that it does not cling to God, we declare most plainly by this that it belonged to its nature to cling to God. And who can worthily conceive or express how great a glory that is, to cling to God, so as to live for Him, to draw wisdom from Him, to delight in Him, and to enjoy this great good, without death, error, or grief? And thus, since every vice is an injury of the nature, that very vice of the wicked angels, their departure from God, is sufficient proof that God created their nature so good, that it is an injury to it not to be with God.

This may be enough to prevent anyone from supposing, when we speak of the apostate angels, that they could have another nature, derived, as it were, from some different origin, and not from God. From the great impiety of this error we shall disentangle ourselves the more readily and easily, the more distinctly we understand what God said by the angel when He sent Moses to the children of Israel: “I am that I am.” Exodus 3:14 For since God is the supreme existence, that is to say, supremely is, and is therefore unchangeable, the things that He made He empowered to be, but not to be supremely like Himself. To some He gave a fuller, to others a more limited existence, and thus arranged the natures of beings in ranks. For as from sapere comes sapientia, so from esse comes essentia — a new word indeed, which the old Latin writers did not use, but which is naturalized in our day, so that our language may not lack an equivalent for the Greek οὐσία . For this is expressed word for word by essentia. Consequently, to that nature which supremely is, and which created all else that exists, no nature is contrary except what does not exist. For nonbeing is the contrary of what is. And thus there is no being contrary to God, the Supreme Being, and Author of all beings whatever.

In Scripture those who oppose His rule are called God's enemies, not by nature, but by vice; having no power to hurt Him, but only themselves. For they are His enemies, not through their power to hurt, but by their will to oppose Him. For God is unchangeable, and wholly beyond the reach of injury. Therefore the vice which makes those who are called His enemies resist Him, is an evil not to God, but to themselves. And to them it is an evil, solely because it corrupts the good of their nature. It is not nature, therefore, but vice, which is contrary to God. For what is evil is contrary to the good. And who will deny that God is the supreme good? Vice, therefore, is contrary to God, as evil to good. Further, the nature it corrupts is a good, and therefore to this good also it is contrary. But while it is contrary to God only as evil to good, it is contrary to the nature it corrupts, both as evil and as harmful. For no evils are harmful to God; but only to natures mutable and corruptible, though, by the testimony of the vices themselves, originally good. For if they were not good, vices could not hurt them. For how do they hurt them but by depriving them of integrity, beauty, welfare, virtue, and, in short, whatever natural good vice usually diminishes or destroys? But if there is no good to take away, then no injury can be done, and consequently there can be no vice. For it is impossible that there should be a harmless vice. From this we gather that though vice cannot injure the unchangeable good, it can injure nothing but good; because it does not exist where it does not injure. This, then, may be put this way: Vice cannot be in the highest good, and cannot be except in some good. Things solely good, therefore, can in some circumstances exist; things solely evil, never; for even those natures which are corrupted by an evil will are evil insofar as they are corrupted, but insofar as they are natures they are good. And when a corrupted nature is punished, besides the good it has in being a nature, it has this also, that it is not unpunished. For this is just, and certainly everything just is a good. For no one is punished for natural, but for voluntary vices. For even the vice which by the force of habit and long continuance has become a second nature, had its origin in the will. For at present we are speaking of the vices of the nature, which has a mental capacity for that enlightenment which distinguishes between what is just and what is unjust.

But it is ridiculous to condemn the faults of beasts and trees, and other such mortal and mutable things as are devoid of intelligence, sensation, or life, even though these faults should destroy their corruptible nature; for these creatures received, at their Creator's will, an existence fitting them, by passing away and giving way to others, to secure that lowest form of beauty, the beauty of seasons, which in its own place is a necessary part of this world. For things earthly were neither to be made equal to things heavenly, nor were they, though inferior, to be quite omitted from the universe. Since, then, in those situations where such things are appropriate, some perish to make way for others that are born in their place, and the lesser yield to the greater, and the things that are overcome are transformed into the quality of those that have the mastery, this is the appointed order of things transitory. The beauty of this order does not strike us, because in our mortal frailty we are so bound up in a part of it, that we cannot perceive the whole, in which these fragments that offend us are harmonized with the most accurate fitness and beauty. And therefore, where we are not so well able to perceive the wisdom of the Creator, we are very properly commanded to believe in it, so that in the vanity of human rashness we do not presume to find any fault with the work of so great a Craftsman. At the same time, if we attentively consider even these faults of earthly things, which are neither voluntary nor penal, they seem to illustrate the excellence of the natures themselves, which are all originated and created by God; for it is what pleases us in this nature which we are displeased to see removed by the fault — unless even the natures themselves displease men, as often happens when they become harmful to them, and then men judge them not by their nature, but by their utility; as in the case of those animals whose swarms scourged the pride of the Egyptians. But by this way of judging, they may find fault with the sun itself; for certain criminals or debtors are sentenced by the judges to be set in the sun. Therefore it is not with respect to our convenience or discomfort, but with respect to their own nature, that the creatures give glory to their Craftsman. Thus even the nature of the eternal fire, though it is a punishment to condemned sinners, is most certainly worthy of praise. For what is more beautiful than fire flaming, blazing, and shining? What is more useful than fire for warming, restoring, cooking, though nothing is more destructive than fire burning and consuming? The same thing, then, when applied in one way, is destructive, but when applied suitably, is most beneficial. For who can find words to tell its uses throughout the whole world? We must not listen, then, to those who praise the light of fire but find fault with its heat, judging it not by its nature, but by their convenience or discomfort. For they wish to see, but not to be burned. But they forget that this very light which is so pleasant to them, disagrees with and hurts weak eyes; and in that heat which is disagreeable to them, some animals find the most suitable conditions of a healthy life.

All natures, then, since they exist, and therefore have a rank and species of their own, and a kind of internal harmony, are certainly good. And when they are in the places assigned to them by the order of their nature, they preserve such being as they have received. And those things which have not received everlasting being, are altered for better or for worse, so as to suit the needs and motions of those things to which the Creator's law has made them subservient; and thus they tend in the divine providence to that end which is embraced in the general scheme of the government of the universe. So, though the corruption of transitory and perishable things brings them to utter destruction, it does not prevent their producing what was designed to be their result. And this being so, God, who supremely is, and who therefore created every being which does not have supreme existence (for what was made from nothing could not be equal to Him, and indeed could not exist at all if He had not made it), is not to be found fault with on account of the creature's faults, but is to be praised in view of the natures He has made.

Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to be this, that they cling to Him who supremely is. And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and not unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence. And what else is this vice called but pride? For “pride is the beginning of sin.”⁠a Ecclesiastes 10:13 They were unwilling, then, to preserve their strength for God; and since clinging to God was the condition of their enjoying a fuller being, they diminished it by preferring themselves to Him. This was the first defect, and the first impoverishment, and the first flaw of their nature, which was created, not indeed supremely existent, but finding its blessedness in the enjoyment of the Supreme Being; while by abandoning Him it would become, not indeed no nature at all, but a nature with a less ample existence, and therefore wretched. If the further question is asked, What was the efficient cause of their evil will? There is none. For what is it which makes the will bad, when it is the will itself which makes the action bad? And consequently the bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the efficient cause of the bad will. For if anything is the cause, this thing either has or has not a will. If it has, the will is either good or bad. If good, who is so senseless as to say that a good will makes a will bad? For in this case a good will would be the cause of sin; a most absurd supposition. On the other hand, if this hypothetical thing has a bad will, I wish to know what made it so; and so that we may not go on forever, I ask at once, what made the first evil will bad? For the first evil will is not one that was itself corrupted by an evil will, but one that was made evil by no other will. For if it was preceded by something that made it evil, the will that made the other evil was first. But if it is replied, “Nothing made it evil; it always was evil,” I ask whether it existed in some nature. For if not, then it did not exist at all; and if it did exist in some nature, then it spoiled and corrupted it, and injured it, and consequently deprived it of good. And therefore the evil will could not exist in an evil nature, but in a nature at once good and mutable, which this vice could injure. For if it did no injury, it was no vice; and consequently the will in which it was, could not be called evil. But if it did injury, it did it by taking away or diminishing good. And therefore there could not be from eternity, as was suggested, an evil will in that thing in which there had been previously a natural good, which the evil will was able to diminish by corrupting it. If, then, it was not from eternity, who, I ask, made it? The only thing that can be suggested in reply is that something which itself had no will, made the will evil. I ask, then, whether this thing was superior, inferior, or equal to it? If superior, then it is better. How, then, has it no will, and not rather a good will? The same reasoning applies if it was equal; for as long as two things have equally a good will, the one cannot produce in the other an evil will. There remains the supposition that what corrupted the will of the angelic nature which first sinned, was itself an inferior thing without a will. But that thing, even if it is of the lowest and most earthly kind, is certainly itself good, since it is a nature and being, with a form and rank of its own in its own kind and order. How, then, can a good thing be the efficient cause of an evil will? How, I say, can good be the cause of evil? For when the will abandons what is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil— not because what it turns to is evil, but because the turning itself is wicked. Therefore it is not an inferior thing which has made the will evil, but the will itself which has become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior thing. For if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see the same bodily beauty, and one of them is excited by the sight to desire an illicit enjoyment while the other steadfastly maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose brings it about that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other? What produces it in the man in whom it exists? Not the bodily beauty, for that was presented equally to the gaze of both, and yet did not produce in both an evil will. Did the flesh of the one cause the desire as he looked? But why did the flesh of the other not do so? Or was it the disposition? But why not the disposition of both? For we are supposing that both were of the same temperament of body and soul. Must we, then, say that the one was tempted by a secret suggestion of the evil spirit? As if it was not by his own will that he consented to this suggestion and to any inducement whatever! This consent, then, this evil will which he presented to the evil persuasion — what was the cause of it, we ask? For, not to delay on such a difficulty as this, if both are tempted equally and one yields and consents to the temptation while the other remains unmoved by it, what other account can we give of the matter than this, that the one is willing, the other unwilling, to fall away from chastity? And what causes this but their own wills, in cases at least such as we are supposing, where the temperament is identical? The same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret temptation pressed on both with equal violence. However minutely we examine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the will of the one to be evil. For if we say that the man himself made his will evil, what was the man himself before his will was evil but a good nature created by God, the unchangeable good? Here are two men who, before the temptation, were alike in body and soul, and of whom one yielded to the tempter who persuaded him, while the other could not be persuaded to desire that lovely body which was equally before the eyes of both. Are we to say of the man who was successfully tempted that he corrupted his own will, since he was certainly good before his will became bad? Then, why did he do so? Was it because his will was a nature, or because it was made of nothing? We will find that the latter is the case. For if a nature is the cause of an evil will, what else can we say than that evil arises from good or that good is the cause of evil? And how can it happen that a nature, good though mutable, should produce any evil— that is to say, should make the will itself wicked?

Let no one, therefore, look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, since the will itself is not the producing of something, but a defect. For to fall away from what supremely is to what has less being — this is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek to discover the causes of these defections — causes, as I have said, not efficient, but deficient — is as if someone were trying to see darkness, or hear silence. Yet both of these are known by us, and the former by means only of the eye, the latter only by the ear; not, however, by their positive reality, but by their lack of it. Let no one, then, seek to know from me what I know that I do not know; unless he perhaps wishes to learn to be ignorant of something of which all we know is that it cannot be known. For those things which are known not by their reality, but by their lack of it, are known, if our expression may be allowed and understood, by not knowing them, so that by knowing them they may be not known. For when the eyesight surveys objects that strike the sense, it sees darkness nowhere except where it begins not to see. And so no other sense but the ear can perceive silence, and yet it is only perceived by not hearing. Thus, too, our mind perceives intelligible forms by understanding them; but when they are deficient, it knows them by not knowing them; for “who can understand defects?”

This I do know, that the nature of God can never, anywhere, in any way be defective, and that natures made of nothing can. These latter, however, the more being they have, and the more good they do (for then they do something positive), the more they have efficient causes; but insofar as they are defective in being, and consequently do evil (for then what is their work but vanity?), they have deficient causes. And I likewise know that the will could not become evil if it were unwilling to become so; and therefore its failings are justly punished, being not necessary, but voluntary. For its defections are not to evil things, but are themselves evil; that is to say, are not toward things that are naturally and in themselves evil, but the defection of the will is evil, because it is contrary to the order of nature, and an abandonment of that which has supreme being for that which has less. For avarice is not a fault inherent in gold, but in the man who inordinately loves gold, to the detriment of justice, which ought to be held in incomparably higher regard than gold. Nor is self-indulgence the fault of lovely and charming objects, but of the heart that inordinately loves sensual pleasures, to the neglect of temperance, which attaches us to objects more lovely in their spirituality, and more delightful by their incorruptibility. Nor yet is boasting the fault of human praise, but of the soul that is inordinately fond of the applause of men, and that makes light of the voice of conscience. Pride, too, is not the fault of the one who delegates power, nor of power itself, but of the soul that is inordinately in love with its own power, and despises the more just dominion of a higher authority. Consequently anyone who inordinately loves the good which any nature possesses, even if he obtains it, himself becomes evil in the good, and wretched because deprived of a greater good.

There is, then, no natural efficient cause or, if I may be allowed the expression, no essential cause, of the evil will, since it is itself the origin of evil in mutable spirits, by which the good of their nature is diminished and corrupted; and the will is made evil by nothing else than defection from God — a defection whose cause, too, is certainly deficient. But as to the good will, if we were to say that it has no efficient cause, we must beware of lending support to the opinion that the good will of the good angels is not created, but is coeternal with God. For if they themselves are created, how can we say that their good will was eternal? But if created, was it created along with themselves, or did they exist for a time without it? If along with themselves, then doubtless it was created by Him who created them, and, as soon as they were created, they attached themselves to Him who created them, with the love He created in them. And they are separated from the society of the rest, because they have continued in the same good will; while the others have fallen away to another will, which is an evil one, by the very fact of its being a falling away from the good; from which, we may add, they would not have fallen away if they had been unwilling to do so. But if the good angels existed for a time without a good will, and produced it in themselves without God's intervention, then it follows that they made themselves better than He made them. Away with such a thought! For without a good will, what were they but evil? Or if they were not evil, because they had no evil will any more than a good one (for they had not fallen away from what they had not yet begun to enjoy), certainly they were not the same, not so good, as when they came to have a good will. Or if they could not make themselves better than they were made by Him who is surpassed by no one in His work, then certainly, without His helping action, they could not come to possess that good will which made them better. And though their good will brought it about that they did not turn to themselves, who had a more limited existence, but to Him who supremely is, and that, being united to Him, their own being was enlarged, and they lived a wise and blessed life by what He shared with them, what does this prove but that the will, however good it might be, would have gone on helplessly only desiring Him, if He who had made their nature out of nothing, and yet capable of enjoying Him, had not first stirred it to desire Him, and then filled it with Himself, and so made it better? Besides, we must also ask whether, if the good angels made their own will good, they did so with or without will? If without, then it was not their doing. If with, was the will good or bad? If bad, how could a bad will give birth to a good one? If good, then they already had a good will. And who made this will, which they already had, but He who created them with a good will, or with that chaste love by which they clung to Him, in one and the same act creating their nature, and endowing it with grace? And thus we are driven to believe that the holy angels never existed without a good will or the love of God. But the angels who, though created good, are nevertheless evil now, became so by their own will. And this will was not made evil by their good nature, except by its voluntary defection from good; for good is not the cause of evil, but a defection from good is. These angels, therefore, either received less of the grace of the divine love than those who persevered in the same; or if both were created equally good, then, while the one fell by their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted, and attained to that pitch of blessedness at which they became certain they would never fall from it — as we have already shown in the preceding book. We must therefore acknowledge, with the praise due to the Creator, that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, it can be said that “the love of God is poured out in their hearts by the Holy Spirit, which is given to them.” Romans 5:5 And what is written is true not only of men, but first and foremost of angels:, “It is good to draw near to God.” And those who have this good in common, have, both with Him to whom they draw near, and with one another, a holy fellowship, and form one city of God — His living sacrifice, and His living temple. And I see that, as I have now spoken of the rise of this city among the angels, it is time to speak of the origin of that part of it which is one day to be united to the immortal angels, and which at present is being gathered from among mortal men, and is either sojourning on earth, or, in the persons of those who have passed through death, is resting in the hidden resting places and dwellings of disembodied spirits. For from one man, whom God created as the first, the whole human race descended, according to the faith of Holy Scripture, which deservedly has remarkable authority among all nations throughout the world; since, among its other true statements, it predicted, by its divine foresight, that all nations would believe it.

Let us, then, pass over the conjectures of men who do not know what they are saying, when they speak of the nature and origin of the human race. For some hold the same opinion regarding men that they hold regarding the world itself, that they have always been. So Apuleius says, when he is describing our race, “Individually they are mortal, but collectively, and as a race, they are immortal.” And when they are asked, how, if the human race has always been, they defend the truth of their history, which narrates who were the inventors, and what they invented, and who first instituted the liberal studies and the other arts, and who first inhabited this or that region, and this or that island, they reply that most, if not all lands, were so desolated at intervals by fire and flood, that men were greatly reduced in numbers, and from these, again, the population was restored to its former numbers, and that thus there was at intervals a new beginning made, and though those things which had been interrupted and checked by the severe devastations were only renewed, they still seemed to originate then; but that man could not exist at all except as produced by man. But they say what they think, not what they know. They are deceived, too, by those thoroughly false documents which profess to give the history of many thousand years, though, calculating by the sacred writings, we find that not 6000 years have yet passed. And, not to spend many words in exposing the baselessness of these documents, in which so many thousands of years are accounted for, nor in proving that their authorities are totally inadequate, let me cite only that letter which Alexander the Great wrote to his mother Olympias, giving her the narrative he had from an Egyptian priest, which he had extracted from their sacred archives, and which gave an account of kingdoms mentioned also by the Greek historians. In this letter of Alexander's a period of more than 5000 years is assigned to the kingdom of Assyria; while in the Greek history only 1300 years are counted from the reign of Bel himself, whom both Greek and Egyptian agree in counting the first king of Assyria. Then to the empire of the Persians and Macedonians this Egyptian assigned more than 8000 years, counting to the time of Alexander, to whom he was speaking; while among the Greeks, 485 years are assigned to the Macedonians down to the death of Alexander, and to the Persians 233 years, counting to the end of his conquests. Thus these give a much smaller number of years than the Egyptians; and indeed, though multiplied three times, the Greek chronology would still be shorter. For the Egyptians are said to have formerly counted only four months to their year; so that one year, according to the fuller and truer computation now in use among them as well as among ourselves, would contain three of their old years. But not even so, as I said, does the Greek history correspond with the Egyptian in its chronology. And therefore the former must be given greater credit, because it does not exceed the true account of the duration of the world as it is given by our documents, which are truly sacred. Further, if this letter of Alexander, which has become so famous, differs widely in this matter of chronology from the probable credible account, how much less can we believe these documents which, though full of fabulous and fictitious antiquities, they would gladly set against the authority of our well-known and divine books, which predicted that the whole world would believe them, and which the whole world accordingly has believed; which proved, too, that it had truly narrated past events by its prediction of future events, which have so exactly come to pass!

There are some, again, who, though they do not suppose that this world is eternal, are of the opinion either that this is not the only world, but that there are numberless worlds or that indeed it is the only one, but that it dies, and is born again at fixed intervals, and does so countless times; but they must acknowledge that the human race existed before there were other men to beget them. For they cannot suppose that, if the whole world perishes, some men would be left alive in the world, as they might survive in floods and conflagrations, which those other speculators suppose to be partial, and from which they can therefore reasonably argue that a few then survived whose posterity would renew the population; but as they believe that the world itself is renewed out of its own material, so they must believe that out of its elements the human race was produced, and then that the progeny of mortals sprang like that of other animals from their parents.

As to those who are always asking why man was not created during these countless ages of the infinitely extended past, and came into being so lately that, according to Scripture, less than 6000 years have elapsed since he began to be, I would reply to them regarding the creation of man, just as I replied regarding the origin of the world to those who will not believe that it is not eternal, but had a beginning, which even Plato himself most plainly declares, though some think his statement was not consistent with his real opinion. If it offends them that the time that has elapsed since the creation of man is so short, and his years so few according to our authorities, let them take this into consideration, that nothing that has a limit is long, and that all the ages of time being finite, are very little, or indeed nothing at all, when compared to endless eternity. Consequently, if there had elapsed since the creation of man, I do not say five or six, but even sixty or six hundred thousand years, or sixty times as many, or six hundred or six hundred thousand times as many, or this sum multiplied until it could no longer be expressed in numbers, the same question could still be put, Why was he not made before? For the past and boundless eternity during which God abstained from creating man is so great that, compare it with whatever vast and untold number of ages you please, as long as there is a definite conclusion of this term of time, it is not even as if you compared the minutest drop of water with the ocean that everywhere flows around the globe.⁠a For of these two, one indeed is very small, the other incomparably vast, yet both are finite; but that space of time which starts from some beginning, and is limited by some end, whatever its extent, if you compare it with what has no beginning, I do not know whether to say we should count it the very minutest thing, or nothing at all. For, take this limited time, and deduct from the end of it, one by one, the briefest moments (as you might take day by day from a man's life, beginning at the day in which he now lives, back to that of his birth), and though the number of moments you must subtract in this backward movement is so great that no word can express it, this subtraction will at some point carry you to the beginning. But if you take away from a time which has no beginning, I do not say brief moments one by one, nor yet hours, or days, or months, or years even in quantities, but terms of years so vast that they cannot be named by the most skillful arithmeticians — take away terms of years as vast as that which we have supposed to be gradually consumed by the deduction of moments — and take them away not once and again repeatedly, but always, and what do you accomplish, what do you achieve by your deduction, since you never reach the beginning, which does not exist? Therefore, what we now ask after five thousand odd years, our descendants might ask with the same curiosity after six hundred thousand years, supposing these dying generations of men continue so long to decay and be renewed, and supposing posterity continues as weak and ignorant as ourselves. The same question might have been asked by those who have lived before us and while man was even newer on earth. The first man himself in short might the day after or the very day of his creation have asked why he was created no sooner. And no matter at what earlier or later period he had been created, this controversy about the beginning of this world's history would have had precisely the same difficulties as it has now.

Some philosophers have seen no other acceptable means of solving this controversy than by introducing cycles of time, in which there would be a constant renewal and repetition of the order of nature; and they have therefore asserted that these cycles will ceaselessly recur, one passing away and another coming, though they are not agreed as to whether one permanent world will pass through all these cycles, or whether the world will at fixed intervals die out, and be renewed so as to exhibit a recurrence of the same phenomena — the things which have been, and those which are to be, coinciding. And from this fantastic round of change they do not exempt even the immortal soul that has attained wisdom, consigning it to a ceaseless transmigration between delusive blessedness and real misery. For how can that be truly called blessed which has no assurance of being so eternally, and is either in ignorance of the truth, and blind to the misery that is approaching, or, knowing it, is in misery and fear? Or if it passes to bliss, and leaves miseries forever, then there happens in time a new thing which time will not end. Why not, then, the world also? Why may not man, too, be a similar thing? So that, by following the straight path of sound doctrine, we escape whatever circuitous paths have been, discovered by deceiving and deceived sages. Some, too, in advocating these recurring cycles that restore all things to their original state cite in favor of their supposition what Solomon says in the book of Ecclesiastes: “What is it that has been? It is what shall be. And what is it that is done? It is what shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. Who can speak and say, See, this is new? It has already been in ages past, which was before us.” This he said either of those things of which he had just been speaking — the succession of generations, the orbit of the sun, the course of rivers — or else of all kinds of creatures that are born and die. For there were men before us, there are men with us, and there will be men after us; and so all living things and all plants. Even monstrous and irregular productions, though differing from one another, and though some are reported as solitary instances, yet resemble one another generally, insofar as they are miraculous and monstrous, and, in this sense, have been, and will be, and are no new and recent things under the sun. However, some would understand these words as meaning that in the predestination of God all things have already existed, and that thus there is no new thing under the sun. In any case, no true believer should ever suppose that by these words of Solomon those cycles are meant, in which, according to those philosophers, the same periods and events of time are repeated; as if, for example, the philosopher Plato, having taught in the school at Athens which is called the Academy, so, numberless ages before, at long but certain intervals, this same Plato and the same school, and the same disciples existed, and so also are to be repeated during the countless cycles that are still to come — we must never, I say, believe this. For once Christ died for our sins; and, rising from the dead, He dies no more. Death has no more dominion over Him; Romans 6:9 and we ourselves after the resurrection shall be “always with the Lord,” 1 Thessalonians 4:16 to whom we now say, as the sacred Psalmist dictates, “You shall keep us, Lord, You shall preserve us from this generation.” And what follows is also, I think, appropriate enough: “The wicked walk in a circle,” not because their life is to recur by means of these circles, which these philosophers imagine, but because the path in which their false doctrine now runs is circuitous.

What wonder is it if, entangled in these circles, they find neither entrance nor exit? For they do not know how the human race, and this mortal condition of ours, took its origin, nor how it will be brought to an end, since they cannot penetrate the inscrutable wisdom of God. For, though He Himself is eternal and without beginning, He caused time to have a beginning; and man, whom He had not previously made He made in time, not from a new and sudden resolution, but by His unchangeable and eternal design. Who can search out the unsearchable depth of this purpose, who can scrutinize the inscrutable wisdom, with which God, without change of will, created man, who had never existed before, and gave him an existence in time, and increased the human race from one individual? For the Psalmist himself, when he had first said, “You shall keep us, Lord, You shall preserve us from this generation forever,” and had then rebuked those whose foolish and impious doctrine preserves for the soul no eternal deliverance and blessedness adds immediately, “The wicked walk in a circle.” Then, as if it were said to him, “What then do you believe, feel, know? Are we to believe that it suddenly occurred to God to create man, whom He had never before made in a past eternity —God, to whom nothing new can occur, and in whom there is no changeableness?” the Psalmist goes on to reply, as if addressing God Himself, “According to the depth of Your wisdom You have multiplied the children of men.” Let men, he seems to say, imagine what they please, let them conjecture and argue as they see fit, but You have multiplied the children of men according to the depth of your wisdom, which no man can comprehend. For this is a depth indeed, that God always has been, and that man, whom He had never made before, He willed to make in time, and this without changing His design and will.

For my own part, indeed, just as I dare not say that there ever was a time when the Lord God was not Lord, so I ought not to doubt that man did not exist before time, and was first created in time. But when I consider what God could be the Lord of, if there was not always some creature, I shrink from making any assertion, remembering my own insignificance, and that it is written, “What man can know the counsel of God? Or who can think what the will of the Lord is? For the thoughts of mortal men are timid, and our devices are but uncertain. For the corruptible body presses down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weighs down the mind that muses on many things.”⁠a I certainly muse on many things in this earthly tabernacle, because the one thing which is true among the many, or beyond the many, I cannot find. If, then, among these many thoughts, I say that there have always been creatures for Him to be Lord of, who is always and has always been Lord, but that these creatures have not always been the same, but succeeded one another (for we do not wish to seem to say that any is coeternal with the Creator, an assertion condemned equally by faith and sound reason), I must take care not to fall into the absurd and ignorant error of maintaining that by these successions and changes mortal creatures have always existed, while the immortal creatures had not begun to exist until the date of our own world, when the angels were created; if at least the angels are intended by that light which was first made, or, rather, by that heaven of which it is said, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.”⁠b Genesis 1:1 The angels, at least, did not exist before they were created; for if we say that they have always existed, we shall seem to make them coeternal with the Creator. Again, if I say that the angels were not created in time, but existed before all times, as those over whom God, who has always been Sovereign, exercised His sovereignty, then I shall be asked whether, if they were created before all time, they, being creatures, could possibly always exist. It may perhaps be replied, Why not always, since what is in all time may very properly be said to be “always?” Now so true is it that these angels have existed in all time that even before time was they were created; if at least time began with the heavens, and the angels existed before the heavens. And if time was even before the heavenly bodies, not indeed marked by hours, days, months, and years — for these measures of time's periods which are commonly and properly called times, plainly began with the motion of the heavenly bodies, and so God said, when He appointed them, “Let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years,” Genesis 1:14 — if, I say, time was before these heavenly bodies by some changing movement, whose parts succeeded one another and could not exist simultaneously, and if there was some such movement among the angels which necessitated the existence of time, so that from their very creation they were subject to these temporal changes, then they have existed in all time, for time came into being along with them. And who will say that what was in all time, was not always? But if I make such a reply, it will be said to me, How, then, are they not coeternal with the Creator, if He and they always have been? How even can they be said to have been created, if we are to understand that they have always existed? What are we to reply to this? Are we to say that both statements are true? That they always have been, since they have been in all time, having been created along with time, or time along with them, and yet that also they were created? For, similarly, we will not deny that time itself was created, though no one doubts that time has been in all time; for if it has not been in all time, then there was a time when there was no time. But the most foolish person could not make such an assertion. For we can reasonably say there was a time when Rome was not; there was a time when Jerusalem was not; there was a time when Abraham was not; there was a time when man was not, and so on: in short, if the world was not made at the beginning of time, but after some time had elapsed, we can say there was a time when the world was not. But to say there was a time when time was not, is as absurd as to say there was a man when there was no man; or, this world was when this world was not. For if we are not referring to the same object, the form of expression may be used, as, there was another man when this man was not. Thus we can reasonably say there was another time when this time was not; but not the merest simpleton could say there was a time when there was no time. As, then, we say that time was created, though we also say that it always has been, since in all time time has been, so it does not follow that if the angels have always been, they were therefore not created. For we say that they have always been, because they have been in all time; and we say they have been in all time, because time itself could in no way exist without them. For where there is no creature whose changing movements admit of succession, there cannot be time at all. And consequently, even if they have always existed, they were created; nor, if they have always existed, are they therefore coeternal with the Creator. For He has always existed in unchangeable eternity; while they were created, and are said to have been always, because they have been in all time, since time is impossible without the creature. But time passing away by its changefulness, cannot be co-eternal with changeless eternity. And consequently, though the immortality of the angels does not pass in time, does not become past as if now it were not, nor has a future as if it were not yet, still their movements, which are the basis of time, do pass from future to past; and therefore they cannot be co-eternal with the Creator, in whose movement we cannot say that there has been what now is not, or will be what is not yet. Therefore, if God always has been Lord, He has always had creatures under His dominion — creatures, however, not begotten of Him, but created by Him out of nothing; nor co-eternal with Him, for He was before them though at no time without them, because He preceded them, not by the lapse of time, but by His abiding eternity. But if I make this reply to those who ask how He was always Creator, always Lord, if there were not always a subject creation; or how this was created, and not rather co-eternal with its Creator, if it always was, I fear I may be accused of recklessly affirming what I do not know, instead of teaching what I know. I return, therefore, to what our Creator has seen fit for us to know; and those things which He has allowed the abler men to know in this life, or has reserved to be known in the next by the perfected saints, I acknowledge to be beyond my capacity. But I have thought it right to discuss these matters without making positive assertions, so that those who read may be warned to keep away from dangerous questions, and may not think themselves fit for everything. Let them rather try to obey the wholesome instruction of the apostle, when he says, “For I say, through the grace given to me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think soberly, as God has dealt to every man the measure of faith.” Romans 12:3 For if an infant receives nourishment suited to its strength, it becomes capable, as it grows, of taking more; but if its strength and capacity are overtaxed, it wastes away instead of growing.

I admit that I do not know what ages passed before the human race was created, but I have no doubt that no created thing is coeternal with the Creator. But even the apostle speaks of time as eternal, and he does so with reference, not to the future, but, which is more surprising, to the past. For he says, “In hope of eternal life, which God, who cannot lie, promised before the eternal times, but has in due times manifested His word.” You see he says that in the past there have been eternal times, which, however, were not coeternal with God. And since God before these eternal times not only existed, but also, “promised” eternal life, which He manifested in its own times (that is to say, in due times), what else is this than His word? For this is eternal life. But then, how did He promise? For the promise was made to men, and yet they did not exist before eternal times? Does this not mean that, in His own eternity, and in His coeternal word, what was to be in its own time was already predestined and fixed?

I also have no doubt that before the first man was created, there never had been a man at all, neither this same man himself returning through some unknown cycles, having made some unknown number of revolutions, nor any other of similar nature. I am not frightened away from this belief by philosophical arguments, among which the one considered most acute is founded on the assertion that the infinite cannot be comprehended by any mode of knowledge. Consequently, they argue, God has in His own mind finite conceptions of all finite things which He makes. Now it cannot be supposed that His goodness was ever idle; for if it were, we would have to ascribe to Him an awakening to activity in time, from a past eternity of inactivity, as if He repented of an idleness that had no beginning, and proceeded, therefore, to make a beginning of work. This being the case, they say that the same things must always be repeated, and that as they pass, so they are destined always to return, whether amid all these changes the world remains the same — the world which has always been, and yet was created, — or that the world in these revolutions is perpetually dying out and being renewed; otherwise, if we point to a time when the works of God were begun, it would be believed that He considered His past eternal leisure to be inert and indolent, and therefore condemned and altered it as displeasing to Himself. Now if God is supposed to have been indeed always making temporal things, but different from one another, and one after the other, so that He came at last in this way to make man, whom He had never made before, then it may seem that He made man not with knowledge (for they suppose no knowledge can comprehend the infinite succession of creatures), but on the impulse of the hour, as it struck Him at the moment, with a sudden and accidental change of mind. On the other hand, they say, if those cycles are admitted, and if we suppose that the same temporal things are repeated, while the world either remains identical through all these rotations, or else dies away and is renewed, then there is ascribed to God neither the slothful ease of a past eternity, nor a rash and unforeseen creation. And if the same things are not repeated in cycles in this way, then they cannot be comprehended by any knowledge or foreknowledge in their endless diversity. Even though reason could not refute, faith would smile at these arguments, with which the godless try to turn our simple piety from the right way, so that we may walk with them “in a circle.” But with the help of the Lord our God, even reason shatters, and readily enough, these revolving circles which conjecture frames. For what especially leads these men astray, so that they prefer their own circles to the straight path of truth, is that they measure by their own human, changeable, and narrow intellect the divine mind, which is absolutely unchangeable, infinite in capacity, and without succession of thought, counting all things without number. So that saying of the apostle comes true of them, for, “comparing themselves with themselves, they do not understand.” For because they do, by a new decision, whatever new thing has occurred to them to be done (their minds being changeable), they conclude it is so with God; and thus compare, not God — for they cannot conceive God, but think of one like themselves when they think of Him — not God, but themselves, and not with Him, but with themselves. For our part, we dare not believe that God is affected in one way when He works, in another when He rests. Indeed, to say that He is affected at all is an abuse of language, since it implies that there comes to be something in His nature which was not there before. For whoever is affected is acted on, and whatever is acted on is changeable. His leisure, therefore, is no laziness, indolence, inactivity; just as in His work there is no labor, effort, industry. He can act while He rests, and rest while He acts. He can begin a new work with (not a new, but) an eternal design; and what He has not made before, He does not now begin to make because He repents of His former rest. But when one speaks of His former rest and later activity (and I do not know how men can understand these things), this “former” and “subsequent” are applied only to the things created, which formerly did not exist, and subsequently came into existence. But in God the former purpose is not altered and wiped out by the subsequent and different purpose, but by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will He brought about, for the things He created, both that formerly, as long as they did not exist, they should not exist, and that subsequently, when they began to be, they should come into existence. And thus, perhaps, He wished to show, in a very striking way, to those who have eyes for such things, how independent He is of what He makes, and how it is from His own freely given goodness that He creates, since from eternity He dwelt without creatures in no less perfect a blessedness.

As for their other assertion, that God's knowledge cannot comprehend things infinite, it only remains for them to affirm, in order to plumb the depths of their impiety, that God does not know all numbers. For it is very certain that they are infinite; since, no matter at what number you suppose an end to be made, this number can be, I will not say, increased by the addition of one more, but however great it is, and however vast the multitude of which it is the rational and scientific expression, it can still be not only doubled, but even multiplied. Moreover, each number is so defined by its own properties, that no two numbers are equal. They are therefore both unequal and different from one another; and while they are individually finite, collectively they are infinite. Does God, therefore, not know numbers on account of this infinity; and does His knowledge extend only to a certain height in numbers, while of the rest He is ignorant? Who is so senseless as to say so? Yet they can hardly claim to put numbers out of the question, or maintain that they have nothing to do with the knowledge of God; for Plato, their great authority, represents God as framing the world on numerical principles: and in our books also it is said to God, “You have ordered all things in number, and measure, and weight.”⁠a The prophet also says, Who brings out their host by number. Isaiah 40:26 And the Savior says in the Gospel, “The very hairs of your head are all numbered.” Matthew 10:30 We must never doubt, then, that all number is known to Him “whose understanding,” according to the Psalmist, “is infinite.” The infinity of number, though infinite numbers cannot be counted, is nevertheless not beyond the comprehension of Him whose understanding is infinite. And thus, if everything which is comprehended is defined or made finite by the comprehension of him who knows it, then all infinity is in some ineffable way made finite to God, for it is comprehensible by His knowledge. Therefore, if the infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, by which it is comprehended, what are we poor creatures to presume to fix limits to His knowledge, and say that unless the same temporal thing is repeated by the same periodic revolutions, God cannot either foreknow His creatures so that He may make them, or know them when He has made them? God, whose knowledge is manifold in its simplicity, and uniform in its variety, comprehends all incomprehensibles with so incomprehensible a comprehension, that though He willed always to make His later works novel and unlike what went before them, He could not produce them without order and foresight, nor conceive them suddenly, but by His eternal foreknowledge.

I do not presume to determine whether God does so, and whether these times which are called “ages of ages” are joined together in a continuous series, and succeed one another with a regulated diversity, and leave exempt from their changes only those who are freed from their misery, and remain without end in a blessed immortality; or whether these are called “ages of ages,” so that we may understand that the ages remain unchangeable in God's unwavering wisdom, and are the efficient causes, as it were, of those ages which are being spent in time. Possibly “ages” is used for “age,” so that nothing else is meant by “ages of ages” than by “age of age,” as nothing else is meant by “heavens of heavens” than by “heaven of heaven.” For God called the firmament, above which are the waters, “Heaven,” and yet the psalm says, “Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord.” Which of these two meanings we are to attach to “ages of ages,” or whether there is not some other and better meaning still, is a very profound question; and the subject we are now handling does not prevent us from putting off the discussion of it for the time being, whether we may be able to determine anything about it, or may only be made more cautious by its further treatment, so as to be deterred from making any rash affirmations in a matter of such obscurity. For now we are arguing against the opinion that affirms the existence of those periodic revolutions by which the same things are always recurring at intervals of time. Now whichever of these suppositions regarding the “ages of ages” is the true one, it does nothing to establish those cycles; for whether the ages of ages are not a repetition of the same world, but different worlds succeeding one another in a regulated connection, with the ransomed souls remaining in well-assured bliss without any recurrence of misery, or whether the ages of ages are the eternal causes which rule what will be and is in time, it equally follows that those cycles which bring the same things around do not exist; and nothing more thoroughly demolishes them than the fact of the eternal life of the saints.

What pious ears could bear to hear that after a life spent in so many and severe distresses (if, indeed, that should be called a life at all which is rather a death, so utter that the love of this present death makes us fear that death which delivers us from it,) that after evils so disastrous, and miseries of all kinds have at last been expiated and finished by the help of true religion and wisdom, and when we have thus attained to the vision of God, and have entered into bliss by the contemplation of spiritual light and participation in His unchangeable immortality, which we burn to attain — that we must at some time lose all this, and that those who do lose it are cast down from that eternity, truth, and happiness to infernal mortality and shameful foolishness, and are entangled in accursed woes, in which God is lost, truth held in detestation, and happiness sought in iniquitous impurities? And that this will happen endlessly again and again, recurring at fixed intervals, and in regularly returning periods? And that this everlasting and ceaseless revolution of definite cycles, which remove and restore true misery and deceitful bliss in turn, is contrived so that God may be able to know His own works, since on the one hand He cannot rest from creating and on the other, cannot know the infinite number of His creatures, if He always makes creatures? Who, I say, can listen to such things? Who can accept them or allow them to be spoken? If they were true, it would not only be more prudent to keep silent about them, but (to express myself as best I can) it would even be the part of wisdom not to know them. For if in the future world we will not remember these things, and will be blessed by this forgetfulness, why should we now increase our misery, already burdensome enough, by the knowledge of them? If, on the other hand, the knowledge of them will be forced on us in the future, let us at least remain in ignorance now, so that in the present expectation we may enjoy a blessedness which the future reality is not to bestow; since in this life we are expecting to obtain everlasting life, but in the world to come are to discover it to be blessed, but not everlasting. And if they maintain that no one can attain to the blessedness of the world to come, unless in this life he has been instructed in those cycles in which bliss and misery alternate, how can they declare that the more a man loves God, the more readily he attains to blessedness, — when they teach what paralyzes love itself? For who would not be more remiss and lukewarm in his love for a person whom he thinks he will be forced to abandon, and whose truth and wisdom he will come to hate; and this, too, after he has quite attained to the utmost and most blissful knowledge of Him that he is capable of? Can anyone be faithful in his love, even to a human friend, if he knows that he is destined to become his enemy? God forbid that there should be any truth in an opinion which threatens us with a real misery that is never to end, but is often and endlessly to be interrupted by intervals of deceptive happiness. For what happiness can be more deceptive and false than that in whose blaze of truth we still remain ignorant that we shall be miserable, or in whose most secure citadel we still fear that we shall be so? For if, on the one hand, we are to be ignorant of coming calamity, then our present misery is not so shortsighted, for it is assured of coming bliss. If, on the other hand, the disaster that threatens is not concealed from us in the world to come, then the time of misery which is to be at last exchanged for a state of blessedness, is spent by the soul more happily than its time of happiness, which is to end in a return to misery. And thus our expectation of unhappiness is happy, but of happiness unhappy. And therefore, as we here suffer present ills, and there fear ills that are imminent, it would be truer to say that we shall always be miserable than that we can some time be happy. But these things are declared to be false by the loud testimony of religion and truth; for religion truthfully promises a true blessedness, of which we shall be eternally assured, and which cannot be interrupted by any disaster. Let us therefore keep to the straight path, which is Christ, and, with Him as our Guide and Savior, let us turn away in heart and mind from the unreal and futile cycles of the godless. Porphyry, Platonist though he was, renounced the opinion of his school, that in these cycles souls are ceaselessly passing away and returning, either being struck with the extravagance of the idea, or sobered by his knowledge of Christianity. As I mentioned in the tenth book, he preferred saying that the soul, as it had been sent into the world so that it might know evil, and be purged and delivered from it, was never again exposed to such an experience after it had once returned to the Father. And if he renounced the tenets of his school, how much more ought we Christians to detest and avoid an opinion so unfounded and hostile to our faith? But having disposed of these cycles and escaped out of them, no necessity compels us to suppose that the human race had no beginning in time, on the ground that there is nothing new in nature which has not, through some cycles or other, existed at some previous period, and is not to exist again in the future. For if the soul, once delivered, as it never was before, is never to return to misery, then there happens in its experience something which never happened before; and this, indeed, something of the greatest consequence, namely, the secure entrance into eternal happiness. And if in an immortal nature there can occur a novelty, which never has been, and never will be, reproduced by any cycle, why is it disputed that the same may occur in mortal natures? If they maintain that blessedness is no new experience to the soul, but only a return to that state in which it has been eternally, then at least its deliverance from misery is something new, since, by their own account, the misery from which it is delivered is itself, too, a new experience. And if this new experience happened by accident, and was not included in the order of things appointed by Divine Providence, then where are those determinate and measured cycles in which no new thing happens, but all things are reproduced as they were before? If, however, this new experience was included in that providential order of nature (whether the soul was exposed to the evil of this world for the sake of discipline, or fell into it by sin), then it is possible for new things to happen which never happened before, and which are nevertheless not foreign to the order of nature. And if the soul is able by its own imprudence to create for itself a new misery, which was not unforeseen by the Divine Providence, but was provided for in the order of nature along with the deliverance from it, how can we, even with all the rashness of human vanity, presume to deny that God can create new things — new to the world, but not to Him — which He never before created, but nevertheless foresaw from all eternity? If they say that it is indeed true that ransomed souls return no more to misery, but that even so no new thing happens, since there always have been, now are, and always will be a succession of ransomed souls, they must at least grant that in this case there are new souls to whom the misery and the deliverance from it are new. For if they maintain that those souls out of which new men are daily being made (from whose bodies, if they have lived wisely, they are so delivered that they never return to misery) are not new, but have existed from eternity, they must logically admit that they are infinite. For however great a finite number of souls there were, that would not have sufficed to make perpetually new men from eternity — men whose souls were to be eternally freed from this mortal state, and never afterward to return to it. And our philosophers will find it hard to explain how there is an infinite number of souls in an order of nature which they require to be finite, so that it may be known by God. And now that we have demolished these cycles which were supposed to bring back the soul at fixed periods to the same miseries, what can seem more in accordance with godly reason than to believe that it is possible for God both to create new things never before created, and in doing so, to preserve His will unaltered? But whether the number of eternally redeemed souls can be continually increased or not, let the philosophers themselves decide, who are so subtle in determining where infinity cannot be admitted. For our own part, our reasoning holds in either case. For if the number of souls can be indefinitely increased, what reason is there to deny that what had never before been created, could be created? For the number of ransomed souls never existed before, and yet it has not only been made once, but will never cease coming into being anew. If, on the other hand, it is more fitting that the number of eternally ransomed souls be definite, and that this number will never be increased, still this number, whatever it is, certainly never existed before, and it cannot increase, and reach the amount it signifies, without having some beginning; and this beginning never before existed. So that this beginning might exist, therefore, the first man was created.

Now that we have solved, as well as we could, this very difficult question about the eternal God creating new things, without any novelty of will, it is easy to see how much better it is that God was pleased to produce the human race from the one individual whom He created, than if He had originated it in several men. For as to the other animals, He created some solitary, and naturally seeking lonely places — such as eagles, kites, lions, wolves, and the like; others gregarious, which herd together, and prefer to live in company — such as pigeons, starlings, stags, and little fallow deer, and the like: but He did not cause either class to be propagated from single individuals, but called into being several at once. Man, on the other hand, whose nature was to be midway between the angelic and the bestial, He created in such a way that if he remained subject to his Creator as his rightful Lord, and piously kept His commandments, he would pass into the company of the angels, and obtain, without the intervention of death, a blessed and endless immortality; but if he offended the Lord his God by a proud and disobedient use of his free will, he would become subject to death, and live as the beasts do — the slave of appetite, and doomed to eternal punishment after death. And therefore God created only one single man, not, certainly, so that he might be solitary, deprived of all society, but so that by this means the unity of society and the bond of concord might be more effectively commended to him, since men would be bound together not only by similarity of nature, but by family affection. And indeed He did not even create the woman that was to be given him as his wife, as He created the man, but created her out of the man, so that the whole human race might derive from one man.

And God was not ignorant that man would sin, and that, being himself made subject now to death, he would propagate men doomed to die, and that these mortals would go to such enormous lengths in sin, that even the beasts devoid of rational will, which were created in numbers from the waters and the earth, would live more securely and peaceably with their own kind than men, who had been propagated from one individual for the very purpose of commending concord. For not even lions or dragons have ever waged such wars with their own kind as men have waged with one another. But God foresaw also that by His grace a people would be called to adoption, and that they, being justified by the remission of their sins, would be united by the Holy Spirit to the holy angels in eternal peace, when the last enemy, death, has been destroyed; and He knew that this people would benefit from considering that God had caused all men to be derived from one, for the sake of showing how highly He prizes unity in a multitude.

God, then, made man in His own image. For He created for him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that he might excel all the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which were not so gifted. And when He had formed the man out of the dust of the earth, and had willed that his soul should be such as I have said — whether He had already made it, and now by breathing imparted it to man, or rather made it by breathing, so that the breath which God made by breathing (for what else is “to breathe” than to make breath?) is the soul, — He also made a wife for him, to aid him in the work of generating his kind, and He formed her from a bone taken out of the man's side, working in a divine manner. For we are not to think of this work in a carnal fashion, as if God worked as we commonly see craftsmen work, who use their hands and the material supplied to them, so that by their skill they may fashion some material object. God's hand is God's power; and He, working invisibly, produces visible results. But this seems fabulous rather than true to men, who measure by customary and everyday works the power and wisdom of God, by which He understands and produces without seeds even seeds themselves; and because they cannot understand the things which at the beginning were created, they are skeptical about them — as if the very things which they do know about human propagation, conceptions and births, would seem less incredible if told to those who had no experience of them; though these very things, too, are attributed by many rather to physical and natural causes than to the work of the divine mind.

But in this book we have nothing to do with those who do not believe that the divine mind made or cares for this world. As for those who believe their own Plato, that all mortal animals — among whom man holds the preeminent place, and is near to the gods themselves — were created not by that most high God who made the world, but by other lesser gods created by the Supreme, and exercising a delegated power under His control — if only those persons are delivered from the superstition which prompts them to seek a plausible reason for paying divine honors and sacrificing to these gods as their creators, they will easily be disentangled from this error of theirs as well. For it is blasphemy to believe or to say (even before it can be understood) that any other than God is creator of any nature, however small and mortal it may be. And as for the angels, whom those Platonists prefer to call gods, although they do, as far as they are permitted and commissioned, aid in the production of the things around us, we are not on that account to call them creators, any more than we call gardeners the creators of fruits and trees.

For there is one form which is given from outside to every bodily substance, — such as the form which is constructed by potters and smiths, and that class of artists who paint and fashion forms like the body of animals — but another and internal form which is not itself constructed, but, as the efficient cause, produces not only the natural bodily forms, but even the life itself of the living creatures, and which proceeds from the secret and hidden choice of an intelligent and living nature, — let that first-mentioned form be attributed to every craftsman, but this latter to one only, God, the Creator and Originator who made the world itself and the angels, without the help of world or angels. For the same divine and, so to speak, creative energy, which cannot be made, but makes, and which gave to the earth and sky their roundness — this same divine, effective, and creative energy gave their roundness to the eye and to the apple; and the other natural objects which we anywhere see, received also their form, not from outside, but from the secret and profound might of the Creator, who said, “Do I not fill heaven and earth?” Jeremiah 23:24 and whose wisdom it is that “reaches from one end to another mightily; and she orders all things sweetly.”⁠a Therefore I do not know what kind of aid the angels, themselves created first, gave to the Creator in making other things. I cannot ascribe to them what perhaps they cannot do, nor ought I to deny them the ability they have. But, by their leave, I attribute the creating and originating work which gave being to all natures to God, to whom they themselves thankfully ascribe their existence. We do not call gardeners the creators of their fruits, for we read, “Neither the one who plants is anything, nor the one who waters, but God who gives the growth.” 1 Corinthians 3:7 We do not call even the earth itself a creator, though she seems to be the prolific mother of all things which she aids in germinating and bursting forth from the seed, and which she keeps rooted in her own breast; for we likewise read, “God gives it a body, as it has pleased Him, and to every seed its own body.” 1 Corinthians 15:38 We ought not even to call a woman the creator of her own offspring; for its creator is rather He who said to His servant, “Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you.” Jeremiah 1:5 And although the various mental emotions of a pregnant woman produce in the fruit of her womb similar qualities, — as Jacob with his peeled wands caused piebald sheep to be produced — the mother no more creates her offspring than she created herself. Whatever bodily or seminal causes, then, may be used for the production of things, either by the cooperation of angels, men, or the lower animals, or by sexual generation; and whatever power the desires and mental emotions of the mother have to produce in the tender and plastic fœtus corresponding features and colors; the natures themselves, which are affected in these various ways, are still the work of no one but the most high God. It is His hidden power which pervades all things, and is present in all without being contaminated, which gives being to all that is, and modifies and limits its existence; so that without Him it would not be thus, or thus, nor would have any being at all. If, then, in regard to that outward form which the workman's hand imposes on his work, we do not say that Rome and Alexandria were built by masons and architects, but by the kings by whose will, plan, and resources they were built, so that the one has Romulus, the other Alexander, for its founder; with how much greater reason ought we to say that God alone is the Author of all natures, since He neither uses for His work any material which was not made by Him, nor any workmen who were not also made by Him, and since, if He were, so to speak, to withdraw from created things His creative power, they would at once fall back into the nothingness in which they were before they were created? “Before,” I mean, with respect to eternity, not of time. For what other creator could there be of time, than He who created those things whose movements make time?

It is obvious that in attributing the creation of the other animals to those inferior gods who were made by the Supreme, he meant it to be understood that the immortal part was taken from God Himself, and that these minor creators added the mortal part; that is to say, he meant them to be considered the creators of our bodies, but not of our souls. But since Porphyry maintains that if the soul is to be purified all entanglement with a body must be escaped from; and at the same time agrees with Plato and the Platonists in thinking that those who have not spent a temperate and honorable life return to mortal bodies as their punishment (to bodies of brutes in Plato's opinion, to human bodies in Porphyry's); it follows that those whom they want us to worship as our parents and authors, so that they may plausibly call them gods, are, after all, only the forgers of our fetters and chains — not our creators, but our jailers and wardens, who lock us up in the most bitter and melancholy house of correction. Let the Platonists, then, either cease menacing us with our bodies as the punishment of our souls, or preaching that we are to worship as gods those whose work on us they urge us by all means in our power to avoid and escape from. But, indeed, both opinions are quite false. It is false that souls return again to this life to be punished; and it is false that there is any other creator of anything in heaven or earth, than He who made the heaven and the earth. For if we live in a body only to expiate our sins, how can Plato say in another place that the world could not have been the most beautiful and good if it had not been filled with all kinds of creatures, mortal and immortal? But if our creation even as mortals is a divine benefit, how is it a punishment to be restored to a body, that is, to a divine benefit? And if God, as Plato continually maintains, embraced in His eternal intelligence the ideas both of the universe and of all the animals, how, then, could He not make them all with His own hand? Could He be unwilling to be the constructor of works, whose idea and plan called for His ineffable intelligence, which deserves ineffable praise?

With good cause, therefore, the true religion recognizes and proclaims that the same God who created the whole cosmos also created all the animals, souls as well as bodies. Among the terrestrial animals man was made by Him in His own image, and, for the reason I have given, was made one individual, though he was not left solitary. For there is nothing so social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption, as this race. And human nature has nothing more appropriate, either for the prevention of discord, or for the healing of it, where it exists, than the remembrance of that first parent of us all, whom God was pleased to create alone, so that all men might be derived from one, and so that they might be reminded in this way to preserve unity among their whole multitude. But from the fact that the woman was made for him from his side, it was plainly meant that we should learn how dear the bond between man and wife should be. These works of God do certainly seem extraordinary, because they are the first works. Those who do not believe them, ought not to believe any prodigies; for these would not be called prodigies if they did not happen outside the ordinary course of nature. But, is it possible that anything should happen in vain, however hidden its cause, in so grand a government of divine providence? One of the sacred Psalmists says, “Come, behold the works of the Lord, what prodigies He has performed on the earth.” Why God made woman out of man's side, and what this first prodigy prefigured, I shall, with God's help, tell in another place. But for now, since this book must be concluded, let us merely say that in this first man, who was created in the beginning, there was laid the foundation, not indeed evidently, but in God's foreknowledge, of these two cities or societies, as far as the human race is concerned. For from that man all men were to be derived — some of them to be associated with the good angels in their reward, others with the wicked in punishment; all of it ordered by the secret yet just judgment of God. For since it is written, “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth,” His grace cannot be unjust, nor His justice cruel.