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Wine and Education

Athenian
A stranger from Athens
Clinias
A Cretan from Knossos
Megillus
A Spartan

Athenian

652a–652b Next, it seems, we should look into this question about our subject: Is discovering people’s natural dispositions the only benefit to be gained from the right use of wine-parties, or do they also bring benefits so great that they deserve serious consideration? What do we say about this? Our argument evidently tends to indicate that they do bring such benefits. So let us now hear how and in what way they do, and let us listen attentively, so that we are not somehow led astray by the argument.

Clinias

652b Go on, then.

Athenian

652b–653a I want us to recall once again our definition of right education. For its safekeeping depends, as I now conjecture, on the correct establishment of the institution we have mentioned.

Clinias

653a That is a strong claim!

Pleasure, Pain, and Early Education

Athenian

653a–653c What I claim is this. In children, the first childish sensations are pleasure and pain, and it is in these first that goodness and badness come to the soul. As for wisdom and settled true opinions, a man is lucky if they come to him even in old age; and whoever possesses these blessings, and everything they include, is indeed a complete man. So I call the goodness that first comes to children education. Pleasure and love, and pain and hatred, may arise rightly in the souls of those who cannot yet grasp a rational account. Then, after they grasp the rational account, they may agree with it that they have been rightly trained in fitting habits. This agreement, taken as a whole, is goodness. But one part of it is rightly trained with respect to pleasures and pains, so as to hate what ought to be hated, right from the beginning to the very end, and to love what ought to be loved. If you were to mark off this part in your definition and call it education, you would, in my opinion, be giving it its right name.

Clinias

653c You are quite right, Stranger, it seems to us, both in what you said before about education and in what you say now.

Athenian

653c–653e Very good. Now these forms of child-training, which consist in right discipline in pleasures and pains, become slack and weakened to a great extent over the course of people’s lives. So the gods took pity on the human race, born as it is to hardship, and appointed the feasts of thanksgiving as periods of rest from their troubles. They have given them the Muses, Apollo the master of music, and Dionysus as companions at their feasts, so that they may at least set their ways of discipline right again by sharing their feasts with gods. We must consider, then, whether the account that is constantly repeated nowadays is true to nature. What it says is that, almost without exception, every young creature is unable to keep either its body or its tongue quiet. It is always striving to move and to cry out, leaping and skipping and delighting in dances and games, and also uttering noises of every kind.

Athenian

653e–654a Now all other creatures lack any perception of the various kinds of order and disorder in movement—which we call rhythm and harmony. But the very gods who, as we said, were given to us as our fellow dancers have granted to us human beings the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony. By means of this they move us and lead our choirs, linking us with one another through songs and dances; and they have named the choir from the cheer that is implanted in it. Shall we accept this account to begin with, and assume that education originates with Apollo and the Muses?

Clinias

654a Yes.

Athenian

654a–654b Shall we assume that the uneducated man is without choir-training, and that the educated man is fully choir-trained?

Clinias

654b Certainly.

Athenian

Choir-training as a whole, of course, includes both dancing and song.

Clinias

Undoubtedly.

Athenian

So the well-educated man will be able both to sing well and to dance well.

Clinias

Evidently.

Athenian

Let us now consider what this last statement of ours implies.

Clinias

Which statement?

Athenian

654b–654c We say, “He sings well and dances well.” Should we or should we not add, “provided that he sings good songs and dances good dances”?

Clinias

654c We should add it.

Athenian

654c–654d What, then, if a man takes the good to be good and the bad to be bad, and treats them accordingly? Which kind of man shall we regard as better trained in choristry and music? Is it the one who is always able, with gesture and voice, to represent adequately what he conceives to be good, though he feels neither delight in the good nor hatred of the bad? Or is it the one who, though not fully able to represent his conception rightly with voice and gesture, still keeps right in his feelings of pain and pleasure, welcoming everything good and loathing everything that is not good?

Clinias

654d There is a vast difference between the two cases, Stranger, as regards education.

Athenian

654d–654e If, then, the three of us understand what makes for goodness in dance and song, we also know who is rightly educated and who is not. But without this knowledge we will never be able to tell whether there is any safeguard for education, or where it is to be found. Isn’t that so?

Clinias

654e It is.

Character in Song and Dance

Athenian

What we have to track down next, like hounds on the trail, is goodness of posture and of tune in relation to song and dance. If this escapes our pursuit, it will be useless for us to say anything more about right education, whether of Greeks or of barbarians.

Clinias

Yes.

Athenian

654e–655a Well then, how in the world shall we define goodness of posture or of tune? Come, consider. Suppose a manly soul is beset by troubles, and a cowardly soul by troubles that are identical and equal. Are the postures and utterances that result in the two cases alike?

Clinias

655a How could they be, when even their complexions differ in color?

Athenian

655a–655b Well said, my friend. But in fact, there are postures and tunes in music, since music deals with rhythm and harmony, so one can rightly speak of a tune or posture as rhythmical or harmonious. Even so, one cannot rightly apply the choirmasters’ metaphor “well-colored” to tune and posture. One can, however, use this language about the posture and tune of the brave man and of the coward, and one is right to call those of the brave man good and those of the coward bad. To avoid a long, tedious discussion, let us sum up the whole matter by saying this: the postures and tunes that belong to goodness of soul or body, or to some image of it, are good without exception, while those that belong to badness are exactly the opposite.

Clinias

655b Your pronouncement is correct, and we now formally endorse it.

Athenian

655b–655c Another point: do we all delight equally in choral dancing, or far from equally?

Clinias

655c Very far indeed.

Athenian

655c–655d Then what are we to suppose misleads us? Is it that we do not all regard the same things as good? Or is it that, although they are the same, they are thought not to be the same? For surely no one will maintain that the choral performances of vice are better than those of virtue, or that he himself enjoys the postures of depravity while everyone else delights in music of the opposite kind. Most people, however, claim that the value of music lies in its power to give pleasure to the soul. But such a claim is quite intolerable, and it is blasphemy even to utter it. What misleads us is more probably the following—

Clinias

655d What?

Athenian

655d–655e Choral performances are representations of character, displayed in actions and circumstances of every kind, in which the individual performers act out their parts by habit and imitative art. So whenever the choral performances suit them in diction, tune, or other features—whether from natural inclination, from habit, or from all these causes combined, these performers invariably delight in such performances and praise them as excellent. But those who find them repugnant to their nature, disposition, or habits cannot possibly delight in them or praise them, and instead call them bad.

Athenian

655e–656a And when people are right in their natural tastes but wrong in those acquired by habituation, or right in the latter but wrong in the former, then their expressions of praise convey the opposite of their real feelings. For they say of a performance that it is pleasant but bad. They are ashamed to indulge in such bodily movements in front of people whose wisdom they respect, or to sing such songs—as though they seriously approved of them; but in private they really delight in them.

Clinias

656a Very true.

Athenian

Does the man who delights in bad postures and tunes suffer any harm from it, or do those who take pleasure in the opposite gain any benefit from it?

Clinias

656a–656b Probably.

Athenian

656b Is it not probable, or rather inevitable, that the result here will be exactly the same as in another case? A man living among the bad habits of wicked people does not really loathe those habits but instead accepts and delights in them; yet he criticizes them casually, as though dimly aware of his own depravity. In such a case, surely, the man who delights in them inevitably becomes like the habits, good or bad, in which he delights, even if he is ashamed to praise them. Yet what greater blessing or curse could we name than this assimilation, which happens to us so inevitably?

Clinias

656b–656c There is none, I believe.

Law and Musical Innovation

Athenian

656c Now where laws are, or will in the future be, rightly laid down concerning musical education and recreation, do we imagine that poets will be given such license that they may teach whatever rhythm, tune, or words they themselves like best to the children of law-abiding citizens and to the young men in the choirs, no matter what the result may be in terms of virtue or depravity?

Clinias

656c–656d That would certainly be unreasonable.

Athenian

656d But at present this license is allowed in practically every State, with the exception of Egypt.

Clinias

How, then, does the law stand in Egypt?

Athenian

656d–656e It is astonishing even to hear about. It seems that long ago they settled on the very rule we are now discussing: that the young people of a State must practice good postures and good tunes in their rehearsals. They prescribed these in detail and posted them in the temples. Beyond this official list, it was, and still is, forbidden to painters and to all other makers of postures and representations to introduce any innovation or invention beyond the traditional forms, whether in such works or in any other branch of music.

Athenian

656e–657a And if you look there, you will find that the things painted or carved there 10,000 years ago—and I mean this not loosely but literally: 10,000—are not the least bit better or worse than the works of today, but are made with the same art.

Clinias

657a An astonishing state of affairs!

Athenian

657a–657c Say rather that it is supremely worthy of a statesman and a legislator. Still, you would find other things in Egypt that are bad. But this is a true and remarkable fact: in music it has proved possible for tunes that possess a natural correctness to be established by law and permanently consecrated. Doing this would be the work of a god or of a godlike man—just as in Egypt they say that the tunes preserved through all this length of time are the compositions of Isis. So, as I said, if one could by any means succeed in grasping the principle of correctness in tune, one could then confidently reduce the tunes to legal form and prescription. For the craving of pleasure and pain always to indulge in new music has, after all, no very great power to corrupt choral forms that are consecrated, merely by mocking them as old-fashioned. In Egypt, at any rate, it seems to have had no such power to corrupt them—in fact, quite the opposite.

Clinias

657c That would evidently be the case, judging from what you now say.

Athenian

May we confidently describe the correct method in music and play, in connection with choristry, in some such terms as this: we rejoice whenever we think we are prospering, and, conversely, whenever we rejoice we think we are prospering? Isn’t that so?

Clinias

Yes, that is so.

Athenian

Moreover, when we are in this state of joy, we are unable to keep still.

Clinias

657c–657d True.

Athenian

657d Now while our young men are fit to dance themselves, we older men consider it fitting for us to spend our time watching them and enjoying their sport and celebration, now that our former nimbleness is leaving us. It is our longing for that nimbleness that leads us to propose such contests for those who can best awaken in us, through memory, the dormant emotions of youth.

Clinias

Very true.

Athenian

657d–657e So we shall not dismiss as entirely groundless the opinion commonly expressed now about people celebrating festivals—namely, that the one who best succeeds in giving us joy and pleasure should be counted the most skillful and be awarded the prize. For since we give ourselves up to recreation on such occasions, surely the highest honor and the prize of victory, as I said just now, should go to the performer who gives the greatest enjoyment to the greatest number.

Athenian

657e–658a Isn’t this the right view, and the right way to act as well, supposing it were carried out?

Clinias

658a Possibly.

Judging Musical Contests

Athenian

658a–658b But, my dear sir, we must not decide this matter hastily. Rather, we must analyze it thoroughly and examine it in some such way as this. Suppose a man were to organize a competition without qualifying it or limiting it to athletic, musical, or equestrian events. Suppose he were to assemble the whole population of the State and proclaim that this is purely a pleasure-contest in which anyone who chooses may compete. And suppose he were to offer a prize to the competitor who gives the spectators the greatest amusement—without any restrictions on the methods used—who excels the others in doing just this to the highest possible degree, and who is judged the most pleasure-giving of the competitors. What do we suppose the effect of such a proclamation would be?

Clinias

658b In what respect do you mean?

Athenian

658b–658c The natural result would be that one man would, like Homer, present a rhapsody, another a song to the harp, one a tragedy and another a comedy. Nor should we be surprised if someone even imagined that he had the best chance of winning with a puppet show. So when competitors like these, and thousands of others, enter the contest, can we say who will deserve to win the prize?

Clinias

658c An absurd question; for who could possibly claim to know the answer before he had actually heard each of the competitors for himself?

Athenian

Very well, then; do you want me to supply you with the answer to this absurd question?

Clinias

By all means.

Athenian

658c–658d If the tiniest children are to be the judges, they will award the prize to the puppet showman, won’t they?

Clinias

658d Certainly they will.

Athenian

And older boys will award it to the one who presents comedies, while educated women, young men, and the general mass of the people will award it to the one who presents tragedies.

Clinias

Most probably.

Athenian

And we old men would very likely take the most delight in listening to a rhapsode giving a fine recitation of the Iliad or the Odyssey or of a piece from Hesiod, and would declare that he is easily the winner. Who, then, would rightly be the winner of the prize? That is the next question, isn’t it?

Clinias

658d–658e Yes.

Athenian

658e Evidently the three of us cannot avoid saying that those judged the winners by our own contemporaries would win rightly. For in our opinion epic poetry is by far the best to be found anywhere nowadays, in any State in the world.

Clinias

Of course.

Athenian

658e–659c This much I myself am willing to concede to the majority of people: that music should be judged by pleasure—not, however, by the pleasure of just anyone. Rather, I would regard as about the finest the music that pleases the best and highly educated men, and as quite the finest the music that pleases the one man who surpasses all others in virtue and education. And we say that the judges of these matters need virtue because they must possess not only wisdom in general but especially courage. For the true judge should not take his verdicts from the dictation of the audience, nor give in weakly to the uproar of the crowd or to his own lack of education. Nor again, when he knows the truth, should he deliver his verdict carelessly out of cowardice and lack of spirit, and so swear falsely with the same mouth with which he called on Heaven when he first took his seat as judge. For, rightly speaking, the judge sits not as a pupil but rather as a teacher of the spectators, ready to oppose those who offer them pleasure in an improper or wrong way. This is what the ancient Hellenic law permitted. But the present law of Sicily and Italy entrusts the decision to the spectators, who award the prize by a show of hands. In this way it has not only corrupted the poets—since they adapt their works to the low standard of pleasure of the judges, which means that the spectators are the teachers of the poets, but has also corrupted the pleasures of the audience. For they ought to be raising their standard of pleasure by listening to characters better than their own, but what they now do has exactly the opposite effect. What, then, is the conclusion to be drawn from this survey? Is it this, do you suppose?

Clinias

659c What?

Athenian

659c–659e This is, I think, the third or fourth time that our discussion has come full circle back to this same point: education is the process of drawing and guiding children toward the principle that the law pronounces right, and that the experience of the oldest and most just men confirms as truly right. The child’s soul must not become accustomed to feeling pains and pleasures contrary to the law and to those who obey the law, but in conformity with it, being pleased and pained by the same things as the old man. For this reason we have what we call chants, which are evidently in reality incantations, seriously designed to produce in souls the conformity and harmony we are speaking of. But since the souls of the young cannot endure serious study, we call these plays and chants, and use them as such— 659e–660b just as, when people suffer from bodily illnesses and infirmities, those whose job it is try to give them wholesome nourishment in pleasant foods and drinks, but unwholesome nourishment in unpleasant ones, so that they may form the right habit of approving the one kind and detesting the other. In the same way, in dealing with the poet, the good legislator will use fine and praiseworthy language to persuade him—and, if persuasion fails, he will compel him—to portray in his rhythms the gestures, and in his harmonies the tunes, of men who show self-control and courage and are good in every respect, and in this way to compose poems rightly.

Clinias

660b–660c In Heaven’s name, Stranger, do you believe that this is how poetry is composed nowadays in other States? As far as my own observation goes, I know of no practices such as you describe except in my own country and in Lacedaemon. But I do know that novelties are constantly being introduced in dancing and in all other forms of music—changes due not to the laws but to disorderly tastes. And these tastes are so far from being constantly uniform and stable, like the Egyptian ones you describe, that they are never uniform for a single moment.

Athenian

660c–660d Well said, Clinias! If, however, I seemed to you to be saying that the practices you refer to are in use now, the mistake very likely arose from my own failure to express my meaning clearly. Probably I stated what I want to see in music in such a way that you imagined I was stating present facts. To denounce things that are beyond remedy and far gone in error is by no means pleasant, but at times it is unavoidable. And now that you share my opinion on this subject, come, tell me: do you claim that such practices are more common among the Cretans and the Lacedaemonians than among the other Greeks?

Clinias

660d Certainly.

Athenian

Suppose now that they were to become common among the rest as well. Would we say that the way things were done would then be better than it is now?

Clinias

The improvement would be immense, if things were done as they are in my country and in that of our friends here, and also as you yourself said just now they ought to be done.

Virtue and the Pleasant Life

Athenian

660d–660e Come now, let us reach an agreement on this matter. In all education and music in your countries, isn’t this what you teach? You require the poets to teach that the good man, since he has self-control and is just, is fortunate and happy, whether he is great or small, strong or weak, rich or poor; whereas if he is unjust, even if he is richer than Cinyras or Midas, he is a wretched man and lives a miserable life.

Athenian

660e–661d Your poet says—if he speaks the truth—“I would not spend a word on the man, or hold him in any esteem, who does or acquires all the things counted good without justice.” And again he describes how the just man drives his spear against the enemy at close quarters, whereas the unjust man does not dare to look on the face of bloody death, nor does he outrun the north wind from Thrace in speed of foot, nor acquire any other of the things called good. For the things most people call good are wrongly called so. People say that the chief good is health, beauty the second, wealth the third; and they call countless other things goods—such as keenness of sight and hearing, and quickness in perceiving all the objects of the senses; being a king, too, and doing exactly as you please; and to possess all these goods and become immortal on the spot—that, they say, is the crown and summit of all happiness. But what you and I say is this: all these things are very good possessions for men who are just and holy, but for the unjust they are, one and all, from health downward, very bad. And we also say that sight and hearing and sensation, and even life itself, are very great evils for the man who has all the so-called goods but lacks justice and all virtue, if he is immortal forever, but a lesser evil for such a man if he survives only a short time. This, I imagine, is what you—like me—will persuade or compel your poets to teach; and you will compel them also to educate your youth by supplying them with rhythms and harmonies in keeping with this teaching. Am I not right? Just consider: what I assert is that the things called evils are good for the unjust but evil for the just, while the so-called goods are truly good for the good but bad for the bad. So, are you in agreement with me—that was my question—or how does the matter stand?

Clinias

661d Apparently we are partly in agreement, but partly quite the opposite.

Athenian

661d–661e Take the case of a man who has health and wealth and absolute power forever—and in addition, if you like, I give him matchless strength and courage, together with immortality and freedom from all the other so-called evils—but a man who has within him nothing but injustice and insolence. Probably I fail to convince you that the man who lives such a life is obviously not happy but wretched?

Clinias

661e Quite true.

Athenian

661e–662a Well, then, what should I say next? Suppose a man who is courageous, strong, handsome, and rich, and who does exactly as he likes all his life long, is really unjust and insolent. Don’t you think he must necessarily be living a shameful life? Probably you will at least agree to call it shameful?

Clinias

662a Certainly.

Athenian

And also a bad life?

Clinias

We would not go so far as to admit that.

Athenian

Well, would you admit the descriptions “unpleasant” and “unprofitable to himself”?

Clinias

How could we agree to such further descriptions?

Athenian

662a–662e How, you ask? Only, it seems, my friends, if some god were to grant us concord, since at present we are pretty much in discord with one another. In my opinion these facts are quite indisputable—even more plainly so, my dear Clinias, than the fact that Crete is an island. If I were a legislator, I would try to compel the poets and all the citizens to speak in this sense. And I would impose nearly the heaviest of penalties on anyone in the land who declared that any wicked people live pleasant lives, or that things profitable and lucrative are different from things just. And there are many other things, contrary to what Cretans and Lacedaemonians—and of course the rest of mankind—now say, it seems, that I would persuade my citizens to proclaim. For come now, my most excellent sirs, in the name of Zeus and Apollo, suppose we were to question the very gods who made laws for you, and ask: “Is the most just life the most pleasant? Or are there two lives, one of which is most pleasant and the other most just?” If they answered that there were two, we might well ask them further, if we were to put the correct question: “Which of the two ought one to call the happier, those who live the most just life or those who live the most pleasant?” If they answered, “Those who live the most pleasant life,” that would be a monstrous statement for them to make. But I prefer not to attribute such statements to gods, but rather to ancestors and lawgivers. Imagine, then, that the questions I have put have been put to an ancestor and lawgiver, and that he has stated that the man who lives the most pleasant life is the happiest. Next, I would say this to him: “Father, didn’t you want me to live as happily as possible? Yet you never stopped urging me constantly to live as justly as possible.”

Athenian

662e–663a And in this way, I think, our lawgiver or ancestor would be shown to be illogical and unable to speak consistently with himself. If, on the other hand, he were to declare the most just life to be the happiest, everyone who heard him would, I suppose, ask what good and charm it contains, superior to pleasure, for which the lawgiver praises it. For apart from pleasure, what good could come to a just man? Come, tell me: is a good reputation, and praise from the mouths of men and gods, a fine and good thing but unpleasant, while a bad reputation is the opposite? “By no means, my dear lawgiver,” we shall say. And is it unpleasant, but fine and good, neither to wrong anyone nor to be wronged by anyone, while the opposite is pleasant, but ignoble and bad?

Clinias

663a By no means.

Athenian

663a–663c So the teaching that refuses to separate the pleasant from the just helps, if nothing else, to induce a man to live the holy and just life. Accordingly, any doctrine that denies this truth is, in the lawgiver’s eyes, most shameful and most hateful; for no one would willingly consent to be induced to do something unless it brings with it more pleasure than pain. Now distance blurs the vision of nearly everyone, and of children especially. But our lawgiver will reverse the appearance by removing the fog, and by one means or another—habituation, praise, or argument—he will persuade people that their notions of justice and injustice are illusory pictures. To the one who is opposed to justice, unjust things appear pleasant and just things most unpleasant, because he views them from his own unjust and evil standpoint; but when they are seen from the standpoint of justice, both appear in every way entirely the opposite.

Clinias

663c So it appears.

Athenian

In point of truth, which of the two judgments shall we say carries more authority—that of the worse soul or that of the better?

Clinias

663c–663d That of the better, undoubtedly.

Athenian

663d Undoubtedly, then, the unjust life is not only more shameful and ignoble, but also in very truth more unpleasant, than the just and holy life.

Clinias

It would seem so, my friends, from our present argument.

Athenian

663d–663e And even if the case were different from what our argument has now proved it to be, could a lawgiver who was worth his salt find any more useful fiction than this—if he dared to use any fiction at all in addressing the young for their good? Could he find one more effective in persuading everyone to act justly in all things, willingly and without constraint?

Clinias

663e Truth is a noble and enduring thing, Stranger; yet persuading people of it seems no easy matter.

Athenian

So be it; yet it proved easy to persuade people of the Sidonian fairy tale, incredible as it was, and of countless others.

Clinias

What tales?

Athenian

663e–664b The tale of the teeth that were sown, and how armed men sprang up from them. Here, indeed, the lawgiver has a striking example of how one can, if he tries, persuade the souls of the young of anything. So the only question he has to consider in his inventing is what belief would do the State the most good. Then he must devise every possible means of ensuring that the whole community, constantly and for as long as they live, uses exactly the same language about these matters, as far as possible, in their songs, their tales, and their discussions alike. If, however, you think otherwise, I have no objection to your arguing the opposite.

Clinias

664b Neither of us, I think, could possibly argue against your view.

The Three Choruses

Athenian

664b–664c The next subject I must handle myself. I maintain that all three choirs must enchant the souls of the children while they are still young and tender, by rehearsing all the noble things we have already recounted or shall recount later. And let this be the sum of them: in asserting that one and the same life is declared by the gods to be both most pleasant and best, we shall not only be saying what is most true, but we shall also convince those who need convincing more effectively than we could by any other assertion.

Clinias

664c We must agree with what you say.

Athenian

664c–664d First, then, the right order will be for the children’s choir of the Muses to come forward first and sing these things with the utmost vigor before the whole city. Second will come the choir of those under thirty, calling on Apollo Paian as witness to the truth of what is said, and praying that he will graciously win over the young by persuasion. The next singers will be the third choir, of those over thirty and under sixty. And lastly there remain those who are no longer able to raise a song; they shall handle the same moral themes in stories and in oracular speech.

Clinias

664d Whom do you mean, Stranger, by these third choristers? For we do not grasp very clearly what you intend to convey about them.

Athenian

664d–664e Yet they are in fact the very people toward whom most of our previous discussion was meant to lead.

Clinias

664e We are still in the dark; try to explain yourself even more clearly.

Athenian

At the start of our discussion we said, if we remember, that since all young creatures are fiery by nature, they cannot keep either body or voice still, but are always crying out and leaping in a disorderly way. We also said that none of the other creatures attains a sense of order, in body or in voice, and that man alone has this; 664e–665a and that order in movement is called rhythm, while order in the voice—in which high and low are blended together—is called harmony, and the combination of the two is given the name choristry. We also stated that the gods, in pity for us, have given us Apollo and the Muses as fellow choristers and choir-leaders—and besides them we mentioned, if we remember, a third, Dionysus.

Clinias

665a Of course we remember.

The Chorus of Dionysus

Athenian

665a–665b The choir of Apollo and that of the Muses have been described; the third and remaining choir, that of Dionysus, must necessarily be described now.

Clinias

665b How so? Tell us. For when one first hears of it, a Dionysiac choir of old men sounds very strange—if you mean that men over thirty, and even men over fifty and up to sixty, are really going to dance in his honor.

Athenian

That is indeed perfectly true. I think it needs argument to show how such a practice could be reasonable.

Clinias

It does.

Athenian

665b–665c Are we agreed about what we proposed earlier?

Clinias

665c In what respect?

Athenian

That it is the duty of every man and child—slave and free, male and female—and the duty of the whole State, to keep charming themselves without ceasing with the chants we have described. They must constantly change them and secure variety in every possible way, so as to fill the singers with an insatiable appetite for the hymns and with pleasure in them.

Clinias

665c–665d Surely we would agree that this ought to be done.

Athenian

665d Then where should we put the best element in the State—the one that, by age and judgment alike, has the most influence of any it contains—so that by singing its finest songs it may do the most good? Or shall we be so foolish as to dismiss the section that has the greatest capacity for the finest and most useful songs?

Clinias

We cannot possibly dismiss it, judging from what you now say.

Athenian

What fitting method can we adopt for it? Will it be this?

Clinias

What?

Athenian

665d–665e Every man, as he grows older, becomes reluctant to sing songs and takes less pleasure in doing so; and when compelled to sing, the older and the more self-controlled he is, the more ashamed he will feel. Isn’t that so?

Clinias

665e It is.

Athenian

Surely, then, he will be more ashamed than ever to stand up and sing in the theater before people of all sorts. Moreover, suppose old men like that were obliged to do as the choristers do, who go thin and without food while training their voices for a competition. They would certainly find singing an unpleasant and degrading task, and they would take it on with little enthusiasm.

Clinias

666a There is no doubt about that.

Athenian

666a–666c How, then, shall we encourage them to take readily to singing? Shall we not pass a law, first, that no children under eighteen may touch wine at all? We shall teach that it is wrong to pour fire on fire, in either body or soul, before they set about their real labors, and so guard against the excitable disposition of the young. Next, we shall rule that the young man under thirty may take wine in moderation, but must entirely abstain from drunkenness and heavy drinking. But when a man has reached the age of forty, he may join in the convivial gatherings and invoke Dionysus above all other gods, inviting his presence at the rite—which is also the recreation—of the elders. For this rite he gave mankind wine as a powerful medicine against the sourness of old age, so that by it we men may renew our youth, and so that, by forgetting our cares, the temper of our souls may lose its hardness and become softer and more malleable, just as iron does when it has been forged in the fire. Will not this softer disposition, first of all, make each of them more willing and less ashamed to sing chants and incantations—as we have often called them, not before a large company of strangers, but before a small number of intimate friends?

Clinias

666c Yes, much more willing!

Athenian

666c–666d So, as a way of inducing them to take part in our singing, this plan would not be altogether improper.

Clinias

666d Not at all.

Athenian

What kind of song will these men raise? Won’t it evidently be one that suits their own condition in every case?

Clinias

Of course.

Athenian

What song, then, would suit godlike men? Would a choral song?

Clinias

At any rate, Stranger, we and our friends here would be unable to sing any song other than the one we learned through practice in choruses.

Athenian

666d–666e Naturally; for in truth you have never attained the finest kind of singing. Your civic organization is that of an army rather than of people living in cities, and you keep your young people massed together like a herd of colts at pasture.

Athenian

666e–667a None of you takes his own colt, drags him away from his fellows despite his fretting and fuming, puts a special groom in charge of him, and trains him by rubbing him down and stroking him and using all the means suited to child-rearing. That is how he would turn out to be not only a good soldier but also able to manage a State and cities—in short, a man who—as we said at the beginning—is more of a warrior than the warriors of Tyrtaeus, since always and everywhere, in States and in individuals alike, he values courage as the fourth of the virtues, not the first.

Clinias

667a Once again, Stranger, you are somehow disparaging our lawgivers.

Athenian

667a–667b If I am doing so, my friend, it is not intentional; but let us go wherever the argument leads us, if you please. If we know of a music finer than that of the choirs or of the public theaters, let us try to supply it to those men who, as we said, are ashamed of the latter, yet are eager to take part in the music that is finest.

Clinias

667b Certainly.

Judging Musical Imitation

Athenian

667b–667c Now, first of all, must it not be true of everything that has charm accompanying it that its most important element is either this charm itself, or some kind of correctness, or, third, usefulness? For example, food and drink and nourishment in general have, as I say, an accompanying charm, which we would call pleasure; but as for their correctness and usefulness, what we call the wholesomeness of each item served is precisely the most perfect element in them.

Clinias

667c Certainly.

Athenian

Learning, too, is accompanied by the element of charm, which is pleasure; but what produces its correctness and usefulness, its goodness and nobility, is truth.

Clinias

667c–667d Quite so.

Athenian

667d Then what about the imitative arts, which produce likenesses? If they succeed in what they produce, should not any pleasure that accompanies and results from it most properly be called charm?

Clinias

Yes.

Athenian

But, generally speaking, the correctness of these things would come not primarily from pleasure but from equality in both quality and quantity.

Clinias

Excellent.

Athenian

667d–667e Then we shall rightly judge by the criterion of pleasure only the object that, in its effects, produces neither usefulness nor truth nor likeness, nor any harm either, but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying element of charm. This element will best be named pleasure whenever none of the other qualities mentioned goes with it.

Clinias

667e You mean only harmless pleasure.

Athenian

Yes, and I say that this same pleasure is also play, whenever the harm or good it does is negligible.

Clinias

Very true.

Athenian

667e–668a Should we not then assert, as a consequence, that no imitation should be judged by the criterion of pleasure or of untrue opinion, and indeed that no kind of equality should be judged in this way? The equal is equal, and the symmetrical symmetrical, not at all because someone thinks so or is charmed by it, but most of all because of truth, and least of all for any other reason.

Clinias

668a Most certainly.

Athenian

We assert, do we not, that all music is representative and imitative?

Clinias

Of course.

Athenian

668a–668b So whenever someone says that pleasure is the criterion of music, we shall firmly reject his claim. We shall regard such music as the least important of all—if indeed any music is important, and prefer the music that has likeness in its imitation of the beautiful.

Clinias

668b Very true.

Athenian

So those who are seeking the best singing and music must seek, it appears, not what is pleasant but what is correct; and the correctness of imitation consists, as we say, in reproducing the original in its own proper quantity and quality.

Clinias

Of course.

Athenian

668b–668c And this is certainly true of music, as everyone would grant: all its productions are imitative and representative. That much, at least, they would all admit—poets, audience, and actors alike—wouldn’t they?

Clinias

668c They would.

Athenian

Now the man who is to judge a poem without error must know in each particular case what exactly the poem is. For if he does not know its essence—what it intends and what the actual original is that it represents—he will hardly be able to decide how far it succeeds or fails in achieving its intention.

Clinias

668c–668d Hardly, to be sure.

Athenian

668d And would a man who does not know what constitutes correctness be able to decide whether a poem is good or bad? But I am not making myself quite clear; it might be clearer if I put it this way—

Clinias

What way?

Athenian

Among objects of sight we have, of course, thousands of representations.

Clinias

Yes.

Athenian

668d–668e What, then, if a man in this class of objects did not know the nature of each of the bodies represented? Could he ever know whether the work is perfectly executed? What I mean is this: whether it preserves the proper dimensions and positions of each of the body’s parts, and has captured their exact number and the proper order in which one is placed next to another, as well as their colors and shapes—or whether all these things are done in a confused way. Do you suppose anyone could possibly decide these points if he were totally ignorant of what animal was being represented?

Clinias

668e How could he?

Athenian

668e–669a Well, suppose we know that the object painted or molded is a man, and know that the art has given him all his proper parts, colors, and shapes. Does it follow at once that the person who knows this can also easily tell whether the work is beautiful, or in what respect it falls short of beauty?

Clinias

669a If that were so, Stranger, practically all of us would know which animals are beautiful.

Athenian

669a–669b You are quite right. With regard, then, to every representation—whether in painting, in music, or in any other art—must not the sensible critic have these three requirements: first, knowledge of the nature of the original; next, knowledge of the correctness of the copy; and third, knowledge of the excellence with which the copy is executed in words, tunes, and rhythms?

Clinias

669b It would certainly seem so.

Training the Musical Judges

Athenian

669b–669e Let us not hesitate, then, to state where the difficulty of music lies. Precisely because it is talked about more than any other form of representation, it requires more caution than any. The man who blunders in this art will do himself the greatest harm by welcoming bad morals; and, moreover, his blunder is very hard to detect, because our poets are inferior as poets to the Muses themselves. For the Muses would never blunder so badly as to give a feminine tune and gesture to verses composed for men, or to fit the rhythms of captives and slaves to gestures designed for free men, or, conversely, after constructing the rhythms and gestures of free men, to give the rhythms a tune or verses of an opposite style. Nor would the Muses ever combine in a single piece the cries of beasts and of men, the clash of instruments, and noises of every kind, as a way of representing a single object. Human poets, however, by senselessly mixing such things and jumbling them together, would provide a subject for laughter to all the men who, in Orpheus’ phrase, have attained the full flower of joyousness. For these men see all these things jumbled together. They also see how the poets crudely tear rhythm and gesture apart from tune, putting bare words into meter, or leaving tune and rhythm without words and using the bare sound of harp or flute. In such music it is almost impossible to understand what this wordless rhythm and harmony intend, or what noteworthy original they represent.

Athenian

669e–670b One ought to realize that such methods are crude in the extreme, insofar as they show an excessive craving for speed, mechanical precision, and the imitation of animal sounds, and consequently use the pipe and the harp without accompanying dance and song; for using either of these instruments by itself is the mark of a charlatan or a boor. Enough, then, of that matter; now as to ourselves. What we are considering is not how those of us who are over thirty years old, or beyond fifty, ought not to make use of the Muses, but how they ought to. Our argument already indicates, I think, this result of our discussion: all men over fifty who are fit to sing ought to have a training that is better than that of the choral Muse. For they must necessarily have knowledge and a keen perception of rhythms and harmonies. Otherwise, how will a man know which tunes are correct—whether the Dorian mode suits a given tune or not, and whether the rhythm the poet has attached to it is right or not?

Clinias

670b Obviously he cannot know this at all.

Athenian

670b–670c It is ridiculous for the general crowd to imagine that they fully understand what is harmonious and rhythmical, or the opposite, just because they have been drilled to sing to the flute and to march in step. They fail to see that they do each of these things in ignorance. But the fact is that every tune that has its appropriate elements is correct, and incorrect if its elements are inappropriate.

Clinias

670c Undoubtedly.

Athenian

What, then, of the man who does not know in the least what the tune’s elements are? Will he ever know about any tune, as we said, that it is correct?

Clinias

There is no possible way he could.

Athenian

670c–670e So once again, it appears, we are discovering that these singers of ours—whom we are now inviting, and in a sense compelling, to sing of their own free will—must almost necessarily be trained to such a point that every one of them can follow both the steps of the rhythms and the notes of the tunes. Then, by observing the harmonies and rhythms, they will be able to select those of an appropriate kind, which it is fitting for men of their own age and character to sing, and they will sing them in this way. And in singing them, they will not only enjoy harmless pleasure themselves at the moment, but will also serve as leaders to the younger men in their fitting adoption of noble manners. If they were trained to such a point, their training would be more thorough than that of the majority, or indeed of the poets themselves.

Athenian

670e–671b For while it is almost necessary for a poet to know harmony and rhythm, he does not need to know the third point as well—namely, whether the representation is noble or ignoble. But our older singers need to know all three points, so that they can determine what is first and what second in nobility; otherwise none of them will ever succeed in drawing the young to virtue by his incantations. The original aim of our argument, which was to show that our defense of the Dionysiac chorus was justified, has now been carried out to the best of our ability. Let us consider whether that is really so. Such a gathering inevitably tends, as the drinking goes on, to grow more and more uproarious; and in the case of present-day gatherings, as we said at the outset, that is an inevitable result.

Clinias

671b Inevitable.

Sober Leaders at Drinking Parties

Athenian

Everyone is lifted above his normal self and is merry. He bubbles over with talkative boldness himself while turning a deaf ear to his neighbors, and considers himself competent to rule both himself and everyone else.

Clinias

Of course.

Athenian

671b–671d And did we not say that when this happens, the souls of the drinkers become softer, like iron, through being heated, and younger too, so that they become malleable, just as when they were young, in the hands of the man who has the skill and the ability to train and mold them? And now, just as then, the one who is to mold them is the good legislator. He must lay down drinking laws that are able to control the drinker who becomes confident and bold and unduly shameless, and who is unwilling to submit to the proper limits of silence and speech, of drinking and of music; these laws must make him consent to do the opposite in every way. They must also be able, with the help of justice, to fight against the entry of such ignoble boldness by sending in that most noble fear which we have named divine fear—modesty and shame.

Clinias

671d That is so.

Athenian

671d–671e And as law-wardens of these laws and fellow workers with them, there must be sober and steady men to act as commanders over those who are not sober. For to fight drunkenness without such men would be a more formidable task than to fight enemies without steady leaders. Any man who refuses to obey these men willingly, and the officers of Dionysus—who are over sixty years old, shall incur as much disgrace as the man who disobeys the officers of Ares, and even more.

Clinias

671e Quite right.

Athenian

671e–672a If the drinking and the recreation were of this character, wouldn’t such fellow drinkers benefit from it, and part from one another better friends than before, instead of enemies, as they do now? For they would be guided by laws in all their dealings with one another, and would follow the directions given by the sober to those who are not sober.

Clinias

672a True, if it really were of the character you describe.

Athenian

672a–672b Then we must no longer bring that old charge, without qualification, against the gift of Dionysus, that it is bad and unworthy of being admitted into a State. Indeed, one could say a good deal more on this subject. For the greatest benefit that gift confers is one that people hesitate to declare to the multitude, since, when it is declared, it is misconceived and misunderstood.

Clinias

672b What is that?

Athenian

672b–672c There is a secret current of story and rumor to the effect that the god Dionysus was robbed of his soul’s judgment by his stepmother Hera, and that in revenge for this he introduced Bacchic rites and all the frenzied choristry, and with the same aim also gave the gift of wine. These matters, however, I leave to those who think it safe to say such things about gods. But this much I know: no creature is ever born possessing the kind or the amount of reason that properly belongs to it when it is fully developed. Consequently, every creature, during the period when it still lacks its proper intelligence, is in a continual frenzy, crying out wildly, and, as soon as it can get on its feet, leaping wildly. Let us remember that we said that here we have the origin of music and gymnastic.

Clinias

672c Of course we remember that.

Athenian

672c–672d Don’t we also remember saying that from this origin the sense of rhythm and harmony was implanted in us human beings, and that its joint authors were Apollo, the Muses, and the god Dionysus?

Clinias

672d Certainly we remember.

Athenian

Moreover, as for wine, the account other people give apparently is that it was given to us human beings as a punishment, to make us mad. But our own account, on the contrary, declares that it is a medicine given for the purpose of producing modesty of soul and health and strength of body.

Clinias

672d–672e You have recalled our account admirably, Stranger.

Music and Gymnastics

Athenian

672e We may say, then, that one half of the subject of choristry has now been dealt with. Shall we go on at once to deal with the other half in whatever way seems best, or shall we leave it alone?

Clinias

What halves do you mean? How are you dividing the subject?

Athenian

In our view, choristry as a whole is identical with education as a whole; and the part of it concerned with the voice consists of rhythms and harmonies.

Clinias

Yes.

Athenian

672e–673a And the part concerned with bodily motion has rhythm in common with vocal motion. Besides this, it has gesture as its own distinctive feature, just as tune is the distinctive feature of vocal motion.

Clinias

673a Very true.

Athenian

Now the vocal activities that bear on training the soul in excellence we somehow ventured to call music.

Clinias

And rightly so.

Athenian

673a–673b As for the bodily activities that we called playful dancing—if such activity attains bodily excellence, we may call the skilled guidance of the body toward this end gymnastic.

Clinias

673b Quite rightly.

Athenian

As for music, which we were referring to a moment ago when we said that one half of choristry had been described and dealt with, let us say the same of it now. But as for the other half, are we to speak about it, or what are we to do?

Clinias

My good sir, you are talking with Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and we have discussed the subject of music. What answer to your question, then, do you suppose either of us will give, when the subject still left untouched is gymnastic?

Athenian

673b–673c I would say you have given me a pretty clear answer in asking this question. Although it is a question, I understand it to be also—as I said—an answer—or rather, an actual instruction to give a full account of gymnastic.

Clinias

673c You have understood my meaning excellently; please do so.

Athenian

Do it I must; and indeed it is not a very hard task to speak of things that are well known to you both. For you are far better acquainted with this art than with the other.

Clinias

That is about right.

Athenian

673c–673d The origin of the play we are speaking of lies in the habitual tendency of every living creature to leap. The human creature, by acquiring, as we said, a sense of rhythm, fathered dancing and gave birth to it. And since the tune suggests and awakens the rhythm, the union of these two gave birth to choristry and play.

Clinias

673d Very true.

Athenian

We have already discussed one part of choristry, and we shall try next to discuss the other part.

Clinias

By all means.

Laws Governing Wine

Athenian

673d–673e But first, if you both agree, let us put the finishing touch to our discussion of the use of drink.

Clinias

673e What finishing touch do you mean, and of what kind?

Athenian

Suppose a State makes use of the institution now mentioned in a lawful and orderly way, regarding it seriously and practicing it with a view to self-control. And suppose that in the same way and with a similar object, aiming at mastery over them, it allows indulgence in all other pleasures. Then they must all be used in the way described.

Athenian

673e–674c But suppose, on the other hand, that this institution is regarded as play, and that anyone who likes is to be allowed to drink whenever he likes and with any companions he likes, and along with all sorts of other practices. Then I would refuse to vote for allowing such a State or such an individual ever to indulge in drink. I would go even beyond the practice of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians. The Carthaginian law ordains that no soldier on campaign shall ever taste this drink, but shall confine himself to drinking water for the whole of that time. To this I would add the following: in the city, too, no male or female slave shall ever taste it; magistrates during their year of office, and pilots and judges while on duty, shall taste no wine at all; nor shall any councilor while attending any important council; nor shall anyone whatever taste it at all in the daytime, except for reasons of bodily training or health; nor shall anyone, man or woman, do so at night when intending to beget children. Many other occasions could also be mentioned when wine should not be drunk by people who are governed by right reason and law. So, according to this argument, no State would need a large number of vineyards. While all the other agricultural products and all foodstuffs would be regulated, the production of wine especially would be kept to the smallest and most modest dimensions. Let this, then, Strangers, if you agree, be the finishing touch we put to our discussion of wine.

Clinias

674c Very good; we quite agree.

Book 3

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