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The Lawgivers of Crete and Sparta

Athenian
A stranger from Athens
Clinias
A Cretan from Knossos
Megillus
A Spartan

Athenian

624a Who do you credit with establishing your laws, my friends? To a god or to some man?

Clinias

To a god, Stranger. It is most rightly said to be a god. We Cretans call Zeus our lawgiver, while in Lacedaemon, where our friend here has his home, I believe they claim Apollo as theirs. Isn’t that so, Megillus?

Megillus

Yes.

Athenian

624a–624b Do you then say, as Homer does, that Minos used to go every ninth year to converse with his father Zeus, and that he was guided by Zeus’s divine oracles in laying down the laws for your cities?

Clinias

624b–625a That is what our people say. They also say that his brother Rhadamanthys was extremely just. No doubt you have heard the name. And we Cretans would certainly maintain that he won this title because of the righteous way he administered justice in those days.

Athenian

625a–625b Yes, his fame is truly glorious and very fitting for a son of Zeus. You and our friend Megillus were both brought up under legal institutions of such a noble kind, so I imagine you would not dislike spending our time, as we go along, in discussing government and laws. Certainly, as I am told, the road from Knossos to the cave and temple of Zeus is a long one. In this stifling weather we are sure to find shady resting places among the tall trees along the road. In them we can rest often, as suits our age, passing the time with conversation, and so finish our journey in comfort.

Clinias

625b–625c True, Stranger. And as one goes farther, one finds cypress trees of wonderful height and beauty in the groves. There are meadows too, where we may rest and talk.

Athenian

625c You are right.

Clinias

Yes, indeed. And when we see them, we will say so even more emphatically. So let’s be going, and may good luck go with us.

War and the Aim of Law

Athenian

So be it! And now tell me: for what reason did your law establish your common meals, your gymnastic schools and your military equipment?

Clinias

625c–625e Our Cretan customs, Stranger, are, I think, such as anyone can easily grasp. As you may notice, Crete as a whole is not a level country like Thessaly. So, whereas the Thessalians mostly go on horseback, we Cretans are runners, since this land of ours is rugged and better suited to the practice of running on foot. Under these conditions we have to keep light armor for running and avoid heavy equipment. So bows and arrows are adopted as suitable because they are light. Thus all these customs of ours are adapted for war. In my opinion, this was the object the lawgiver had in view when he established them all. This was probably also his reason for instituting common meals. He saw how soldiers, the whole time they are on campaign, are forced by circumstances to eat together for the sake of their own security. And in this, I think, he condemned the stupidity of most people in failing to see that all are constantly involved in a lifelong war against all States.

Clinias

625e–626b Suppose these practices are necessary in war, namely, eating together for safety’s sake and appointing relays of officers and privates to act as guards. If so, they must be carried out in the same way in time of peace. For, as he would say, peace in the common use of the term is nothing more than a name. The truth is that every State is, by a law of nature, perpetually engaged in an undeclared war with every other State. If you look at the matter from this point of view, you will find it practically true that our Cretan lawgiver established all our legal usages, both public and private, with an eye to war. You will also find that he therefore entrusted us with guarding our laws on that basis. He was convinced that without victory in war nothing else, whether possession or institution, is of the least value. All the goods of the conquered fall into the hands of the conquerors.

Athenian

626b–626c Your training, Stranger, has certainly given you, as it seems to me, an excellent understanding of the legal practices of Crete. But tell me this still more clearly. By the definition you have given of the well-constituted State, you seem to me to imply that it ought to be organized so as to be victorious in war over all other States. Is that so?

Clinias

626c It certainly is. And I think that our friend here shares my opinion.

Megillus

No Lacedaemonian, my good sir, could possibly say otherwise.

Athenian

If this, then, is the right attitude for one State to take toward another, is the right attitude for one village toward another village different?

Clinias

Not at all.

Athenian

It is the same, you say?

Clinias

Yes.

Athenian

Well then, is the same attitude also right for one household in the village toward another, and for each man toward every other?

Clinias

626c–626d It is.

Athenian

626d And must each individual man regard himself as his own enemy? Or what do we say when we reach this point?

Clinias

626d–626e Athenian Stranger, I would not like to call you a man of Attica. I think you deserve rather to be named after the goddess Athena, because you have made the argument clearer by taking it back to its starting point. In this way you will more easily discover how right our recent statement was. In the mass, all men are enemies of all, both publicly and privately, and individually each man is also his own enemy.

Athenian

626e What do you mean, my admirable friend?

Clinias

It is in exactly this war, my friend, that victory over self is the first and best of all victories, while self-defeat is at once the worst and the most shameful of all defeats. For these phrases signify that a war against self exists within each of us.

Athenian

626e–627a Now let us take the argument back in the opposite direction. Each of us individually is partly superior to himself and partly inferior. Are we to affirm that the same condition exists in household, village and State, or are we to deny it?

Clinias

627a Do you mean the condition of being partly superior to oneself and partly inferior to oneself?

Athenian

Yes.

Clinias

627a–627b That, too, is a fair question. Such a condition most certainly does exist, and in States above all. Every State in which the better class is victorious over the masses and the lower classes would rightly be called superior to itself. It would most justly be praised for a victory of this kind. And the opposite holds when the opposite is the case.

Athenian

627b–627c Well then, let us leave aside whether the worse element is ever superior to the better, which would require a longer discussion. As I now understand, you are asserting this. Sometimes citizens of one stock and one State who are unjust and numerous may combine and try to enslave by force those who are just but fewer in number. Wherever the unjust prevail, such a State would rightly be called inferior to itself and bad. But wherever they are defeated, it would rightly be called superior to itself and good.

Clinias

627c This statement is very strange indeed, Stranger. Nevertheless, we cannot possibly reject it.

Justice and Reconciliation

Athenian

Wait a moment. Here too is a case we must consider further. Suppose there were a number of brothers, all sons of the same parents. It would not be at all surprising if most of them were unjust and only a few just.

Clinias

It would not.

Athenian

627c–627d Moreover, it would hardly be fitting for you and me to go chasing after this way of speaking. On that usage, if the bad ones won, this whole family and household should be called inferior to itself, but superior to itself if they were defeated. Our present reference to the usage of ordinary speech is not concerned with whether verbal phrases are proper or improper. It is concerned with what is essentially right or wrong in laws.

Clinias

627d Very true, Stranger.

Megillus

And well said too, I agree, as far as it goes.

Athenian

Let us also look at this point. The brothers we have just described would have a judge, I suppose?

Clinias

Certainly.

Athenian

627d–627e Which of the two would be better? The first is a judge who destroyed all the wicked among them and told the good to govern themselves. The second is one who made the good members govern and, while allowing the bad to live, made them willingly submit to being governed.

Athenian

627e–628a And there is a third judge we must mention, third and best in point of merit, if indeed such a judge can be found. In dealing with a single divided family, he will destroy none of them but reconcile them. By enacting laws for them, he will succeed in securing lasting friendship among them from then on.

Clinias

628a A judge and lawgiver of that kind would be by far the best.

Athenian

But notice this: his aim in the laws he enacted for them would be the opposite of war.

Clinias

That is true.

Athenian

628a–628b And what about the one who brings the State into harmony? In ordering its life, would he look to external warfare rather than to internal war, whenever it occurs, which is called civil strife? Every man would wish that this war, if possible, would never occur in his own State. And if it did occur, he would wish it to come to an end as quickly as possible.

Clinias

628b Clearly he would look to civil war.

Athenian

628b–628c Suppose internal peace had been secured by the destruction of one faction and the victory of its opponents, and the citizens then had to turn their attention to external enemies. Would anyone prefer this to their turning to external enemies after friendship and peace had been established by terms of reconciliation?

Clinias

628c Everyone would prefer the second alternative to the first for his own State.

Athenian

And wouldn’t the lawgiver do the same?

Clinias

Of course.

Athenian

Wouldn’t every lawgiver aim at the highest good in all his legislation?

Clinias

Certainly.

Athenian

628c–628e The highest good, however, is neither war nor civil strife. We should rather pray to be saved from these things. The highest good is peace with one another and goodwill. Moreover, it would seem that the victory of a State over itself that we mentioned is not one of the best things but one of the necessary ones. Imagine a man supposing that a human body was best off when it was sick and purged with medicine, while never giving a thought to the body that needs no medicine at all! Similarly, consider the well-being of a State or an individual. A man who pays attention solely and primarily to the needs of foreign warfare will never become a true statesman. Nor will he become an accomplished lawgiver unless he designs his war legislation for the sake of peace, rather than his peace legislation for the sake of war.

Clinias

628e This statement, Stranger, seems to be true. Yet, unless I am badly mistaken, our legal practices in Crete, and in Lacedaemon too, are wholly directed toward war.

Courage and Complete Virtue

Athenian

628e–629b Very possibly. But we must not attack them violently now. Instead we should question them gently, since both we and your legislators are seriously interested in these matters. Please follow the argument closely. Let us take the opinion of Tyrtaeus, an Athenian by birth who later became a citizen of Lacedaemon. He, above all men, was keenly interested in our subject. This is what he says: “Even if a man were the richest of men”, “even if a man owned plenty of good things”—and he lists nearly every good there is, “if he failed to prove himself at all times as brave as possible in war, I would neither mention him nor take any account of him at all.” No doubt you have heard these poems too, while our friend Megillus, I imagine, has had more than his fill of them.

Megillus

629b I certainly have.

Clinias

And I can assure you they have reached Crete too, shipped over from Lacedaemon.

Athenian

629b–629d Come now, let us jointly question this poet in some such way as this: “Tyrtaeus, most inspired of poets! You certainly seem to us both wise and good, since you have praised excellently those who excel in war. On this matter the three of us, Megillus, Clinias of Knossos and I, already agree with you entirely, as we suppose. But we want to be sure that both we and you are referring to the same people. So tell us: do you clearly recognize, as we do, two distinct kinds of war?” I suppose that even a much less able man than Tyrtaeus would answer with the truth, that there are two kinds. One is what we all call civil war, which is the most bitter of all wars, as we said just now. The other kind, as I suppose we will all agree, is the one we engage in when we quarrel with foreigners and outsiders. It is a much milder kind than the first.

Clinias

629d Certainly.

Athenian

629d–629e “Come, then, which kind of warriors, fighting in which kind of war, did you praise so highly, while blaming others? Warriors, apparently, who fight in war abroad. At any rate, in your poems you have said that you cannot tolerate men ‘who do not dare to face the bloody battle and strike the enemy in close combat’.” Then we would go on to say, “It appears, Tyrtaeus, that you are chiefly praising those who win distinction in foreign and external warfare.” To this, I presume, he would agree and say yes?

Clinias

630a Of course.

Athenian

630a–630d Yet brave as these men are, we still maintain that they are far surpassed in bravery by those who are conspicuously brave in the greatest of wars. We too have a poet as a witness, Theognis, a citizen of Megara in Sicily. He says: “In the day of bitter conflict, Cyrnus, the loyal warrior is worth his weight in silver and gold”. Such a man, we say, in a far more terrible war, is very much better than the other. In fact, he is nearly as much better as the union of justice, prudence and wisdom with courage is better than courage all by itself. A man would never prove himself loyal and sound in civil war if he lacked goodness in its entirety. But in the war Tyrtaeus speaks of there are vast numbers of mercenaries ready to die fighting, feet firmly planted apart. Most of them, with very few exceptions, prove reckless, unjust, violent and foolish beyond almost anyone. What, then, is the conclusion our present discussion is heading toward, and what point is it trying to make clear by these statements? Plainly it is this. Both the heaven-taught legislator of Crete and every legislator who is worth his salt will certainly always legislate with an eye to the highest goodness and to that alone. And this, to quote Theognis, consists in loyalty in danger, and one might call it complete righteousness. But the goodness that Tyrtaeus especially praised is fine, and the poet glorified it fittingly. Nevertheless, it deserves to be placed no higher than fourth in order and value.

Clinias

630d We are demoting our own lawgiver to a very low rank, Stranger!

Athenian

No, my good sir, it is ourselves we are demoting, insofar as we imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down all the legal practices here and in Lacedaemon with a special view to war.

Clinias

How, then, should we have stated the matter?

Athenian

630d–630e In the way that is, I think, true and proper when speaking of a divine hero. That is, we should state that he enacted laws with an eye to goodness as a whole. He was not looking to some single fraction of goodness, and that the most trivial. We should also state that he devised the laws themselves according to classes, though not the classes put forward by those who devise laws today.

Athenian

630e–631b For today everyone brings forward and devises just the class he needs. One deals with inheritances and heiresses, another with cases of battery, and so on in endless variety. But what we assert is that the devising of laws, when done properly, follows the procedure we have now begun. Indeed, I greatly admire the way you opened your account of the laws. To start with goodness and say that this was the lawgiver’s aim is the right way. But you went on to say that he legislated wholly with reference to a fraction of goodness, and the smallest fraction at that. In this you seemed to me to be mistaken, and that is the reason for all this latter part of what I have said. What, then, is the kind of account I would have liked to hear from you? Shall I tell you?

Clinias

631b Yes, by all means.

Human and Divine Goods

Athenian

631b–631e This is what you ought to have said: Stranger, it is not for nothing that the laws of the Cretans are held in exceptionally high regard among all the Greeks. They are true laws, since they bring about the well-being of those who use them by supplying all good things. Now goods are of two kinds, human and divine, and the human goods depend on the divine. If a State receives the greater, it acquires the lesser as well; otherwise it is deprived of both. The lesser goods are those of which health ranks first and beauty second. The third is strength, in running and in all other bodily exercises. The fourth is wealth. This is no blind god Plutus but one keen of sight, provided he has wisdom for his companion. Wisdom, in turn, holds first place among the divine goods, and rational self-control of the soul comes second. From these two, when combined with courage, justice arises as the third, and the fourth is courage. Now all these are by nature ranked before the human goods, and the lawgiver too must truly rank them in that way. Next, it must be proclaimed to the citizens that all the other instructions they receive have these in view. It must also be proclaimed that, among these goods themselves, the human look to the divine, and the divine look to reason as their chief. The lawgiver must supervise the citizens with regard to their marriages and their subsequent having and rearing of children, male and female. He must do so both in their youth and later in life up to old age, properly assigning honor and dishonor; 631e–632d and in all their dealings with one another he must observe and watch their pains and pleasures and desires and all intense passions, and distribute praise and blame correctly by means of the laws themselves. There is also anger and fear, and all the disturbances that come upon souls through misfortune, and all the escapes from them that occur in good fortune. There are all the experiences that confront people through disease or war or poverty or their opposites. In all these matters, definite instruction must be given as to what is the right and what is the wrong disposition in each case. Next, the lawgiver must keep watch on the ways the citizens gain and spend money. He must supervise the associations they form with one another and the dissolutions of these associations, whether voluntary or under compulsion. He must observe the manner in which they conduct each of these mutual transactions and note where justice is present and where it is lacking. To those who obey he must assign honors by law, but on the disobedient he must impose the duly appointed penalties. Then finally, when he reaches the completion of the whole constitution, he must consider how the burial of the dead should be carried out in each case and what honors should be assigned to them. Once this is settled, the framer of the laws will hand over all his statutes to the care of Wardens. Some will be guided by wisdom, others by true opinion. Reason, having bound everything into one single system, may then declare that they all serve self-control and justice, not wealth or ambition. Strangers, this is how I would have wished, and still wish, that you had fully explained how all these regulations are inherent in the reputed laws of Zeus and in those of Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus established, and how their systematic arrangement is quite evident to anyone expert in law, whether through art or practice, although it is not at all obvious to the rest of us.

Clinias

632d Then what, Stranger, should be the next step in our argument?

Training in Courage and Self-Control

Athenian

632d–632e I think we ought to do as we did at first and start from the beginning. We should first explain the institutions that have to do with courage. After that, if you wish, we will deal with a second and a third form of goodness. As soon as we have finished treating the first theme, we will take it as our model. By discussing the rest along similar lines, we will make the road pass pleasantly. At the end of our treatment of goodness in all its forms, we will make it clear, God willing, that the rules we discussed just now had goodness as their aim.

Megillus

633a A good suggestion! And begin with our friend here, the eulogist of Zeus. Try to put him to the test first.

Athenian

I will try, and I will test you and myself too, for the argument concerns all of us alike. So tell me: do we assert that the common meals and the gymnasia were devised by the lawgiver with a view to war?

Megillus

Yes.

Athenian

633a–633b And is there a third institution of the kind, and a fourth? Probably one ought to use this method of enumeration also in dealing with the subdivisions, or whatever we ought to call them, of the other forms of goodness, provided only that one makes one’s meaning clear.

Megillus

633b The third thing he devised was hunting. That is what I and every Lacedaemonian would say.

Athenian

Let us also try to state what comes fourth, and fifth too, if possible.

Megillus

633b–633c I may also try to state the fourth. It is the training in hardy endurance of pain that is widespread among us. This training uses hand-to-hand fights and robberies carried out each time at the risk of a sound beating. Moreover, the so-called Crypteia provides a wonderfully severe training in hardihood. The men go barefoot in winter, sleep without bedding and have no attendants. They wait on themselves and roam through the whole countryside by night and by day. In our games, too, we have severe tests of endurance, when men without clothing battle against the force of the heat. And there are other examples so numerous that listing them would be almost endless.

Athenian

633c–633d Splendid, Stranger from Lacedaemon! But come now, how shall we define courage? Shall we define it quite simply as a battle against fears and pains only? Or is it also a battle against desires and pleasures, with their dangerous enticements and flatteries? These melt people’s hearts like wax, even the hearts of those who think themselves most highly respected.

Megillus

633d I think the second definition is the right one: courage is a battle against them all.

Athenian

Earlier in our discussion, if I am not mistaken, Clinias here used the expression “inferior to itself” of a State or an individual. Didn’t you, Stranger from Knossos?

Clinias

633d–633e Most certainly.

Athenian

633e As things stand now, do we apply the term “bad” to the man who is inferior to pains, or also to the man who is inferior to pleasures?

Clinias

In my opinion, more to the man who is inferior to pleasures than to the other. Indeed, all of us, when we speak of a man as shamefully inferior to himself, mean one who is mastered by pleasures rather than one who is mastered by pains.

Athenian

634a Then surely the lawgiver of Zeus and the lawgiver of Apollo did not enact by law a lame kind of courage, able to defend itself only on the left and unable to resist charms and allurements on the right? Didn’t they enact one able to resist on both sides?

Clinias

On both sides, I would maintain.

Athenian

634a–634b Then let us mention once more the State institutions in both your countries that give men a taste of pleasures instead of shunning them. They did not shun pains, but plunged their citizens into the midst of them. In this way they compelled them, or induced them by rewards, to master them. Where, please tell me, is the same policy adopted toward pleasures in your laws? Let us declare what regulation of yours makes the same men courageous toward pains and pleasures alike. They should conquer where they ought to conquer and in no way be defeated by their nearest and most dangerous enemies.

Megillus

634b–634c I was able, Stranger, to mention a number of laws that dealt with mastery over pains. But in the case of pleasures I may not find it as easy to produce important and conspicuous examples. I might perhaps supply some minor instances, though.

Clinias

634c Nor could I, in the same way, give clear examples from the Cretan laws.

Examining Inherited Laws

Athenian

634c–634d And no wonder, my most excellent friends. In his desire to discover what is true and best, any one of us might find fault with some law in another’s homeland. If so, let us take one another’s remarks in good part and without resentment.

Clinias

634d You are right, Stranger. That is what we must do.

Athenian

Yes, Clinias, for resentment would ill suit men of our age.

Clinias

It would indeed.

Athenian

634d–634e Whether people are right or wrong in their criticisms of the Laconian and the Cretan constitutions is another story. In any case, I am probably in a better position than either of you to state what most people actually say. In your case, your laws are wisely framed, so one of the best of your laws will be this. None of the young shall inquire which laws are wrong and which are right. All shall declare in unison, with one mouth and one voice, that all are rightly established by divine enactment. They shall refuse to listen to anyone who says otherwise. Further, if any old man has any criticism to make of any of your laws, he must not voice such views in the presence of any young man. He must voice them before a magistrate or someone his own age.

Clinias

634e–635a A very sound observation, Stranger. You are far away from the original lawgiver’s intention, yet just like a diviner you have fairly hit upon it, I think, and described it with perfect truth.

Athenian

635a Well, there are no young people with us now. So the lawgiver may permit us, old as we are, to discuss these matters privately among ourselves without offense.

Clinias

635a–635b That is so. So do not hesitate to criticize our laws. There is nothing discreditable in being told of some flaw. Rather, it is exactly this that leads to a remedy, if the criticism is accepted not resentfully but in a friendly spirit.

Athenian

635b–635e Good! But until I have examined your laws as carefully as I can, I will not criticize them. I will rather express the doubts I feel. As far as I can discover, you alone of Greeks and barbarians have a lawgiver who commanded you to abstain from the greatest pleasures and amusements and not taste them. But about pains and fears, as we said before, he held a different view. Suppose someone continually shuns them from childhood onward and is then confronted with unavoidable hardships and fears and pains. Such a person will be put to flight by the men who are trained in these things and will become their slave. Now I presume this same lawgiver should have held the same view about pleasures as well. He should have argued with himself as follows. If our citizens grow up from their youth unpracticed in the greatest pleasures, they will find themselves among pleasures without having been trained to resist them. They will not have learned to refuse to commit any disgraceful act because of the natural attraction of pleasures. Then they must suffer the same fate as those who are defeated by fears. In another and still more shameful way, they will be enslaved by those who are able to hold out amid pleasures. They will also be enslaved by those who are expert in the art of pleasure, people who are sometimes thoroughly wicked. Thus their souls will be partly enslaved and partly free. They will not deserve to be called, without qualification, free men and men of courage. Consider, then, whether you approve these remarks of mine at all.

Clinias

635e On the face of it, we are inclined to approve. But to give quick and easy belief in matters of such importance would, I fear, be rash and thoughtless.

Athenian

635e–636a Well then, Clinias, and you, Stranger from Lacedaemon, suppose we discuss the second of the subjects we proposed and take self-control next after courage. Will we discover any point in which these constitutions are superior to those framed at random, as we found just now with regard to their military organization?

Megillus

636a That is hardly an easy matter! Still, the common meals and the gymnasia are probably well devised to foster both these virtues.

Athenian

636a–636e In truth, Strangers, it seems difficult for State institutions to be equally beyond criticism both in theory and in practice. Their case resembles that of the human body. There it seems impossible to prescribe any given treatment for each case without finding that this same prescription is partly beneficial and partly harmful to the body. Take these common meals, for example, and these gymnasia. At present they benefit the States in many other respects, yet in the event of civil strife they prove dangerous, as the case of the youth of Miletus, Boeotia and Thurii shows. Moreover, this institution, when long established, is thought to have corrupted the pleasures of love, which are natural not only to men but also to beasts. Your States are held primarily responsible for this, and along with them all others that especially encourage the use of gymnasia. Whether one makes the observation in earnest or in jest, one certainly should not fail to observe this. When male unites with female for procreation, the pleasure experienced is held to be due to nature. But it is held to be contrary to nature when male mates with male or female with female. And those first guilty of such outrages were driven by their slavery to pleasure. And we all accuse the Cretans of inventing the story about Ganymede. Because it was believed that their laws came from Zeus, they added this story about Zeus. In this way they could be following his example in enjoying this pleasure as well. Now we have no further concern with the story itself. But when people are investigating laws, their investigation deals almost entirely with pleasures and pains, whether in States or in individuals. These are the two fountains that gush out at nature’s impulse. Whoever draws from them the right supply at the right place and time is blessed, whether a State or an individual or any kind of creature. But whoever does so without understanding and at the wrong time will fare the opposite way.

Wine and Spartan Customs

Megillus

636e–637b What you say, Stranger, is excellent, I suppose. Nevertheless, I am at a loss to know what reply I should make to it. Still, in my opinion, the Lacedaemonian lawgiver was right in prescribing the avoidance of pleasures. As to the laws of Knossos, our friend Clinias will defend them if he sees fit. The rules about pleasures at Sparta seem to me the best in the world. Our law banished entirely from the land the institution that gives people the most occasion to fall into excessive pleasures, riotous behavior and follies of every kind. Neither in the countryside nor in the cities controlled by Spartiates is a drinking club to be seen. Nor will you see any of the practices that belong to such clubs and foster every kind of pleasure to the utmost. Indeed, there is not a man who would not at once and most severely punish any drunken reveler he happened to meet. Not even the festival of Dionysus would serve as an excuse to save him. I once witnessed such a revel on the wagons in your country, and at our colony of Tarentum, too, I saw the whole city drunk at the Dionysia. But with us nothing of the kind is possible.

Athenian

637b–637e Stranger from Lacedaemon, all such practices are praiseworthy where there is a strain of firm moral fiber, but where this is relaxed they are quite stupid. An Athenian in self-defense might at once retaliate by pointing to the looseness of the women in your country. Whether such practices are in Tarentum, Athens or Sparta, there is one answer that is thought to vindicate their propriety. A stranger may be surprised at seeing some unfamiliar practice in a State. The universal answer to him is this: “Do not be surprised, Stranger. This is our custom. With you, perhaps, the custom in these matters is different.” But, my dear sirs, our argument now is not concerned with the rest of mankind but with the goodness or badness of the lawgivers themselves. So let us deal more fully with the subject of drunkenness in general. It is a practice of no small importance, and it takes no ordinary legislator to understand it. I am not now referring to the drinking or not drinking of wine in general, but to drunkenness pure and simple. The question is whether we ought to deal with it as the Scythians and Persians do, and the Carthaginians too, and the Celts, Iberians and Thracians, who are all warlike races. Or ought we to deal with it as you Spartans do? For you, as you say, abstain from it altogether. But the Scythians and Thracians, both men and women, drink their wine unmixed and let it pour down over their clothes. They regard this practice of theirs as noble and splendid. And the Persians indulge greatly in these and other luxurious habits that you reject, although in a more orderly fashion than the others.

Megillus

638a But we, my good sir, put all these people to rout when we take up arms.

Athenian

638a–638c Don’t say that, my dear sir. In fact, there have been many flights and pursuits in the past that are beyond explaining, and there will be many in the future. So victory or defeat in battle could never be called a decisive test of whether an institution is good or bad, but rather a questionable one. Larger States, for example, are victorious in battle over smaller States. We find the Syracusans subjugating the Locrians, who are reputed to have been the best-governed of the peoples in that part of the world. We find the Athenians subjugating the Ceans, and we could find countless other instances of the same kind. So let us leave victories and defeats out of account for the present. Let us discuss each institution individually on its own merits, trying to convince ourselves, and explain in what way one kind is good and another bad. And to begin with, listen to my account of the right method of inquiring into the merits and faults of institutions.

Megillus

638c What is your account of it?

How to Judge an Institution

Athenian

638c–638e In my opinion, all who take up an institution for discussion and propose, at its first mention, to criticize or praise it are proceeding in quite the wrong way. They act like a man who hears somebody praising wheat as a good food and at once starts to disparage it. He has not learned either its effects or its mode of administration. He does not know in what form it should be administered, by whom and with what accompaniments, and in what condition and to people in what condition. This, it seems to me, is exactly what we are now doing in our discussion. At the first mention of the mere name of drunkenness, some of us immediately start blaming it and others praising it, which is most absurd. Each side relies on the support of witnesses. One side claims that its statement is convincing because of the large number of witnesses produced. The other side does so on the ground that those who abstain from wine are seen to be victorious in battle. And then this point also gives rise to a dispute. Now it would not be at all to my taste to go through all the rest of the legal arrangements in this way. About our present subject, drunkenness, I want to speak in quite another way, which in my opinion is the right way. I will try, if possible, to show the correct method for dealing with all such subjects. Indeed, thousands upon thousands of nations would attack and dispute the view of them adopted by your two States.

Megillus

638e–639a Certainly, if we know of a right method of investigating these matters, we are bound to give it a ready hearing.

Athenian

639a Let us adopt some such method as this. Suppose a man were to praise the rearing of goats, and the goat itself as a fine thing to own. Suppose also that another man had seen goats grazing without a herdsman and doing damage on cultivated land. He then runs them down and finds fault in the same way with every animal he saw that had no master or a bad master. Would such a man’s criticism, about any object whatever, be of the slightest value?

Megillus

639a–639b Certainly not.

Athenian

639b Do we call the man who possesses only nautical science, whether or not he suffers from seasickness, a good commander on a ship? Or what do we say?

Megillus

By no means good, if along with his skill he suffers in the way you say.

Athenian

And what about the army commander? Is a man fit for command provided he has military science, even though he is a coward and grows seasick with a kind of drunken terror when danger comes?

Megillus

Certainly not.

Athenian

And suppose he has no military skill, besides being a coward?

Megillus

639b–639c You are describing an utterly worthless fellow, not a commander of men at all, but of the most cowardly women.

Athenian

639c Now take the case of any social institution whatever that naturally has a commander and is beneficial under its commander. Suppose someone who had never seen the institution conducted under its commander were to praise it or criticize it. He has seen it only when it had no commander or bad commanders. Do we imagine that either the praise or the blame of such an observer of such an institution is of any value?

Megillus

639c–639d Certainly not, when the man has never seen or shared in an institution of the kind that was properly conducted.

Leadership at Drinking Parties

Athenian

639d Now wait a moment! Shall we lay it down that, among the many kinds of social institutions, that of banqueters and banquets forms one?

Megillus

Most certainly.

Athenian

639d–639e Now has anyone ever yet seen this institution rightly conducted? Both of you can easily answer, “Never at all,” for with you this institution is neither customary nor legal. But I have come across many modes of banqueting in many places, and I have also inquired into nearly all of them. I have scarcely seen or heard of a single one that was rightly conducted in every respect. If any were right at all, it was only in a few details. Most of them were almost entirely on the wrong lines.

Clinias

639e–640a What do you mean by that, Stranger? Explain yourself more clearly. As you observed, we have no experience of such institutions. So even if we did come across them, we would probably fail to see at once what was right in them and what was wrong.

Athenian

640a That is very likely. Try, however, to learn from my description. You understand this: in all gatherings and associations for any purpose whatever, it is right for each group always to have a commander.

Clinias

Of course.

Athenian

Moreover, we said recently that the commander of fighting men must be courageous.

Clinias

Of course.

Athenian

640a–640b The courageous man is less disturbed by alarms than the coward.

Clinias

640b That is true, too.

Athenian

Now suppose there had been any means of putting an army in the charge of a general who was absolutely impervious to fear or disturbance. Wouldn’t we have made every effort to do so?

Clinias

Most certainly.

Athenian

But what we are discussing now is not the man who is to command an army in wartime, when enemy meets enemy. It is the man who is to command friends in friendly association with friends in peacetime.

Clinias

640b–640c Quite so.

Athenian

640c Such a gathering, if it is accompanied by drunkenness, is not free from disturbance, is it?

Clinias

Certainly not. Quite the opposite, I imagine.

Athenian

So those people also need a commander, in the first place?

Clinias

Undoubtedly, and they above all.

Athenian

Should we, if possible, provide them with a commander who cannot be disturbed?

Clinias

Certainly.

Athenian

640c–640d Naturally, he should also be wise about social gatherings. He has to preserve the friendliness that already exists among the company, and to see that the present gathering promotes it still further.

Clinias

640d Very true.

Athenian

Then the commander we set over drunken men should be sober and wise, rather than the opposite? A commander of drunkards who was himself drunk, young and foolish would be very lucky if he escaped doing some serious harm.

Clinias

Extraordinarily lucky.

Athenian

640d–640e Suppose, then, that a man were to find fault with such institutions in States where they are managed in the best possible way. If he objected to the institution in itself, he might perhaps be right in doing so. But a man may abuse an institution when he sees it managed in the worst possible way. Then it is plain that he is ignorant of two things. First, he does not know that it is badly conducted. Second, he does not know that every institution will appear similarly bad when it is carried on without a sober ruler and commander.

Athenian

640e–641a For surely you see that a sea captain, or any commander of anything, upsets everything if he is drunk. This is true whether it is a ship or a chariot or an army or anything else that is under his command.

Clinias

641a–641b What you say, Stranger, is perfectly true. Next, then, tell us this. Suppose this institution of drinking were rightly conducted: what possible benefit would it be to us? Take the case of an army, which we mentioned just now. There, given a right leader, his men will win victory in war, which is no small benefit, and the same is true with the other cases. But what solid advantage would come either to individuals or to a State from the right regulation of a drinking party?

Athenian

641b–641c Well, what great gain would we say comes to the State from the right control of one single child, or even of one band of children? If the question were put to us that way, we would reply that the State would benefit little from one. But perhaps you are asking a general question: what solid advantage does the State gain from the education of the educated? Then it is quite simple to reply. Well-educated men will turn out to be good men, and being good, they will conquer their enemies in battle, besides acting nobly in other ways. So while education also brings victory, victory sometimes brings a lack of education. Men have often grown more insolent because of victory in war, and through their insolence they have become filled with countless other vices. Education has never yet proved to be Cadmean, but the victories that men win in war often have been Cadmean, and will be.

Clinias

641c–641d You seem to us, my friend, to be implying that the convivial gathering, when rightly conducted, is an important element in education.

Athenian

641d Certainly.

Clinias

Could you then show us next how this statement is true?

Athenian

Many dispute my statement, and it is for God to assert its truth. But I am quite ready to give my own opinion if it is wanted, now that we have in fact embarked on a discussion of laws and constitutions.

Clinias

641d–641e Well, it is exactly your opinion about the questions now in dispute that we are trying to learn.

Athenian

641e Then this is what we must do. You must brace yourselves in the effort to learn the argument, and I must brace myself to explain it as best I can. But first of all I have a preliminary remark to make. In the general opinion of the Greeks, our city, Athens, is both fond of talk and full of talk. But Lacedaemon is sparing of talk, while Crete is more witty than wordy; 642a–642b so I am afraid you will think I am a great talker about a small matter. I would be spinning out a discussion of enormous length about the small matter of drunkenness. But the fact is that its right ordering could never be treated adequately and clearly in our discussion apart from correctness in music. Nor could music be treated apart from education as a whole, and these require lengthy discussions. Consider, then, what we should do. Suppose we leave these matters aside for the present and take up some other legal topic instead.

Megillus

642b–642d Athenian Stranger, you are perhaps not aware that our family is in fact a proxenus of your State. Probably all children feel this way once they have been told that they are proxeni of a certain State. They conceive an affection for that State from infancy, and each of them regards it as a second motherland, next after his own country. That is exactly the feeling I now have. I used to hear mere children cry out whenever they, as Lacedaemonians, were blaming or praising the Athenians for anything. They would say, “Your State, Megillus, has done us a bad turn,” or “a good one.” Through hearing such remarks, and by constantly fighting your battles against those who were disparaging your State in this way, I acquired a deep affection for it. So now I not only delight in your accent, but regard as absolutely true the common saying that good Athenians are always incomparably good. For they alone are good not by outward compulsion but by their inner disposition, freely, by divine dispensation, truly and not artificially. So as far as I am concerned, you may speak without fear and say all you please.

Clinias

642d–642e My story too, Stranger, when you hear it, will show you that you may boldly say all you wish. You have probably heard of that inspired man Epimenides, who was born in Crete and was related to our family. Ten years before the Persian War, in obedience to the god’s oracle, he went to Athens and offered certain sacrifices that the god had prescribed. Moreover, when the Athenians were alarmed at the Persians’ expeditionary force, he made this prophecy: “They will not come for ten years. And when they do come, they will go back again with all their hopes frustrated, after suffering more harm than they inflict.”

Clinias

642e–643a At that time our ancestors became guest-friends of yours. Ever since then, both my parents and I myself have cherished an affection for Athens.

Education for Virtue

Athenian

643a Evidently, then, you are both ready to play your part as listeners. As for my part, the will is there, though accomplishing the task is hard. Still, I must try. First, then, our argument requires us to define education and describe its effects. That is the path our present discussion must follow until it finally arrives at the god of wine.

Clinias

643a–643b By all means let us do so, since that is your wish.

Athenian

643b Then while I am stating how education ought to be defined, you must consider whether you are satisfied with my statement.

Clinias

Go on with your statement.

Athenian

643b–643d I will. I assert that every man who is going to be good at any pursuit must practice that particular pursuit from infancy. He must use all its implements both in his play and in his work. For example, a man who is to become a good builder must play at building toy houses. To become a good farmer, he must play at tilling the soil. Those who are rearing them must provide each child with toy tools modeled on real ones. Besides this, they ought to receive elementary instruction in all the necessary subjects. The carpenter, for instance, should be taught in play to use the rule and measure, and the soldier taught riding or some similar skill. So by means of their games we should try to turn the tastes and desires of the children toward the object that forms their ultimate goal. First and foremost, we say, education consists in right nurture. It most strongly draws the child’s soul, while he is at play, to a love of the pursuit that he must master perfectly when he becomes a man. Now consider, as I said before, whether you are satisfied with this statement of mine up to this point.

Clinias

643d Certainly we are.

Athenian

643d–643e But we must not leave our description of education vague. At present, when criticizing or praising someone’s upbringing, we describe one man as educated and another as uneducated. Yet the latter may often be exceptionally well educated in the trade of a peddler or a ship’s captain, or some other similar occupation. But naturally, in our present discussion, we are not taking the view that things like these make up education. The education we mean is training from childhood in goodness. It makes a man eagerly desire to become a perfect citizen who understands how both to rule and to be ruled justly.

Athenian

643e–644b This is the special form of nurture to which, I suppose, our present argument would limit the term “education.” An upbringing may aim only at making money or physical strength, or even at some mental accomplishment lacking reason and justice. Our argument would call such an upbringing vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name education. Let us not, however, quarrel over a name. Let us hold to the statement we agreed on just now: those who are rightly educated generally become good. One should never disparage education, since it stands first among the finest gifts given to the best men. And if it ever strays from the right path but can be set straight again, every man must devote himself to this task with all his might as long as he lives.

Clinias

644b You are right, and we agree with what you say.

Athenian

Further, we agreed long ago that if men are capable of ruling themselves, they are good, but if they are incapable, they are bad.

Clinias

Quite true.

The Soul as a Divine Puppet

Athenian

644b–644c Then let us restate more clearly what we meant by this. With your permission, I will use an illustration in the hope of explaining the matter.

Clinias

644c Go ahead.

Athenian

May we assume that each of us by himself is a single unit?

Clinias

Yes.

Athenian

And that each has within himself two opposing and foolish counselors, whom we call pleasure and pain?

Clinias

That is so.

Athenian

644c–644d And that, besides these two, each man has opinions about the future, which go by the general name of expectations? The expectation that comes before pain has the special name of fear, and the one that comes before pleasure has the special name of confidence. And in addition to all these there is calculation, which judges which of them is good and which bad. Calculation, when it has become the public decree of the State, is called law.

Clinias

644d I have some difficulty keeping up with you. Assume, however, that I am keeping up, and go on.

Megillus

I am in exactly the same situation.

Athenian

644d–644e Let us think of the matter in this way. Let us suppose that each of us living creatures is an ingenious puppet of the gods. Perhaps it was made as a toy of theirs, or perhaps for some serious purpose. We know nothing about that. But this we do know: these inner feelings of ours, like sinews or cords, drag us along. Being opposed to one another, they pull against each other toward opposite actions. Here lies the dividing line between goodness and badness.

Athenian

644e–645c For, as our argument declares, there is one of these pulling forces that every man should always follow and never let go of. By following it he counteracts the pull of the other sinews. It is the golden and holy leading string of calculation, which is called the public law of the State. The other cords are hard and steely and of every possible shape and appearance. But this one is flexible and uniform, since it is made of gold. We must always cooperate with that most excellent leading string of the law. For calculation is excellent, but gentle rather than forceful, so its leading string needs helpers. They ensure that the golden kind within us may conquer the other kinds. In this way our story comparing ourselves to puppets will not fall flat. The meaning of the terms “superior to oneself” and “inferior to oneself” will become somewhat clearer. It will also become clearer how necessary it is for the individual man to grasp the true account of these inner pulling forces and to live in accordance with it. And it will become clearer how necessary it is for the State to receive such an account from a god or from a man who knows. It must make this into a law for itself and be guided by it in its dealings both with itself and with all other States. Thus both badness and goodness would be distinguished more clearly for us. Once these have become more evident, education and the other institutions will probably also appear less obscure. And it may very likely be shown that the institution of the drinking party in particular is by no means a trivial matter, as might be thought. It is not absurd to discuss it at great length; rather, it fully deserves prolonged discussion.

Clinias

645c–645d Quite right. Let us go through every topic that seems important for the present discussion.

Wine and the Passions

Athenian

645d Now tell me: if we give strong drink to this puppet of ours, what effect will it have on its character?

Clinias

With reference to what particular are you asking this question?

Athenian

To no particular, for the moment. I am putting the question in general terms: when this shares in that, what sort of thing does it become as a result? I will try to convey my meaning still more clearly. What I am asking is this: does drinking wine intensify pleasures and pains and passions and lusts?

Clinias

645d–645e Yes, greatly.

Athenian

645e And what about sensations and memories and opinions and thoughts? Does it make them more intense in the same way? Or rather, don’t these desert a man entirely if he becomes glutted with drink?

Clinias

Yes, they desert him entirely.

Athenian

He then arrives at the same condition of soul as when he was a young child?

Clinias

He does.

Athenian

So at that moment he will have very little control of himself?

Clinias

646a Very little.

Athenian

And such a man, we say, is very bad?

Clinias

Very bad indeed.

Athenian

It appears, then, that the graybeard is not the only one who may be in his second childhood; the drunkard may be too.

Clinias

An admirable observation, Stranger.

Athenian

Is there any argument that will undertake to persuade us that this is a practice we ought to indulge in? Should we not rather avoid it with all our might as far as we possibly can?

Clinias

646a–646b It appears there is. At any rate, you assert this, and you were ready just now to argue it.

Athenian

646b You are right to remind me, and I am still ready to do so, now that you and Megillus have both said you are willing to listen to me.

Clinias

Of course we will listen, if only because of the surprising paradox that a man ought to plunge into the depths of depravity of his own free will.

Athenian

Depravity of soul, you mean, don’t you?

Clinias

Yes.

Athenian

646b–646c And what about plunging into a bad state of body, such as leanness or ugliness or feebleness? Would we be surprised if a man ever got into such a state of his own free will?

Clinias

646c Of course we would.

Athenian

Well then, consider people who go of their own accord to dispensaries to drink medicines. Do we suppose they are not aware of what will follow? Soon afterward, and for many days to come, they will find themselves in a bodily condition that would make life intolerable if it were to last forever. And we know, don’t we, that men who go to the gymnasia for hard training start by becoming weaker?

Clinias

We know all this.

Athenian

646c–646d We also know that they go there voluntarily for the sake of the later benefit?

Clinias

646d Quite true.

Athenian

Shouldn’t one take the same view of the other institutions also?

Clinias

Certainly.

Athenian

Then one must also take the same view of the practice of wine drinking, if one can rightly class it among the others.

Clinias

Of course one must.

Athenian

646d–646e Suppose, then, that this practice should prove to be quite as beneficial to us as bodily training. It is certainly superior to it at the outset, since it is not accompanied by pain, as bodily training is.

Clinias

646e That is true. But I would be surprised if we succeeded in discovering any benefit in it.

Fear, Confidence, and Shame

Athenian

That is exactly the point we must at once try to make plain. Now tell me: can we distinguish two kinds of fear, one of which is nearly the opposite of the other?

Clinias

What kinds do you mean?

Athenian

These: when we expect evils to happen, we fear them.

Clinias

Yes.

Athenian

646e–647a And we often fear for our reputation, when we think we will get a bad name for doing or saying something base. This fear we call shame, as I imagine everyone else does.

Clinias

647a Of course.

Athenian

These are the two fears I meant. The second of these is opposed to pains and to all other objects of fear, and it is also opposed to the greatest and most numerous pleasures.

Clinias

Very true.

Athenian

647a–647b Doesn’t the lawgiver, then, and every man who is worth anything, hold this kind of fear in the highest honor and call it modesty? And doesn’t he give the name immodesty to the confidence that is opposed to it? Doesn’t he declare it to be a very great evil for everyone, both publicly and privately?

Clinias

647b Quite right.

Athenian

This fear saves us in many other important respects. Doesn’t it also do more than anything else to secure for us victory in war and safety? For victory is in fact secured by two things. One is confidence toward enemies. The other is fear of the shame of cowardice in the eyes of friends.

Clinias

That is so.

Athenian

647b–647c So each of us ought to become both fearless and fearful, for the different reasons we have now explained.

Clinias

647c Certainly.

Athenian

Moreover, we may want to make a person fearless with respect to a number of fears. Then we make him so by drawing him into fear with the help of the law.

Clinias

Apparently.

Testing Character with Wine

Athenian

647c–647d And what about the opposite case, when we try, with the aid of justice, to make a man fearful? Isn’t it by pitting him against shamelessness and exercising him against it that we must make him victorious in the fight against his own pleasures? Or shall we say something different? In the case of courage, a man can become perfect only by fighting and conquering his innate cowardice. No one who is inexperienced and unpracticed in contests of this sort can attain even half the excellence of which he is capable. Are we to say that self-control is different? Might a man attain perfection in it without a stubborn fight against hordes of pleasures and lusts that entice him toward shamelessness and wrongdoing? Might he do so without conquering them by the aid of speech and action and skill, both in play and in earnest? Might he, in fact, attain it without going through any of these experiences?

Clinias

647d–647e It would not be reasonable to suppose so.

Athenian

647e Well then: 647e–648a In the case of fear, is there any remedy, given by God to men, that works like this? The more a man chooses to drink of it, the more he imagines himself plunged into misfortune with every drink. He fears everything present and future. Finally, even if he is the bravest of men, he reaches a state of utter terror. But once he has slept it off and is rid of the potion, he always becomes his normal self again.

Clinias

648a What potion of that kind, Stranger, can we say exists anywhere among men?

Athenian

648a–648b There is none. But supposing there had been one, would it have been of any use to the lawgiver for promoting courage? For instance, we might well have spoken to him about it in this way: “Come now, lawgiver, whether you are legislating for Cretans or for anyone else. Wouldn’t your first wish be to have a test of courage and of cowardice that you could apply to your citizens?”

Clinias

648b Obviously every one of them would say yes.

Athenian

“And would you want a test that was safe and free from serious risks, or the opposite?”

Clinias

All will also agree that the test must be safe.

Athenian

648b–648c “And would you use the test by bringing men into these fears and testing them while they were in that state? Would you do this so as to compel them to become fearless, using exhortations, warnings and rewards? Would you use disgrace for all who refused to conform entirely to the character you prescribed? Would you let everyone who had trained himself bravely and well go free without penalty, but impose a penalty on everyone who had trained badly? Or would you refuse to use the potion as a test at all, even though you have no objection to it on other grounds?”

Clinias

648c Of course he would use it, Stranger.

Athenian

648c–648e At any rate, my friend, the training involved would be wonderfully simple compared with our present methods. This would be true whether it were applied to individuals singly, to small groups or to groups of any size. A man might be moved by a sense of shame and be reluctant to show himself in public before he was in the best condition. Suppose such a man should remain alone by himself while undergoing this training against fears. He would rely on the potion alone as his solitary equipment instead of endless exercises. He would be acting quite rightly. Another man might trust that he is already well equipped by nature and practice. He might not hesitate to train in company with a number of drinking companions. He would show off how, in speed and strength, he is superior to the potency of the drinks he is obliged to take. As a result, because of his excellence he would neither commit any serious impropriety nor lose his head. He would leave the company before they came to the last round, fearing the defeat that the wine cup inflicts on all men. He would be acting quite rightly too.

Clinias

648e–649a Yes, Stranger, this man too would be acting with self-control.

Athenian

649a Let us address the lawgiver once more and say: “Very well, lawgiver. For producing fear, apparently no such drug has been given to men by God, nor have we devised one ourselves. I do not count quacks as part of our company. But does a potion exist for inducing fearlessness and excessive and untimely confidence? Or what shall we say about this?”

Clinias

Presumably he will say that there is one, naming wine.

Athenian

649a–649b And isn’t this exactly the opposite of the potion described just now? First, it makes the person who drinks it more cheerful than he was before. The more he drinks of it, the more he becomes filled with high hopes and a sense of power. Finally, puffed up with conceit, he abounds in every kind of license of speech and action and every kind of audacity. He has no scruple about what he says or what he does. Everyone, I imagine, would agree that this is so.

Clinias

649b Undoubtedly.

Athenian

649b–649c Let us recall our earlier statement that we must cultivate two things in our souls. One is the greatest possible confidence, and the other is its opposite, the greatest possible fear.

Clinias

649c Which you called, I think, the marks of modesty.

Athenian

Your memory serves you well. Courage and fearlessness ought to be practiced amid fears. So we have to consider whether the opposite quality ought to be cultivated amid conditions of the opposite kind.

Clinias

That certainly seems likely.

Athenian

649c–649d It appears, then, that we ought to be placed in conditions that naturally tend to make us exceptionally confident and audacious. This applies when we are practicing how to be as free as possible from shamelessness and excessive audacity. In these conditions we should be fearful of ever daring to say or suffer or do anything shameful.

Clinias

649d So it appears.

Athenian

649d–649e And aren’t these the conditions in which we have the character described: anger, lust, insolence, ignorance, covetousness and extravagance? Aren’t these conditions too: wealth, beauty, strength, and everything that intoxicates a man with pleasure and turns his head? Our first purpose is to provide a cheap and comparatively harmless test of these conditions, and our second is to give practice in them. For these purposes, what more suitable pleasure can we mention than wine, with its playful testing, provided that it is used with any care at all?

Athenian

649e–650b For consider the case of a man whose disposition is sullen and savage, the source of countless wrongs. Isn’t it more dangerous to test him by entering into money dealings with him at one’s own personal risk? Wouldn’t it be safer to associate with him with the help of Dionysus and his festive insight? And when a man is a slave to sexual pleasures, isn’t it a more dangerous test to entrust to him one’s own daughters and sons and wife? Doing so endangers one’s own nearest and dearest in order to discover the disposition of his soul. In fact, one might cite countless instances in a vain effort to show fully how superior this playful method of examination is. It has neither serious consequences nor costly damage. Indeed, as far as that is concerned, I imagine that neither the Cretans nor any other people would dispute this. Here we have a fair test of one man by another, and for cheapness, safety and speed it is superior to all other tests.

Clinias

650b That certainly is true.

Athenian

Discovering the natures and conditions of people’s souls, then, will prove one of the most useful things for the art whose task it is to treat them. That art is, as I presume we say, the art of politics. Isn’t that so?

Clinias

Undoubtedly.

Book 2

About this book

Laws, Book 1

Tradition
Classical
Author
Plato
Written
350 BCE
Text
Based on the translation by R. G. Bury (1926) · Public domain

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