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Laws, Book 12

941a–941d

Athenian: If anyone, while serving as an ambassador or herald, falsely represents his State in his dealings with another State, or fails to deliver the actual message he was sent to deliver, or is shown to have brought back a false version of the reply of some nation, whether friendly or hostile, while acting as ambassador or herald, an indictment shall be brought against all such persons for breaking the law by committing impiety against the sacred messages and commands of Hermes and Zeus. If they are convicted, the penalty they are to suffer or pay shall be assessed. Theft of property is mean and unworthy of a free man; open robbery is shameless. None of the sons of Zeus has ever practiced either of these out of delight in fraud or force. So let no one be deceived on this subject, or be persuaded by poets or by any other misguided tellers of myths into believing that when he steals or robs by force he is doing nothing shameful, but only what the gods themselves do. That is neither likely nor true. Whoever acts unlawfully in this way is neither a god at all nor a child of gods, and the lawgiver, as is his duty, knows this better than the whole tribe of poets. So whoever listens to our argument is blessed, and may he be blessed for all time; but whoever does not listen shall from then on have to contend with this law: If anyone steals any piece of public property, he shall receive the same punishment whether the theft is great or small. For the one who steals something small steals with the same greed, though with less power, while the one who carries off something large that he did not put there does wrong in full. So the law does not think it right to punish either offender less than the other on the ground that his theft is smaller, but rather on the ground that one may still be curable while the other is incurable.

941d–942e

Athenian: So if anyone convicts either a resident alien or a slave in a court of law of stealing any piece of public property, the court shall decide what punishment he is to suffer or what fine he is to pay, since he is probably curable. But in the case of a citizen who has been brought up in the way he is to be brought up, if he is convicted of plundering his fatherland or doing violence to it, whether he was caught in the act or not, he shall be punished with death, as being practically incurable. Military organization calls for much deliberation and many appropriate laws. The main principle is this: nobody, male or female, should ever be left without a commander over them, and no one, whether at work or at play, should let his mind grow used to acting alone and on his own initiative. Instead, in war and in peace alike, he should always live with his eyes fixed on his commander, following his lead, and he should be guided by him even in the smallest details of his actions: for example, standing still when ordered, marching, exercising, washing, eating, getting up at night for sentry duty and for carrying dispatches, and, in moments of danger, waiting for the commander’s signal before either pursuing an enemy or retreating before one. In a word, he must train his soul by habit to avoid all thought or idea of doing anything at all apart from the rest of his company, so that the life of all is lived together as a body and in common. For there is not, and never will be, any rule superior to this, or better or more effective in securing safety and victory in war. This practice of ruling others and being ruled by others must be cultivated in peacetime from earliest childhood; but anarchy must be utterly removed from the life of all mankind, and also from that of the animals subject to human beings. Moreover, with a view to excellence in war, they shall dance all kinds of dances, and for the same purpose they shall cultivate suppleness and dexterity in general, and endurance as well, in going without food and drink, in bearing cold and heat, and in sleeping on hard beds. And, most important of all, they shall train themselves not to ruin the natural powers of the head and feet by wrapping them in coverings of foreign material, and in this way destroying the production and growth of their own natural hair and soles.

942e–943e

Athenian: For when these extremities are preserved, they keep the power of the whole body at its highest, but when they are ruined they have the opposite effect. Of these two extremities, one is the chief servant of the whole body and the other its chief master, since, by nature’s arrangement, it contains all the body’s governing senses. This is the praise of the military life that, in our view, the young ought to listen to, and its laws are these: Anyone who has been enrolled, or assigned to some duty roster, shall perform military service. If anyone, out of cowardice, fails to report without leave from the commanders, he shall be indicted for shirking service before the military officers when they return from camp. Those who served shall sit as judges, each branch by itself — hoplites, cavalry, and each of the other branches likewise — and they shall bring hoplites before hoplites, cavalrymen before cavalry, and all others in the same way before soldiers of their own branch. Anyone who is convicted shall be barred from ever competing for any distinction, from ever prosecuting another man for shirking service, and from acting as accuser on such charges; and in addition, the court shall determine what further penalty he is to suffer or pay. Next, when the suits for shirking service have been fully decided, the officers shall again hold a review of each branch, and anyone who wishes shall be judged before a court of his own comrades on his claim to an award of merit. But any proof or testimony of witnesses that the claimant produces must concern not any earlier war but only the campaign in which they have just been engaged. The prize for each branch shall be a wreath of olive leaves, which the winner shall hang up, with an inscription, in whichever temple of the war gods he chooses, to serve throughout his life as evidence that he has won the first, second, or third prize, as the case may be. If a man goes on campaign but returns home before the time without leave from the officers, he shall be liable to be indicted for desertion before the same court that deals with cases of shirking service, and if he is convicted, the same penalties already prescribed shall be imposed on him. Everyone who brings an action against another ought rightly to fear bringing a wrongful punishment on him, whether intentionally or unintentionally (for Justice is called, and truly called, the daughter of Reverence, and falsehood and wrong are by nature hateful to Reverence and Justice). He should also take care not to offend against Justice in any matter, and especially in regard to the loss of arms in battle, so that he does not, by mistakenly condemning such losses as shameful when they were really unavoidable, bring undeserved charges against an undeserving man.

943e–944e

Athenian: It is by no means easy to draw distinctions between such cases; but the law should nevertheless try somehow to distinguish one case from another. To illustrate, we may cite the story of Patroclus. Suppose he had been brought to his tent without his arms and had recovered — as has happened to thousands — while the arms he had had (which, as the poet tells us, the gods gave to Peleus as a dowry with Thetis) were in the hands of Hector. Then all the base men of that time would have been free to reproach the son of Menoetius with the loss of his arms. Moreover, there are cases of men losing their arms by being hurled down from cliffs, or at sea, or in ravines, when a sudden great rush of water overwhelmed them, or through other mishaps, countless in number, which one could mention by way of consolation, and so excuse an evil that easily lends itself to slander. It is right, therefore, to separate as well as one can the greater and more serious evil from its opposite. As a rule, in fact, the use of the names in question as terms of abuse allows a distinction: the term “shield-flinger” would not properly be applied in every case, but rather the term “arms-dropper.” For the man who is stripped of his arms by a fair amount of violence will not be a shield-flinger in the same way as the man who has voluntarily thrown them away; rather, there is a vast difference between the two cases. So let the law declare this: If a man is overtaken by his enemies while he has his arms, and instead of turning and defending himself, voluntarily drops his arms or flings them away, so gaining for himself a shameful life by speed of foot rather than a noble and blessed death by bravery, a trial shall be held concerning arms flung away in a loss of this kind; but the judge shall pass over in his inquiry a case of the kind described earlier. For one must always punish the bad man, in order to make him better, but not the unlucky man, since that does no good. What, then, would be a fitting penalty for the man who has turned such powerful weapons of defense to the opposite purpose? It is said that a god once changed Caeneus the Thessalian from a woman’s form into a man’s; but it is beyond human power to do the opposite. Otherwise the reverse transformation — changing him from a man into a woman — would perhaps be the most fitting of all penalties for a shield-flinger.

944e–945e

Athenian: As it is, to come as close as possible to this, because the man loves life at any price, and to make sure that for the rest of his life he will run no risk but will live with this disgrace hanging over him as long as possible, the law dealing with such cases shall be this: If any man is convicted on a charge of shamefully throwing away his military weapons, no general or other military officer shall ever employ him as a soldier or assign him to any rank. Otherwise, the examiner shall fine the officer who assigns the coward 1,000 drachmae if he belongs to the highest property class, five minas if to the second, three minas if to the third, and one mina if to the fourth. And the soldier who is convicted of the charge, besides being released, as his own nature requires, from manly risks, shall also pay back his wages: 1,000 drachmae if he belongs to the highest class, five minas if to the second, three if to the third, and one mina if to the fourth, just as in the previous cases. As for examiners, what would be the proper thing for us to say, since some of the magistrates are appointed by the chance of the lot and for one year, while others are appointed for several years and chosen from a list of preselected candidates? Who will be a competent examiner of such officials, if any one of them says anything crooked, or, bent under the weight of his office and his own inability to bear it worthily, acts at all crookedly? It is by no means easy to find an official over officials who surpasses them in excellence; but we must still try to find examiners of a divine quality. In fact, the situation is this. The dissolution of a political order, like that of a ship or of some living creature, depends on many critical points. In the case of a ship, though these are one in nature, they are distributed through many parts, and we call them by many names, such as stays, undergirders, and bracing cords of sinew. For the preservation of a political order, or for its dissolution and disappearance, the office of examiner is one such critical point, and of the gravest kind. For if those who examine the magistrates are better men than they are, and act blamelessly with blameless justice, then the whole State and country flourishes and is happy. But if the examination of the magistrates is carried out in any other way, then the bond of justice that holds all the political elements together as one is dissolved, and as a result every office is torn apart from every other. They no longer all tend toward the same end, and so they turn one State into many, fill it with civil strife, and quickly bring it to ruin. That is why the examiners must above all be men of admirable and complete virtue.

945e–946e

Athenian: Let us arrange for them to come into being in some such way as this. Every year, after the summer solstice, the whole State must assemble at the common precinct of Helios and Apollo, to present to the god three men from among their own number. Each citizen shall nominate the man, not less than fifty years old, whom he considers the best in every respect, apart from himself. From those so nominated they shall choose the ones who have won the most votes: half of the total number nominated if that number is even; but if it is odd, they shall drop the one with the fewest votes and keep the remaining half, separating them according to the number of votes received. If several have an equal number of votes, so that the upper half becomes too large, they shall remove the excess by dropping the youngest. Keeping the rest on the list, they shall vote again on them, and they shall continue the same process until three are left with unequal numbers of votes. If, however, all of these, or two of them, have equal votes, they shall entrust the matter to good fortune and chance, decide by lot who is first, second, and third, and crown them with olive wreaths. When they have awarded these distinctions, they shall make this public proclamation: “The State of the Magnesians, which by God’s grace has once again been kept safe, has presented to Helios the three best of its own men, and it now dedicates them, according to the ancient law, as a joint offering of its choicest first fruits to Apollo and Helios, for as long as they carry out their task of judgment.” Twelve such examiners shall be appointed in the first year, to serve until each of them reaches the age of seventy-five; after that, three shall be added every year. They shall divide all the public offices into twelve sections and examine them, using every test befitting free men. As long as they are serving as examiners, they shall live within the precinct of Apollo and Helios, where they were chosen. When they have judged the officials of the State — each examiner sometimes alone, sometimes in consultation with the others — they shall publish, by posting written records in the marketplace, what each official is to suffer or pay according to the examiners’ decision. If any official claims that he has not been judged justly, he shall summon the examiners before the select judges. If he is acquitted of the examiners’ charges, he may, if he wishes, prosecute the examiners themselves. But if he is convicted, then if the penalty the examiners imposed on him is death, he shall simply be put to death (since only one death is possible); and in the case of other penalties that can be doubled, he shall pay double. As for the examination of these examiners themselves, we must hear what it is to be and how it is to be conducted.

946e–947e

Athenian: During their lifetime, these men who have been judged worthy of the highest distinction by the whole State shall have the front seats at every festival. From their number, too, shall be chosen the leaders of every sacred delegation sent out to take part in any public sacrifices, gatherings, or other such sacred assemblies of the Greeks. These alone of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel. All of them shall be priests of Apollo and Helios, and each year the one among them judged first of those appointed that year shall be high priest; they shall inscribe his name at the head of the year, so that it may serve as a measure for dating as long as the State endures. When they die, their laying out, funeral procession, and burial shall differ from those of other citizens. Only white clothing shall be used, and there shall be no dirges or lamentations. A chorus of fifteen girls and another of boys shall stand around the bier, and they shall take turns singing a hymn in verse in praise of the priests, celebrating their blessedness in song all day long. At dawn the next day, the bier itself shall be carried to the tomb by a hundred of the young men who attend the gymnasia, chosen by the relatives of the dead man. The procession shall be led by the unmarried young men, each wearing his proper military equipment — cavalry with their horses, hoplites with their weapons, and the rest likewise. Around the bier itself, the boys, walking in front, shall sing their ancestral hymn, and behind them shall follow the girls, singing, together with all the women who are past childbearing. After them shall follow the priests and priestesses, as to a tomb that is pure, even though they are barred from approaching all other tombs — provided that the voice of the Pythian priestess approves of this arrangement. Their tomb shall be built underground, in the form of an oblong vault of porous stone, as long-lasting as possible, fitted with stone couches set side by side. When they have laid the one who has gone to his blessed rest there, they shall heap up a mound in a circle over it and plant a grove of trees around it, except on one side, so that at that point the tomb may be enlarged for all time, in case additional mounds are needed for those buried there. And every year contests in music, gymnastics, and horse racing shall be held in their honor.

947e–948e

Athenian: These shall be the rewards for those who have passed the examiners’ scrutiny. But if any of these examiners, relying on the fact of his election, shows his human frailty by becoming bad after his election, the law shall direct that anyone who wishes may indict him, and the trial shall take place in court in the following way. The court shall consist first of Law-wardens, next of the living members of the body of examiners themselves, and in addition of the court of select judges. The prosecutor shall state in his indictment that the person in question is unworthy of his distinctions and his office. If the defendant is convicted, he shall be deprived of his office, his tomb, and the other honors granted to him; but if the prosecutor fails to win one-fifth of the votes, he shall pay twelve minas if he belongs to the highest class, eight if to the second, six if to the third, and two minas if to the fourth. Rhadamanthus deserves admiration for the way, we are told, he judged lawsuits. He saw that the people of his time clearly believed in the existence of gods — naturally enough, since most people at that time were the offspring of gods, he himself among them, as the story goes. He probably thought that he should entrust lawsuits not to any human being but only to gods, from whom he obtained verdicts that were both simple and quick. For he had the disputing parties swear an oath on each matter in dispute, and in this way secured a quick and safe settlement. But nowadays, when, as we say, some people do not believe in gods at all, others hold that they pay no attention to us human beings, and a third group, made up of the most numerous and worst of people, suppose that in return for small offerings and flatteries the gods help them commit large robberies and often free them from great penalties — under such conditions the method of Rhadamanthus would no longer be suitable in lawsuits for people as they now are. Since, then, people’s opinions about the gods have changed, their laws must change as well. In lawsuits, laws framed with intelligence ought to bar both litigants from taking oaths. A person bringing an action against anyone ought to write down his charges but swear no oath, and the defendant, in the same way, ought to write down his denial and hand it to the magistrates without an oath. For surely it is a terrible thing to know full well that, since lawsuits are frequent in a State, nearly half the citizens are perjurers, even though they have no qualms about associating with one another at common meals and at other public and private gatherings.

948e–949e

Athenian: So it shall be laid down by law that a judge shall take an oath when he is about to give judgment; and oaths shall likewise be taken by anyone who is appointing public officials, whether by voting under oath or by bringing his ballot from a sacred place; by the judge of choruses or of any musical performance; and by the presidents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, or of any matters that, in human estimation, bring no profit to the one who commits perjury. But in all cases where it clearly appears that a large profit will come to the person who flatly denies a claim and swears he knows nothing, all the contending parties shall be judged by trials without oaths. And in general, during a trial, the presidents of the court shall not permit anyone to speak under oath for the sake of being believed, or to call down curses on himself and his family, or to resort to undignified pleading and sobbing like a woman, but only and always to state and to hear what is just in proper language. Otherwise, the magistrate shall stop him for straying from the point and bring him back to the matter at hand. In the case of resident aliens dealing with aliens, they shall be allowed, as now, to give and receive binding oaths from one another, if they choose; for these people will not grow old in the State, nor, as a rule, will they make their nest in it and raise others like themselves to become naturalized in the country. And in the private actions they bring against one another, they shall all have the same privilege during the trial. In all cases where a free man disobeys the State, not in acts deserving blows, imprisonment, or death, but in matters such as attendance at festivals, processions, or other public ceremonies of a similar kind — matters involving either a sacrifice in peacetime or a contribution in time of war — in all such cases the first necessity is to assess the penalty. In case of disobedience, the officials whom the State and the law appoint to exact the penalty shall take a pledge. If anyone disregards the taking of pledges, the items pledged shall be sold, and the proceeds shall go to the State. And if a greater penalty is required, the appropriate official in each case shall impose suitable penalties on the disobedient and summon them before the court, until they agree to do what they have been ordered. For a State that makes no money except from the produce of its land, and does not engage in commerce, it is necessary to decide what it should do about its citizens’ travel to foreign countries and the admission of foreigners from elsewhere. In giving advice on these matters, the lawgiver must begin by using persuasion, as far as he can.

949e–950e

Athenian: The mixing of States with States naturally produces a blending of characters of every kind, as strangers introduce new customs among strangers. This would cause enormous damage to peoples who enjoy a good political order under right laws. But most States are by no means well governed, so for them it makes no difference if their population becomes mixed through the citizens receiving strangers and through their own members visiting other States whenever any one of them, young or old, wishes to go abroad, at any time or to any place. On the other hand, for the citizens to refuse altogether either to admit others or to go abroad themselves is not a possible policy at all; and besides, it would seem to the rest of the world both rude and harsh, since they would get a reputation for using harsh language, such as that of the so-called Aliens Expulsion Acts, and for methods both tyrannical and severe. And one’s reputation in the eyes of others, whether for goodness or the opposite, is something that should never be taken lightly. For most people, however far they may be from real goodness themselves, are not equally lacking in the ability to judge whether others are bad or good. Even in the wicked there is a divine and accurate intuition, by which a great many even of the extremely wicked distinguish correctly, in what they say and think, between the better people and the worse. Accordingly, for most States it is good advice to value a good public reputation highly. The most correct and most important rule is this: the man who pursues a good reputation should himself be truly good, and he should never pursue it without goodness, if he is to be a truly perfect man. Furthermore, it would be fitting for the State we are founding in Crete to win for itself, in the eyes of the rest of the world, the best and finest reputation possible for goodness. And if it develops according to plan, there is every reason to hope that, as is natural, it will be one of the few well-ordered States and countries that the Sun and all the other gods look down upon. So with regard to travel abroad to other lands and places, and the admission of foreigners, we must act as follows. First, no man under forty years old shall be permitted to go abroad to any place whatever. Next, no one shall be permitted to go abroad in a private capacity; but in a public capacity, permission shall be granted to heralds, embassies, and certain inspection missions. It would not be appropriate to count military expeditions in war among official visits abroad.

950e–951c

Athenian: It is right to send delegations to Apollo at Pytho, to Zeus at Olympia, and to Nemea and the Isthmus, to take part in the sacrifices and games held in honor of these gods. It is right, too, that the delegates sent should be, as far as practicable, as numerous, noble, and good as possible — men who will win the State a high reputation at the sacred gatherings of peacetime and give it a glory to rival that of its warriors. When they return home, these men will teach the young that the political institutions of other countries are inferior to their own. They should also send out other observers, once they have obtained permission from the Law-wardens, of the following kind. If any of the citizens wish to study the affairs of the outside world at their leisure, no law shall prevent them. For a State that has no experience of bad people and good could never, because of its isolation, become fully civilized and perfect, nor could it preserve its laws unless it grasped them not by habit alone but also by conviction. Among the mass of people there are always some divinely inspired individuals — though only a few — whose company is of the greatest value, and they spring up in badly governed States just as much as in well-governed ones. It is always right for someone who lives in a well-ordered State to go out by sea and by land in search of such people, provided he himself is incorruptible, so as to confirm those of his native laws that are rightly enacted and to correct any that are deficient. For without this observation and inquiry a State will never remain perfect, nor will it if the observation is badly conducted.

951c

Clinias: How, then, could both these aims be achieved? Athenian: In this way. First, our overseas observer shall be more than fifty years old. Second, he shall have proven himself a man of high reputation in military matters as well as in other affairs, if he is to be sent into other States with the approval of the Law-wardens. But once he is past sixty years of age, he shall no longer serve as an observer. When he has observed for as many of the ten years as he wishes and has returned home, he shall go to the synod of those who supervise the laws. This synod shall be a mixed body of young and old men, required to meet every day from dawn until sunrise. It shall consist, first, of the priests who have won the award of merit, and second, of the ten most senior Law-wardens. It shall also include the most recently appointed Supervisor of Education, together with his predecessors in that office. None of these members shall go alone; each shall bring with him a companion, a young man between thirty and forty years old whom he has chosen himself.

951e–952e

Athenian: Their meetings and discussions shall always concern laws and their own State, any important information bearing on this subject that they may have learned elsewhere, and any branches of study that seem likely to help their inquiry, since learning them helps toward a clearer view of legal matters, while ignorance of them leaves that view dim and blurred. Whatever the older members approve among these studies, the younger members shall learn with all diligence. If any of the young men invited to attend is judged unworthy, the whole synod shall criticize the member who invited him. But those of the young men who are well thought of shall be watched over by the rest of the citizens, who shall pay special attention to them and observe them carefully, honoring them when they do right, but dishonoring them more than others if they turn out worse than most. The person who has inspected the legal institutions of other peoples shall go to this synod immediately after his return home. If he has found any people able to declare any oracle regarding legislation, education, or upbringing, or if he has brought back observations of his own, he shall share them with the whole synod. If it appears that he has come back in no way worse, though also no better, than when he left, he shall still be commended for his great zeal; but if it appears that he has come back much better, he shall be commended much more highly during his life, and when he dies, fitting honors shall be paid to him by the authority of the synod. If, on the other hand, such an observer appears to have come back corrupted, despite his claims to wisdom, he shall be forbidden to associate with anyone, young or old. If he obeys the magistrates in this, he shall live as a private person; but if not, he shall be put to death — that is, if he is convicted in a court of law of meddling in education and the laws. And if, when such a person deserves to be brought to trial, none of the magistrates brings him to trial, this shall count against the magistrates when the awards of merit are decided. This, then, shall be the character and conduct of the person who travels abroad. Next, we must deal in a friendly way with the visitor from abroad. There are four types of foreign visitor that call for comment. The first, and the one who cannot be avoided, is the visitor who as a rule chooses summer for his yearly visits, like migratory birds — and, like birds, most of these cross the sea as though they had wings, to make money by trade, and fly over to foreign cities during the summer season.

952e–953e

Athenian: When this visitor comes to the city, he must be received at the markets, harbors, and public buildings outside the city by the officials in charge of them. They shall take care that no such visitors introduce any innovation, and they shall administer justice to them properly and have as much dealing with them as is necessary, but as little as possible. The second type of visitor is an observer in the literal sense, one who comes to see with his eyes and also to hear with his ears everything that belongs to musical performances. For all such visitors, lodgings must be provided at the temples to offer them friendly hospitality, and the priests and temple keepers must look after them and attend to their needs until they have stayed a reasonable length of time and have seen and heard everything they intended. After that, if they have neither done nor suffered any harm, they shall be sent on their way. The priests shall act as their judges if anyone wrongs one of them, or one of them wrongs anyone else, provided the claim does not exceed fifty drachmae; but if any larger claim is made, such visitors must be tried before the market stewards. The third type of visitor who requires a public reception is the one who comes from another country on some public business. He must be received only by the generals, hipparchs, and taxiarchs, and the care of a visitor of this kind shall rest entirely with the official with whom he lodges, acting together with the prytaneis. The fourth type of visitor comes rarely, if ever. But if at some time an observer like those we send abroad comes from another country, he shall come on these conditions. First, he shall be not less than fifty years old; second, his purpose in coming must be to see some fine thing that surpasses in beauty anything to be found in other States, or else to show another State something of the same kind. Every visitor of this kind shall go without invitation to the doors of the rich and wise, since he himself is both rich and wise. He shall also go to the residence of the General Supervisor of Education, confident that he is a fitting guest for such a host, or to the house of one of those who have won a prize for virtue. When he has spent time with some of these, giving and receiving information, he shall depart, honored as a friend by friends with suitable gifts and distinctions. These are the laws by which they must receive all foreigners, of either sex, from another country, and send out their own citizens, so honoring Zeus, Protector of Strangers, instead of driving strangers away by means of foods and ceremonies (as the nurslings of the Nile now do), or by savage proclamations.

953e–954e

Athenian: If anyone gives security for another, he shall do so in explicit terms, setting out the whole transaction in a written record, and he shall do this in the presence of not less than three witnesses if the amount is under 1,000 drachmae, and not less than five if it is over 1,000. The broker in a sale shall act as security for the seller if the seller has no lawful right to the goods sold or is wholly unable to guarantee their possession, and the broker shall be legally liable just as the seller is. If anyone wishes to search a man’s premises, he shall do so either naked or wearing only a short tunic without a belt; and after first swearing by the gods appointed by law that he truly expects to find the object, he shall make his search. The other man shall allow him to search his house, including things both sealed and unsealed. But if a man wishes to search and the other party refuses permission, the one prevented shall take legal action, setting a value on the object sought; and anyone convicted in such a case shall pay damages of twice the assessed value. If the master of the house happens to be away from home, the occupants shall let the claimant search whatever is unsealed, and the searcher shall add his own seal to whatever is sealed and appoint anyone he chooses to guard it for five days. If the master is away longer than that, the claimant shall call in the city stewards and make his search in their presence, opening what is sealed as well, and then sealing it up again in the same way in the presence of the household and the city stewards. In cases of disputed ownership there must be a time limit, after which it will no longer be possible to dispute the claim of the person in possession. In our State no dispute is possible concerning land or houses. But in the case of anything else a man has acquired, if the possessor is seen using it in the city, the marketplace, and the temples, and no one lays claim to it, then if someone says he has been looking for it all this time, while the possessor has clearly made no attempt to hide it, and if this goes on for a year, with the possessor still keeping the article and the other still searching, then once the year has passed, no one shall be allowed to lay claim to it. And if a man uses an article openly in the countryside, though not in the city or the marketplace, and no claimant confronts him within five years, then once the five years have passed, no claim to such a possession shall be allowed. If a man uses an article indoors in the city, the time limit shall be three years; if he keeps it in a concealed place in the countryside, it shall be ten years; and if it is in a foreign country, there shall be no time limit for making a claim, whenever it is found.

954e–955e

Athenian: If anyone forcibly prevents any person — either a party himself or his witnesses — from appearing at a lawsuit, then if that person is a slave, whether his own or someone else’s, the suit shall be null and void. If the person so prevented is free, then in addition to the annulment of the suit, the offender shall be imprisoned for a year and shall be liable to prosecution for kidnapping by anyone who chooses. If anyone forcibly prevents a rival competitor in a gymnastic, musical, or other contest from appearing, anyone who wishes shall report it to the presidents of the games, and they shall allow the person who wishes to compete to enter the contest freely. But if they prove unable to do so, then if the one who prevented the competitor wins, they shall give the prize to the man who was prevented and inscribe his name as victor in whatever temples he chooses; the one who prevented him shall be forbidden to set up any votive tablet or inscription concerning such a contest, and he shall be liable for damages whether he is defeated in the contest or wins. If anyone knowingly receives any stolen article, he shall be liable to the same penalty as the thief; and the penalty for harboring an exile shall be death. Everyone shall regard the friend or enemy of the State as his own personal friend or enemy. If anyone makes peace or war with any parties privately and without public consent, the penalty in his case too shall be death. And if any section of the State makes peace or war with any parties on its own account, the generals shall bring those responsible for this action before the court, and the penalty for anyone convicted shall be death. Those who perform any service for their country must do it without accepting gifts; and it shall be no excuse, nor any acceptable argument, to say that a man ought to accept gifts for good deeds, though not for bad ones. To judge wisely, and to stand firmly by one’s judgment, is no easy thing, and the safest course is to listen to and obey the law, which says: Perform no service for gifts. Whoever disobeys, if convicted by the court, shall simply be put to death. As for contributions of money to the public treasury, every man’s property must be valued, for many reasons, and the members of each tribe must also submit to the country wardens a written record of the year’s produce. In this way the Treasury may use whichever of the two existing methods of contribution it prefers, deciding year by year whether to require a share of the whole assessed value or a share of the current year’s income, not counting the payments made for the common meals.

955e–957a

Athenian: As for votive offerings to the gods, it is proper for a reasonable man to present offerings of reasonable value. The land and the hearth are in every case already sacred to all the gods; so no one shall consecrate a second time what is already sacred. Gold and silver, which in other States are found both in private homes and in temples, are possessions that invite envy; ivory, which comes from a body the soul has left, is not a pure offering; and iron and bronze are instruments of war. But a man may offer in the public temples whatever he wishes made from a single piece of wood, and likewise of stone, and of woven fabric an amount not exceeding one woman’s work for a month. For woven fabric and other materials, white is the color fitting for the gods; dyes shall not be used, except for military decorations. The most godlike gifts are birds and images such as a single painter can complete in one day; and all other votive offerings shall be modeled on similar lines. Now that we have stated in detail how many and what divisions the State as a whole must have, and have also stated, as well as we can, the laws concerning all the most important business transactions, it will be proper to deal next with judicial procedure. Of the law courts, the first shall consist of judges chosen jointly by both plaintiff and defendant; these shall be called arbitrators, since that is a more suitable name for them than judges. The second court shall be made up of villagers and tribesmen (the tribes being divided into twelve parts). If the case is not decided in the first court, the parties shall come before these judges to contest a case involving a greater penalty; and if the defendant loses at this second trial, he shall pay, as an additional penalty, one-fifth of the assessed amount of the penalty recorded. If, dissatisfied with his judges, he wishes to contest his case before a court a third time, he shall bring it before the select judges; and if he loses again, he shall pay one and a half times the assessed amount. Again, if the plaintiff loses in the first court and is not satisfied, but goes on to the second court, then if he wins he shall receive the fifth part, but if he loses he shall pay the same fraction of the penalty. And if, dissatisfied with the earlier verdict, they proceed to the third court, the defendant, if he loses, shall pay one and a half times the penalty, as we have said, and the plaintiff one-half of it. As for the assignment of courts by lot, the filling of vacancies, the appointment of attendants for the various boards of magistrates, the times set for carrying out each of these duties, the recording of votes, adjournments, and all other necessary judicial arrangements — such as the drawing of lots for the order of trials, rules about counter-pleadings and counter-attendances, and all related matters — we have dealt with all these before. Still, it is a good thing to repeat what is true twice, or even three times.

957a–957e

Athenian: The old lawgiver, however, may pass over all such legal practices as are trivial and easy to work out, and the young lawgiver shall fill in what he has left out. For the private courts this method would be reasonable. But in connection with the public courts of the State, and all those the officials must use in managing the business of their various offices, many States already have a good number of admirable ordinances made by capable men. From these the Law-wardens must construct a code suited to the political order we are now framing, partly by comparing and correcting them, partly by testing them through experience, until each such ordinance is judged satisfactory. When they have been finally approved and sealed as completely unchangeable, the magistrates shall put them into practice for the rest of their lives. All the rules regarding silence and restrained speech on the part of the judges, and the opposite of these, and everything else that differs from the rules prevailing in other States about justice and goodness — some of this has been stated, and some will be stated at the end. Anyone who intends to be a righteous and just judge must pay attention to all these matters, and must study the written account of them that he possesses. For of all studies, the study of legal regulations, provided they are rightly framed, will prove the most effective in making the learner a better man; if it were not so, it would be in vain that our divine and admirable law bears a name akin to reason. Moreover, of all other writings and speeches — whether speeches of personal praise or blame, composed in verse or prose, written down or spoken day by day at some gathering, whether in argument or in agreement (often of a very empty kind) — of all such writings and speeches the writings of the lawgiver will serve as a test. Since the good judge possesses these within himself as a talisman against other writings and speeches, he will guide both himself and the State rightly. For the good he will secure both the preservation and the increase of what is just; and for the bad, as great a change as possible from their ignorance, intemperance, and cowardice, and, in short, from all their injustice — that is, for all the bad whose opinions are curable.

957e–958e

Athenian: But for those whose opinions are truly fixed by Fate, if such judges and leaders of judges assign death as the cure for souls in this condition (a statement that deserves to be repeated often), they will deserve praise from the whole State. When all the lawsuits for the year have been finally decided, we must have laws for the execution of the verdicts, to this effect. First, the magistrate who acted as judge shall award to the winning party all the property of the convicted party, except what the latter must necessarily keep. He shall do this in each case immediately after the vote, by means of a herald’s proclamation made in the hearing of the judges. And if the loser has not settled with the winner to their mutual satisfaction by the end of the month following the months in which the courts sit, the magistrate who tried the case shall, at the winner’s request, hand over the loser’s property to him. If the means are not available, and the shortfall is not less than one drachma, the loser shall be barred from suing anyone else until he has paid his whole debt to the winner in full; but others may bring valid actions against him. If anyone who has been condemned obstructs the court that condemned him, the officials so wrongfully obstructed shall bring him before the court of the Law-wardens, and anyone who loses such a case shall be punished with death, as guilty of subverting the whole State and its laws. Next, when a man has been born and brought up, has himself fathered and raised children, has taken a reasonable part in business dealings, paying or receiving compensation for wrongs as the case may be, and has thus grown old in due course in a law-abiding life, his end will come in the course of nature. Concerning the dead, male or female, the Interpreters shall have final authority to declare what sacred rites must be performed in honor of the gods of the underworld or of this world. No tombs, however, shall be placed on land that is farmed, whether the monument is small or great. Instead, they shall fill those places where the land is naturally suited only for this purpose — namely, to receive and hide the bodies of the dead with the least harm to the living. But as for all the places in which the earth, as our mother, naturally wishes to bring forth food for human beings, no one, living or dead, shall deprive us, the living, of them.

958e–959e

Athenian: They shall not pile up a mound higher than five men can make in five days, nor set up stone pillars larger than is needed to hold, at most, a eulogy of the dead man’s life of no more than four lines of heroic verse. As for the laying out of the body, first, it shall remain in the house only as long as is needed to establish that the person is not merely in a faint but really dead; accordingly, in a normal case, the third day will be the proper day for carrying it out to burial. As in other matters it is right to trust the lawgiver, so too we must believe him when he declares that the soul is entirely superior to the body, and that in this life what makes each of us what he is is nothing other than the soul, while the body is a likeness that accompanies each of us. So it is well said that the bodily corpses are images of the dead, but that the real self of each of us, which we call the immortal soul, departs into the presence of other gods, there, as the ancestral law declares, to give its account — a prospect to be faced with courage by the good, but with the deepest dread by the wicked. No great help can be given to the man who is dead. It was while he was alive that all his relatives should have helped him, so that in life he might live as justly and as piously as possible, and after death he might be free, in the life that follows this one, from the punishment for wickedness and sin. That being so, one should never spend extravagantly on the dead by supposing that the mass of flesh being buried is, in the truest sense, one’s own relative. Rather, one should believe that the real son or brother — or whoever else it is that a man imagines he is burying in mourning — has departed to further and fulfill his own destiny, and that it is our duty to make wise use of what we have and to spend in moderation, as though on a soulless altar to the gods below. And what counts as moderation the lawgiver will most fittingly divine. So let this be the law: Spending on the whole funeral of no more than five minas for a man of the highest property class, three minas for one of the second class, two for one of the third, and one mina for one of the fourth class shall be considered a moderate amount. The Law-wardens must necessarily perform many other duties and supervise many other matters, but by no means the least of their duties is to spend their lives keeping a constant watch over children, men, and people of every age. And above all, at the end of each person’s life, some one Law-warden must take charge of him — the one whom the relatives of the dead man call in as overseer. It shall be to his credit if the arrangements for the dead man are carried out properly and with moderation, and to his discredit if they are not.

959e–960c

Athenian: The laying out of the body and the other arrangements shall be carried out according to custom in such matters, but it is right for custom to give way to the following regulations of State law. To command or to forbid weeping for the dead is improper; but we shall forbid loud mourning and lamentation outside the house, we shall prohibit carrying the dead out onto the open roads and lamenting while the body is carried through the streets, and the funeral party must be outside the city limits before daybreak. These shall be the legal regulations on such matters. Whoever obeys them shall be free from penalty; but whoever disobeys any single one of the Law-wardens shall be penalized by all of them, with the penalty decided by all in common. All other burials of the dead, and the disposal of corpses without burial in the case of parricides, temple robbers, and all such criminals, have been dealt with and laid down in law earlier, so our task of legislation has nearly come to an end. But in every case, the full end does not consist in doing, acquiring, or founding something. Rather, we should hold that only when we have found a lasting and complete means of salvation for what we have created are we finally justified in believing that we have done all that ought to be done; until then, we must believe, the whole of our creation is incomplete.

960c

Clinias: Well said, Stranger; but explain to us still more clearly what you mean by your last remark. Athenian: Clinias, many sayings from ancient times have been finely expressed, and not the least of them, I would say, are the titles given to the Fates. Clinias: What titles do you mean? Athenian: That the first of them is Lachesis, the second Clotho, and Atropos the third, the savior — she who gives the destinies ratified by Clotho the quality of irreversibility. It is she who must also provide the State and its citizens not only with health and salvation for their bodies but also with good order under law in their souls — or rather, with the salvation of the laws. And this, it seems clear to me, is what our laws still lack: a right way of implanting this irreversible quality in them by nature.

960d–960e

Clinias: The point you raise is a serious one, if it really is impossible to find a way for everything to acquire some such quality.

960e

Athenian: But it is possible, as I now see quite clearly. Clinias: Then let us by no means give up until we have secured this very quality for the laws we have laid down; for it would be ridiculous for us to have spent all this labor on something and then not set it on any firm foundation. Athenian: You are right to urge us on, and you will find me just as ready as you are to proceed. Clinias: Very good. Then what do you say will be a means of salvation for our political order and its laws, and how will it work?

961a–961c

Athenian: Did we not say that our State must have a synod of the following kind? The ten most senior members of the body of Law-wardens at any given time shall form the synod, together with all who have won the award of merit. Moreover, those observers who have gone abroad to find out whether they could hear of anything relevant to the safekeeping of the laws, and who, believing they have succeeded, have come safely home again, shall, after undergoing a searching test, be judged worthy to take part in the synod. In addition, every member must bring with him one of the young men, not less than thirty years old, whom he has first judged suitable by both nature and training. After choosing him, he shall introduce him to the other members; if they also approve, he shall keep him as a colleague, but if they disapprove, the fact that he was originally chosen must be kept secret from everyone else, and especially from the young man who was rejected. The synod must meet early in the morning, when everyone has the most time free from other business, private or public. Was it not something like this that we described in our earlier discussion?

961c

Clinias: It was. Athenian: Returning, then, to the subject of this synod, I will say this: if someone were to set it down as an anchor for the whole State, with all the conditions it requires, then, I affirm, it would secure the salvation of everything we desire. Clinias: How so? Athenian: Now is the time for us to show no lack of zeal in stating truly what follows. Clinias: Excellently said! Go ahead as you intend.

961d

Athenian: Clinias, with regard to every object, we ought to observe what serves as its proper savior in each of its activities — as, for example, in a living creature the soul and the head are preeminently such by nature. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: Surely it is the excellence of those parts that provides salvation for every living creature. Clinias: How? Athenian: Through the presence of reason in the soul, in addition to all its other qualities, and the presence of sight and hearing in the head, in addition to everything else. So, to sum the matter up, it is the combination of reason with the finest senses, and their union into one, that would most justly be called the salvation of each living creature. Clinias: That certainly seems likely.

961e

Athenian: It does. But what kind of reason is it that, combined with the senses, will provide salvation for ships in stormy weather and in calm? On board ship, is it not the pilot and the sailors who, by combining their senses with the pilot’s reason, secure salvation both for themselves and for everything that belongs to the ship? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: There is no need for many examples to illustrate this. Consider, for instance, what target a general should rightly set himself to aim at in the case of an army, or the medical profession in the case of a human body, if they were aiming at salvation. Would not the general make victory and mastery over the enemy his target, while the target of doctors and their assistants would be providing health for the body?

962a

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: But if a doctor were ignorant of the bodily condition we have just called health, or a general ignorant of victory, or anyone ignorant of the other matters we have mentioned, could he possibly be thought to possess reason about any of these things? Clinias: How could he? Athenian: Now, what shall we say about a State? If a man were plainly ignorant of the political target to be aimed at, would he, first of all, deserve the title of magistrate, and, secondly, would he be able to secure the salvation of something whose aim he knows nothing about at all?

962b

Clinias: How could he? Athenian: So now, in our present case, if our settlement of the country is to be finally completed, there must, it seems, be some element in it that knows, first, what this political aim we are speaking of really is, and, secondly, in what way it may attain this aim, and which of the laws, first of all, and then which of the people, give it good or bad advice. But if any State lacks such an element, it will not be surprising if, being thus without reason and without sense, it always acts at random in everything it does.

962c

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: In which, then, of the parts or institutions of our State do we now have anything so constructed as to prove an adequate safeguard of this kind? Can we answer that question? Clinias: No, Stranger, at least not clearly. But if I have to guess, it seems to me that this argument of yours is leading up to that synod which, as you said just now, has to meet at night.

962d

Athenian: An excellent answer, Clinias! And, as our present argument shows, this synod must possess every virtue. The first virtue is not to keep shifting its aim among many objects, but to keep its eye always fixed on one particular target and, so to speak, to shoot all its arrows continually at that one target. Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: So now we shall understand that it is not at all surprising if the legal customs of States keep shifting, since different parts of the legislation in each State look in different directions. And in general, it is not surprising that for some statesmen the aim of justice is to enable a certain group of people to rule in the State, whether they are actually better or worse; for others the aim is how to become rich, whether or not they are someone’s slaves; and others again direct their efforts toward winning a life of freedom. Still others make two objects at once the joint aim of their legislation — gaining freedom for themselves and mastery over other States; while those who, in their own opinion, are the wisest of all aim not at one object only but at all of these and similar objects together, since they cannot name any one object of preeminent value toward which they would want everything else to be directed.

963a

Clinias: Then, Stranger, wasn’t the view we stated long ago the right one? We said that all our laws must always aim at one single object, and we agreed that this is quite rightly named virtue. Athenian: Yes. Clinias: And we said that virtue consists of four things. Athenian: Certainly. Clinias: And that the leader of all four is reason, at which the other three, as well as everything else, should aim. Athenian: You follow us admirably, Clinias; now follow us in what comes next as well. In the case of the pilot, the doctor, and the general, reason is directed, as we said, toward the one object of aim that is proper in each case. Now we have reached the point of examining reason in the case of a statesman, and, addressing it as if it were a person, we shall question it like this: “My admirable friend, what is your aim? Medical reason can state clearly the one single object at which it aims. Will you, then, be unable to state your one object — you who are superior, as you would perhaps say, to all the wise?” Megillus and Clinias, can you two define that object on his behalf and tell me what you say it is, just as I, on behalf of many others, defined their objects for you?

963c

Clinias: We are entirely unable to do so. Athenian: Well then, can you say that we need to make an earnest effort to discern both the object itself as a whole and the forms it takes? Clinias: Give an example of what you mean by the forms you speak of. Athenian: For example, when we said that there are four forms of virtue, it is clear that, since there are four, we must say that each is a separate one. Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: And yet we call them all by one name. We say that courage is virtue, and wisdom is virtue, and the other two likewise, as though they were really not a plurality but solely this one thing — virtue.

963d

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Now it is not hard to explain how these two, and the others, differ from one another and how they have come to have two names; but to explain why we have given the one name “virtue” to both of them, and to the others, is no longer an easy matter. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: It is not hard to make my meaning clear. Let one of us take the role of questioner and the other of answerer. Clinias: How so?

963e

Athenian: Ask me this question: why, when we call both of them by the single name of virtue, did we again speak of them as two, courage and wisdom? Then I shall tell you the reason. It is that one of them, courage, has to do with fear, and beasts share in it too, as do the characters of very young children; for a courageous soul comes into being naturally and without reasoning. But without reasoning there has never yet come into being, nor is there now, nor will there ever be, a soul that is wise and rational, since it is a different kind of thing. Clinias: That is true.

964a–964b

Athenian: You have now learned from my answer how they differ and are two. So now it is your turn to tell me how they are one and the same. Imagine that you are also going to tell me how, although they are four, they are still one; and then, once you have shown me how they are one, ask me in turn how they are four. After that, let us consider whether the person who has full knowledge of any objects that have both a name and a definition ought to know only the name and not the definition, or whether it is not shameful for a man of any worth to be ignorant of all these points in matters of surpassing beauty and importance.

964b

Clinias: It certainly seems so. Athenian: For the lawgiver and the Law-warden, and for the man who thinks he surpasses everyone in virtue and has won prizes for just these qualities, is there anything more important than the very qualities we are now discussing — courage, self-control, justice, and wisdom? Clinias: Impossible. Athenian: In these matters, is it not right that the interpreters, the teachers, and the lawgivers, as the wardens of the rest, should surpass all others in the skill of teaching the nature of vice and virtue and explaining it fully, whether they are dealing with someone who needs knowledge and information, or with someone who needs punishment and rebuke for his wrongdoing? Or is some poet who comes into the State, or someone who calls himself a trainer of the young, to be considered plainly superior to the man who has won prizes for every virtue? In a State like that, where there are no wardens competent in both word and deed and possessing an adequate knowledge of virtue — is it surprising, I ask, if such a State, unguarded as it is, suffers the same fate as many of the States that exist today?

964d

Clinias: Not at all, I would say. Athenian: Well then, must we do what we are now proposing, or what? Must we arrange for our wardens to have a more precise grasp of virtue, in both word and deed, than most people have? Otherwise, how will our State resemble the head and senses of a wise man, on the ground that it has a similar kind of wardenship within itself? Clinias: What is this resemblance we are speaking of, and in what does it consist?

964e

Athenian: Clearly we are comparing the State itself to the skull; and, among the wardens, the younger ones, who are chosen as the most intelligent and quick-witted in every part of their souls, are set, as it were, like the eyes at the top of the head, and survey the State all around. Athenian: As they keep watch, they pass on their perceptions to the organs of memory — that is, they report to the older wardens everything that happens in the State — while the old men, who are compared to reason because of their outstanding wisdom in many important matters, act as counselors and make use of the young men as their assistants and also as colleagues in their deliberations. In this way both groups, by working together, truly secure the salvation of the whole State. Is this the way it should be, or should we arrange something else? Should the State, do you think, have all its members equal, instead of having some who are more highly trained and educated?

965a

Clinias: No, my good friend, that would be impossible. Athenian: We must go on, then, to set out a kind of education more rigorous than the one described before.

965b

Clinias: I suppose so. Athenian: Will the kind we hinted at just now prove to be the one we need? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Did we not say that a first-class craftsman or warden in any field must not only be able to pay attention to the many but must also be able to press on toward the One, so as to recognize it, and, having recognized it, to survey and organize everything else with a single eye to it? Clinias: Quite right.

965c

Athenian: Can anyone get a more accurate vision and view of any object than by being able to look from the many and dissimilar things to the one unifying form? Clinias: Perhaps not. Athenian: It is certain, my friend, not merely probable, that no one can possibly have a clearer method than this. Clinias: I trust you, Stranger, and I agree; so let us use this method in the rest of our discussion. Athenian: Naturally, then, we must compel the wardens of our divine political order too to see precisely, first of all, what the common element is that runs through all four virtues — the element that, since it exists as a unity in courage, self-control, justice, and wisdom, may justly be called, as we say, by the single name of virtue. This, my friends, if we are willing, we must now hold onto very tightly and not let go until we have adequately explained the essential nature of the object we must keep in view — whether, that is, it exists by nature as a unity, or as a whole, or as both, or in some other way. Otherwise, if this escapes us, can we possibly suppose that we will adequately grasp the nature of virtue, when we cannot say whether it is many, or four, or one? So if we follow our own advice, we will find some way or other to make sure that this knowledge exists in our State. If, however, we decide to drop the matter entirely, then drop it we must.

965e

Clinias: No, Stranger, by the god who protects strangers, we must by no means drop a matter like this, since what you say seems to us entirely true. But how is this to be arranged?

966a

Athenian: It is too early to explain how we are to arrange it. Let us first make sure that we agree among ourselves whether or not we ought to do so. Clinias: Well, surely we ought, if we can. Athenian: Very well, then. Do we take the same view about the beautiful and the good? Should our wardens know only that each of these is a plurality, or should they also know how and in what way each is a unity? Clinias: It is fairly obvious that they must also understand how these are a unity.

966b

Athenian: Well then, should they understand it but be unable to demonstrate it in words? Clinias: Impossible! The state of mind you describe is that of a slave. Athenian: Well then, do we take the same view about all forms of goodness — that those who are to be real wardens of the laws must really know their true nature, and be able both to explain it in words and to follow it in action, judging fine actions and shameful ones according to their real character? Clinias: Certainly.

966c–966d

Athenian: And is not one of the finest things the doctrine about the gods that we set out so earnestly — knowing both that they exist and how great a power they evidently possess, as far as a human being is capable of learning these matters? So while we should pardon the mass of the citizens if they merely follow the letter of the law, we must exclude from office anyone eligible for wardenship who does not work hard to grasp every proof there is about the existence of gods. This exclusion from office consists in never choosing as a Law-warden, or counting among those approved for excellence, a man who is not himself divine and has not labored over divine things.

966d

Clinias: It is certainly just, as you say, that the man who is lazy or incapable in this subject should be strictly kept out of the ranks of the noble. Athenian: Are we sure, then, that among the things we discussed earlier there are two that lead to belief in the gods? Clinias: Which two? Athenian: One is our doctrine about the soul — that it is the oldest and most divine of all the things whose motion, when it has developed into becoming, provides an ever-flowing source of being. The other is our doctrine concerning the ordered motion of the stars and of all the other bodies under the control of reason, which has made a cosmos of the All.

966e–967a

Athenian: For no one who has studied these things seriously, and not in a careless or amateurish way, has ever proved so godless as not to be affected by them in exactly the opposite way from what most people expect. For they imagine that those who study these things through astronomy and the other necessary allied sciences become atheists, because they observe, as they suppose, that all things come into being by necessary forces and not by the mental energy of a will aiming at the fulfillment of good.

967a

Clinias: What, in fact, is the real situation? Athenian: The situation now, as I said, is exactly the opposite of what it was when those who studied these objects thought them soulless. Even then they were objects of wonder, and all who studied them precisely suspected what is now the accepted conviction: that if they were soulless, and therefore without reason, they could never have used such marvelously precise calculations. Even in those days some dared to risk the claim that reason is what orders everything in the heavens. But these same thinkers, mistaking the nature of the soul and imagining that she is later than the body instead of earlier, turned the whole universe upside down again, so to speak, and themselves most of all. For as far as the visible objects before their eyes were concerned, everything that moves through the heavens seemed to them to be full of stones, earth, and many other soulless bodies, which distribute the causes of the whole cosmos. These were the views that, at that time, brought these thinkers many charges of atheism and much hostility, and that also prompted the poets to abuse them, comparing philosophers to dogs howling in vain, along with other senseless slanders. But today, as we have said, the situation is quite the opposite.

967d

Clinias: How so? Athenian: It is impossible for any mortal man to become steadfastly god-fearing unless he grasps the two truths now stated: that the soul is the oldest of all things that share in generation, that it is immortal, and that it rules over all bodies. In addition to this, he must also grasp the reason that, as we have often said, governs what exists among the stars, together with the necessary preliminary sciences. He must also see the connection of music theory with these, and apply it harmoniously to the institutions and rules of ethics; and he must be able to give a rational account of everything that admits of one.

968a–968b

Athenian: Anyone who cannot master these sciences, in addition to the ordinary civic virtues, will never make a competent magistrate of the whole State, but only an assistant to other magistrates. And now, Megillus and Clinias, it is at last time to consider whether, in addition to all the laws we have already stated, we shall add this one as well: that the nocturnal synod of magistrates shall be legally established, sharing in all the education we have described, to keep watch over the State and secure its salvation. Or what are we to do?

968b

Clinias: Of course we shall add this law, my excellent friend, if we can possibly do so, even to a small extent. Athenian: Then truly, let us all strive to do so. In this you will find me a most willing helper, given my very long experience and study of this subject; and perhaps I shall find other helpers besides myself. Clinias: Well, Stranger, we most certainly must go forward along the path on which God too, it seems, is leading us. But what is the right method for us to use? That is what we must now discover and state.

968c

Athenian: At this stage, Megillus and Clinias, it is not possible to enact laws for such a body until it has been properly organized; once it has been, its members must themselves lay down what authority they should have. But it is already clear that what is needed to form such a body, if it is to be formed rightly, is teaching through long and frequent discussions. Clinias: How so? What are we to understand by this remark? Athenian: Surely we must first draw up a list of all those who are suited for the office of warden by age, intellectual ability, and moral character and habits. But as for the next point, the subjects they should learn, it is neither easy to discover these for oneself nor easy to find someone else who has discovered them and learn from him. Moreover, with regard to time limits — when and for how long they ought to receive instruction in each subject — it would be pointless to lay down written regulations. For not even the learners themselves could be sure that they were learning at the right time until each of them had acquired some knowledge of the subject in question within his soul. Accordingly, although it would be wrong to call all these matters indescribable, they should be called imprescribable, since prescribing them in advance does nothing to clarify the question under discussion.

968e

Clinias: Then what must we do, Stranger, in these circumstances? Athenian: It seems, my friends, that, as the saying goes, we must take our chance with the crowd; and if we are willing to stake the whole political order on a throw of the dice and, as people say, roll three sixes or three aces, then that is what must be done. I will share the risk with you by stating and explaining my views on education and upbringing, the subject that our discussion has now raised again. But truly, the risk will be no small one, nor comparable to any other. And you, Clinias, I especially urge to pay close attention to this matter. For as for the State of the Magnesians — or whatever other name the god gives your State — if you set it up rightly, you will win the very highest renown, or at any rate you will inevitably gain the reputation of being the boldest of all who come after you. If this divine synod actually comes into being, my dear colleagues, we must hand the State over to it; and practically none of today’s lawgivers would dispute this. Then we shall have as an accomplished fact and a waking reality what we touched on only a little while ago in our discussion as a mere dream, when we sketched a kind of picture of the union of reason and the head — if, that is, we have the members carefully selected and suitably trained, and after their training settled in the acropolis of the country, and so finally made into wardens whose equal in excellence at safeguarding we have never before seen in our lives.

969c

Megillus: My dear Clinias, from everything that has now been said, it follows that either we must give up the idea of founding the State, or else we must keep this Stranger here and, by entreaties and every possible means, secure his partnership in the task of founding the State. Clinias: That is perfectly true, Megillus. I will do as you say, and you must help me yourself.

969d

Megillus: I will help you.

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