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Nedarim

Babylonian Talmud

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Chapter 28a

except for by taking of an oath, due to its more stringent nature. And Beit Hillel say: One may mislead them even by taking an oath. Beit Shammai say: When negotiating with a robber, one should not initiate by taking a vow for him unless the robber does not believe his claim, in which case he may take a vow to reinforce his words. And Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate by taking a vow to him. Beit Shammai say: One may take a vow only about that which the robber compels him to take a vow but may not add to it. And Beit Hillel say: One may take a vow even about that which he does not compel him to take a vow. The mishna explains the previous statement: How so? If the extortionist said to him that he should say: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife if the vow is not true, and he said: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife and my children, Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted to benefit from him, since the extortionist demanded that he take that vow, but his children, whom he added of his own accord, are prohibited from benefiting from their father. And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted to benefit from him. GEMARA: The Gemara asks, concerning the mishna’s statement that one may take a vow to tax collectors: But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., there is a halakhic principle that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they live? Since one must pay the tax determined by the kingdom, how did the Sages permit one to lie in order to avoid paying?⁠ Rav Ḥinnana said that Rav Kahana said that Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who has no fixed amount for collection established by the kingdom, but rather collects the tax arbitrarily. Therefore, this case is not included in the law of the kingdom. A Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who establishes himself as such independently and was not appointed by the kingdom. § The mishna states: He may also take a vow to them that his produce belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. The Gemara asks: How does he take a vow in this way? Rav Amram said that Rav said: This is a case where he said: The produce of the world should be forbidden to me if this produce does not belong to the house of the king. The Gemara asks: Since he said that the produce of the world shall be forbidden to him, shouldn’t all the produce of the world is forbidden to him, as this produce did not belong to the house of the king? The Gemara answers: This is a case where he says: They shall be forbidden to me only today. The Gemara wonders: If he says: Today, the tax collector will not accept it as a vow, since it is not difficult to avoid eating produce for one day. Therefore, he may still be suspected of lying. The Gemara answers: This is a case where he says: Today, in his heart but verbalizes the vow in an unspecified manner. And although we hold that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters and are not taken into consideration, with regard to circumstances beyond one’s control it is different, and he is permitted to rely on the mental stipulation that he added in order to limit the duration of the prohibition effected by the vow. § The mishna states: Beit Shammai say that they may take a vow in such a case using every means of vowing except for an oath, while Beit Hillel say they may take a vow even using an oath. Beit Shammai say: One may vow only about that which the extortionist compels him to take a vow but may not add to it. And Beit Hillel say: One may take a vow even about that which he does not compel him to take a vow. How so? If the extortionist said to him that he should say: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife if the vow is not true, and he said: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife and my children, Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted to benefit from him, since the extortionist demanded that he take that vow, but his children, whom he added of his own accord, are prohibited from benefiting from their father. And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted to benefit from him. Rav Huna said that a Sage taught: Beit Shammai say that one may not initiate by taking an oath to him unless the extortionist does not believe his claim, and Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate by taking an oath to him. The Gemara asks: A precise analysis of the wording indicates that according to Beit Shammai it is only by taking an oath to him that one may not initiate, but one may initiate by taking a vow to him. Rav Huna asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that Beit Shammai say: He may not initiate by taking a vow to him? Rav Huna asks another question: And furthermore, a precise analysis of the wording indicates that he may not initiate by taking an oath to him, but he may certainly vow with an oath if the tax collector insists on it; but didn’t we learn in the mishna that Beit Shammai say: They may take a vow in such a case using every means of vowing in order to mislead them except for by taking an oath, which indicates that one may not take an oath even if he does not initiate with one? The Gemara resolves the contradiction: The mishna taught the halakha that pertains to a vow to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say that one may not initiate even with a vow. However, the baraita taught the halakha that pertains to an oath to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Beit Hillel, who maintain that initiating even with an oath is permitted. It is apparent that according to Beit Shammai one may not initiate with a vow and may not take an oath at all. Therefore, the baraita cannot be used to infer Beit Shammai’s opinion concerning oaths. Rav Ashi said the following to resolve the contradiction: This is what it is teaching: The baraita does not refer to a vow taken in the case of robbers or tax collectors. Rather, the dispute focuses on an entirely different topic: Beit Shammai say that there is no allowance for a request for dissolution of an oath, and the statement: He may not initiate, relates to a halakhic authority who seeks an opening to dissolve an oath. And Beit Hillel say there is an allowance for a request for dissolution of an oath. MISHNA: If one sees his property in danger of being destroyed, and takes a vow stating, for example: These saplings are like an offering if they are not cut down, or: This garment is like an offering if it is not burned, these items are consecrated if the saplings remain standing or if the garment is not burned. In addition, they are subject to the possibility of redemption just as other items consecrated for maintenance of the Temple may be redeemed. But if one said: These saplings are like an offering until they are cut down, or: This garment is like an offering until it is burned,

Texts in conversation

Compare Matthew 22:21 and Nedarim 28a

New Testament · Rabbinic

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Summary

In Matthew, Jesus answers a question about taxes by separating what belongs to rulers from what belongs to God. Tractate Nedarim discusses a similar issue and says people must follow the laws where they live, a rule known as “dina de-malchuta dina.”

Passages

Matthew 22:21

New Testament
15 Then the Pharisees went out and planned together to entrap him with his own words. 16 They sent to him their disciples along with the Herodians, saying, “Teacher, we know that you are truthful and teach the way of God in accordance with the truth. You do not court anyone’s favor because you show no partiality. 17 Tell us then, what do you think? Is it right to pay taxes to Caesar or not?” 18 But Jesus realized their evil intentions and said, “Hypocrites! Why are you testing me? 19 Show me the coin used for the tax.” So they brought him a denarius. 20 Jesus said to them, “Whose image is this, and whose inscription?” 21 They replied, “Caesar’s.” He said to them, “Then give to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” 22 Now when they heard this they were stunned, and they left him and went away.
70–90 CE (scholarly estimate) Read in Matthew

Nedarim 28a

Rabbinic · Babylonian Talmud
GEMARA: The Gemara asks, concerning the mishna’s statement that one may take a vow to tax collectors: But didn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., there is a halakhic principle that Jews must obey the laws of the state in which they live? Since one must pay the tax determined by the kingdom, how did the Sages permit one to lie in order to avoid paying? Rav Ḥinnana said that Rav Kahana said that Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who has no fixed amount for collection established by the kingdom, but rather collects the tax arbitrarily. Therefore, this case is not included in the law of the kingdom. A Sage of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The mishna is referring to a tax collector who establishes himself as such independently and was not appointed by the kingdom.
450–550 CE (scholarly estimate) Read in Nedarim

References

"... On the surface, Jesus seems to be saying that Jews should pay their taxes to Rome, but on closer examination, the statement is actually quite equivocal and could be understood to be saying the opposite: yes, pay Caesar his due, but since God is the only true king (or so many Jews in Jesus’s day believed) nothing is really due Caesar, while Jews’ true loyalty remains with God, to whom they owe everything. A Roman could thus hear one thing, while an anti-Roman Jew might hear something more subversive ... The Jews, like everyone else, were ultimately subject to the royal authorities, of course, and they even found justification for this in the Talmudic legal principle of dina de-malkhuta dina , or “the law of the land is the law.” As a tight-knit group legally and religiously set apart from the surrounding Christian society, however, the Jewish communities also had ample room to run their own affairs according to the dictates of Jewish law. In Ashkenaz as elsewhere in the Jewish Diaspora, communities were guided by rabbinic and lay leaders, though the two were more closely intertwined than in other parts of the Jewish world. Generally, each community was independent and local custom was particularly cherished in Ashkenaz, and nowhere did a supreme, supralocal religious authority or clear hierarchical structure of religious leadership emerge ..."
John M. Efron, The Jews: A History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 103–104, 191.

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Matthew 22:21 and Nedarim 28a

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