Mishnah Shevuot

1 Oaths are of two kinds, subdivided into four. The laws concerning awareness of having become impure are of two kinds, subdivided into four. The laws concerning carrying on the Sabbath are of two kinds, subdivided into four. The signs of skin disease are of two kinds, subdivided into four.

2 Where there is knowledge at the beginning and at the end but forgetfulness between, a sliding scale sacrifice is brought. Where there is knowledge at the beginning but not at the end, the goat that is sacrificed and its blood sprinkled within the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement together with the Day of Atonement itself hold the sin in suspense until it becomes known to the sinner, and he brings the sliding scale sacrifice.

3 Where there is no knowledge at the beginning but there is knowledge at the end, the goat sacrificed on the outer altar together with the Day of Atonement bring atonement, for it says: “one goat for a sin offering besides the sin offering of atonement”Numbers 29:11: what this goat prepared inside the Holy of Holies atones for, this goat prepared outside atones for. Just as the “inner” goat atones only for a sin where there was knowledge at the beginning, so the “outer” goat atones only for a sin where there was knowledge at the end.

4 Where there is no knowledge of the impurity either at the beginning or at the end, the goats offered as sin offerings on festivals and new months bring atonement, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: “The festival goats atone for such sins and not the new moon goats. And for what do the new month goats bring atonement? For a pure man who ate impure holy food.” Rabbi Meir says: “All the goats have equal powers of atonement for imparting impurity to the Temple and holy food.” Rabbi Shimon used to say: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure man who ate impure holy food; and the festival goats atone for transgression of the laws of impurity where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; and the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement atones for transgression of these laws where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end.” They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said to them: “Let it be offered.” They said to him: “Since they are not equal in the atonement they bring, how can they take each other’s place?” He replied: “They are all at least equal in the wider sense in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the Temple and holy food.”

5 Rabbi Shimon ben Judah said in his name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food; the festival goats, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food, atone also for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food and for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end, atones also for a case where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end.” They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said, “Yes.” They further said to him: “Granted that the Day of Atonement goat may be offered up on the new month, but how can the new month goat be offered up on the Day of Atonement to bring atonement for a sin that is not within its scope?” He replied: “They are all at least equal in the wider sense in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the Temple and holy food.”

6 For intentional transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the Temple and holy food, the goat offered inside the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement together with the Day of Atonement itself bring atonement. For other transgressions of the Torah, light and grave, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive and negative, those punishable by karet and those punishable by death imposed by the court: for all these the scapegoat sent out on the Day of Atonement brings atonement.

7 The scapegoat brings atonement to Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest alike. What then is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest? None, except that the bull offered on the Day of Atonement brings atonement to the priests for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the Temple and holy food. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as the blood of the goat that is offered within the Holy of Holies brings atonement for Israelites, so the blood of the bull offered on the Day of Atonement brings atonement for priests; and just as the confession of sins pronounced over the scapegoat brings atonement for Israelites, so the confession pronounced over the bull brings atonement for priests.”

1 The laws concerning awareness of having become impure are of two kinds, subdivided into four. If he became impure and was aware of it, then he forgot that he had been impure, though he remembered that the food was holy; if the fact that it was holy food was unknown to him, though he remembered that he was impure; if both were unknown to him; and he ate holy food, and was not aware, and after he had eaten, he became aware: in these cases he brings a sliding scale sacrifice. If he became impure and was aware of it, then he forgot that he had been impure, though he remembered that he was entering the Temple; if the fact that he was entering the Temple was unknown to him, though he remembered that he was impure; if both were hidden from him; and he entered the Temple and was not aware, and after he had gone out, became aware: in these cases he brings a sliding scale sacrifice.

2 It is the same whether one while impure enters the Temple court or the addition to the Temple court, for additions are not made to the city of Jerusalem, or to the Temple courts except by the king, prophet, Urim and Thummim, the Sanhedrin of seventy-one, and with two loaves of thanksgiving, and with song. And the court walks in a procession, the two loaves of thanksgiving being carried after them, and all Israel following behind them. The inner one is eaten, and the outer one is burnt. And as for any addition made without all these, one who enters it while impure is not liable.

3 If he became impure while in the Temple court and was aware of it, and then forgot that he was impure, though he remembered that he was in the Temple; or he forgot that he was in the Temple, though he remembered that he was impure; or he forgot both; and he prostrated himself, or waited in the Temple the time it takes to prostrate; or went out the long way, he is liable. If he went out the shorter way, he is not liable. This is the positive precept concerning the Temple for which they the court are not liable.

4 And which is the positive precept concerning a menstruant for which they are liable? This: if one was having relations with a ritually pure woman, and she said to him, “I have become impure,” and he withdrew immediately, he is liable, because his withdrawal is as pleasurable to him as his entry.

5 Rabbi Eliezer said: “Scripture says, ‘If anyone touches ... the carcass of an impure creeping thing, and it is unknown to him’Leviticus 5:2: when the impure creeping thing is unknown to him, he is liable; but he is not liable when the fact that he is in the Temple is unknown to him.” Rabbi Akiva said: “Scripture says, ‘and it is hidden from him that he is impure’Leviticus 5:3: when his impurity is unknown to him, he is liable; but he is not liable when the fact that he is in the Temple is unknown to him.” Rabbi Ishmael said: “Scripture twice says, ‘and it is hidden from him,’ in order to make him liable both for the forgetfulness of the impurity and the forgetfulness of the Temple.”

1 Oaths are two, subdivided into four. “I swear I will eat,” and “I swear I will not eat”; “I swear I have eaten,” and “I swear I have not eaten.” “I swear I will not eat,” and he ate even a minute quantity, he is liable, the words of Rabbi Akiva. They the Sages said to Rabbi Akiva: “Where do we find that he who eats a minute quantity is liable, that this one should be liable?” Rabbi Akiva said to them: “But where do we find that he who merely speaks brings a sacrifice, that this one should bring a sacrifice?” If a man says, “I swear I will not eat,” and he ate and drank, he is liable only once. “I swear I will not eat and I will not drink,” and he ate and drank, he is liable twice.

2 “I swear I will not eat,” and he ate wheat bread, barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable only once. “I swear I will not eat wheat bread, barley bread, and spelt bread,” and he ate all three, he is liable for each one.

3 “I swear I will not drink,” and he drank many liquids, he is liable only once. “I swear I will not drink wine, oil, and honey,” and he drank all three, he is liable for each one.

4 “I swear I will not eat,” and he ate foods that are not fit to be eaten, and drank liquids that are not fit to be drunk, he is exempt. “I swear I will not eat,” and he ate carrion, terefot, reptiles, and creeping things, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him. He said, “I vow that my wife may not benefit from me, if I have eaten today,” and he had eaten carrion, terefot, forbidden animals, or reptiles, his wife is prohibited to him.

5 It is the same whether he swears about things concerning himself, or about things concerning others, or about things that have substance, or about things that have no substance. How so? If he said, “I swear that I will give to so-and-so,” or “I will not give”; “I have given,” or “I have not given”; “I will sleep,” or “I will not sleep”; “I have slept,” or “I have not slept”; “I will throw a pebble into the sea,” or “I will not throw”; “I have thrown,” or “I have not thrown”; he is liable. Rabbi Ishmael says: “He is liable only for an oath with regard to the future, for it says, ‘To do bad or to do good.’Leviticus 5:4” Rabbi Akiva said to him: “If so, we would know only such cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable; but how do we know such cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable?” He said to him: “From the amplification of the verse.” He said to him: “If the verse amplifies for that, it amplifies for this also.”

6 If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. If he swore to fulfill a commandment, and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical in the second instance that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. For Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for swearing with regard to an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable should he not fulfill his oath, for swearing with regard to a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable should he not fulfill his oath!” They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regard to an optional matter he is liable, it is because Scripture has in that case made negative equal to positive for liability; but how can you say that for an oath to fulfill a commandment he is liable, since Scripture has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt!”

7 “I swear I will not eat this loaf”; “I swear I will not eat it”; “I swear I will not eat it”; and he ate it, he is liable only once. This is the oath of utterance, for which one is liable, for its willful transgression, flogging; and for its unwitting transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice. For a vain oath one is liable for willful transgression, flogging, and for unwitting transgression one is exempt.

8 What is a vain oath? If he swore to what is contrary to the facts known to people, saying of a pillar of stone that it is of gold; or of a man that he is a woman; or of a woman that she is a man. If he swore concerning a thing that is impossible, for instance, if he said, “If I have not seen a camel flying in the air,” or “If I have not seen a serpent as thick as the beam of the olive press.” If he said to witnesses, “Come and bear testimony for me,” and they replied, “We swear that we will not bear testimony for you.” If he swore to annul a commandment, for example not to make a sukkah, or not to take a lulav, or not to put on tefillin. These are vain oaths, for which one is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression one is exempt.

9 If one said: “I swear I will eat this loaf”; and then he said, “I swear I will not eat it,” the first is an oath of utterance, and the second is a vain oath. If he ate it, he transgressed the vain oath; if he did not eat it, he transgressed the oath of utterance.

10 The oath of utterance applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified to bear witness and those not qualified, whether uttered before the court, or not before the court, but it must be uttered with a man’s own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice.

11 A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified to bear witness and those not qualified, whether uttered before the court, or not before the court, but it must be uttered with a man’s own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression he is exempt. In the case of both this and that oath, if he was adjured by the mouth of others, he is liable. How so? If he said, “I have not eaten today,” or, “I have not put on tefillin today,” and another person said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen!” he is liable if his oath was false.

1 The oath of testimony applies to men and not to women, to non-relatives and not to relatives, to those qualified to bear witness and not to those unqualified. And it applies only to those eligible to bear witness. Whether uttered in front of the court or not in front of the court, if uttered with his own mouth; but if adjured by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “Whether uttered with his own mouth or adjured by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court.”

2 And they are liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional denial of knowledge of testimony, but they are not liable for unintentional transgression. And what are they liable for intentional transgression of the oath? A sliding scale sacrifice.

3 The oath of testimony: how is it done? If he said to two persons: “Come and bear testimony for me”; and they replied: “We swear we know no testimony for you”; or they said to him: “We know no testimony for you,” and he said: “I adjure you,” and they said, “Amen!” they are liable. If he adjured them five times outside the court, and then they came to the court and admitted knowledge of testimony, they are exempt. If they denied, they are liable for each oath. If he adjured them five times before the court, and they denied knowledge of testimony, they are liable only once. Rabbi Shimon said: “What is the reason? Because they cannot afterwards admit knowledge.”

4 If both persons denied knowledge together, they are both liable. If one after another, the first is liable, and the second exempt. If one denied, and the other admitted, the one who denied is liable. If there were two sets of witnesses, and the first denied, and then the second denied, they are both liable, because the testimony could be upheld by either of the two.

5 “I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that so-and-so has in his possession a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object of mine”; and they respond: “We swear we know no testimony for you,” they are liable only once. “We swear we do not know that so-and-so has in his possession a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object of yours,” they are liable for each one. “I adjure you that you bear testimony for me that so-and-so has in his possession a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt of mine”; and they respond: “We swear we know no testimony for you,” they are liable only once. “We swear we know no testimony for you that so-and-so has in his possession a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt of yours,” they are liable for each one.

6 “I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that so-and-so owes me full damages, or half damages, or double payment, or fourfold or fivefold payment; or that so-and-so raped my daughter, or seduced my daughter; or that my son struck me; or that my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Day of Atonement”; and they deny knowledge of testimony, they are liable.

7 “I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that I am a priest, or, that I am a Levite, or, that I am not the son of a divorced woman, or, that I am not the son of a halutzah; that so-and-so is a priest, or, that so-and-so is a Levite, or, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, or, that he is not the son of a halutzah; that so-and-so violated his daughter, or seduced his daughter; that my son injured me; that my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Sabbath,” and they deny knowledge of testimony, they are exempt.

8 If a man said, “I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that so-and-so promised to give me two hundred zuz, and did not give it to me,” they are exempt, for they are liable only for a money claim as in the case of deposit.

9 “I adjure you that, when you know any testimony for me, you should come and bear testimony for me,” they are exempt, because the oath preceded the testimony.

10 If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me,” they are exempt unless he directs himself to them.

11 If he said to two persons: “I adjure you, so-and-so and so-and-so, that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me,” and they replied, “We swear we know no testimony for you,” and they did know testimony for him, but it was evidence of one witness from the mouth of another witness; or if one of them was a relative or otherwise ineligible as a witness, they are exempt.

12 If he sent the adjuration through his servant, or if the defendant said to them: “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for him you should come and bear testimony for him,” they are exempt, until they hear the adjuration directly from the claimant.

13 If he said: “I adjure you”; “I command you”; “I bind you”; they are liable. “By heaven and earth!” they are exempt. “By Alef Dalet”; “By Yod He”; “By God Almighty”; “By the Lord of Hosts”; “By the Merciful and Gracious One”; “By the Long-Suffering One”; “By the One Abounding in Kindness”; or by any of the substitutes for the name, they are liable. He who blasphemes by any of them is liable, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses his father or mother by any of them is liable, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages exempt him. He who curses himself or his neighbor by any of them transgresses a negative precept. If he said, “May God strike you,” or “Yes, may God strike you,” this is the curse written in the Torah. “May God not strike you”; or “May he bless you”; or “May he do good to you if you bear testimony for me,” Rabbi Meir makes them liable, and the Sages exempt them.

1 The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified to bear testimony and those unqualified; before the court and not before the court, if uttered from his own mouth. And if adjured by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: whether uttered from his own mouth or adjured by the mouth of others, since he denied it, he is liable. And he is liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional denial of having received the deposit, but he is not liable for unintentional transgression. And what is he liable for intentional transgression of the oath? A guilt offering of the value of two shekels of silver.

2 The oath of deposit: how is it done? If he said to him: “Give me my deposit that I have in your possession,” and the other replied: “I swear that you have nothing in my possession”; or he replied to him, “You have nothing in my possession,” and the depositor said: “I adjure you,” and he responded, “Amen!” he is liable. If he adjured him five times, whether before the court or not before the court, and he denied, he is liable for each one. Rabbi Shimon said: “What is the reason? Because he can retract and admit.”

3 If five claimed from him, and said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,” and he replied: “I swear that you have nothing in my possession,” he is liable only once. If he said: “I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ at the end.” Rabbi Shimon says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ to each one.” “Give me the deposit, loan, theft, and lost object that I have in your possession,” and he replied, “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost object,” he is liable for each one. “Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession,” and he replied, “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Meir said: “Even if he said, ‘... a grain of wheat, barley, and spelt,’ he is liable for each one.”

4 “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and the other says, “I did not rape or seduce her”; “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him, for he does not pay a fine on his own admission. They said to him: “Even though he does not pay a fine on his own admission, he still pays for the shame and blemish to the girl, based on his own admission.”

5 “You stole my ox,” and he says, “I have not stolen it”; “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “I have stolen it, but I have not killed it or sold it”; “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. “Your ox killed my ox,” and he says, “It did not kill your ox”; “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” and he says, “It did not kill your slave”; “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. He said to him, “You injured me, or bruised me,” and the other says, “I have not injured you or bruised you”; “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. His slave said to him, “You knocked out my tooth, or blinded my eye,” and he said, “I did not knock out your tooth, or blind your eye”; “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. This is the principle: whenever he pays on his own admission, he is liable; and when he does not pay on his own admission, he is exempt.

1 The oath of the judges is imposed when the claim is at least two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so? “Two silver maʿahs of mine are in your possession,” and the other replies, “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is exempt. “Two silver maʿahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” and the other replies, “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession,” and the other replies, “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession,” and the other replies, “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable. “You have a hundred denarii of my father’s,” and the other replies, “I have only fifty denarii of his,” he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.

2 “You have a hundred denarii of mine,” and he said to him, “Yes.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me,” and he replied, “I have given them to you,” he is exempt. If he says, “Nothing of yours is in my possession,” he is liable. “You have a hundred denarii of mine,” and he said to him, “Yes.” And then he said, “Do not give them to me except before witnesses.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me,” and he replied, “I have given them to you,” he is liable, because he should have given them to him before witnesses.

3 “You have a litra of gold of mine,” and he replies, “I have only a litra of silver of yours,” he is exempt. “You have a golden denar of mine,” and he replies, “I have only a silver denar of yours, or a tresis, or a pundion, or a perutah,” he is liable, for all are one kind of coinage. “You have a kor of grain of mine,” and he replies, “I have only a letek of beans of yours,” he is exempt. “You have a kor of produce of mine,” and he replies, “I have only a letek of beans of yours,” he is liable, for beans are included in produce. If he claimed from him wheat, and the other admitted barley, he is exempt. But Rabban Gamaliel makes him liable. If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits his claim to the empty jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the same kind as the claim, he must swear. But the Sages say, the admission is not of the same kind as the claim. Rabban Gamaliel said, “I approve the words of Admon.” If he claims from him vessels and lands, and he admits the vessels, but denies the lands; or admits the lands, but denies the vessels, he is exempt. If he admits a portion of the lands, he is exempt; a portion of the vessels, he is liable, because property for which there is no security binds property for which there is security to an oath.

4 No oath is imposed in a claim by a deaf-mute, mentally incompetent person, or minor. And no oath is imposed on a minor. But an oath is imposed when a claim is lodged against a minor, or against the Temple’s property.

5 And these are the things for which no oath is imposed: slaves, bonds, lands, and dedicated objects. The law of paying double, or four or five times the value, does not apply to them. An unpaid guardian does not take an oath, and a paid guardian does not pay. Rabbi Shimon says: “For dedicated objects for which he is responsible an oath is imposed and for dedicated objects for which he is not responsible an oath is not imposed.”

6 Rabbi Meir says: “There are things that are attached to land, but are not like land.” But the Sages do not agree with him. How so? If one says, “I delivered to you ten vines laden with fruit,” and the other says, “There were only five”; Rabbi Meir makes him take an oath; but the Sages say: “All that is attached to land is like land.” An oath is imposed only for a thing defined by size, weight, or number. How so? If one says, “I delivered to you a storeroom full of produce,” or “I delivered to you a purse full of money,” and the other says, “I do not know; but what you left you may take,” he is exempt. If one says, “I gave you produce reaching up to the molding above the window,” and the other says, “Only up to the window,” he is liable.

7 If a man lends money to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it the pledge was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela,” he is exempt. “I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, for fear that if the other takes the oath, this one may then bring out the deposit.

1 All whom the Torah obligates to take an oath, take an oath, and do not pay. But these take an oath, and receive payment: the hired laborer, he who has been robbed, he who has been wounded, and he whose opponent is suspected of taking a false oath, and the shopkeeper with his account book. “The hired laborer”: how so? If he says to him his employer, “Give me my wages that you owe me,” and he replies, “I have given,” and the other says, “I have not received it,” he the laborer takes an oath and collects his wages. Rabbi Judah says: “There is no oath unless there is partial admission. How so? If he says to him, ‘Give me my wages, fifty denarii, which you owe me,’ and the other says, ‘You have received a gold denar worth twenty-five silver denarii.’”

2 “He who has been robbed”: how so? If they testified of a man that he entered another’s house to take a pledge without permission, and the other says, “You have taken my vessels,” and he says, “I have not taken them,” he takes an oath, and takes back his vessels. Rabbi Judah says: “There is no oath unless there is partial admission. How so? He said to him, ‘You have taken two vessels,’ and the other says, ‘I have taken only one.’”

3 “He who has been wounded”: how so? If they testified about a person that another went onto his property whole, and came out wounded, and he said to him, “You have wounded me,” and the other said, “I have not wounded you,” he takes an oath, and receives damages. Rabbi Judah says: “There is no oath unless there is partial admission. How so? He said to him, ‘You have inflicted on me two wounds,’ and the other said, ‘I inflicted on you only one wound.’”

4 “He whose opponent is suspected of taking a false oath”: how so? Whether it is the oath of testimony, or the oath of deposit, or even a vain oath. If one of the litigants was a dice-player, or usurer, or pigeon-flyer, or dealer in the produce of the seventh year, his opponent takes the oath and collects his claim. If both are suspect, the oath returns to its place; these are the words of Rabbi Yose. Rabbi Meir says: “They divide the claim.”

5 “And the shopkeeper with his account book”: how so? Not that he the shopkeeper says to him the customer, “It is written in my account book that you owe me two hundred zuz.” Rather he the customer says to him the shopkeeper, “Give my son two seahs of wheat,” or, “Give my laborer small change to the value of a sela,” and then he says, “I have given,” and they say, “We have not received”; he the shopkeeper takes an oath, and receives his due from the customer. And they take an oath, and receive their due. Ben Nanas said: “How can both be permitted to come to a vain oath? Rather he takes without an oath, and they take without an oath.”

6 If he said to a shopkeeper, “Give me fruit for a denar,” and he gave him, and then the shopkeeper said to him, “Give me the denar,” and he replied to him, “I gave it to you, and you placed it in the till,” the customer takes an oath. If he gave him the denar, and said to him, “Give me the fruit,” and the shopkeeper says to him, “I have given it to you, and you took it to your house,” the shopkeeper takes an oath. Rabbi Judah says: “He who has the fruit in his possession has the advantage.” If he said to a money-changer, “Give me change for a denar,” and he gave him; and said to him, “Give me the denar,” and the other said, “I have given it to you, and you placed it in the till,” the customer takes an oath. If he gave him the denar, and said to him, “Give me the small change,” and the other said to him, “I have given it to you, and you threw it in your purse,” the money-changer takes an oath. Rabbi Judah says: “It is not usual for a money-changer to give even an issar until he receives the denar.”

7 So too, they said that she who impairs her ketubah by admitting that it had already been partially paid cannot receive the remainder of the payment except on oath; and that if one witness testifies against her that it the ketubah has been paid in full, she cannot receive payment except on oath; and that from assigned property or orphans’ property she cannot exact payment for her ketubah except on oath; and that if she claims her ketubah not in his presence, she cannot receive payment except on oath. So too, orphans cannot receive payment except on oath namely: “We swear that our father did not instruct us in his will, nor did our father say to us, nor did we find written among our father’s documents, that this document is paid.” Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: “Even if the son was born after his father’s death he may take an oath, and collect his claim.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document was not paid, he receives his claim without an oath.”

8 And these take an oath though there is no definite claim: partners, tenants, guardians, the wife who manages the affairs of the household, and the son of the house. If he said to him, “What do you claim from me?” and the other replied, “I want you to swear to me,” he must take an oath. If the partners or tenants had divided, he cannot impose an oath on them. If an oath was imposed on him in another case, they impose the whole on him. And the seventh year cancels the oath.

1 There are four kinds of guardians: an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath that he had not been neglectful in every case of loss or damage and be free of liability. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or died, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen.

2 If he the owner said to the unpaid guardian, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; or he replied, “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; or he replied, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; or he replied, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; or he replied, “It was lost,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; and the owner said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt from having to bring a sacrifice for a false oath.

3 If the owner said, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, and the owner said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. If the owner said, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was lost”; and the owner said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” and witnesses testify against him that he had consumed it, he pays the principal; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal, a fifth, and brings a guilt offering. If the owner said, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was stolen,” and the owner said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” and witnesses testify against him that he himself stole it, he pays double; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal, a fifth, and brings a guilt offering.

4 If a man said to one in the market, “Where is my ox that you have stolen?” and he replied, “I did not steal it,” and witnesses testified against him that he did steal it, he pays double. If he killed it or sold it, he pays four or five times its value. If he saw witnesses coming nearer and nearer, and he said, “I did steal it, but I did not kill or sell it,” he pays only the principal.

5 If he the owner said to the borrower, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; or he replied, “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; or he replied, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; or he replied, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; or he replied, “It was lost,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; and the owner said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt.

6 If the owner said, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; and the owner said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; or he replied, “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; or he replied, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; or he replied, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it was lost; or he replied, “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; and the owner said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. If he replied, “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; and the owner said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he replied, “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; and the owner said, “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This is the principle: he who by lying changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt; from liability to exemption, is liable. This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.