Laws

624a

Athenian: Who do you credit with establishing your laws, my friends? To a god or to some man? Clinias: To a god, Stranger. It is most rightly said to be a god. We Cretans call Zeus our lawgiver, while in Lacedaemon, where our friend here has his home, I believe they claim Apollo as theirs. Isn't that so, Megillus? Megillus: Yes. Athenian: Do you then say, as Homer does, that Minos used to go every ninth year to converse with his father Zeus, and that he was guided by Zeus's divine oracles in laying down the laws for your cities?

624b–625a

Clinias: That is what our people say. They also say that his brother Rhadamanthys was extremely just. No doubt you have heard the name. And we Cretans would certainly maintain that he won this title because of the righteous way he administered justice in those days.

625a–625b

Athenian: Yes, his fame is truly glorious and very fitting for a son of Zeus. You and our friend Megillus were both brought up under legal institutions of such a noble kind, so I imagine you would not dislike spending our time, as we go along, in discussing government and laws. Certainly, as I am told, the road from Knossos to the cave and temple of Zeus is a long one. In this stifling weather we are sure to find shady resting places among the tall trees along the road. In them we can rest often, as suits our age, passing the time with conversation, and so finish our journey in comfort.

625b–625c

Clinias: True, Stranger. And as one goes farther, one finds cypress trees of wonderful height and beauty in the groves. There are meadows too, where we may rest and talk.

625c

Athenian: You are right. Clinias: Yes, indeed. And when we see them, we will say so even more emphatically. So let's be going, and may good luck go with us. Athenian: So be it! And now tell me: for what reason did your law establish your common meals, your gymnastic schools and your military equipment? Clinias: Our Cretan customs, Stranger, are, I think, such as anyone can easily grasp. As you may notice, Crete as a whole is not a level country like Thessaly. So, whereas the Thessalians mostly go on horseback, we Cretans are runners, since this land of ours is rugged and better suited to the practice of running on foot. Under these conditions we have to keep light armor for running and avoid heavy equipment. So bows and arrows are adopted as suitable because they are light. Thus all these customs of ours are adapted for war. In my opinion, this was the object the lawgiver had in view when he established them all. This was probably also his reason for instituting common meals. He saw how soldiers, the whole time they are on campaign, are forced by circumstances to eat together for the sake of their own security. And in this, I think, he condemned the stupidity of most people in failing to see that all are constantly involved in a lifelong war against all States.

625e–626b

Clinias: Suppose these practices are necessary in war, namely, eating together for safety's sake and appointing relays of officers and privates to act as guards. If so, they must be carried out in the same way in time of peace. For, as he would say, peace in the common use of the term is nothing more than a name. The truth is that every State is, by a law of nature, perpetually engaged in an undeclared war with every other State. If you look at the matter from this point of view, you will find it practically true that our Cretan lawgiver established all our legal usages, both public and private, with an eye to war. You will also find that he therefore entrusted us with guarding our laws on that basis. He was convinced that without victory in war nothing else, whether possession or institution, is of the least value. All the goods of the conquered fall into the hands of the conquerors.

626b–626c

Athenian: Your training, Stranger, has certainly given you, as it seems to me, an excellent understanding of the legal practices of Crete. But tell me this still more clearly. By the definition you have given of the well-constituted State, you seem to me to imply that it ought to be organized so as to be victorious in war over all other States. Is that so?

626c

Clinias: It certainly is. And I think that our friend here shares my opinion. Megillus: No Lacedaemonian, my good sir, could possibly say otherwise. Athenian: If this, then, is the right attitude for one State to take toward another, is the right attitude for one village toward another village different? Clinias: Not at all. Athenian: It is the same, you say? Clinias: Yes. Athenian: Well then, is the same attitude also right for one household in the village toward another, and for each man toward every other? Clinias: It is.

626d

Athenian: And must each individual man regard himself as his own enemy? Or what do we say when we reach this point? Clinias: Athenian Stranger, I would not like to call you a man of Attica. I think you deserve rather to be named after the goddess Athena, because you have made the argument clearer by taking it back to its starting point. In this way you will more easily discover how right our recent statement was. In the mass, all men are enemies of all, both publicly and privately, and individually each man is also his own enemy.

626e

Athenian: What do you mean, my admirable friend? Clinias: It is in exactly this war, my friend, that victory over self is the first and best of all victories, while self-defeat is at once the worst and the most shameful of all defeats. For these phrases signify that a war against self exists within each of us. Athenian: Now let us take the argument back in the opposite direction. Each of us individually is partly superior to himself and partly inferior. Are we to affirm that the same condition exists in household, village and State, or are we to deny it?

627a

Clinias: Do you mean the condition of being partly superior to oneself and partly inferior to oneself? Athenian: Yes. Clinias: That, too, is a fair question. Such a condition most certainly does exist, and in States above all. Every State in which the better class is victorious over the masses and the lower classes would rightly be called superior to itself. It would most justly be praised for a victory of this kind. And the opposite holds when the opposite is the case.

627b–627c

Athenian: Well then, let us leave aside whether the worse element is ever superior to the better, which would require a longer discussion. As I now understand, you are asserting this. Sometimes citizens of one stock and one State who are unjust and numerous may combine and try to enslave by force those who are just but fewer in number. Wherever the unjust prevail, such a State would rightly be called inferior to itself and bad. But wherever they are defeated, it would rightly be called superior to itself and good.

627c

Clinias: This statement is very strange indeed, Stranger. Nevertheless, we cannot possibly reject it. Athenian: Wait a moment. Here too is a case we must consider further. Suppose there were a number of brothers, all sons of the same parents. It would not be at all surprising if most of them were unjust and only a few just. Clinias: It would not. Athenian: Moreover, it would hardly be fitting for you and me to go chasing after this way of speaking. On that usage, if the bad ones won, this whole family and household should be called inferior to itself, but superior to itself if they were defeated. Our present reference to the usage of ordinary speech is not concerned with whether verbal phrases are proper or improper. It is concerned with what is essentially right or wrong in laws.

627d

Clinias: Very true, Stranger. Megillus: And well said too, I agree, as far as it goes. Athenian: Let us also look at this point. The brothers we have just described would have a judge, I suppose? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Which of the two would be better? The first is a judge who destroyed all the wicked among them and told the good to govern themselves. The second is one who made the good members govern and, while allowing the bad to live, made them willingly submit to being governed.

627e–628a

Athenian: And there is a third judge we must mention, third and best in point of merit, if indeed such a judge can be found. In dealing with a single divided family, he will destroy none of them but reconcile them. By enacting laws for them, he will succeed in securing lasting friendship among them from then on.

628a

Clinias: A judge and lawgiver of that kind would be by far the best. Athenian: But notice this: his aim in the laws he enacted for them would be the opposite of war. Clinias: That is true. Athenian: And what about the one who brings the State into harmony? In ordering its life, would he look to external warfare rather than to internal war, whenever it occurs, which is called civil strife? Every man would wish that this war, if possible, would never occur in his own State. And if it did occur, he would wish it to come to an end as quickly as possible.

628b

Clinias: Clearly he would look to civil war. Athenian: Suppose internal peace had been secured by the destruction of one faction and the victory of its opponents, and the citizens then had to turn their attention to external enemies. Would anyone prefer this to their turning to external enemies after friendship and peace had been established by terms of reconciliation?

628c

Clinias: Everyone would prefer the second alternative to the first for his own State. Athenian: And wouldn't the lawgiver do the same? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Wouldn't every lawgiver aim at the highest good in all his legislation? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: The highest good, however, is neither war nor civil strife. We should rather pray to be saved from these things. The highest good is peace with one another and goodwill. Moreover, it would seem that the victory of a State over itself that we mentioned is not one of the best things but one of the necessary ones. Imagine a man supposing that a human body was best off when it was sick and purged with medicine, while never giving a thought to the body that needs no medicine at all! Similarly, consider the well-being of a State or an individual. A man who pays attention solely and primarily to the needs of foreign warfare will never become a true statesman. Nor will he become an accomplished lawgiver unless he designs his war legislation for the sake of peace, rather than his peace legislation for the sake of war.

628e

Clinias: This statement, Stranger, seems to be true. Yet, unless I am badly mistaken, our legal practices in Crete, and in Lacedaemon too, are wholly directed toward war. Athenian: Very possibly. But we must not attack them violently now. Instead we should question them gently, since both we and your legislators are seriously interested in these matters. Please follow the argument closely. Let us take the opinion of Tyrtaeus, an Athenian by birth who later became a citizen of Lacedaemon. He, above all men, was keenly interested in our subject. This is what he says: "Even if a man were the richest of men" (Tyrtaeus 12 Bergk), "even if a man owned plenty of good things" (and he lists nearly every good there is), "if he failed to prove himself at all times as brave as possible in war, I would neither mention him nor take any account of him at all." No doubt you have heard these poems too, while our friend Megillus, I imagine, has had more than his fill of them.

629b

Megillus: I certainly have. Clinias: And I can assure you they have reached Crete too, shipped over from Lacedaemon. Athenian: Come now, let us jointly question this poet in some such way as this: "Tyrtaeus, most inspired of poets! You certainly seem to us both wise and good, since you have praised excellently those who excel in war. On this matter the three of us, Megillus, Clinias of Knossos and I, already agree with you entirely, as we suppose. But we want to be sure that both we and you are referring to the same people. So tell us: do you clearly recognize, as we do, two distinct kinds of war?" I suppose that even a much less able man than Tyrtaeus would answer with the truth, that there are two kinds. One is what we all call civil war, which is the most bitter of all wars, as we said just now. The other kind, as I suppose we will all agree, is the one we engage in when we quarrel with foreigners and outsiders. It is a much milder kind than the first.

629d

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: "Come, then, which kind of warriors, fighting in which kind of war, did you praise so highly, while blaming others? Warriors, apparently, who fight in war abroad. At any rate, in your poems you have said that you cannot tolerate men 'who do not dare to face the bloody battle and strike the enemy in close combat' (Tyrtaeus)." Then we would go on to say, "It appears, Tyrtaeus, that you are chiefly praising those who win distinction in foreign and external warfare." To this, I presume, he would agree and say yes?

630a

Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Yet brave as these men are, we still maintain that they are far surpassed in bravery by those who are conspicuously brave in the greatest of wars. We too have a poet as a witness, Theognis, a citizen of Megara in Sicily. He says: "In the day of bitter conflict, Cyrnus, the loyal warrior is worth his weight in silver and gold" (Theognis 77–78, Bergk). Such a man, we say, in a far more terrible war, is very much better than the other. In fact, he is nearly as much better as the union of justice, prudence and wisdom with courage is better than courage all by itself. A man would never prove himself loyal and sound in civil war if he lacked goodness in its entirety. But in the war Tyrtaeus speaks of there are vast numbers of mercenaries ready to die fighting, feet firmly planted apart. Most of them, with very few exceptions, prove reckless, unjust, violent and foolish beyond almost anyone. What, then, is the conclusion our present discussion is heading toward, and what point is it trying to make clear by these statements? Plainly it is this. Both the heaven-taught legislator of Crete and every legislator who is worth his salt will certainly always legislate with an eye to the highest goodness and to that alone. And this, to quote Theognis, consists in loyalty in danger, and one might call it complete righteousness. But the goodness that Tyrtaeus especially praised is fine, and the poet glorified it fittingly. Nevertheless, it deserves to be placed no higher than fourth in order and value.

630d

Clinias: We are demoting our own lawgiver to a very low rank, Stranger! Athenian: No, my good sir, it is ourselves we are demoting, insofar as we imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down all the legal practices here and in Lacedaemon with a special view to war. Clinias: How, then, should we have stated the matter? Athenian: In the way that is, I think, true and proper when speaking of a divine hero. That is, we should state that he enacted laws with an eye to goodness as a whole. He was not looking to some single fraction of goodness, and that the most trivial. We should also state that he devised the laws themselves according to classes, though not the classes put forward by those who devise laws today.

630e–631b

Athenian: For today everyone brings forward and devises just the class he needs. One deals with inheritances and heiresses, another with cases of battery, and so on in endless variety. But what we assert is that the devising of laws, when done properly, follows the procedure we have now begun. Indeed, I greatly admire the way you opened your account of the laws. To start with goodness and say that this was the lawgiver's aim is the right way. But you went on to say that he legislated wholly with reference to a fraction of goodness, and the smallest fraction at that. In this you seemed to me to be mistaken, and that is the reason for all this latter part of what I have said. What, then, is the kind of account I would have liked to hear from you? Shall I tell you?

631b

Clinias: Yes, by all means. Athenian: This is what you ought to have said: Stranger, it is not for nothing that the laws of the Cretans are held in exceptionally high regard among all the Greeks. They are true laws, since they bring about the well-being of those who use them by supplying all good things. Now goods are of two kinds, human and divine, and the human goods depend on the divine. If a State receives the greater, it acquires the lesser as well; otherwise it is deprived of both. The lesser goods are those of which health ranks first and beauty second. The third is strength, in running and in all other bodily exercises. The fourth is wealth. This is no blind god Plutus but one keen of sight, provided he has wisdom for his companion. Wisdom, in turn, holds first place among the divine goods, and rational self-control of the soul comes second. From these two, when combined with courage, justice arises as the third, and the fourth is courage. Now all these are by nature ranked before the human goods, and the lawgiver too must truly rank them in that way. Next, it must be proclaimed to the citizens that all the other instructions they receive have these in view. It must also be proclaimed that, among these goods themselves, the human look to the divine, and the divine look to reason as their chief. The lawgiver must supervise the citizens with regard to their marriages and their subsequent having and rearing of children, male and female. He must do so both in their youth and later in life up to old age, properly assigning honor and dishonor;

631e–632d

Athenian: and in all their dealings with one another he must observe and watch their pains and pleasures and desires and all intense passions, and distribute praise and blame correctly by means of the laws themselves. There is also anger and fear, and all the disturbances that come upon souls through misfortune, and all the escapes from them that occur in good fortune. There are all the experiences that confront people through disease or war or poverty or their opposites. In all these matters, definite instruction must be given as to what is the right and what is the wrong disposition in each case. Next, the lawgiver must keep watch on the ways the citizens gain and spend money. He must supervise the associations they form with one another and the dissolutions of these associations, whether voluntary or under compulsion. He must observe the manner in which they conduct each of these mutual transactions and note where justice is present and where it is lacking. To those who obey he must assign honors by law, but on the disobedient he must impose the duly appointed penalties. Then finally, when he reaches the completion of the whole constitution, he must consider how the burial of the dead should be carried out in each case and what honors should be assigned to them. Once this is settled, the framer of the laws will hand over all his statutes to the care of Wardens. Some will be guided by wisdom, others by true opinion. Reason, having bound everything into one single system, may then declare that they all serve self-control and justice, not wealth or ambition. Strangers, this is how I would have wished, and still wish, that you had fully explained how all these regulations are inherent in the reputed laws of Zeus and in those of Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus established, and how their systematic arrangement is quite evident to anyone expert in law, whether through art or practice, although it is not at all obvious to the rest of us.

632d

Clinias: Then what, Stranger, should be the next step in our argument? Athenian: I think we ought to do as we did at first and start from the beginning. We should first explain the institutions that have to do with courage. After that, if you wish, we will deal with a second and a third form of goodness. As soon as we have finished treating the first theme, we will take it as our model. By discussing the rest along similar lines, we will make the road pass pleasantly. At the end of our treatment of goodness in all its forms, we will make it clear, God willing, that the rules we discussed just now had goodness as their aim.

633a

Megillus: A good suggestion! And begin with our friend here, the eulogist of Zeus. Try to put him to the test first. Athenian: I will try, and I will test you and myself too, for the argument concerns all of us alike. So tell me: do we assert that the common meals and the gymnasia were devised by the lawgiver with a view to war? Megillus: Yes. Athenian: And is there a third institution of the kind, and a fourth? Probably one ought to use this method of enumeration also in dealing with the subdivisions, or whatever we ought to call them, of the other forms of goodness, provided only that one makes one's meaning clear.

633b

Megillus: The third thing he devised was hunting. That is what I and every Lacedaemonian would say. Athenian: Let us also try to state what comes fourth, and fifth too, if possible. Megillus: I may also try to state the fourth. It is the training in hardy endurance of pain that is widespread among us. This training uses hand-to-hand fights and robberies carried out each time at the risk of a sound beating. Moreover, the so-called Crypteia provides a wonderfully severe training in hardihood. The men go barefoot in winter, sleep without bedding and have no attendants. They wait on themselves and roam through the whole countryside by night and by day. In our games, too, we have severe tests of endurance, when men without clothing battle against the force of the heat. And there are other examples so numerous that listing them would be almost endless.

633c–633d

Athenian: Splendid, Stranger from Lacedaemon! But come now, how shall we define courage? Shall we define it quite simply as a battle against fears and pains only? Or is it also a battle against desires and pleasures, with their dangerous enticements and flatteries? These melt people's hearts like wax, even the hearts of those who think themselves most highly respected.

633d

Megillus: I think the second definition is the right one: courage is a battle against them all. Athenian: Earlier in our discussion, if I am not mistaken, Clinias here used the expression "inferior to itself" of a State or an individual. Didn't you, Stranger from Knossos? Clinias: Most certainly.

633e

Athenian: As things stand now, do we apply the term "bad" to the man who is inferior to pains, or also to the man who is inferior to pleasures? Clinias: In my opinion, more to the man who is inferior to pleasures than to the other. Indeed, all of us, when we speak of a man as shamefully inferior to himself, mean one who is mastered by pleasures rather than one who is mastered by pains.

634a

Athenian: Then surely the lawgiver of Zeus and the lawgiver of Apollo did not enact by law a lame kind of courage, able to defend itself only on the left and unable to resist charms and allurements on the right? Didn't they enact one able to resist on both sides? Clinias: On both sides, I would maintain. Athenian: Then let us mention once more the State institutions in both your countries that give men a taste of pleasures instead of shunning them. They did not shun pains, but plunged their citizens into the midst of them. In this way they compelled them, or induced them by rewards, to master them. Where, please tell me, is the same policy adopted toward pleasures in your laws? Let us declare what regulation of yours makes the same men courageous toward pains and pleasures alike. They should conquer where they ought to conquer and in no way be defeated by their nearest and most dangerous enemies.

634b–634c

Megillus: I was able, Stranger, to mention a number of laws that dealt with mastery over pains. But in the case of pleasures I may not find it as easy to produce important and conspicuous examples. I might perhaps supply some minor instances, though.

634c

Clinias: Nor could I, in the same way, give clear examples from the Cretan laws. Athenian: And no wonder, my most excellent friends. In his desire to discover what is true and best, any one of us might find fault with some law in another's homeland. If so, let us take one another's remarks in good part and without resentment.

634d

Clinias: You are right, Stranger. That is what we must do. Athenian: Yes, Clinias, for resentment would ill suit men of our age. Clinias: It would indeed. Athenian: Whether people are right or wrong in their criticisms of the Laconian and the Cretan constitutions is another story. In any case, I am probably in a better position than either of you to state what most people actually say. In your case, your laws are wisely framed, so one of the best of your laws will be this. None of the young shall inquire which laws are wrong and which are right. All shall declare in unison, with one mouth and one voice, that all are rightly established by divine enactment. They shall refuse to listen to anyone who says otherwise. Further, if any old man has any criticism to make of any of your laws, he must not voice such views in the presence of any young man. He must voice them before a magistrate or someone his own age.

634e–635a

Clinias: A very sound observation, Stranger. You are far away from the original lawgiver's intention, yet just like a diviner you have fairly hit upon it, I think, and described it with perfect truth.

635a

Athenian: Well, there are no young people with us now. So the lawgiver may permit us, old as we are, to discuss these matters privately among ourselves without offense. Clinias: That is so. So do not hesitate to criticize our laws. There is nothing discreditable in being told of some flaw. Rather, it is exactly this that leads to a remedy, if the criticism is accepted not resentfully but in a friendly spirit.

635b–635e

Athenian: Good! But until I have examined your laws as carefully as I can, I will not criticize them. I will rather express the doubts I feel. As far as I can discover, you alone of Greeks and barbarians have a lawgiver who commanded you to abstain from the greatest pleasures and amusements and not taste them. But about pains and fears, as we said before, he held a different view. Suppose someone continually shuns them from childhood onward and is then confronted with unavoidable hardships and fears and pains. Such a person will be put to flight by the men who are trained in these things and will become their slave. Now I presume this same lawgiver should have held the same view about pleasures as well. He should have argued with himself as follows. If our citizens grow up from their youth unpracticed in the greatest pleasures, they will find themselves among pleasures without having been trained to resist them. They will not have learned to refuse to commit any disgraceful act because of the natural attraction of pleasures. Then they must suffer the same fate as those who are defeated by fears. In another and still more shameful way, they will be enslaved by those who are able to hold out amid pleasures. They will also be enslaved by those who are expert in the art of pleasure, people who are sometimes thoroughly wicked. Thus their souls will be partly enslaved and partly free. They will not deserve to be called, without qualification, free men and men of courage. Consider, then, whether you approve these remarks of mine at all.

635e

Clinias: On the face of it, we are inclined to approve. But to give quick and easy belief in matters of such importance would, I fear, be rash and thoughtless. Athenian: Well then, Clinias, and you, Stranger from Lacedaemon, suppose we discuss the second of the subjects we proposed and take self-control next after courage. Will we discover any point in which these constitutions are superior to those framed at random, as we found just now with regard to their military organization?

636a

Megillus: That is hardly an easy matter! Still, the common meals and the gymnasia are probably well devised to foster both these virtues. Athenian: In truth, Strangers, it seems difficult for State institutions to be equally beyond criticism both in theory and in practice. Their case resembles that of the human body. There it seems impossible to prescribe any given treatment for each case without finding that this same prescription is partly beneficial and partly harmful to the body. Take these common meals, for example, and these gymnasia. At present they benefit the States in many other respects, yet in the event of civil strife they prove dangerous, as the case of the youth of Miletus, Boeotia and Thurii shows. Moreover, this institution, when long established, is thought to have corrupted the pleasures of love, which are natural not only to men but also to beasts. Your States are held primarily responsible for this, and along with them all others that especially encourage the use of gymnasia. Whether one makes the observation in earnest or in jest, one certainly should not fail to observe this. When male unites with female for procreation, the pleasure experienced is held to be due to nature. But it is held to be contrary to nature when male mates with male or female with female. And those first guilty of such outrages were driven by their slavery to pleasure. And we all accuse the Cretans of inventing the story about Ganymede. Because it was believed that their laws came from Zeus, they added this story about Zeus. In this way they could be following his example in enjoying this pleasure as well. Now we have no further concern with the story itself. But when people are investigating laws, their investigation deals almost entirely with pleasures and pains, whether in States or in individuals. These are the two fountains that gush out at nature's impulse. Whoever draws from them the right supply at the right place and time is blessed, whether a State or an individual or any kind of creature. But whoever does so without understanding and at the wrong time will fare the opposite way.

636e–637b

Megillus: What you say, Stranger, is excellent, I suppose. Nevertheless, I am at a loss to know what reply I should make to it. Still, in my opinion, the Lacedaemonian lawgiver was right in prescribing the avoidance of pleasures. As to the laws of Knossos, our friend Clinias will defend them if he sees fit. The rules about pleasures at Sparta seem to me the best in the world. Our law banished entirely from the land the institution that gives people the most occasion to fall into excessive pleasures, riotous behavior and follies of every kind. Neither in the countryside nor in the cities controlled by Spartiates is a drinking club to be seen. Nor will you see any of the practices that belong to such clubs and foster every kind of pleasure to the utmost. Indeed, there is not a man who would not at once and most severely punish any drunken reveler he happened to meet. Not even the festival of Dionysus would serve as an excuse to save him. I once witnessed such a revel on the wagons in your country, and at our colony of Tarentum, too, I saw the whole city drunk at the Dionysia. But with us nothing of the kind is possible.

637b–637e

Athenian: Stranger from Lacedaemon, all such practices are praiseworthy where there is a strain of firm moral fiber, but where this is relaxed they are quite stupid. An Athenian in self-defense might at once retaliate by pointing to the looseness of the women in your country. Whether such practices are in Tarentum, Athens or Sparta, there is one answer that is thought to vindicate their propriety. A stranger may be surprised at seeing some unfamiliar practice in a State. The universal answer to him is this: "Do not be surprised, Stranger. This is our custom. With you, perhaps, the custom in these matters is different." But, my dear sirs, our argument now is not concerned with the rest of mankind but with the goodness or badness of the lawgivers themselves. So let us deal more fully with the subject of drunkenness in general. It is a practice of no small importance, and it takes no ordinary legislator to understand it. I am not now referring to the drinking or not drinking of wine in general, but to drunkenness pure and simple. The question is whether we ought to deal with it as the Scythians and Persians do, and the Carthaginians too, and the Celts, Iberians and Thracians, who are all warlike races. Or ought we to deal with it as you Spartans do? For you, as you say, abstain from it altogether. But the Scythians and Thracians, both men and women, drink their wine unmixed and let it pour down over their clothes. They regard this practice of theirs as noble and splendid. And the Persians indulge greatly in these and other luxurious habits that you reject, although in a more orderly fashion than the others.

638a

Megillus: But we, my good sir, put all these people to rout when we take up arms. Athenian: Don't say that, my dear sir. In fact, there have been many flights and pursuits in the past that are beyond explaining, and there will be many in the future. So victory or defeat in battle could never be called a decisive test of whether an institution is good or bad, but rather a questionable one. Larger States, for example, are victorious in battle over smaller States. We find the Syracusans subjugating the Locrians, who are reputed to have been the best-governed of the peoples in that part of the world. We find the Athenians subjugating the Ceans, and we could find countless other instances of the same kind. So let us leave victories and defeats out of account for the present. Let us discuss each institution individually on its own merits, trying to convince ourselves, and explain in what way one kind is good and another bad. And to begin with, listen to my account of the right method of inquiring into the merits and faults of institutions.

638c

Megillus: What is your account of it? Athenian: In my opinion, all who take up an institution for discussion and propose, at its first mention, to criticize or praise it are proceeding in quite the wrong way. They act like a man who hears somebody praising wheat as a good food and at once starts to disparage it. He has not learned either its effects or its mode of administration. He does not know in what form it should be administered, by whom and with what accompaniments, and in what condition and to people in what condition. This, it seems to me, is exactly what we are now doing in our discussion. At the first mention of the mere name of drunkenness, some of us immediately start blaming it and others praising it, which is most absurd. Each side relies on the support of witnesses. One side claims that its statement is convincing because of the large number of witnesses produced. The other side does so on the ground that those who abstain from wine are seen to be victorious in battle. And then this point also gives rise to a dispute. Now it would not be at all to my taste to go through all the rest of the legal arrangements in this way. About our present subject, drunkenness, I want to speak in quite another way, which in my opinion is the right way. I will try, if possible, to show the correct method for dealing with all such subjects. Indeed, thousands upon thousands of nations would attack and dispute the view of them adopted by your two States.

638e–639a

Megillus: Certainly, if we know of a right method of investigating these matters, we are bound to give it a ready hearing.

639a

Athenian: Let us adopt some such method as this. Suppose a man were to praise the rearing of goats, and the goat itself as a fine thing to own. Suppose also that another man had seen goats grazing without a herdsman and doing damage on cultivated land. He then runs them down and finds fault in the same way with every animal he saw that had no master or a bad master. Would such a man's criticism, about any object whatever, be of the slightest value? Megillus: Certainly not.

639b

Athenian: Do we call the man who possesses only nautical science, whether or not he suffers from seasickness, a good commander on a ship? Or what do we say? Megillus: By no means good, if along with his skill he suffers in the way you say. Athenian: And what about the army commander? Is a man fit for command provided he has military science, even though he is a coward and grows seasick with a kind of drunken terror when danger comes? Megillus: Certainly not. Athenian: And suppose he has no military skill, besides being a coward? Megillus: You are describing an utterly worthless fellow, not a commander of men at all, but of the most cowardly women.

639c

Athenian: Now take the case of any social institution whatever that naturally has a commander and is beneficial under its commander. Suppose someone who had never seen the institution conducted under its commander were to praise it or criticize it. He has seen it only when it had no commander or bad commanders. Do we imagine that either the praise or the blame of such an observer of such an institution is of any value? Megillus: Certainly not, when the man has never seen or shared in an institution of the kind that was properly conducted.

639d

Athenian: Now wait a moment! Shall we lay it down that, among the many kinds of social institutions, that of banqueters and banquets forms one? Megillus: Most certainly. Athenian: Now has anyone ever yet seen this institution rightly conducted? Both of you can easily answer, "Never at all," for with you this institution is neither customary nor legal. But I have come across many modes of banqueting in many places, and I have also inquired into nearly all of them. I have scarcely seen or heard of a single one that was rightly conducted in every respect. If any were right at all, it was only in a few details. Most of them were almost entirely on the wrong lines.

639e–640a

Clinias: What do you mean by that, Stranger? Explain yourself more clearly. As you observed, we have no experience of such institutions. So even if we did come across them, we would probably fail to see at once what was right in them and what was wrong.

640a

Athenian: That is very likely. Try, however, to learn from my description. You understand this: in all gatherings and associations for any purpose whatever, it is right for each group always to have a commander. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Moreover, we said recently that the commander of fighting men must be courageous. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: The courageous man is less disturbed by alarms than the coward.

640b

Clinias: That is true, too. Athenian: Now suppose there had been any means of putting an army in the charge of a general who was absolutely impervious to fear or disturbance. Wouldn't we have made every effort to do so? Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: But what we are discussing now is not the man who is to command an army in wartime, when enemy meets enemy. It is the man who is to command friends in friendly association with friends in peacetime. Clinias: Quite so.

640c

Athenian: Such a gathering, if it is accompanied by drunkenness, is not free from disturbance, is it? Clinias: Certainly not. Quite the opposite, I imagine. Athenian: So those people also need a commander, in the first place? Clinias: Undoubtedly, and they above all. Athenian: Should we, if possible, provide them with a commander who cannot be disturbed? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Naturally, he should also be wise about social gatherings. He has to preserve the friendliness that already exists among the company, and to see that the present gathering promotes it still further.

640d

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Then the commander we set over drunken men should be sober and wise, rather than the opposite? A commander of drunkards who was himself drunk, young and foolish would be very lucky if he escaped doing some serious harm. Clinias: Extraordinarily lucky. Athenian: Suppose, then, that a man were to find fault with such institutions in States where they are managed in the best possible way. If he objected to the institution in itself, he might perhaps be right in doing so. But a man may abuse an institution when he sees it managed in the worst possible way. Then it is plain that he is ignorant of two things. First, he does not know that it is badly conducted. Second, he does not know that every institution will appear similarly bad when it is carried on without a sober ruler and commander.

640e–641a

Athenian: For surely you see that a sea captain, or any commander of anything, upsets everything if he is drunk. This is true whether it is a ship or a chariot or an army or anything else that is under his command.

641a–641b

Clinias: What you say, Stranger, is perfectly true. Next, then, tell us this. Suppose this institution of drinking were rightly conducted: what possible benefit would it be to us? Take the case of an army, which we mentioned just now. There, given a right leader, his men will win victory in war, which is no small benefit, and the same is true with the other cases. But what solid advantage would come either to individuals or to a State from the right regulation of a drinking party?

641b–641c

Athenian: Well, what great gain would we say comes to the State from the right control of one single child, or even of one band of children? If the question were put to us that way, we would reply that the State would benefit little from one. But perhaps you are asking a general question: what solid advantage does the State gain from the education of the educated? Then it is quite simple to reply. Well-educated men will turn out to be good men, and being good, they will conquer their enemies in battle, besides acting nobly in other ways. So while education also brings victory, victory sometimes brings a lack of education. Men have often grown more insolent because of victory in war, and through their insolence they have become filled with countless other vices. Education has never yet proved to be Cadmean, but the victories that men win in war often have been Cadmean, and will be.

641c–641d

Clinias: You seem to us, my friend, to be implying that the convivial gathering, when rightly conducted, is an important element in education.

641d

Athenian: Certainly. Clinias: Could you then show us next how this statement is true? Athenian: Many dispute my statement, and it is for God to assert its truth. But I am quite ready to give my own opinion if it is wanted, now that we have in fact embarked on a discussion of laws and constitutions. Clinias: Well, it is exactly your opinion about the questions now in dispute that we are trying to learn.

641e

Athenian: Then this is what we must do. You must brace yourselves in the effort to learn the argument, and I must brace myself to explain it as best I can. But first of all I have a preliminary remark to make. In the general opinion of the Greeks, our city, Athens, is both fond of talk and full of talk. But Lacedaemon is sparing of talk, while Crete is more witty than wordy;

642a–642b

Athenian: so I am afraid you will think I am a great talker about a small matter. I would be spinning out a discussion of enormous length about the small matter of drunkenness. But the fact is that its right ordering could never be treated adequately and clearly in our discussion apart from correctness in music. Nor could music be treated apart from education as a whole, and these require lengthy discussions. Consider, then, what we should do. Suppose we leave these matters aside for the present and take up some other legal topic instead.

642b–642d

Megillus: Athenian Stranger, you are perhaps not aware that our family is in fact a proxenus of your State. Probably all children feel this way once they have been told that they are proxeni of a certain State. They conceive an affection for that State from infancy, and each of them regards it as a second motherland, next after his own country. That is exactly the feeling I now have. I used to hear mere children cry out whenever they, as Lacedaemonians, were blaming or praising the Athenians for anything. They would say, "Your State, Megillus, has done us a bad turn," or "a good one." Through hearing such remarks, and by constantly fighting your battles against those who were disparaging your State in this way, I acquired a deep affection for it. So now I not only delight in your accent, but regard as absolutely true the common saying that good Athenians are always incomparably good. For they alone are good not by outward compulsion but by their inner disposition, freely, by divine dispensation, truly and not artificially. So as far as I am concerned, you may speak without fear and say all you please.

642d–642e

Clinias: My story too, Stranger, when you hear it, will show you that you may boldly say all you wish. You have probably heard of that inspired man Epimenides, who was born in Crete and was related to our family. Ten years before the Persian War, in obedience to the god's oracle, he went to Athens and offered certain sacrifices that the god had prescribed. Moreover, when the Athenians were alarmed at the Persians' expeditionary force, he made this prophecy: "They will not come for ten years. And when they do come, they will go back again with all their hopes frustrated, after suffering more harm than they inflict."

642e–643a

Clinias: At that time our ancestors became guest-friends of yours. Ever since then, both my parents and I myself have cherished an affection for Athens.

643a

Athenian: Evidently, then, you are both ready to play your part as listeners. As for my part, the will is there, though accomplishing the task is hard. Still, I must try. First, then, our argument requires us to define education and describe its effects. That is the path our present discussion must follow until it finally arrives at the god of wine. Clinias: By all means let us do so, since that is your wish.

643b

Athenian: Then while I am stating how education ought to be defined, you must consider whether you are satisfied with my statement. Clinias: Go on with your statement. Athenian: I will. I assert that every man who is going to be good at any pursuit must practice that particular pursuit from infancy. He must use all its implements both in his play and in his work. For example, a man who is to become a good builder must play at building toy houses. To become a good farmer, he must play at tilling the soil. Those who are rearing them must provide each child with toy tools modeled on real ones. Besides this, they ought to receive elementary instruction in all the necessary subjects. The carpenter, for instance, should be taught in play to use the rule and measure, and the soldier taught riding or some similar skill. So by means of their games we should try to turn the tastes and desires of the children toward the object that forms their ultimate goal. First and foremost, we say, education consists in right nurture. It most strongly draws the child's soul, while he is at play, to a love of the pursuit that he must master perfectly when he becomes a man. Now consider, as I said before, whether you are satisfied with this statement of mine up to this point.

643d

Clinias: Certainly we are. Athenian: But we must not leave our description of education vague. At present, when criticizing or praising someone's upbringing, we describe one man as educated and another as uneducated. Yet the latter may often be exceptionally well educated in the trade of a peddler or a ship's captain, or some other similar occupation. But naturally, in our present discussion, we are not taking the view that things like these make up education. The education we mean is training from childhood in goodness. It makes a man eagerly desire to become a perfect citizen who understands how both to rule and to be ruled justly.

643e–644b

Athenian: This is the special form of nurture to which, I suppose, our present argument would limit the term "education." An upbringing may aim only at making money or physical strength, or even at some mental accomplishment lacking reason and justice. Our argument would call such an upbringing vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name education. Let us not, however, quarrel over a name. Let us hold to the statement we agreed on just now: those who are rightly educated generally become good. One should never disparage education, since it stands first among the finest gifts given to the best men. And if it ever strays from the right path but can be set straight again, every man must devote himself to this task with all his might as long as he lives.

644b

Clinias: You are right, and we agree with what you say. Athenian: Further, we agreed long ago that if men are capable of ruling themselves, they are good, but if they are incapable, they are bad. Clinias: Quite true. Athenian: Then let us restate more clearly what we meant by this. With your permission, I will use an illustration in the hope of explaining the matter.

644c

Clinias: Go ahead. Athenian: May we assume that each of us by himself is a single unit? Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And that each has within himself two opposing and foolish counselors, whom we call pleasure and pain? Clinias: That is so. Athenian: And that, besides these two, each man has opinions about the future, which go by the general name of expectations? The expectation that comes before pain has the special name of fear, and the one that comes before pleasure has the special name of confidence. And in addition to all these there is calculation, which judges which of them is good and which bad. Calculation, when it has become the public decree of the State, is called law.

644d

Clinias: I have some difficulty keeping up with you. Assume, however, that I am keeping up, and go on. Megillus: I am in exactly the same situation. Athenian: Let us think of the matter in this way. Let us suppose that each of us living creatures is an ingenious puppet of the gods. Perhaps it was made as a toy of theirs, or perhaps for some serious purpose. We know nothing about that. But this we do know: these inner feelings of ours, like sinews or cords, drag us along. Being opposed to one another, they pull against each other toward opposite actions. Here lies the dividing line between goodness and badness.

644e–645c

Athenian: For, as our argument declares, there is one of these pulling forces that every man should always follow and never let go of. By following it he counteracts the pull of the other sinews. It is the golden and holy leading string of calculation, which is called the public law of the State. The other cords are hard and steely and of every possible shape and appearance. But this one is flexible and uniform, since it is made of gold. We must always cooperate with that most excellent leading string of the law. For calculation is excellent, but gentle rather than forceful, so its leading string needs helpers. They ensure that the golden kind within us may conquer the other kinds. In this way our story comparing ourselves to puppets will not fall flat. The meaning of the terms "superior to oneself" and "inferior to oneself" will become somewhat clearer. It will also become clearer how necessary it is for the individual man to grasp the true account of these inner pulling forces and to live in accordance with it. And it will become clearer how necessary it is for the State to receive such an account from a god or from a man who knows. It must make this into a law for itself and be guided by it in its dealings both with itself and with all other States. Thus both badness and goodness would be distinguished more clearly for us. Once these have become more evident, education and the other institutions will probably also appear less obscure. And it may very likely be shown that the institution of the drinking party in particular is by no means a trivial matter, as might be thought. It is not absurd to discuss it at great length; rather, it fully deserves prolonged discussion.

645c–645d

Clinias: Quite right. Let us go through every topic that seems important for the present discussion.

645d

Athenian: Now tell me: if we give strong drink to this puppet of ours, what effect will it have on its character? Clinias: With reference to what particular are you asking this question? Athenian: To no particular, for the moment. I am putting the question in general terms: when this shares in that, what sort of thing does it become as a result? I will try to convey my meaning still more clearly. What I am asking is this: does drinking wine intensify pleasures and pains and passions and lusts? Clinias: Yes, greatly.

645e

Athenian: And what about sensations and memories and opinions and thoughts? Does it make them more intense in the same way? Or rather, don't these desert a man entirely if he becomes glutted with drink? Clinias: Yes, they desert him entirely. Athenian: He then arrives at the same condition of soul as when he was a young child? Clinias: He does. Athenian: So at that moment he will have very little control of himself?

646a

Clinias: Very little. Athenian: And such a man, we say, is very bad? Clinias: Very bad indeed. Athenian: It appears, then, that the graybeard is not the only one who may be in his second childhood; the drunkard may be too. Clinias: An admirable observation, Stranger. Athenian: Is there any argument that will undertake to persuade us that this is a practice we ought to indulge in? Should we not rather avoid it with all our might as far as we possibly can? Clinias: It appears there is. At any rate, you assert this, and you were ready just now to argue it.

646b

Athenian: You are right to remind me, and I am still ready to do so, now that you and Megillus have both said you are willing to listen to me. Clinias: Of course we will listen, if only because of the surprising paradox that a man ought to plunge into the depths of depravity of his own free will. Athenian: Depravity of soul, you mean, don't you? Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And what about plunging into a bad state of body, such as leanness or ugliness or feebleness? Would we be surprised if a man ever got into such a state of his own free will?

646c

Clinias: Of course we would. Athenian: Well then, consider people who go of their own accord to dispensaries to drink medicines. Do we suppose they are not aware of what will follow? Soon afterward, and for many days to come, they will find themselves in a bodily condition that would make life intolerable if it were to last forever. And we know, don't we, that men who go to the gymnasia for hard training start by becoming weaker? Clinias: We know all this. Athenian: We also know that they go there voluntarily for the sake of the later benefit?

646d

Clinias: Quite true. Athenian: Shouldn't one take the same view of the other institutions also? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Then one must also take the same view of the practice of wine drinking, if one can rightly class it among the others. Clinias: Of course one must. Athenian: Suppose, then, that this practice should prove to be quite as beneficial to us as bodily training. It is certainly superior to it at the outset, since it is not accompanied by pain, as bodily training is.

646e

Clinias: That is true. But I would be surprised if we succeeded in discovering any benefit in it. Athenian: That is exactly the point we must at once try to make plain. Now tell me: can we distinguish two kinds of fear, one of which is nearly the opposite of the other? Clinias: What kinds do you mean? Athenian: These: when we expect evils to happen, we fear them. Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And we often fear for our reputation, when we think we will get a bad name for doing or saying something base. This fear we call shame, as I imagine everyone else does.

647a

Clinias: Of course. Athenian: These are the two fears I meant. The second of these is opposed to pains and to all other objects of fear, and it is also opposed to the greatest and most numerous pleasures. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Doesn't the lawgiver, then, and every man who is worth anything, hold this kind of fear in the highest honor and call it modesty? And doesn't he give the name immodesty to the confidence that is opposed to it? Doesn't he declare it to be a very great evil for everyone, both publicly and privately?

647b

Clinias: Quite right. Athenian: This fear saves us in many other important respects. Doesn't it also do more than anything else to secure for us victory in war and safety? For victory is in fact secured by two things. One is confidence toward enemies. The other is fear of the shame of cowardice in the eyes of friends. Clinias: That is so. Athenian: So each of us ought to become both fearless and fearful, for the different reasons we have now explained.

647c

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Moreover, we may want to make a person fearless with respect to a number of fears. Then we make him so by drawing him into fear with the help of the law. Clinias: Apparently. Athenian: And what about the opposite case, when we try, with the aid of justice, to make a man fearful? Isn't it by pitting him against shamelessness and exercising him against it that we must make him victorious in the fight against his own pleasures? Or shall we say something different? In the case of courage, a man can become perfect only by fighting and conquering his innate cowardice. No one who is inexperienced and unpracticed in contests of this sort can attain even half the excellence of which he is capable. Are we to say that self-control is different? Might a man attain perfection in it without a stubborn fight against hordes of pleasures and lusts that entice him toward shamelessness and wrongdoing? Might he do so without conquering them by the aid of speech and action and skill, both in play and in earnest? Might he, in fact, attain it without going through any of these experiences?

647d–647e

Clinias: It would not be reasonable to suppose so.

647e

Athenian: Well then: Athenian: In the case of fear, is there any remedy, given by God to men, that works like this? The more a man chooses to drink of it, the more he imagines himself plunged into misfortune with every drink. He fears everything present and future. Finally, even if he is the bravest of men, he reaches a state of utter terror. But once he has slept it off and is rid of the potion, he always becomes his normal self again.

648a

Clinias: What potion of that kind, Stranger, can we say exists anywhere among men? Athenian: There is none. But supposing there had been one, would it have been of any use to the lawgiver for promoting courage? For instance, we might well have spoken to him about it in this way: "Come now, lawgiver, whether you are legislating for Cretans or for anyone else. Wouldn't your first wish be to have a test of courage and of cowardice that you could apply to your citizens?"

648b

Clinias: Obviously every one of them would say yes. Athenian: "And would you want a test that was safe and free from serious risks, or the opposite?" Clinias: All will also agree that the test must be safe. Athenian: "And would you use the test by bringing men into these fears and testing them while they were in that state? Would you do this so as to compel them to become fearless, using exhortations, warnings and rewards? Would you use disgrace for all who refused to conform entirely to the character you prescribed? Would you let everyone who had trained himself bravely and well go free without penalty, but impose a penalty on everyone who had trained badly? Or would you refuse to use the potion as a test at all, even though you have no objection to it on other grounds?"

648c

Clinias: Of course he would use it, Stranger. Athenian: At any rate, my friend, the training involved would be wonderfully simple compared with our present methods. This would be true whether it were applied to individuals singly, to small groups or to groups of any size. A man might be moved by a sense of shame and be reluctant to show himself in public before he was in the best condition. Suppose such a man should remain alone by himself while undergoing this training against fears. He would rely on the potion alone as his solitary equipment instead of endless exercises. He would be acting quite rightly. Another man might trust that he is already well equipped by nature and practice. He might not hesitate to train in company with a number of drinking companions. He would show off how, in speed and strength, he is superior to the potency of the drinks he is obliged to take. As a result, because of his excellence he would neither commit any serious impropriety nor lose his head. He would leave the company before they came to the last round, fearing the defeat that the wine cup inflicts on all men. He would be acting quite rightly too.

648e–649a

Clinias: Yes, Stranger, this man too would be acting with self-control.

649a

Athenian: Let us address the lawgiver once more and say: "Very well, lawgiver. For producing fear, apparently no such drug has been given to men by God, nor have we devised one ourselves. I do not count quacks as part of our company. But does a potion exist for inducing fearlessness and excessive and untimely confidence? Or what shall we say about this?" Clinias: Presumably he will say that there is one, naming wine. Athenian: And isn't this exactly the opposite of the potion described just now? First, it makes the person who drinks it more cheerful than he was before. The more he drinks of it, the more he becomes filled with high hopes and a sense of power. Finally, puffed up with conceit, he abounds in every kind of license of speech and action and every kind of audacity. He has no scruple about what he says or what he does. Everyone, I imagine, would agree that this is so.

649b

Clinias: Undoubtedly. Athenian: Let us recall our earlier statement that we must cultivate two things in our souls. One is the greatest possible confidence, and the other is its opposite, the greatest possible fear.

649c

Clinias: Which you called, I think, the marks of modesty. Athenian: Your memory serves you well. Courage and fearlessness ought to be practiced amid fears. So we have to consider whether the opposite quality ought to be cultivated amid conditions of the opposite kind. Clinias: That certainly seems likely. Athenian: It appears, then, that we ought to be placed in conditions that naturally tend to make us exceptionally confident and audacious. This applies when we are practicing how to be as free as possible from shamelessness and excessive audacity. In these conditions we should be fearful of ever daring to say or suffer or do anything shameful.

649d

Clinias: So it appears. Athenian: And aren't these the conditions in which we have the character described: anger, lust, insolence, ignorance, covetousness and extravagance? Aren't these conditions too: wealth, beauty, strength, and everything that intoxicates a man with pleasure and turns his head? Our first purpose is to provide a cheap and comparatively harmless test of these conditions, and our second is to give practice in them. For these purposes, what more suitable pleasure can we mention than wine, with its playful testing, provided that it is used with any care at all?

649e–650b

Athenian: For consider the case of a man whose disposition is sullen and savage, the source of countless wrongs. Isn't it more dangerous to test him by entering into money dealings with him at one's own personal risk? Wouldn't it be safer to associate with him with the help of Dionysus and his festive insight? And when a man is a slave to sexual pleasures, isn't it a more dangerous test to entrust to him one's own daughters and sons and wife? Doing so endangers one's own nearest and dearest in order to discover the disposition of his soul. In fact, one might cite countless instances in a vain effort to show fully how superior this playful method of examination is. It has neither serious consequences nor costly damage. Indeed, as far as that is concerned, I imagine that neither the Cretans nor any other people would dispute this. Here we have a fair test of one man by another, and for cheapness, safety and speed it is superior to all other tests.

650b

Clinias: That certainly is true. Athenian: Discovering the natures and conditions of people's souls, then, will prove one of the most useful things for the art whose task it is to treat them. That art is, as I presume we say, the art of politics. Isn't that so? Clinias: Undoubtedly.

652a–652b

Athenian: Next, it seems, we should look into this question about our subject: Is discovering people's natural dispositions the only benefit to be gained from the right use of wine-parties, or do they also bring benefits so great that they deserve serious consideration? What do we say about this? Our argument evidently tends to indicate that they do bring such benefits. So let us now hear how and in what way they do, and let us listen attentively, so that we are not somehow led astray by the argument.

652b

Clinias: Go on, then. Athenian: I want us to recall once again our definition of right education. For its safekeeping depends, as I now conjecture, on the correct establishment of the institution we have mentioned.

653a

Clinias: That is a strong claim! Athenian: What I claim is this. In children, the first childish sensations are pleasure and pain, and it is in these first that goodness and badness come to the soul. As for wisdom and settled true opinions, a man is lucky if they come to him even in old age; and whoever possesses these blessings, and everything they include, is indeed a complete man. So I call the goodness that first comes to children education. Pleasure and love, and pain and hatred, may arise rightly in the souls of those who cannot yet grasp a rational account. Then, after they grasp the rational account, they may agree with it that they have been rightly trained in fitting habits. This agreement, taken as a whole, is goodness. But one part of it is rightly trained with respect to pleasures and pains, so as to hate what ought to be hated, right from the beginning to the very end, and to love what ought to be loved. If you were to mark off this part in your definition and call it education, you would, in my opinion, be giving it its right name.

653c

Clinias: You are quite right, Stranger, it seems to us, both in what you said before about education and in what you say now. Athenian: Very good. Now these forms of child-training, which consist in right discipline in pleasures and pains, become slack and weakened to a great extent over the course of people's lives. So the gods took pity on the human race, born as it is to hardship, and appointed the feasts of thanksgiving as periods of rest from their troubles. They have given them the Muses, Apollo the master of music, and Dionysus as companions at their feasts, so that they may at least set their ways of discipline right again by sharing their feasts with gods. We must consider, then, whether the account that is constantly repeated nowadays is true to nature. What it says is that, almost without exception, every young creature is unable to keep either its body or its tongue quiet. It is always striving to move and to cry out, leaping and skipping and delighting in dances and games, and also uttering noises of every kind.

653e–654a

Athenian: Now all other creatures lack any perception of the various kinds of order and disorder in movement (which we call rhythm and harmony). But the very gods who, as we said, were given to us as our fellow dancers have granted to us human beings the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony. By means of this they move us and lead our choirs, linking us with one another through songs and dances; and they have named the choir from the cheer that is implanted in it. Shall we accept this account to begin with, and assume that education originates with Apollo and the Muses?

654a

Clinias: Yes. Athenian: Shall we assume that the uneducated man is without choir-training, and that the educated man is fully choir-trained?

654b

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Choir-training as a whole, of course, includes both dancing and song. Clinias: Undoubtedly. Athenian: So the well-educated man will be able both to sing well and to dance well. Clinias: Evidently. Athenian: Let us now consider what this last statement of ours implies. Clinias: Which statement? Athenian: We say, "He sings well and dances well." Should we or should we not add, "provided that he sings good songs and dances good dances"?

654c

Clinias: We should add it. Athenian: What, then, if a man takes the good to be good and the bad to be bad, and treats them accordingly? Which kind of man shall we regard as better trained in choristry and music? Is it the one who is always able, with gesture and voice, to represent adequately what he conceives to be good, though he feels neither delight in the good nor hatred of the bad? Or is it the one who, though not fully able to represent his conception rightly with voice and gesture, still keeps right in his feelings of pain and pleasure, welcoming everything good and loathing everything that is not good?

654d

Clinias: There is a vast difference between the two cases, Stranger, as regards education. Athenian: If, then, the three of us understand what makes for goodness in dance and song, we also know who is rightly educated and who is not. But without this knowledge we will never be able to tell whether there is any safeguard for education, or where it is to be found. Isn't that so?

654e

Clinias: It is. Athenian: What we have to track down next, like hounds on the trail, is goodness of posture and of tune in relation to song and dance. If this escapes our pursuit, it will be useless for us to say anything more about right education, whether of Greeks or of barbarians. Clinias: Yes. Athenian: Well then, how in the world shall we define goodness of posture or of tune? Come, consider. Suppose a manly soul is beset by troubles, and a cowardly soul by troubles that are identical and equal. Are the postures and utterances that result in the two cases alike?

655a

Clinias: How could they be, when even their complexions differ in color? Athenian: Well said, my friend. But in fact, there are postures and tunes in music, since music deals with rhythm and harmony, so one can rightly speak of a tune or posture as rhythmical or harmonious. Even so, one cannot rightly apply the choirmasters' metaphor "well-colored" to tune and posture. One can, however, use this language about the posture and tune of the brave man and of the coward, and one is right to call those of the brave man good and those of the coward bad. To avoid a long, tedious discussion, let us sum up the whole matter by saying this: the postures and tunes that belong to goodness of soul or body, or to some image of it, are good without exception, while those that belong to badness are exactly the opposite.

655b

Clinias: Your pronouncement is correct, and we now formally endorse it. Athenian: Another point: do we all delight equally in choral dancing, or far from equally?

655c

Clinias: Very far indeed. Athenian: Then what are we to suppose misleads us? Is it that we do not all regard the same things as good? Or is it that, although they are the same, they are thought not to be the same? For surely no one will maintain that the choral performances of vice are better than those of virtue, or that he himself enjoys the postures of depravity while everyone else delights in music of the opposite kind. Most people, however, claim that the value of music lies in its power to give pleasure to the soul. But such a claim is quite intolerable, and it is blasphemy even to utter it. What misleads us is more probably the following—

655d

Clinias: What? Athenian: Choral performances are representations of character, displayed in actions and circumstances of every kind, in which the individual performers act out their parts by habit and imitative art. So whenever the choral performances suit them in diction, tune, or other features (whether from natural inclination, from habit, or from all these causes combined), these performers invariably delight in such performances and praise them as excellent. But those who find them repugnant to their nature, disposition, or habits cannot possibly delight in them or praise them, and instead call them bad.

655e–656a

Athenian: And when people are right in their natural tastes but wrong in those acquired by habituation, or right in the latter but wrong in the former, then their expressions of praise convey the opposite of their real feelings. For they say of a performance that it is pleasant but bad. They are ashamed to indulge in such bodily movements in front of people whose wisdom they respect, or to sing such songs (as though they seriously approved of them); but in private they really delight in them.

656a

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Does the man who delights in bad postures and tunes suffer any harm from it, or do those who take pleasure in the opposite gain any benefit from it? Clinias: Probably.

656b

Athenian: Is it not probable, or rather inevitable, that the result here will be exactly the same as in another case? A man living among the bad habits of wicked people does not really loathe those habits but instead accepts and delights in them; yet he criticizes them casually, as though dimly aware of his own depravity. In such a case, surely, the man who delights in them inevitably becomes like the habits, good or bad, in which he delights, even if he is ashamed to praise them. Yet what greater blessing or curse could we name than this assimilation, which happens to us so inevitably? Clinias: There is none, I believe.

656c

Athenian: Now where laws are, or will in the future be, rightly laid down concerning musical education and recreation, do we imagine that poets will be given such license that they may teach whatever rhythm, tune, or words they themselves like best to the children of law-abiding citizens and to the young men in the choirs, no matter what the result may be in terms of virtue or depravity? Clinias: That would certainly be unreasonable.

656d

Athenian: But at present this license is allowed in practically every State, with the exception of Egypt. Clinias: How, then, does the law stand in Egypt? Athenian: It is astonishing even to hear about. It seems that long ago they settled on the very rule we are now discussing: that the young people of a State must practice good postures and good tunes in their rehearsals. They prescribed these in detail and posted them in the temples. Beyond this official list, it was, and still is, forbidden to painters and to all other makers of postures and representations to introduce any innovation or invention beyond the traditional forms, whether in such works or in any other branch of music.

656e–657a

Athenian: And if you look there, you will find that the things painted or carved there 10,000 years ago (and I mean this not loosely but literally: 10,000) are not the least bit better or worse than the works of today, but are made with the same art.

657a

Clinias: An astonishing state of affairs! Athenian: Say rather that it is supremely worthy of a statesman and a legislator. Still, you would find other things in Egypt that are bad. But this is a true and remarkable fact: in music it has proved possible for tunes that possess a natural correctness to be established by law and permanently consecrated. Doing this would be the work of a god or of a godlike man—just as in Egypt they say that the tunes preserved through all this length of time are the compositions of Isis. So, as I said, if one could by any means succeed in grasping the principle of correctness in tune, one could then confidently reduce the tunes to legal form and prescription. For the craving of pleasure and pain always to indulge in new music has, after all, no very great power to corrupt choral forms that are consecrated, merely by mocking them as old-fashioned. In Egypt, at any rate, it seems to have had no such power to corrupt them—in fact, quite the opposite.

657c

Clinias: That would evidently be the case, judging from what you now say. Athenian: May we confidently describe the correct method in music and play, in connection with choristry, in some such terms as this: we rejoice whenever we think we are prospering, and, conversely, whenever we rejoice we think we are prospering? Isn't that so? Clinias: Yes, that is so. Athenian: Moreover, when we are in this state of joy, we are unable to keep still. Clinias: True.

657d

Athenian: Now while our young men are fit to dance themselves, we older men consider it fitting for us to spend our time watching them and enjoying their sport and celebration, now that our former nimbleness is leaving us. It is our longing for that nimbleness that leads us to propose such contests for those who can best awaken in us, through memory, the dormant emotions of youth. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: So we shall not dismiss as entirely groundless the opinion commonly expressed now about people celebrating festivals—namely, that the one who best succeeds in giving us joy and pleasure should be counted the most skillful and be awarded the prize. For since we give ourselves up to recreation on such occasions, surely the highest honor and the prize of victory, as I said just now, should go to the performer who gives the greatest enjoyment to the greatest number.

657e–658a

Athenian: Isn't this the right view, and the right way to act as well, supposing it were carried out?

658a

Clinias: Possibly. Athenian: But, my dear sir, we must not decide this matter hastily. Rather, we must analyze it thoroughly and examine it in some such way as this. Suppose a man were to organize a competition without qualifying it or limiting it to athletic, musical, or equestrian events. Suppose he were to assemble the whole population of the State and proclaim that this is purely a pleasure-contest in which anyone who chooses may compete. And suppose he were to offer a prize to the competitor who gives the spectators the greatest amusement—without any restrictions on the methods used—who excels the others in doing just this to the highest possible degree, and who is judged the most pleasure-giving of the competitors. What do we suppose the effect of such a proclamation would be?

658b

Clinias: In what respect do you mean? Athenian: The natural result would be that one man would, like Homer, present a rhapsody, another a song to the harp, one a tragedy and another a comedy. Nor should we be surprised if someone even imagined that he had the best chance of winning with a puppet show. So when competitors like these, and thousands of others, enter the contest, can we say who will deserve to win the prize?

658c

Clinias: An absurd question; for who could possibly claim to know the answer before he had actually heard each of the competitors for himself? Athenian: Very well, then; do you want me to supply you with the answer to this absurd question? Clinias: By all means. Athenian: If the tiniest children are to be the judges, they will award the prize to the puppet showman, won't they?

658d

Clinias: Certainly they will. Athenian: And older boys will award it to the one who presents comedies, while educated women, young men, and the general mass of the people will award it to the one who presents tragedies. Clinias: Most probably. Athenian: And we old men would very likely take the most delight in listening to a rhapsode giving a fine recitation of the Iliad or the Odyssey or of a piece from Hesiod, and would declare that he is easily the winner. Who, then, would rightly be the winner of the prize? That is the next question, isn't it? Clinias: Yes.

658e

Athenian: Evidently the three of us cannot avoid saying that those judged the winners by our own contemporaries would win rightly. For in our opinion epic poetry is by far the best to be found anywhere nowadays, in any State in the world. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: This much I myself am willing to concede to the majority of people: that music should be judged by pleasure—not, however, by the pleasure of just anyone. Rather, I would regard as about the finest the music that pleases the best and highly educated men, and as quite the finest the music that pleases the one man who surpasses all others in virtue and education. And we say that the judges of these matters need virtue because they must possess not only wisdom in general but especially courage. For the true judge should not take his verdicts from the dictation of the audience, nor give in weakly to the uproar of the crowd or to his own lack of education. Nor again, when he knows the truth, should he deliver his verdict carelessly out of cowardice and lack of spirit, and so swear falsely with the same mouth with which he called on Heaven when he first took his seat as judge. For, rightly speaking, the judge sits not as a pupil but rather as a teacher of the spectators, ready to oppose those who offer them pleasure in an improper or wrong way. This is what the ancient Hellenic law permitted. But the present law of Sicily and Italy entrusts the decision to the spectators, who award the prize by a show of hands. In this way it has not only corrupted the poets (since they adapt their works to the low standard of pleasure of the judges, which means that the spectators are the teachers of the poets), but has also corrupted the pleasures of the audience. For they ought to be raising their standard of pleasure by listening to characters better than their own, but what they now do has exactly the opposite effect. What, then, is the conclusion to be drawn from this survey? Is it this, do you suppose?

659c

Clinias: What? Athenian: This is, I think, the third or fourth time that our discussion has come full circle back to this same point: education is the process of drawing and guiding children toward the principle that the law pronounces right, and that the experience of the oldest and most just men confirms as truly right. The child's soul must not become accustomed to feeling pains and pleasures contrary to the law and to those who obey the law, but in conformity with it, being pleased and pained by the same things as the old man. For this reason we have what we call chants, which are evidently in reality incantations, seriously designed to produce in souls the conformity and harmony we are speaking of. But since the souls of the young cannot endure serious study, we call these plays and chants, and use them as such—

659e–660b

Athenian: just as, when people suffer from bodily illnesses and infirmities, those whose job it is try to give them wholesome nourishment in pleasant foods and drinks, but unwholesome nourishment in unpleasant ones, so that they may form the right habit of approving the one kind and detesting the other. In the same way, in dealing with the poet, the good legislator will use fine and praiseworthy language to persuade him—and, if persuasion fails, he will compel him—to portray in his rhythms the gestures, and in his harmonies the tunes, of men who show self-control and courage and are good in every respect, and in this way to compose poems rightly.

660b–660c

Clinias: In Heaven's name, Stranger, do you believe that this is how poetry is composed nowadays in other States? As far as my own observation goes, I know of no practices such as you describe except in my own country and in Lacedaemon. But I do know that novelties are constantly being introduced in dancing and in all other forms of music—changes due not to the laws but to disorderly tastes. And these tastes are so far from being constantly uniform and stable, like the Egyptian ones you describe, that they are never uniform for a single moment.

660c–660d

Athenian: Well said, Clinias! If, however, I seemed to you to be saying that the practices you refer to are in use now, the mistake very likely arose from my own failure to express my meaning clearly. Probably I stated what I want to see in music in such a way that you imagined I was stating present facts. To denounce things that are beyond remedy and far gone in error is by no means pleasant, but at times it is unavoidable. And now that you share my opinion on this subject, come, tell me: do you claim that such practices are more common among the Cretans and the Lacedaemonians than among the other Greeks?

660d

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Suppose now that they were to become common among the rest as well. Would we say that the way things were done would then be better than it is now? Clinias: The improvement would be immense, if things were done as they are in my country and in that of our friends here, and also as you yourself said just now they ought to be done. Athenian: Come now, let us reach an agreement on this matter. In all education and music in your countries, isn't this what you teach? You require the poets to teach that the good man, since he has self-control and is just, is fortunate and happy, whether he is great or small, strong or weak, rich or poor; whereas if he is unjust, even if he is richer than Cinyras or Midas, he is a wretched man and lives a miserable life.

660e–661d

Athenian: Your poet says—if he speaks the truth—"I would not spend a word on the man, or hold him in any esteem, who does or acquires all the things counted good without justice." And again he describes how the just man drives his spear against the enemy at close quarters, whereas the unjust man does not dare to look on the face of bloody death, nor does he outrun the north wind from Thrace in speed of foot, nor acquire any other of the things called good. For the things most people call good are wrongly called so. People say that the chief good is health, beauty the second, wealth the third; and they call countless other things goods—such as keenness of sight and hearing, and quickness in perceiving all the objects of the senses; being a king, too, and doing exactly as you please; and to possess all these goods and become immortal on the spot—that, they say, is the crown and summit of all happiness. But what you and I say is this: all these things are very good possessions for men who are just and holy, but for the unjust they are, one and all, from health downward, very bad. And we also say that sight and hearing and sensation, and even life itself, are very great evils for the man who has all the so-called goods but lacks justice and all virtue, if he is immortal forever, but a lesser evil for such a man if he survives only a short time. This, I imagine, is what you (like me) will persuade or compel your poets to teach; and you will compel them also to educate your youth by supplying them with rhythms and harmonies in keeping with this teaching. Am I not right? Just consider: what I assert is that the things called evils are good for the unjust but evil for the just, while the so-called goods are truly good for the good but bad for the bad. So, are you in agreement with me—that was my question—or how does the matter stand?

661d

Clinias: Apparently we are partly in agreement, but partly quite the opposite. Athenian: Take the case of a man who has health and wealth and absolute power forever—and in addition, if you like, I give him matchless strength and courage, together with immortality and freedom from all the other so-called evils—but a man who has within him nothing but injustice and insolence. Probably I fail to convince you that the man who lives such a life is obviously not happy but wretched?

661e

Clinias: Quite true. Athenian: Well, then, what should I say next? Suppose a man who is courageous, strong, handsome, and rich, and who does exactly as he likes all his life long, is really unjust and insolent. Don't you think he must necessarily be living a shameful life? Probably you will at least agree to call it shameful?

662a

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: And also a bad life? Clinias: We would not go so far as to admit that. Athenian: Well, would you admit the descriptions "unpleasant" and "unprofitable to himself"? Clinias: How could we agree to such further descriptions? Athenian: How, you ask? Only, it seems, my friends, if some god were to grant us concord, since at present we are pretty much in discord with one another. In my opinion these facts are quite indisputable—even more plainly so, my dear Clinias, than the fact that Crete is an island. If I were a legislator, I would try to compel the poets and all the citizens to speak in this sense. And I would impose nearly the heaviest of penalties on anyone in the land who declared that any wicked people live pleasant lives, or that things profitable and lucrative are different from things just. And there are many other things, contrary to what Cretans and Lacedaemonians—and of course the rest of mankind—now say, it seems, that I would persuade my citizens to proclaim. For come now, my most excellent sirs, in the name of Zeus and Apollo, suppose we were to question the very gods who made laws for you, and ask: "Is the most just life the most pleasant? Or are there two lives, one of which is most pleasant and the other most just?" If they answered that there were two, we might well ask them further, if we were to put the correct question: "Which of the two ought one to call the happier, those who live the most just life or those who live the most pleasant?" If they answered, "Those who live the most pleasant life," that would be a monstrous statement for them to make. But I prefer not to attribute such statements to gods, but rather to ancestors and lawgivers. Imagine, then, that the questions I have put have been put to an ancestor and lawgiver, and that he has stated that the man who lives the most pleasant life is the happiest. Next, I would say this to him: "Father, didn't you want me to live as happily as possible? Yet you never stopped urging me constantly to live as justly as possible."

662e–663a

Athenian: And in this way, I think, our lawgiver or ancestor would be shown to be illogical and unable to speak consistently with himself. If, on the other hand, he were to declare the most just life to be the happiest, everyone who heard him would, I suppose, ask what good and charm it contains, superior to pleasure, for which the lawgiver praises it. For apart from pleasure, what good could come to a just man? Come, tell me: is a good reputation, and praise from the mouths of men and gods, a fine and good thing but unpleasant, while a bad reputation is the opposite? "By no means, my dear lawgiver," we shall say. And is it unpleasant, but fine and good, neither to wrong anyone nor to be wronged by anyone, while the opposite is pleasant, but ignoble and bad?

663a

Clinias: By no means. Athenian: So the teaching that refuses to separate the pleasant from the just helps, if nothing else, to induce a man to live the holy and just life. Accordingly, any doctrine that denies this truth is, in the lawgiver's eyes, most shameful and most hateful; for no one would willingly consent to be induced to do something unless it brings with it more pleasure than pain. Now distance blurs the vision of nearly everyone, and of children especially. But our lawgiver will reverse the appearance by removing the fog, and by one means or another—habituation, praise, or argument—he will persuade people that their notions of justice and injustice are illusory pictures. To the one who is opposed to justice, unjust things appear pleasant and just things most unpleasant, because he views them from his own unjust and evil standpoint; but when they are seen from the standpoint of justice, both appear in every way entirely the opposite.

663c

Clinias: So it appears. Athenian: In point of truth, which of the two judgments shall we say carries more authority—that of the worse soul or that of the better? Clinias: That of the better, undoubtedly.

663d

Athenian: Undoubtedly, then, the unjust life is not only more shameful and ignoble, but also in very truth more unpleasant, than the just and holy life. Clinias: It would seem so, my friends, from our present argument. Athenian: And even if the case were different from what our argument has now proved it to be, could a lawgiver who was worth his salt find any more useful fiction than this (if he dared to use any fiction at all in addressing the young for their good)? Could he find one more effective in persuading everyone to act justly in all things, willingly and without constraint?

663e

Clinias: Truth is a noble and enduring thing, Stranger; yet persuading people of it seems no easy matter. Athenian: So be it; yet it proved easy to persuade people of the Sidonian fairy tale, incredible as it was, and of countless others. Clinias: What tales? Athenian: The tale of the teeth that were sown, and how armed men sprang up from them. Here, indeed, the lawgiver has a striking example of how one can, if he tries, persuade the souls of the young of anything. So the only question he has to consider in his inventing is what belief would do the State the most good. Then he must devise every possible means of ensuring that the whole community, constantly and for as long as they live, uses exactly the same language about these matters, as far as possible, in their songs, their tales, and their discussions alike. If, however, you think otherwise, I have no objection to your arguing the opposite.

664b

Clinias: Neither of us, I think, could possibly argue against your view. Athenian: The next subject I must handle myself. I maintain that all three choirs must enchant the souls of the children while they are still young and tender, by rehearsing all the noble things we have already recounted or shall recount later. And let this be the sum of them: in asserting that one and the same life is declared by the gods to be both most pleasant and best, we shall not only be saying what is most true, but we shall also convince those who need convincing more effectively than we could by any other assertion.

664c

Clinias: We must agree with what you say. Athenian: First, then, the right order will be for the children's choir of the Muses to come forward first and sing these things with the utmost vigor before the whole city. Second will come the choir of those under thirty, calling on Apollo Paian as witness to the truth of what is said, and praying that he will graciously win over the young by persuasion. The next singers will be the third choir, of those over thirty and under sixty. And lastly there remain those who are no longer able to raise a song; they shall handle the same moral themes in stories and in oracular speech.

664d

Clinias: Whom do you mean, Stranger, by these third choristers? For we do not grasp very clearly what you intend to convey about them. Athenian: Yet they are in fact the very people toward whom most of our previous discussion was meant to lead.

664e

Clinias: We are still in the dark; try to explain yourself even more clearly. Athenian: At the start of our discussion we said, if we remember, that since all young creatures are fiery by nature, they cannot keep either body or voice still, but are always crying out and leaping in a disorderly way. We also said that none of the other creatures attains a sense of order, in body or in voice, and that man alone has this; Athenian: and that order in movement is called rhythm, while order in the voice (in which high and low are blended together) is called harmony, and the combination of the two is given the name choristry. We also stated that the gods, in pity for us, have given us Apollo and the Muses as fellow choristers and choir-leaders—and besides them we mentioned, if we remember, a third, Dionysus.

665a

Clinias: Of course we remember. Athenian: The choir of Apollo and that of the Muses have been described; the third and remaining choir, that of Dionysus, must necessarily be described now.

665b

Clinias: How so? Tell us. For when one first hears of it, a Dionysiac choir of old men sounds very strange—if you mean that men over thirty, and even men over fifty and up to sixty, are really going to dance in his honor. Athenian: That is indeed perfectly true. I think it needs argument to show how such a practice could be reasonable. Clinias: It does. Athenian: Are we agreed about what we proposed earlier?

665c

Clinias: In what respect? Athenian: That it is the duty of every man and child—slave and free, male and female—and the duty of the whole State, to keep charming themselves without ceasing with the chants we have described. They must constantly change them and secure variety in every possible way, so as to fill the singers with an insatiable appetite for the hymns and with pleasure in them. Clinias: Surely we would agree that this ought to be done.

665d

Athenian: Then where should we put the best element in the State—the one that, by age and judgment alike, has the most influence of any it contains—so that by singing its finest songs it may do the most good? Or shall we be so foolish as to dismiss the section that has the greatest capacity for the finest and most useful songs? Clinias: We cannot possibly dismiss it, judging from what you now say. Athenian: What fitting method can we adopt for it? Will it be this? Clinias: What? Athenian: Every man, as he grows older, becomes reluctant to sing songs and takes less pleasure in doing so; and when compelled to sing, the older and the more self-controlled he is, the more ashamed he will feel. Isn't that so?

665e

Clinias: It is. Athenian: Surely, then, he will be more ashamed than ever to stand up and sing in the theater before people of all sorts. Moreover, suppose old men like that were obliged to do as the choristers do, who go thin and without food while training their voices for a competition. They would certainly find singing an unpleasant and degrading task, and they would take it on with little enthusiasm.

666a

Clinias: There is no doubt about that. Athenian: How, then, shall we encourage them to take readily to singing? Shall we not pass a law, first, that no children under eighteen may touch wine at all? We shall teach that it is wrong to pour fire on fire, in either body or soul, before they set about their real labors, and so guard against the excitable disposition of the young. Next, we shall rule that the young man under thirty may take wine in moderation, but must entirely abstain from drunkenness and heavy drinking. But when a man has reached the age of forty, he may join in the convivial gatherings and invoke Dionysus above all other gods, inviting his presence at the rite (which is also the recreation) of the elders. For this rite he gave mankind wine as a powerful medicine against the sourness of old age, so that by it we men may renew our youth, and so that, by forgetting our cares, the temper of our souls may lose its hardness and become softer and more malleable, just as iron does when it has been forged in the fire. Will not this softer disposition, first of all, make each of them more willing and less ashamed to sing chants and incantations (as we have often called them), not before a large company of strangers, but before a small number of intimate friends?

666c

Clinias: Yes, much more willing! Athenian: So, as a way of inducing them to take part in our singing, this plan would not be altogether improper.

666d

Clinias: Not at all. Athenian: What kind of song will these men raise? Won't it evidently be one that suits their own condition in every case? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: What song, then, would suit godlike men? Would a choral song? Clinias: At any rate, Stranger, we and our friends here would be unable to sing any song other than the one we learned through practice in choruses. Athenian: Naturally; for in truth you have never attained the finest kind of singing. Your civic organization is that of an army rather than of people living in cities, and you keep your young people massed together like a herd of colts at pasture.

666e–667a

Athenian: None of you takes his own colt, drags him away from his fellows despite his fretting and fuming, puts a special groom in charge of him, and trains him by rubbing him down and stroking him and using all the means suited to child-rearing. That is how he would turn out to be not only a good soldier but also able to manage a State and cities—in short, a man who (as we said at the beginning) is more of a warrior than the warriors of Tyrtaeus, since always and everywhere, in States and in individuals alike, he values courage as the fourth of the virtues, not the first.

667a

Clinias: Once again, Stranger, you are somehow disparaging our lawgivers. Athenian: If I am doing so, my friend, it is not intentional; but let us go wherever the argument leads us, if you please. If we know of a music finer than that of the choirs or of the public theaters, let us try to supply it to those men who, as we said, are ashamed of the latter, yet are eager to take part in the music that is finest.

667b

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Now, first of all, must it not be true of everything that has charm accompanying it that its most important element is either this charm itself, or some kind of correctness, or, third, usefulness? For example, food and drink and nourishment in general have, as I say, an accompanying charm, which we would call pleasure; but as for their correctness and usefulness, what we call the wholesomeness of each item served is precisely the most perfect element in them.

667c

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Learning, too, is accompanied by the element of charm, which is pleasure; but what produces its correctness and usefulness, its goodness and nobility, is truth. Clinias: Quite so.

667d

Athenian: Then what about the imitative arts, which produce likenesses? If they succeed in what they produce, should not any pleasure that accompanies and results from it most properly be called charm? Clinias: Yes. Athenian: But, generally speaking, the correctness of these things would come not primarily from pleasure but from equality in both quality and quantity. Clinias: Excellent. Athenian: Then we shall rightly judge by the criterion of pleasure only the object that, in its effects, produces neither usefulness nor truth nor likeness, nor any harm either, but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying element of charm. This element will best be named pleasure whenever none of the other qualities mentioned goes with it.

667e

Clinias: You mean only harmless pleasure. Athenian: Yes, and I say that this same pleasure is also play, whenever the harm or good it does is negligible. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Should we not then assert, as a consequence, that no imitation should be judged by the criterion of pleasure or of untrue opinion, and indeed that no kind of equality should be judged in this way? The equal is equal, and the symmetrical symmetrical, not at all because someone thinks so or is charmed by it, but most of all because of truth, and least of all for any other reason.

668a

Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: We assert, do we not, that all music is representative and imitative? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: So whenever someone says that pleasure is the criterion of music, we shall firmly reject his claim. We shall regard such music as the least important of all (if indeed any music is important), and prefer the music that has likeness in its imitation of the beautiful.

668b

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: So those who are seeking the best singing and music must seek, it appears, not what is pleasant but what is correct; and the correctness of imitation consists, as we say, in reproducing the original in its own proper quantity and quality. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: And this is certainly true of music, as everyone would grant: all its productions are imitative and representative. That much, at least, they would all admit—poets, audience, and actors alike—wouldn't they?

668c

Clinias: They would. Athenian: Now the man who is to judge a poem without error must know in each particular case what exactly the poem is. For if he does not know its essence—what it intends and what the actual original is that it represents—he will hardly be able to decide how far it succeeds or fails in achieving its intention. Clinias: Hardly, to be sure.

668d

Athenian: And would a man who does not know what constitutes correctness be able to decide whether a poem is good or bad? But I am not making myself quite clear; it might be clearer if I put it this way— Clinias: What way? Athenian: Among objects of sight we have, of course, thousands of representations. Clinias: Yes. Athenian: What, then, if a man in this class of objects did not know the nature of each of the bodies represented? Could he ever know whether the work is perfectly executed? What I mean is this: whether it preserves the proper dimensions and positions of each of the body's parts, and has captured their exact number and the proper order in which one is placed next to another, as well as their colors and shapes—or whether all these things are done in a confused way. Do you suppose anyone could possibly decide these points if he were totally ignorant of what animal was being represented?

668e

Clinias: How could he? Athenian: Well, suppose we know that the object painted or molded is a man, and know that the art has given him all his proper parts, colors, and shapes. Does it follow at once that the person who knows this can also easily tell whether the work is beautiful, or in what respect it falls short of beauty?

669a

Clinias: If that were so, Stranger, practically all of us would know which animals are beautiful. Athenian: You are quite right. With regard, then, to every representation—whether in painting, in music, or in any other art—must not the sensible critic have these three requirements: first, knowledge of the nature of the original; next, knowledge of the correctness of the copy; and third, knowledge of the excellence with which the copy is executed in words, tunes, and rhythms?

669b

Clinias: It would certainly seem so. Athenian: Let us not hesitate, then, to state where the difficulty of music lies. Precisely because it is talked about more than any other form of representation, it requires more caution than any. The man who blunders in this art will do himself the greatest harm by welcoming bad morals; and, moreover, his blunder is very hard to detect, because our poets are inferior as poets to the Muses themselves. For the Muses would never blunder so badly as to give a feminine tune and gesture to verses composed for men, or to fit the rhythms of captives and slaves to gestures designed for free men, or, conversely, after constructing the rhythms and gestures of free men, to give the rhythms a tune or verses of an opposite style. Nor would the Muses ever combine in a single piece the cries of beasts and of men, the clash of instruments, and noises of every kind, as a way of representing a single object. Human poets, however, by senselessly mixing such things and jumbling them together, would provide a subject for laughter to all the men who, in Orpheus' phrase, have attained the full flower of joyousness. For these men see all these things jumbled together. They also see how the poets crudely tear rhythm and gesture apart from tune, putting bare words into meter, or leaving tune and rhythm without words and using the bare sound of harp or flute. In such music it is almost impossible to understand what this wordless rhythm and harmony intend, or what noteworthy original they represent.

669e–670b

Athenian: One ought to realize that such methods are crude in the extreme, insofar as they show an excessive craving for speed, mechanical precision, and the imitation of animal sounds, and consequently use the pipe and the harp without accompanying dance and song; for using either of these instruments by itself is the mark of a charlatan or a boor. Enough, then, of that matter; now as to ourselves. What we are considering is not how those of us who are over thirty years old, or beyond fifty, ought not to make use of the Muses, but how they ought to. Our argument already indicates, I think, this result of our discussion: all men over fifty who are fit to sing ought to have a training that is better than that of the choral Muse. For they must necessarily have knowledge and a keen perception of rhythms and harmonies. Otherwise, how will a man know which tunes are correct—whether the Dorian mode suits a given tune or not, and whether the rhythm the poet has attached to it is right or not?

670b

Clinias: Obviously he cannot know this at all. Athenian: It is ridiculous for the general crowd to imagine that they fully understand what is harmonious and rhythmical, or the opposite, just because they have been drilled to sing to the flute and to march in step. They fail to see that they do each of these things in ignorance. But the fact is that every tune that has its appropriate elements is correct, and incorrect if its elements are inappropriate.

670c

Clinias: Undoubtedly. Athenian: What, then, of the man who does not know in the least what the tune's elements are? Will he ever know about any tune, as we said, that it is correct? Clinias: There is no possible way he could. Athenian: So once again, it appears, we are discovering that these singers of ours (whom we are now inviting, and in a sense compelling, to sing of their own free will) must almost necessarily be trained to such a point that every one of them can follow both the steps of the rhythms and the notes of the tunes. Then, by observing the harmonies and rhythms, they will be able to select those of an appropriate kind, which it is fitting for men of their own age and character to sing, and they will sing them in this way. And in singing them, they will not only enjoy harmless pleasure themselves at the moment, but will also serve as leaders to the younger men in their fitting adoption of noble manners. If they were trained to such a point, their training would be more thorough than that of the majority, or indeed of the poets themselves.

670e–671b

Athenian: For while it is almost necessary for a poet to know harmony and rhythm, he does not need to know the third point as well—namely, whether the representation is noble or ignoble. But our older singers need to know all three points, so that they can determine what is first and what second in nobility; otherwise none of them will ever succeed in drawing the young to virtue by his incantations. The original aim of our argument, which was to show that our defense of the Dionysiac chorus was justified, has now been carried out to the best of our ability. Let us consider whether that is really so. Such a gathering inevitably tends, as the drinking goes on, to grow more and more uproarious; and in the case of present-day gatherings, as we said at the outset, that is an inevitable result.

671b

Clinias: Inevitable. Athenian: Everyone is lifted above his normal self and is merry. He bubbles over with talkative boldness himself while turning a deaf ear to his neighbors, and considers himself competent to rule both himself and everyone else. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: And did we not say that when this happens, the souls of the drinkers become softer, like iron, through being heated, and younger too, so that they become malleable, just as when they were young, in the hands of the man who has the skill and the ability to train and mold them? And now, just as then, the one who is to mold them is the good legislator. He must lay down drinking laws that are able to control the drinker who becomes confident and bold and unduly shameless, and who is unwilling to submit to the proper limits of silence and speech, of drinking and of music; these laws must make him consent to do the opposite in every way. They must also be able, with the help of justice, to fight against the entry of such ignoble boldness by sending in that most noble fear which we have named divine fear—modesty and shame.

671d

Clinias: That is so. Athenian: And as law-wardens of these laws and fellow workers with them, there must be sober and steady men to act as commanders over those who are not sober. For to fight drunkenness without such men would be a more formidable task than to fight enemies without steady leaders. Any man who refuses to obey these men willingly, and the officers of Dionysus (who are over sixty years old), shall incur as much disgrace as the man who disobeys the officers of Ares, and even more.

671e

Clinias: Quite right. Athenian: If the drinking and the recreation were of this character, wouldn't such fellow drinkers benefit from it, and part from one another better friends than before, instead of enemies, as they do now? For they would be guided by laws in all their dealings with one another, and would follow the directions given by the sober to those who are not sober.

672a

Clinias: True, if it really were of the character you describe. Athenian: Then we must no longer bring that old charge, without qualification, against the gift of Dionysus, that it is bad and unworthy of being admitted into a State. Indeed, one could say a good deal more on this subject. For the greatest benefit that gift confers is one that people hesitate to declare to the multitude, since, when it is declared, it is misconceived and misunderstood.

672b

Clinias: What is that? Athenian: There is a secret current of story and rumor to the effect that the god Dionysus was robbed of his soul's judgment by his stepmother Hera, and that in revenge for this he introduced Bacchic rites and all the frenzied choristry, and with the same aim also gave the gift of wine. These matters, however, I leave to those who think it safe to say such things about gods. But this much I know: no creature is ever born possessing the kind or the amount of reason that properly belongs to it when it is fully developed. Consequently, every creature, during the period when it still lacks its proper intelligence, is in a continual frenzy, crying out wildly, and, as soon as it can get on its feet, leaping wildly. Let us remember that we said that here we have the origin of music and gymnastic.

672c

Clinias: Of course we remember that. Athenian: Don't we also remember saying that from this origin the sense of rhythm and harmony was implanted in us human beings, and that its joint authors were Apollo, the Muses, and the god Dionysus?

672d

Clinias: Certainly we remember. Athenian: Moreover, as for wine, the account other people give apparently is that it was given to us human beings as a punishment, to make us mad. But our own account, on the contrary, declares that it is a medicine given for the purpose of producing modesty of soul and health and strength of body. Clinias: You have recalled our account admirably, Stranger.

672e

Athenian: We may say, then, that one half of the subject of choristry has now been dealt with. Shall we go on at once to deal with the other half in whatever way seems best, or shall we leave it alone? Clinias: What halves do you mean? How are you dividing the subject? Athenian: In our view, choristry as a whole is identical with education as a whole; and the part of it concerned with the voice consists of rhythms and harmonies. Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And the part concerned with bodily motion has rhythm in common with vocal motion. Besides this, it has gesture as its own distinctive feature, just as tune is the distinctive feature of vocal motion.

673a

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Now the vocal activities that bear on training the soul in excellence we somehow ventured to call music. Clinias: And rightly so. Athenian: As for the bodily activities that we called playful dancing—if such activity attains bodily excellence, we may call the skilled guidance of the body toward this end gymnastic.

673b

Clinias: Quite rightly. Athenian: As for music, which we were referring to a moment ago when we said that one half of choristry had been described and dealt with, let us say the same of it now. But as for the other half, are we to speak about it, or what are we to do? Clinias: My good sir, you are talking with Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and we have discussed the subject of music. What answer to your question, then, do you suppose either of us will give, when the subject still left untouched is gymnastic? Athenian: I would say you have given me a pretty clear answer in asking this question. Although it is a question, I understand it to be also (as I said) an answer—or rather, an actual instruction to give a full account of gymnastic.

673c

Clinias: You have understood my meaning excellently; please do so. Athenian: Do it I must; and indeed it is not a very hard task to speak of things that are well known to you both. For you are far better acquainted with this art than with the other. Clinias: That is about right. Athenian: The origin of the play we are speaking of lies in the habitual tendency of every living creature to leap. The human creature, by acquiring, as we said, a sense of rhythm, fathered dancing and gave birth to it. And since the tune suggests and awakens the rhythm, the union of these two gave birth to choristry and play.

673d

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: We have already discussed one part of choristry, and we shall try next to discuss the other part. Clinias: By all means. Athenian: But first, if you both agree, let us put the finishing touch to our discussion of the use of drink.

673e

Clinias: What finishing touch do you mean, and of what kind? Athenian: Suppose a State makes use of the institution now mentioned in a lawful and orderly way, regarding it seriously and practicing it with a view to self-control. And suppose that in the same way and with a similar object, aiming at mastery over them, it allows indulgence in all other pleasures. Then they must all be used in the way described. Athenian: But suppose, on the other hand, that this institution is regarded as play, and that anyone who likes is to be allowed to drink whenever he likes and with any companions he likes, and along with all sorts of other practices. Then I would refuse to vote for allowing such a State or such an individual ever to indulge in drink. I would go even beyond the practice of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians. The Carthaginian law ordains that no soldier on campaign shall ever taste this drink, but shall confine himself to drinking water for the whole of that time. To this I would add the following: in the city, too, no male or female slave shall ever taste it; magistrates during their year of office, and pilots and judges while on duty, shall taste no wine at all; nor shall any councilor while attending any important council; nor shall anyone whatever taste it at all in the daytime, except for reasons of bodily training or health; nor shall anyone, man or woman, do so at night when intending to beget children. Many other occasions could also be mentioned when wine should not be drunk by people who are governed by right reason and law. So, according to this argument, no State would need a large number of vineyards. While all the other agricultural products and all foodstuffs would be regulated, the production of wine especially would be kept to the smallest and most modest dimensions. Let this, then, Strangers, if you agree, be the finishing touch we put to our discussion of wine.

674c

Clinias: Very good; we quite agree.

676a

Athenian: That's enough on that subject, then! Now, what are we to say about the origin of government? Wouldn't the best and easiest way to discern it be from this standpoint? Clinias: What standpoint? Athenian: The one from which we should always observe the progress of states as they move toward either goodness or badness. Clinias: What standpoint is that? Athenian: Observing, I suppose, an infinitely long period of time and the changes that occur within it.

676b

Clinias: Explain what you mean. Athenian: Tell me: do you think you could ever determine how much time has passed since cities came into existence and people began living under civic government? Clinias: It certainly would be no easy task. Athenian: But you can easily see that it is vast and immeasurable? Clinias: That I most certainly can. Athenian: During this time, haven't thousands upon thousands of states come into existence, and, by a similar reckoning, just as many perished? And hasn't each of them exhibited every kind of constitution over and over again? And haven't they changed at one time from small to great, at another from great to small, and also from good to bad and from bad to good?

676c

Clinias: Necessarily. Athenian: Let us discover, if we can, the cause of this process of change; for this might perhaps show us what the primary origin of constitutions is, as well as how they are transformed. Clinias: You are right; and we must all make an effort—you to explain your view about them, and we to keep pace with you.

677a

Athenian: Do you think there is any truth in the ancient stories? Clinias: What stories? Athenian: That the human world has often been destroyed by floods, plagues, and many other things, in such a way that only a small part of the human race survived. Clinias: Everyone would consider such accounts perfectly believable. Athenian: Come, then, let us picture to ourselves one of the many catastrophes—namely, the one that once occurred through the Flood. Clinias: And what are we to suppose about it?

677b

Athenian: That the people who escaped destruction at that time must have been mostly herdsmen of the hills, small embers of the human race preserved somewhere on the mountaintops. Clinias: Evidently. Athenian: Moreover, people of this kind must necessarily have been unskilled in the arts generally, and especially in the schemes that people in cities use against one another for purposes of greed and rivalry and all the other villainies they devise against one another.

677c

Clinias: That is certainly probable. Athenian: Shall we assume that the cities located in the plains and near the sea were totally destroyed at that time? Clinias: Let us assume it. Athenian: And shall we say that all tools were lost, and that every important art or invention they may have had—whether concerned with politics or with other branches of knowledge—perished at that time? For if things had remained ordered all that time just as they are now, how, my good sir, could anything new ever have been invented?

677d

Clinias: Do you mean that these things were unknown to the people of those days for thousands upon thousands of years, and that one or two thousand years ago some of them were revealed to Daedalus, some to Orpheus, some to Palamedes, the musical arts to Marsyas and Olympus, the art of the lyre to Amphion, and, in short, a vast number of others to other people—all dating, so to speak, from yesterday or the day before? Athenian: Do you realize, Clinias, that you have left out your friend, who was literally a man of yesterday? Clinias: Is it Epimenides you mean? Athenian: Yes, I mean him. For he far outstripped everyone you had, my friend, with that invention of his, which he actually produced, as you Cretans say, although Hesiod had foretold it and spoken of it long before.

677e

Clinias: We do say so. Athenian: Shall we, then, say that at the time when the destruction took place, human affairs stood like this: there was a vast and terrible desolation, with an enormous abundance of land available; most of the animals had been destroyed, and the few herds of cattle and flocks of goats that happened to survive provided their herdsmen at first with only scanty sustenance?

678a

Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And as for the matters our present discussion is concerned with—states, statecraft, and legislation—do we think that those people could have kept any memory of such things at all, broadly speaking? Clinias: Not at all. Athenian: So from those people, in that situation, our whole present order has sprung—states and constitutions, arts and laws, with a great deal of evil and a great deal of good as well? Clinias: How do you mean?

678b

Athenian: Do we imagine, my good sir, that the people of that age, who were inexperienced in many of the fine ways of city life and in many of the opposite kind as well, were fully developed in either virtue or vice? Clinias: Well said! We grasp your meaning. Athenian: As time went on and our race multiplied, everything advanced—didn't it?—to the condition that exists now. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: But in all probability they did not advance all at once, but little by little, over an immense span of time.

678c

Clinias: Yes, that is most likely. Athenian: For all of them, I imagine, had a dread of going down from the highlands to the plains still ringing in their ears, so to speak. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: And because there were so few of them around in those days, weren't they delighted to see one another? Yet the means of travel by which they might have visited one another by sea or by land had practically all perished along with the arts. So, I imagine, it was not very easy for them to meet. For iron and bronze and all the metals in the mines had been flooded over and had disappeared, so that it was extremely difficult to extract fresh metal; and as a result there was a shortage of felled timber. For even if a few tools happened still to be left somewhere in the mountains, these were soon worn out, and they could not be replaced by others until people had rediscovered the art of metalworking.

678d

Clinias: They could not. Athenian: Now, how many generations do we suppose passed before this happened?

678e

Clinias: A great many, evidently. Athenian: And during all this period, or even longer, all the arts that require iron and bronze and all such metals must have remained in abeyance? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Moreover, civil strife and war also disappeared during that time, and for many reasons. Clinias: How so? Athenian: First, because of their desolate state, they were kindly disposed and friendly toward one another; and second, they had no need to fight over food. For there was no shortage of flocks and herds (except perhaps for some of them at the outset), and in that age these were what people mostly lived on. So they were well supplied with milk and meat, and they obtained further supplies of food, both excellent and plentiful, by hunting. They were also well furnished with clothing, bedding, and houses, and with vessels both for cooking and for other uses; for the arts of molding and weaving require no iron, and God gave these two arts to human beings to supply them with all these necessities, so that the human race might have the means to sprout and increase whenever it fell into such a state of distress. Consequently, they were not excessively poor, nor were they driven by the pressure of poverty to quarrel with one another; and on the other hand, since they had no gold or silver, as was their condition at that time, they could never have become rich. Now a community that has no share in either poverty or wealth is generally the one in which the noblest characters are formed; for in it there is no room for the growth of insolence and injustice, of rivalries and jealousies. So these people were good, both for these reasons and because of their simple-mindedness, as it is called; for, being simple-minded, when they heard things called bad or good, they took what was said as gospel truth and believed it. None of them had the shrewdness of people today to suspect a falsehood; instead, they accepted as true what was said about gods and human beings, and ordered their lives by it. So they were entirely of the character we have just described.

679d

Clinias: Megillus and I certainly agree completely with what you say. Athenian: And shall we not say that people who lived in this way for many generations were bound to be unskilled compared with either those who lived before the Flood or the people of today, and ignorant of arts in general, and especially of the arts of war as they are now practiced on land and sea—including those warlike arts peculiar to cities, which go by the names of lawsuits and factions and are contrived with every device of word and deed to inflict hurt and injury on one another—and that they were also simpler, braver, more self-controlled, and in every way more just? And we have already explained the cause of this state of affairs.

679e

Clinias: Quite true. Athenian: We must keep in mind that the whole purpose of what we have said and what we are going to say next is this: to understand what possible need of laws the people of that time had, and who their lawgiver was.

680a

Clinias: Excellent. Athenian: Shall we suppose that those people had no need of lawgivers, and that in those days it was not yet usual to have such a thing? For those born in that period of the world's history did not yet have the art of writing, but lived by following custom and what is called patriarchal law. Clinias: That is certainly probable. Athenian: But this already amounts to a kind of government. Clinias: What kind?

680b–680c

Athenian: Everyone, I believe, gives the name of headship to the government that existed then—and it still exists today in many places among both Greeks and barbarians. And of course Homer mentions its existence in connection with the household system of the Cyclopes, where he says: “They have no halls of council and no laws, / But in hollow caves on mountain heights / They live up high, each making his own law / For wife and child; they care nothing for others.” Hom. Od. 9.112

680c

Clinias: This poet of yours seems to have been a man of genius. We have also read other verses of his, and they were extremely fine; though in truth we have not read much of him, since we Cretans do not go in much for foreign poetry. Megillus: But we Spartans do, and we regard Homer as the best of such poets; all the same, the way of life he describes is always Ionian rather than Laconian. And now he seems to be confirming your statement admirably, when in his legendary account he attributes the primitive habits of the Cyclopes to their savagery.

680d

Athenian: Yes, his testimony supports us; so let us take him as evidence that polities of this sort do sometimes come into existence. Clinias: Quite right. Athenian: Didn't they originate among those people who lived scattered in separate clans or single households because of the distress that followed the catastrophes? Among these the eldest rules, because rule comes down to them from their parents; following them, they form a single flock, like a covey of birds, and live under a patriarchal government and a kingship that is the most just of all kingships.

680e

Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: Next, they gather together in greater numbers and form larger communities; and first they turn to farming on the hillsides, and build ring-fences of rubble and walls to keep off wild beasts, until finally they have constructed a single large common dwelling.

681a

Clinias: It is certainly probable that this was the course of events. Athenian: Well, isn't this also probable? Clinias: What? Athenian: That, while these larger settlements were growing out of the original small ones, each of the small settlements kept, clan by clan, both the rule of the eldest and also certain customs of its own that came from its isolation. Since those who fathered and raised them were different, these customs of theirs, relating to the gods and to themselves, also differed: they were more orderly where their ancestors had been orderly, and braver where they had been brave. And as the fathers of each clan in due course stamped their own cast of mind on their children and their children's children, these people came (as we say) into the larger community, each group equipped with its own particular laws.

681b–681c

Clinias: Of course.

681c

Athenian: And no doubt each clan was well pleased with its own laws, and less pleased with those of its neighbors. Clinias: True. Athenian: Without realizing it, it seems, we have now set foot, as it were, on the starting point of legislation. Clinias: We have indeed. Athenian: The next necessary step is for these people to come together and choose some members of each clan who, after surveying the legal customs of all the clans, shall publicly inform the tribal leaders and chiefs (who may be called their kings) which of those customs they like best, and shall recommend that they be adopted. These men will themselves be called legislators; and when they have appointed the chiefs as magistrates and have formed an aristocracy, or possibly even a monarchy, out of the existing plurality of headships, they will live under the constitution thus transformed.

681d

Clinias: The next steps would certainly be as you describe. Athenian: Let us go on to describe the rise of a third form of constitution, in which all kinds and varieties of constitutions, and of states as well, are blended.

681e

Clinias: What form is that? Athenian: The one Homer himself mentioned after the second, when he said that the third form arose in this way. His verses go like this: “He founded Dardania when / The holy citadel of Ilium was not yet built / Upon the plain, a town for mortal people, / But they still lived on the highland slopes / Of Ida with its many springs.” Hom. Il. 20.216 ff.

682a

Athenian: Indeed, these verses of his, as well as the ones he speaks about the Cyclopes, are in a kind of harmony with the voices of both God and Nature. For the poetic tribe, being divinely inspired in its chanting, often grasps the truth of history with the help of the Graces and the Muses. Clinias: It certainly does. Athenian: Now let us go still further in the tale that now occupies us; for it may possibly give some hint about the matter we have in view. Shouldn't we do so?

682b

Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: Ilium, we say, was founded after people moved down from the highlands to a large and beautiful plain, on a hill of no great height that had many rivers flowing down to it from Ida above. Clinias: So they say. Athenian: And don't we suppose that this happened many ages after the Flood? Clinias: Many ages after, no doubt. Athenian: At any rate, they seem to have been strangely forgetful of the catastrophe we just mentioned, since they placed their city, as described, beneath a number of rivers descending from the mountain, and relied for their safety on hills of no great height.

682c

Clinias: So it is evident that they were separated from that calamity by a very long interval. Athenian: By this time, too, as humankind multiplied, many other cities had been founded. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: And these cities also attacked Ilium, probably by sea as well as by land, since by this time everyone used the sea without fear. Clinias: So it appears.

682d

Athenian: And after staying ten years, the Achaeans sacked Troy. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Now during this ten-year period, while the siege lasted, the affairs of each of the besiegers at home suffered greatly because of the seditious conduct of the young men. For when the soldiers returned to their own cities and homes, these young people did not receive them properly and justly, but in such a way that a vast number of deaths, massacres, and banishments followed. So the soldiers, driven out once more, returned under a new name: because Dorieus was the man who then gathered the exiles together, they were called Dorians instead of Achaeans. But as for all the events that follow from there, you Lacedaemonians relate them all fully in your traditions.

682e

Megillus: Quite true. Athenian: And now—as if by divine guidance—we have come back once more to the very point in our discussion of laws where we made our digression, when we plunged into the subject of music and drinking parties; and we can, so to speak, get a fresh grip on the argument, now that it has reached this point—the settlement of Lacedaemon, which you rightly said was settled, like Crete, under kindred laws. From the wandering course of our argument and our excursion through various polities and settlements, we have gained this much: we have observed a first, a second, and a third state, all, as we suppose, succeeding one another in settlements that took place over vast ages of time. And now there has emerged this fourth state—or nation, if you prefer—which was once in the process of being established and is now established. Now, if from all this we can gather which of these settlements was right and which wrong, which laws keep safe what is kept safe and which laws ruin what is ruined, and what changes in what particulars would bring about the happiness of the state, then, Megillus and Clinias, we ought to describe these things again, making a fresh start from the beginning—unless we have some fault to find with what we have already said.

683b–683c

Megillus: I can assure you, Stranger, that if some god were to promise us that, in making this second attempt to investigate legislation, we would hear a discussion no worse and no shorter than the one we have just been listening to, I for one would go a long way to hear it; in fact, today would seem quite a short day to me, even though it is actually close to the summer solstice.

683c

Athenian: So it seems we must go on with our inquiry. Megillus: Most certainly. Athenian: Then let us place ourselves in imagination at the time when Lacedaemon, together with Argos and Messene and the neighboring districts, had come completely under the control, Megillus, of your ancestors. Next, according to the tradition, they decided to divide their army into three parts and to establish three states—Argos, Messene, and Lacedaemon.

683d

Megillus: Very true. Athenian: And Temenus became king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, and Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon. Megillus: Of course. Athenian: And all the people of that time swore that they would help these kings if anyone tried to wreck their kingdoms.

683e

Megillus: Quite so. Athenian: In the name of Zeus, is the dissolution of a kingdom, or of any government that has ever been dissolved, caused by anyone other than the rulers themselves? Or, though we asserted this a moment ago when we happened upon this subject, have we now forgotten it? Megillus: How could we possibly have forgotten? Athenian: Shall we, then, confirm that assertion further now? For it seems we have come to the same view now while dealing with historical facts, so that we will be examining it not in reference to a mere abstraction, but to real events. Now what actually happened was this: each of the three royal houses and the cities under their rule swore to one another, according to the laws they had made, which were binding alike on ruler and subject. The rulers swore that, as time went on and the nation advanced, they would not make their rule more oppressive; and the subjects swore that, as long as the rulers kept their promise, they would never overthrow the monarchy themselves, nor allow others to do so. And they swore that the kings would aid both kings and peoples when they were wronged, and the peoples would aid both peoples and kings. Wasn't that how it was?

684b

Megillus: It was. Athenian: In the polities legally established in the three states—whether by the kings or by others—wasn't this the most important principle? Megillus: What principle? Athenian: That the other two states should always come to help against the third, whenever it disobeyed the laws laid down. Megillus: Evidently. Athenian: And surely most people insist on this: that lawgivers shall enact laws of a kind that the mass of the people will accept willingly—just as one might insist that trainers or doctors make their treatments and cures of people's bodies pleasant.

684c

Megillus: Exactly so. Athenian: But in fact one often has to be content if one can bring a body into a sound and healthy state without a great deal of pain. Megillus: Very true.

684d

Athenian: The people of that age also had another advantage that did a great deal to make legislation easier. Megillus: What was that? Athenian: In their efforts to establish equality of property, their legislators were free from the worst of accusations, the one commonly incurred in states with laws of a different kind whenever someone tries to disturb the ownership of land or proposes canceling debts, because he sees that without these measures equality could never be fully secured. In such cases, if the lawgiver attempts to disturb any of these things, everyone confronts him with the cry “Hands off,” and they curse him for introducing redistributions of land and cancellations of debts, with the result that every man is left helpless. But the Dorians had this further advantage: they were free of all fear of causing resentment, so they could divide up their land without dispute; and they had no large debts of long standing.

684e

Megillus: True. Athenian: Then how was it, my good sirs, that their settlement and legislation turned out so badly?

685a

Megillus: What do you mean? What fault do you find with it? Athenian: This: although three states were settled, two of the three quickly wrecked their constitutions and their laws, and only one remained stable—and that was your state, Megillus. Megillus: That is no easy question. Athenian: Yet surely, in considering and investigating this subject—indulging in an old man's sober play with laws—we ought to proceed on our journey painlessly, as we said when we first set out.

685b

Megillus: Certainly, we must do as you say. Athenian: Well, what laws would offer a better subject for investigation than the laws by which those states were governed? Or what larger or more famous states are there whose settlement we might inquire into? Megillus: It would be hard to name better examples than these. Athenian: It is fairly clear that the people of that age intended this organization of theirs to serve as an adequate protection not only for the Peloponnese but for the whole of Hellas as well, in case any of the barbarians should attack them—just as those who formerly lived around Ilium were emboldened to undertake the Trojan War by relying on the power of Assyria as it had been in the reign of Ninus. For much of the splendor of that empire still survived, and the people of that age feared its united power, just as we today dread the Great King. Since Troy was part of the Assyrian empire, the second capture of Troy was a serious grievance against the Greeks. It was in view of all this that the Dorian army was at that time organized and distributed among three states under princes who were brothers, the sons of Heracles; and people thought the plan admirably devised, and the army's equipment superior even to that of the army that had sailed to Troy. For people considered, first, that in the sons of Heracles they had better leaders than the Pelopidae, and further, that this army was superior in valor to the army that went to Troy, since the latter, which was Achaean, had been defeated by the former, which was Dorian. Must we not suppose that it was in this way, and with this intention, that the people of that age organized themselves?

685e

Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: Isn't it also probable that they would suppose this arrangement to be stable and likely to last quite a long time, since they had shared many hardships and dangers together, were marshaled under leaders of a single family (their princes being brothers), and had, moreover, consulted a number of diviners, including the Delphian Apollo?

686a

Megillus: That is certainly probable. Athenian: But it seems that these great expectations quickly vanished, except, as we said, in the case of that small part, your state of Laconia; and ever since, down to the present day, this part has never stopped making war on the other two. For if the original intention had been carried out, and if they had been in agreement about their policy, it would have created a power invincible in war.

686b

Megillus: It certainly would. Athenian: How, then, and by what means was it destroyed? Isn't it worthwhile to inquire what stroke of fortune wrecked so great a confederacy? Megillus: Yes; for if someone passed over these examples, he would not be likely to find elsewhere either laws or constitutions that preserve such fine and great interests or, on the other hand, wreck them completely.

686c

Athenian: So by a piece of good luck, it seems, we have embarked on an inquiry of some importance. Megillus: Undoubtedly. Athenian: Now, my dear sir, don't people in general, just like us at this moment, unconsciously imagine that every fine thing they set eyes on would produce marvelous results if only someone knew the right way to make fine use of it? But for us to hold such an idea about the matter before us would possibly be both wrong and contrary to nature; and the same is true in all other cases where people hold such ideas.

686d

Megillus: What do you mean? And what shall we say is the particular point of your remarks? Athenian: Why, my dear sir, I was just laughing at myself. For when I looked at this armament we are talking about, I thought it an amazingly fine thing, and that, if anyone had made fine use of it at that time, it would have proved, as I said, a wonderful asset to the Greeks.

686e

Megillus: And wasn't it quite right and sensible of you to say this, and of us to agree? Athenian: Possibly. I imagine, however, that everyone who sees something large, powerful, and strong is immediately struck by the conviction that, if its owner knew how to use an instrument of that size and quality, he could make himself happy by many wonderful achievements.

687a

Megillus: Isn't that a correct conviction? Or what is your view? Athenian: Just consider what one ought to have in view in each case to justify giving such praise. First, with regard to the matter now under discussion: if the men who were then marshaling the army had known how to organize it properly, how would they have achieved success? Wouldn't it have been by establishing it firmly and preserving it forever, so that they would be both free themselves and masters over all others they chose, and so that both they and their descendants could do, in general, whatever they pleased throughout the whole world of Greeks and barbarians alike? Aren't these the reasons they would be praised?

687b

Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: And in every case where someone speaks in praise on seeing great wealth or eminent family distinctions or anything else of the kind, wouldn't it be true to say that in doing so he has this fact particularly in mind: that the possessor of such things is likely, just because of them, to realize all, or at least the most and greatest, of his desires? Megillus: That is certainly probable.

687c

Athenian: Come now, is there one object of desire common to all people—the one our argument now points to? Megillus: What is that? Athenian: The desire that, if possible, everything—or, failing that, all that is humanly possible—should happen in accordance with the commands of one's own heart. Megillus: To be sure. Athenian: Since, then, this is what we all always wish, in childhood, adulthood, and old age alike, it is necessarily this that we would pray for continually. Megillus: Of course.

687d

Athenian: Moreover, on behalf of our friends we will join them in making the same prayer that they make on their own behalf. Megillus: To be sure. Athenian: And a son is a friend to his father—the boy to the man. Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: Yet the father will often pray to the gods that the things the son prays to obtain may in no way be granted as the son prays. Megillus: Do you mean when the son who is praying is still young and foolish? Athenian: Yes, and also when the father, whether through old age or through the hot temper of youth, has no sense of what is right and just and indulges in the vehement prayers of passion (like those of Theseus against Hippolytus, who met an unhappy end), while the son, on the other hand, has a sense of justice—in that case do you suppose the son will join in his father's prayers?

687e

Megillus: I grasp your meaning. You mean, I suppose, that what a person ought to pray and strive for is not that everything should follow his own desire while his desire in no way follows his own reason; rather, it is the winning of wisdom that every one of us, states and individuals alike, ought to pray for and strive after.

688a–688d

Athenian: Yes. And what is more, I would remind you, as well as myself, of what was said (if you remember) at the outset: that the legislator of a state, in settling his legal ordinances, must always have regard to wisdom. Your instruction was that the good lawgiver must frame all his laws with a view to war. I, on the other hand, maintained that, whereas under your instruction the laws would be framed with reference to only one of the four virtues, it was really essential to look to the whole of virtue, and first and above all to pay regard to the leading virtue of the four, which is wisdom and reason and opinion, together with the love and desire that accompany them. Now the argument has come back again to the same point, and I now repeat what I said before—in jest, if you like, or else in earnest: I assert that prayer is a dangerous practice for someone who lacks reason, and that what he obtains is the opposite of what he desires. If you want to take me as speaking in earnest, then do so; for I fully expect that, as you follow the argument we set out a little while ago, you will now discover that the cause of the ruin of those kingdoms, and of their whole plan, was not cowardice or ignorance of warfare on the part of either the rulers or those who should have been their subjects; rather, what ruined them was badness of every other kind, and especially ignorance about the greatest of human concerns. That this was how events went then, and still go whenever such events occur, and will go in the same way in the future—this, with your permission, I will try to discover as the argument proceeds, and to make as clear as I can to you, my very good friends.

688d

Clinias: Verbal compliments are in poor taste, Stranger; but in deed, if not in word, we will pay you the highest compliment by following your discussion eagerly; and that is what best shows whether compliments are freely given or not. Megillus: Excellent, Clinias! Let us do just as you say.

688e

Clinias: So it shall be, God willing. Just go on. Athenian: Well then, to advance further along the path of our discussion: we assert that it was ignorance, in its greatest form, that destroyed at that time the power we have described, and that it naturally still produces the same results; and if this is so, it follows that the lawgiver must try to implant as much wisdom in states as possible, and to root out folly as far as he can. Clinias: Obviously.

689a

Athenian: What kind of ignorance would deserve to be called the greatest? See whether you will agree with my description; I take it to be ignorance of this kind— Clinias: What kind? Athenian: The kind we see in a person who hates, instead of loving, what he judges to be noble and good, while he loves and cherishes what he judges to be evil and unjust. This lack of harmony between the feelings of pain and pleasure and rational judgment is, I maintain, the extreme form of ignorance, and also the greatest, because it belongs to the main mass of the soul—for the part of the soul that feels pain and pleasure corresponds to the mass of the populace in the state. So whenever this part opposes what are by nature the ruling principles—knowledge, opinion, or reason—I call this condition folly, whether in a state, when the masses disobey the rulers and the laws, or in an individual, when the noble elements of reason present in the soul accomplish nothing good, but quite the opposite. All these I would count as the most discordant forms of ignorance, whether in the state or in the individual, and not the ignorance of the craftsman—if you grasp my meaning, Strangers.

689c

Clinias: We do, my dear sir, and we agree with it. Athenian: Then let it be resolved and declared as follows: no authority shall be entrusted to citizens who are ignorant in this way, but they shall be reproached for their ignorance, even if they are expert calculators and trained in all accomplishments and in everything that fosters quickness of mind; while those whose mental condition is the opposite of this shall be called wise, even if—as the saying goes—they can neither read nor swim; and to these latter, as people of sense, the government shall be entrusted. For without harmony, my friends, how could even the smallest fraction of wisdom exist? It is impossible. But the greatest and finest of harmonies would most rightly be considered the greatest wisdom; and whoever lives by reason has a share in it, whereas whoever lacks it will always prove to be a wrecker of his household and anything but a savior of the state, because of his ignorance in these matters. So let this declaration stand, as we said just now, as one of our axioms.

689e

Clinias: Yes, let it stand. Athenian: Our states, I presume, must have rulers and subjects. Clinias: Of course.

690a

Athenian: Very well then: what are the acknowledged rights or claims to ruling and being ruled, and how many are there, in states large and small alike, and in households? Isn't the right of father and mother one of them? And in general, wouldn't the claim of parents to rule over their offspring be a claim that is just everywhere? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: And next to this, the right of the noble to rule over the ignoble; and then, following these as a third claim, the right of older people to rule and of younger ones to be ruled. Clinias: To be sure.

690b

Athenian: The fourth right is that slaves ought to be ruled and masters ought to rule. Clinias: Undoubtedly. Athenian: And the fifth, I imagine, is that the stronger should rule and the weaker be ruled. Clinias: A truly compulsory form of rule! Athenian: Yes, and one that is very widespread among all kinds of creatures, being in accordance with nature, as Pindar of Thebes once said. The most important right, it seems, would be the sixth, which commands that the person without understanding should follow, and the wise person lead and rule. And yet, my most wise Pindar, this is something I for one would hardly call contrary to nature, but rather in accordance with it—the natural rule of law, without force, over willing subjects.

690c

Clinias: A very just observation. Athenian: Heaven's favor and good luck mark the seventh form of rule, in which we bring a person forward for a drawing of lots and declare that, if he wins the lot, he will most justly be ruler, but if he fails, he shall take his place among the ruled. Clinias: Very true.

690d–690e

Athenian: Do you see, legislator—this is how we might playfully address one of those who lightly set out on the task of legislation—how many rights belong to rulers, and how they are naturally opposed to one another? Here we have now discovered a source of factions, which you must remedy. So, first, join us in inquiring how it happened, and through what violation of those rights, that the kings of Argos and Messene brought ruin both on themselves and on the power of Hellas, splendid as it was at that time. Wasn't it through ignorance of Hesiod's very true saying that often the half is greater than the whole? For whenever taking the whole is harmful while the half is the due measure, he considered the due measure to be more than the excess, as the better is more than the worse.

690e

Clinias: Most true, indeed. Athenian: Is it our view, then, that this causes ruin when it occurs in kings, rather than when it occurs in peoples?

691a

Clinias: Probably this is, for the most part, a disease of kings, in whom luxury breeds an arrogant way of life. Athenian: Isn't it plain that what those kings strove for first was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in harmony with one another about the pledge they had approved both by word and by oath? And this discord—reputed to be wisdom, but really, as we affirm, the height of ignorance—through its grating dissonance and lack of harmony brought the whole Greek world to ruin. Clinias: It certainly seems so.

691b

Athenian: Very well then: what precaution should the legislator have taken in his enactments at that time to guard against the growth of this disorder? In the name of the gods, to see that now requires no great wisdom, nor is it hard to state; but the person who foresaw it in those days—if it could possibly have been foreseen—would have been wiser than we are. Megillus: What are you referring to? Athenian: If one looks at what has happened among you Lacedaemonians, Megillus, it is easy to see, and having seen it, to state, what ought to have been done at that time. Megillus: Speak even more clearly. Athenian: The clearest statement would be this— Megillus: What?

691c–691d

Athenian: If one neglects the rule of due measure and gives too much power to things too small to bear it—sails to ships, food to bodies, offices of rule to souls—then everything is overturned; and, through excess of insolence, some run into bodily disorders, others into that offspring of insolence, injustice. What, then, is our conclusion? Isn't it this? There does not exist, my friends, a mortal soul whose nature, when young and unaccountable, will ever be able to bear holding the highest ruling position on earth without having its mind filled with that greatest of disorders, folly, and earning the hatred of its nearest friends; and when this happens, it quickly ruins the soul itself and wipes out all its power. To guard against this, by recognizing the due measure, is the task of the great lawgiver. So the most reasonable conjecture we can now make about what happened at that time seems to be this—

691d

Megillus: What? Athenian: To begin with, there was a god watching over you; and he, foreseeing the future, confined the royal power within due bounds by making your line of kings twofold instead of single. Next, a man in whom human nature was blended with a certain divine power, seeing that your government was still swollen with fever, blended the self-willed strength of the royal stock with the moderating power of age, by giving the power of the twenty-eight elders equal weight with that of the kings in the most important matters. Then your third savior, seeing your government still fretting and fuming, curbed it, so to speak, with the power of the ephors, which came close to government by lot. So in your case, according to this account, because the kingship was blended of the right elements and possessed due measure, it not only survived itself but ensured the survival of everything else. For if the matter had been left to Temenus and Cresphontes and the lawgivers of their day—whoever those lawgivers really were—not even the portion of Aristodemus could ever have survived; for they were not fully expert in the art of legislation. Otherwise they could hardly have thought it enough to restrain by sworn pledges a young soul endowed with power that might grow into a tyranny. But now God has shown what kind of government there ought to have been then, and ought to be now, if it is to endure. For us to understand this after the event is, as I said before, no great sign of wisdom, since it is not at all difficult to draw an inference from a past example. But if at the time there had been someone who foresaw the result and was able to moderate the ruling powers and make one out of the three, he would have preserved all the grand designs formed then, and no Persian or other armament would ever have set out against Greece or held us in contempt as a people of little account.

692c–692d

Clinias: True.

692d–692e

Athenian: The way they drove off the Persians, Clinias, was disgraceful. But when I say disgraceful, I do not mean that they did not win fine victories on both land and sea in those victorious campaigns. What I call disgraceful is this: first, only one of those three states defended Greece, while the other two were so basely corrupt that one of them actually prevented Lacedaemon from helping Greece by making war on her with all its might, and the other, Argos—which ranked first of the three in the days of the Dorian settlement—when called on to help against the barbarian, paid no attention and gave no help. One would have to bring many discreditable charges against Greece in relating the events of that war;

692e–693c

Athenian: Indeed, it would be wrong to say that Greece defended herself. For if the slavery that threatened her had not been fended off by the joint policy of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, practically all the Greek peoples would by now have been mixed up together, barbarians with Greeks and Greeks with barbarians—just as the peoples under the Persian empire today are either scattered or jumbled together and live in a miserable condition. These, Megillus and Clinias, are the charges we have to bring against the so-called statesmen and lawgivers, both of the past and of the present, so that, by investigating their causes, we may discover what different course should have been followed. So in the case before us, we called it a blunder to establish by law a government that is great or unblended, because our idea is that a state ought to be free and wise and at friendship with itself, and that the lawgiver should legislate with this in view. Nor should it surprise us that, although we have often already proposed aims at which, as we say, the legislator should aim in his legislation, the various aims thus proposed seem to differ. One needs to reflect that when self-control, or wisdom, or friendship is stated to be the aim in view, these are not really different aims but the same one; and if we meet with many other such terms, we should not let this disturb us.

693c–693d

Clinias: We will try to keep this in mind as we go back over the arguments. But for now, regarding friendship, wisdom, and freedom—tell us what you meant to say the lawgiver ought to aim at.

693d–693e

Athenian: Listen, then. There are two mother forms of constitution, so to speak, from which one may truly say all the rest are derived. One of these is properly called monarchy, the other democracy; the extreme form of the former is the Persian polity, and of the latter the Athenian. Practically all the rest, as I said, are variations of these two. Now a polity must share in both of these forms if it is to have freedom and friendliness combined with wisdom. And that is what our argument means to require when it declares that a state that has no share in these can never be rightly constituted.

693e

Clinias: It could not. Athenian: Since the one embraced monarchy and the other freedom, unmixed and in excess, neither has either in due measure. Your Laconian and Cretan states are better in this respect, as the Athenian and Persian states were in old times—in contrast to their present condition. Shall we set out the reasons for this?

694a

Clinias: By all means—that is, if we mean to complete the task we have set ourselves. Athenian: Let us listen, then. When the Persians under Cyrus kept the right balance between slavery and freedom, they first became free themselves and then masters of many others. For when the rulers gave their subjects a share of freedom and raised them to a position of equality, the soldiers were friendlier toward their commanders and showed their devotion in times of danger. And if there was any wise man among them able to give counsel, then, since the king was not jealous but allowed free speech and honored those who could help at all with their counsel, such a man had the opportunity to contribute the fruit of his wisdom to the common store. So at that time all their affairs made progress, thanks to their freedom, friendliness, and mutual sharing of reason.

694b–694c

Clinias: That is probably more or less how the matters you speak of took place.

694c

Athenian: How did it happen, then, that they were ruined in the reign of Cambyses and nearly restored again under Darius? Shall I use a kind of divination to picture this? Clinias: Yes; that will certainly help us get a view of what we are looking for. Athenian: What I now divine about Cyrus is this: although in other respects he was a good and patriotic commander, he had no proper education at all and had paid no attention to managing his household. Clinias: What makes us say this?

694d

Athenian: He probably spent his whole life from boyhood on campaign and left his children to the women to raise. And they brought them up from earliest childhood as though they had already attained Heaven's favor and happiness and lacked no heavenly gift; and so, by treating them as the special favorites of Heaven, forbidding anyone to oppose them in anything, and compelling everyone to praise their every word and deed, they raised them to be what they became. Clinias: A fine upbringing, I would say!

694e

Athenian: Say rather a feminine upbringing by royal women who had recently grown rich, who raised the children while the men were away, kept busy by many dangers and wars. Clinias: That sounds reasonable. Athenian: And their father, while acquiring flocks and sheep and plenty of herds, both of men and of many other possessions, did not know that the children to whom he was going to leave them were not being trained in their father's craft. This craft was Persian—for the Persians were shepherds, offspring of a rugged land—and it was a hard one, fit to produce shepherds of great strength, able to camp in the open, to keep watch without sleep, and, if need be, to go on campaign. He overlooked the fact that his sons were trained by women and eunuchs in the Median fashion, and that the indulgence shown them as Heaven's darlings had ruined their training; as a result they became just what one would expect of those raised in an upbringing that spared the rod. So when, at the death of Cyrus, his sons took over the kingdom, overindulged and undisciplined as they were, first one of them killed the other, out of resentment at being put on an equal footing with him; and soon afterward, maddened by drink and lack of education, he lost his own throne at the hands of the Medes, under the man then called the Eunuch, who despised the stupidity of Cambyses.

695b–695c

Clinias: That is certainly the story, and it is probably close to the truth.

695c

Athenian: Further, the story says that the kingdom was restored to the Persians through Darius and the Seven. Clinias: It does. Athenian: Let us follow the story and see how things went. Darius was not a king's son, nor had he been raised in luxury. When he came and seized the kingdom with his six companions, he divided it into seven parts, of which some small traces still remain today. He saw fit to govern it by enacting laws into which he introduced a measure of political equality, and he also incorporated into the law regulations about the tribute money that Cyrus had promised the Persians. In this way he secured friendliness and fellowship among all classes of Persians and won over the common people with money and gifts; and because of this, the devotion of his armies won him as much additional land as Cyrus had originally left behind. After Darius came Xerxes, who was again brought up with the luxurious upbringing of a royal house. Darius—for this is how one may rightly address the father—how is it that you ignored the blunder of Cyrus and raised Xerxes in just the same habits of life in which Cyrus raised Cambyses? And Xerxes, being the product of the same training, ended by repeating almost exactly the misfortunes of Cambyses. Since then there has hardly ever been a single Persian king who was truly, and not just in name, Great.

695e–696b

Athenian: And, as our argument asserts, the cause of this does not lie in luck, but in the evil life that is usually lived by the sons of exceptionally rich men and of tyrants; for such an upbringing can never produce a boy or a man or a gray-haired elder of outstanding goodness. To this, we say, the lawgiver must pay attention—as must we ourselves on the present occasion. It is proper, however, my Lacedaemonian friends, to give your state credit for at least this: you assign no different honor or training whatever to poverty or wealth, to the commoner or the king, beyond what your original oracle declared at the command of some god. Nor indeed is it right that preeminent honors in a state should be given to someone because he is especially wealthy, any more than it is right to give them because he is swift or handsome or strong without any virtue, or with a virtue that lacks self-control.

696b

Megillus: What do you mean by that, Stranger? Athenian: Courage is, presumably, one part of virtue. Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: Now that you have heard the argument, judge for yourself whether you would welcome as a housemate or neighbor a man who is extremely courageous but unrestrained rather than self-controlled.

696c

Megillus: Don't even suggest such a thing! Athenian: Well then, a man who is wise in arts and crafts, but unjust? Megillus: Certainly not. Athenian: But justice, surely, does not grow apart from self-control. Megillus: Impossible. Athenian: Nor does the man we just put forward as our model of wisdom—the man whose feelings of pleasure and pain are in harmony with the dictates of right reason and obey them. Megillus: No, indeed.

696d

Athenian: Here is a further point we must consider in order to judge about the awarding of honors in states—when it is right and when it is wrong. Megillus: What point? Athenian: If self-control existed alone in a person's soul, separated from all the rest of virtue, would it justly be held in honor, or the opposite? Megillus: I cannot tell what answer to give. Athenian: Yet in fact you have given an answer, and a reasonable one. For if you had declared for either of the alternatives in my question, you would, in my view, have said something quite out of tune. Megillus: So it has turned out all right. Athenian: Very good. Accordingly, the additional element in things deserving honor or dishonor will be something that calls not for speech so much as for a kind of speechless silence.

696e

Megillus: I suppose you mean self-control. Athenian: Yes. And of the rest, the one that, with self-control added, benefits us most would most deserve to be held in the highest honor, and the one second in benefit should be second in honor; and so with each of the others in turn—it will be proper to assign to each the honor due to its rank.

697a

Megillus: Just so. Athenian: Well then, shall we not declare that distributing these things is the lawgiver's task? Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: Would you like us to hand the whole distribution over to him, to deal with every case and all the details, while we—since we too are enthusiasts for law—confine ourselves to a threefold division and try to distinguish what comes first in importance, and what second and third? Megillus: By all means. Athenian: We declare, then, that a state that is to endure and to be as happy as it is possible for human beings to be must of necessity distribute honors and dishonors rightly. And the right way is this: it shall be laid down that the goods of the soul are highest in honor and come first, provided that the soul possesses self-control; second come the good and fine things of the body; and third the so-called goods of substance and property. And if any lawgiver or state violates these rules, either by promoting wealth to honors or by raising one of the lower goods to a higher rank through honors, he will be guilty of an offense against both religion and statesmanship. Shall this be our declaration, or what?

697c

Megillus: By all means let us declare this plainly. Athenian: It was our investigation of the Persian polity that led us to discuss these matters at greater length. We find that they grew still worse; and the reason, we say, is that by robbing the common people of too much of their liberty and introducing despotism to excess, they destroyed the bonds of friendliness and fellowship in the state. And when these are destroyed, the policy of the rulers no longer looks to the good of the subjects and the common people, but only to the maintenance of their own power. If they think it will profit them in the slightest degree, they are ready at any time to overturn cities and to overturn and burn up friendly nations; and so they both hate and are hated with a fierce and ruthless hatred. And when they come to need the common people to fight on their behalf, they find in them no patriotism and no readiness to risk their lives in battle. So although they have countless tens of thousands of men, all of them are useless for war, and they hire soldiers from abroad as though they were short of men, and imagine that their safety will be secured by hirelings and foreigners.

697e–698a

Athenian: And besides all this, they inevitably display their ignorance, since by their actions they declare that the things considered honorable and noble in a state are never anything but worthless trash compared with silver and gold.

698a

Megillus: Very true. Athenian: So let this be the end of our account of the Persian empire, and of how its present bad administration is due to an excess of slavery and despotism. Megillus: By all means. Athenian: Next we ought to examine the Attic constitution in the same way, and show how complete liberty, unrestrained by any authority, is far inferior to a moderate form of government under other magistrates. At the time when the Persians made their assault on the Greeks—and indeed, one might say, on nearly all the nations of Europe—we Athenians had an ancient constitution and magistracies based on a fourfold grading by property; and we had Reverence, which acted as a kind of queen, causing us to live as willing slaves of the laws then in force. Moreover, the vastness of the Persian armament that threatened us by both sea and land, through the desperate fear it inspired, bound us still more tightly in the bonds of slavery to our rulers and our laws; and because of all this, our friendliness toward one another and our patriotism were greatly strengthened. It was just about ten years before the sea battle at Salamis that the Persian force arrived under Datis, whom Darius had sent expressly against the Athenians and Eretrians, with orders to bring them back in chains, and with the warning that death would be the penalty if he failed. So within a very short time Datis, with his many tens of thousands, captured the entire Eretrian population by force; and he sent an alarming report on to Athens that not a single Eretrian had escaped him: the soldiers of Datis had joined hands and swept the whole of Eretria clean, as if with a dragnet. This report—whether true, or whatever its origin—struck terror into the Greeks in general, and especially the Athenians; but when they sent out embassies in every direction to seek help, everyone refused except the Lacedaemonians. And they were held back by the war they were then waging against Messene, and possibly by other obstacles we have no information about, with the result that they arrived one day too late for the battle that took place at Marathon. After this, endless threats and reports of huge preparations kept arriving from the Persian king.

698e–699d

Athenian: Then, as time went on, news came that Darius was dead, and that his son, who had succeeded to the throne, was young and hotheaded and still determined on the planned expedition. The Athenians imagined that all these preparations were aimed at them because of what had happened at Marathon; and when they heard how a canal had been dug through Athos and a bridge thrown across the Hellespont, and were told of the vast number of ships in the Persian fleet, they felt that there was no salvation for them by land, nor yet by sea. By land, they had no hope that anyone would come to their aid; for they remembered how, when the Persians first came and subjugated Eretria, nobody helped them or ventured to join them in the fight; and so they expected that the same thing would happen again this time. By sea, too, they saw no hope of safety, with more than a thousand warships bearing down on them. They saw only one hope of safety—a slight and desperate one, it is true, but the only one—and they drew it from the events of the past, when victory in battle had seemed to spring out of a desperate situation. Buoyed up by this hope, they realized that they must rely for refuge on themselves alone and on the gods. So all this created friendliness among them toward one another—both the fear that gripped them then and the fear born of the past, which they had acquired through their subjection to the former laws. This is the fear that, in our earlier discussions, we have often called reverence, saying that a man must be subject to it if he is to be good (though the coward is free of it and unafraid of it). If this fear had not seized our people then, they would never have united in self-defense, nor would they have defended their temples and tombs and fatherland, and their relatives and friends as well, in the way they then came to the rescue; instead, we would all have been broken up at that time and scattered one by one in every direction.

699d

Megillus: What you say, Stranger, is perfectly true, and worthy of your country as well as of yourself. Athenian: That is so, Megillus; and it is proper to mention the events of that period to you, since you share in the native character of your ancestors. But both you and Clinias must now consider whether what we are saying is at all relevant to our lawmaking; for I am not telling my story for its own sake, but for the sake of the lawmaking I speak of. Just think: since we Athenians suffered practically the same fate as the Persians—they through reducing their people to the extreme of slavery, and we, on the contrary, through urging our populace on to the extreme of liberty—what are we to say happened next, if what we said earlier has been anywhere near correct?

700a

Megillus: Well said! But try to make your meaning still clearer to us. Athenian: I will. Under the old laws, my friends, our common people had control over nothing, but were, so to speak, voluntary slaves to the laws. Megillus: What laws do you mean? Athenian: First, those that dealt with the music of that age—so that we may describe from the beginning how the life of excessive liberty grew up. Among us at that time, music was divided into various classes and styles. One class of song consisted of prayers to the gods, which were called hymns; opposed to this was another class, best called dirges; paeans formed another; and yet another was the dithyramb, named, I imagine, after Dionysus. Nomes, too, were so called as being a distinct class of song, and these were further described as citharoedic nomes. With these and other kinds classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different class of tune. The authority whose duty it was to know these regulations, and, knowing them, to apply them in its judgments and to penalize the disobedient, was not the pipe, nor, as now, the unmusical shouting of the mob, nor yet the clapping that signals applause. Instead, those in charge of education made it a rule that they themselves would listen in silence throughout, while the children, their attendants, and the general crowd were kept in order by the discipline of the rod. In the matter of music the populace willingly submitted to orderly control and refrained from presuming to judge by uproar. But later on, as time went by, there arose poets as leaders of unmusical lawlessness—men who, though poetic by nature, were ignorant of what was just and lawful in music. Frenzied and possessed more than was proper by a spirit of pleasure, they mixed dirges with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs, imitated flute tunes with harp tunes, and blended every kind of music with every other. And so, through their folly, they unintentionally bore false witness against music, as though it had no standard of correctness at all and its best criterion were the pleasure of the listener, whether he is a good man or a bad one.

700e–701b

Athenian: By compositions of this kind, set to similar words, they bred in the populace a spirit of lawlessness regarding music and the effrontery of thinking themselves capable of judging it. As a result, theater audiences became noisy instead of silent, as though they knew the difference between good and bad music, and in place of an aristocracy in music there arose a kind of base theatrocracy. For if a democracy of free men had arisen only in music, the result would not have been so very alarming; but as it was, the universal conceit of universal wisdom and the contempt for law began in music, and on the heels of these came liberty. For thinking themselves knowledgeable, people became fearless; and audacity fathered effrontery. For to be unafraid of the opinion of a better person because of self-confidence is nothing other than base effrontery, and it is brought about by a liberty that is audacious to excess.

701b

Megillus: Most true. Athenian: Next after this form of liberty would come the liberty that refuses to submit to the rulers; and following that, the avoidance of submission to one's parents and elders and their warnings; then, as the next-to-last stage, comes the effort to disregard the laws; while the very last stage is to lose all respect for oaths and pledges and the gods—in which people display and reproduce the character of the Titans of legend, who are said to have returned to their original state, dragging out a painful existence with never any rest from misery. What, again, is our purpose in saying all this? Clearly I must, every time, rein in my discussion like a horse, and not let it run away with me as though it had no bridle in its mouth, and so take a tumble off the donkey (as the saying goes). So I must once more repeat my question and ask: for what purpose has all this been said?

701d

Megillus: Very good. Athenian: What has just been said bears on the purposes stated earlier. Megillus: What were they? Athenian: We said that the lawgiver must aim at three objectives in his legislation: to make the state he is legislating for free, at unity with itself, and possessed of good sense. That was what we said, wasn't it? Megillus: Certainly.

701e

Athenian: With these purposes in view, we selected the most despotic of polities and the most completely free, and we are now inquiring which of these is rightly constituted. When we took a moderate example of each—of despotic rule on the one hand and of liberty on the other—we observed that at that time they enjoyed prosperity in the highest degree; but when they advanced, the one to the extreme of slavery and the other to the extreme of liberty, neither the one nor the other gained anything.

702a

Megillus: Most true. Athenian: With the same purposes in view we also surveyed the settlement of the Dorian army, the homes of Dardanus at the foot of the hills, the colony by the sea, and the first people who survived the Flood, together with our earlier discussions about music and revelry, as well as everything that came before these. The purpose of all these discussions was to discover how a state might best be managed and how the individual citizen might best live his life. But as for the value of our conclusions, what test can we apply in talking among ourselves, Megillus and Clinias?

702b–702d

Clinias: I think, Stranger, that I can see one. It is a piece of good luck for me that we have dealt with all these matters in our discussion. For I myself have now nearly reached the point where I will need them, and my meeting with you and Megillus here came at just the right time. I will not hide from you what has happened to me; in fact, I count it as a sign from Heaven. Most of Crete is undertaking to found a colony, and it has put the Knossians in charge of the undertaking, and the city of Knossos has entrusted it to me and nine others. We are also instructed to frame laws, choosing whichever ones we please, either from our own local laws or from those of other countries, without objecting to their foreign character, provided only that they seem superior. So let us grant this favor to me and to yourselves as well: let us select from what we have said and build up in argument the framework of a state, as though we were establishing it from the foundation. In this way we will at the same time be investigating our subject, and I may possibly also make use of our framework for the state that is to be formed.

702d

Athenian: Your proclamation, Clinias, is certainly not a declaration of war! So if Megillus has no objection, you may count on me to do all I can to grant your wish. Clinias: That is good to hear. Megillus: And you can count on me too.

702e

Clinias: Splendid of you both! But first, let us try to found the state in words.

704a

Athenian: Now, what sort of State are we proposing? I am not asking for its present name or the name it will have in the future; since that might come from the circumstances of its founding or from a place, or a river or spring or some local deity might give its sacred name to the new State. What I want to know is this: will it be inland or on the coast?

704b

Clinias: The State I just mentioned, Stranger, lies roughly eighty stades from the sea. Athenian: Does it have harbors on the coast, or none at all? Clinias: It has excellent harbors on that side, Stranger, none better.

704c

Athenian: Oh, how unfortunate! What about the surrounding country? Does it produce everything, or are some products lacking? Clinias: It lacks practically nothing. Athenian: Will any other State border it? Clinias: None at all, and that is the reason for settling it. People emigrated from this district long ago, and the country has been deserted for a very long time. Athenian: How about plains, mountains and forests? How much of each does it have?

704d

Clinias: Overall, it is like the rest of Crete. Athenian: You would call it hilly rather than level? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Then its obstacles to developing virtue would not be beyond remedy. If the State were on the coast, with fine harbors, but lacked many products instead of producing everything, it would need a powerful savior and divine lawgivers to keep these circumstances from producing all kinds of luxurious and corrupt habits. As things stand, those eighty stades provide some comfort. Still, it is too close to the sea, especially since its harbors are good, as you say. But we must make the best of that. The sea really is a salty and bitter neighbor, although its closeness offers some sweetness in everyday life; by filling the city’s markets with foreign goods and retail trade, and teaching people to cheat and deceive, it makes the city untrustworthy and unfriendly both to its own people and to the rest of the world. But our State has a compensating advantage: it produces everything; since it is hilly, it cannot produce everything in great quantities; if it produced large surpluses for export, gold and silver money would flood back in. Perhaps nothing is more destructive to a State’s development of noble and just ways of life, as we said in our earlier discussion, if you remember.

705b

Clinias: We remember, and we agree with what you said then and now.

705c

Athenian: Then how well supplied is our district with timber for shipbuilding? Clinias: There is no fir to speak of, or pine, and there is very little cypress. There is not much larch or plane either, which shipbuilders always need for the interior fittings of ships. Athenian: Those, too, are natural features that would be good for the country. Clinias: Why?

705d

Athenian: It is good for a State to find it difficult to copy its enemies’ bad habits. Clinias: Which of our earlier points does that refer to? Athenian: My friend, keep an eye on what I say, and remember our opening statement about the Cretan laws. We said those laws had a single aim. You said that aim was military strength. I replied that laws should indeed aim at virtue, but I strongly objected to restricting that aim to one part of virtue rather than the whole. So now, in turn, watch the laws I propose as you follow the discussion, in case any of them fails to promote virtue or promotes only part of it.

705e

Athenian: My principle is that a law is rightly made only if, like an archer, it always aims solely at what is accompanied by lasting beauty. It must pass over every other target, whether wealth or anything else of that kind that lacks beauty. To show how people living by the sea and harassed by enemies come to imitate their enemies’ bad habits, I will give you an example (without wishing, of course, to bring back painful memories). When Minos long ago forced the people of Attica to pay a crushing tribute, he had great naval power, while they had no warships like the ones they have now, and their country did not have enough timber for them to build a fleet easily. So they could not quickly copy their enemies’ naval methods and drive them off by becoming sailors themselves. In fact, it would have been better for them to lose seven children many times over rather than to become marines instead of steadfast infantrymen. Marines become accustomed to repeatedly jumping ashore and running back at full speed to their ships. They feel no shame at failing to die bravely at their posts when the enemy attacks. People readily excuse them as a matter of course when they throw away their weapons and take to what they call an honorable retreat. These are the usual results of employing naval troops, and they deserve the exact opposite of endless praise. We should never accustom people to degrading habits, especially the best of the citizens. Even Homer could have taught us that such an institution is not noble. He has Odysseus rebuke Agamemnon for ordering the Achaeans to haul down their ships to the sea, when the Trojans were pressing them in battle. In his anger he says: “Are you telling our people to haul their ships with their fine benches toward the sea while war and shouting surround us? That will fulfill the Trojans’ prayers, and bring utter destruction on us! Once the ships are drawn toward the sea, our Achaeans will no longer keep fighting, but will look behind them and leave the battle. That is how destructive your advice will prove.” (Homer, Iliad 14.96)

707a

Athenian: So Homer, too, knew that triremes lined up in the sea alongside infantry fighting on land are a bad thing: even lions with habits like these would grow accustomed to running away from female deer! Moreover, States that depend on navies for their power give honors, as rewards for their safety, to a part of their forces that is not the best; they owe their safety to the skills of the pilot, captain, and rower, all kinds of men and not very respectable ones, so it would be impossible to award each of them honors justly. But how can a State be well governed if it cannot get this right?

707b

Clinias: It is almost impossible. Nevertheless, Stranger, it was the naval battle at Salamis, fought by the Greeks against the barbarians, that saved Greece, at least according to us Cretans. Athenian: Yes, that is what is said by most of the Greeks and barbarians. But our friend Megillus and I say that the land battle at Marathon began the rescue of Greece, and the battle at Plataea completed it; we also say that these battles made the Greeks better, whereas the naval battles made them worse, if we may speak that way about battles that helped at that time to save us (for I will let you count Artemisium also as a naval battle, as well as Salamis). But our present aim is political excellence, so we are considering a country’s natural character and its legal arrangements. Unlike most people, we regard the greatest possible goodness, gained and kept throughout life, as more precious than mere safety and survival. I believe we said this before, too.

707d

Clinias: It was. Athenian: Then let us consider just this: are we following the same road we chose before as the best for States when founding settlements and framing laws?

707e

Clinias: The best by far. Athenian: Next, tell me who the settlers will be. Will they include everyone who wants to go from anywhere in Crete, assuming that every city’s population has outgrown its food supply? You are not, I assume, gathering everyone who wants to go from Greece; Athenian: although I do see settlers in your country from Argos, Aegina, and other parts of Greece. So tell us where the citizens in this new expedition are likely to come from.

708a

Clinias: The settlers will probably come from the whole of Crete. Among the other Greeks, they seem most willing to admit people from the Peloponnese as fellow-settlers. As you just said, we do have people from Argos here, including our most famous clan, the Gortynians, whose settlement came from Gortys in the Peloponnese.

708b

Athenian: States will find settlement easier in some respects when, like a swarm of bees, a single people leaves one country to settle elsewhere, departing as friends from friends because there is too little room or some other urgent need. At times, too, violent internal conflict might force a whole part of a State to emigrate; and on one occasion an entire State went into exile, after being completely crushed by an overwhelming attack. Such cases make settlement and lawmaking easier in one respect but harder in another. When the people have a common ancestry, language, and laws, their unity encourages friendship, since they also share sacred rites and religious practices. But such a group does not readily accept laws or constitutions different from those of its homeland. Again, if such a group has broken away because bad laws led to internal conflict, yet long habit makes it cling to the very customs that ruined it, it will be difficult and unmanageable for whoever directs its settlement and laws. On the other hand, a people formed from several different groups might accept new laws more readily. But giving it a common spirit and making it breathe together, as they say, like a team of horses would take a long time and be extremely difficult. In fact, lawmaking and founding States require people who surpass everyone else in goodness.

708d

Clinias: Very probably; but explain more clearly what these remarks mean.

708e

Athenian: My friend, as our investigation returns to lawgivers, I may have to say something that reflects badly on them. But if it is relevant, there will be no harm in it. Why should I worry? Practically all human affairs seem to be in the same situation. Clinias: What is it you refer to? Athenian: I was about to say that nobody ever makes laws: all kinds of chance events and accidents make all our laws for us. Sometimes war violently overturns constitutions and changes laws; sometimes it is the suffering caused by severe poverty. Disease, too, often forces political change when epidemics strike and bad seasons recur for many years. Considering all this, we might reasonably say, as I just did, that no mortal makes any law and that human affairs are almost entirely matters of chance. But although this may seem entirely true of seafaring and the skills of the pilot, doctor, and general, something else can be said about these same things with equal truth.

709b

Clinias: What is that? Athenian: God controls everything, and Chance and Opportunity work with God in directing all human affairs. But it is less harsh to admit a third factor alongside these two: skill. I would certainly consider it a great advantage for a pilot’s skill to work together with Opportunity. Wouldn’t you?

709c

Clinias: It is. Athenian: Then the same reasoning must apply to the other cases, including lawmaking. When a country has all the other fortunate circumstances needed for a successful settlement, its State still needs a lawgiver who holds firmly to the truth.

709d

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Then couldn’t a person skilled in any of these crafts pray for just the right conditions, so that, if Chance provided them, only his own skill would still be needed? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: And if all those other craftsmen were asked to say what they were praying for, they could tell us, couldn’t they? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: And the lawgiver, I suppose, could do the same? Clinias: I suppose so. Athenian: Let us ask him, “Lawgiver, what should we give you, and in what condition should the State be, so that once you receive it you can successfully manage it yourself?”

709e

Clinias: What would be the right answer? Athenian: You mean the lawgiver’s answer? Clinias: Yes. Athenian: This is what he will say: Give me a State ruled by a tyrant. Let the tyrant be young, naturally gifted with a good memory, quick intelligence, courage, and a noble manner; and let his soul also have that quality which, as we said before, must accompany every part of virtue if his other qualities are to have any value.

710a

Clinias: I think, Megillus, that the Stranger means self-control must accompany the other qualities. Doesn’t he? Athenian: Yes, Clinias; ordinary self-control, not what people mean when, using philosophical language, they identify self-control with wisdom. I mean the natural tendency that appears from birth in children and animals, making some unable to restrain themselves in seeking pleasure and others able to do so. We said that, apart from the many things called goods, this tendency had no value. You understand, of course, what I mean.

710b

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Then let our tyrant have this natural quality alongside the others, if the State is to acquire, as quickly and successfully as possible, the constitution it needs for the happiest life. No quicker or better way of establishing a constitution exists or could ever arise.

710c

Clinias: How could someone convince himself that this is true, Stranger? What argument would establish it? Athenian: At least this is easy to see, Clinias: it is naturally as I have described. Clinias: What do you mean? Provided, you say, that there is a young tyrant with self-control, a quick mind, a good memory, courage, and a noble manner? Athenian: Add good fortune, too: not in other respects, but in having a praiseworthy lawgiver appear during his lifetime and, through good fortune, meet him; if that happened, God would have done almost everything he does when he wants a State to prosper exceptionally well. The second-best situation would have two such rulers; the third-best would have three, and so on. The more rulers there are, the greater the difficulty; the fewer there are, the less the difficulty.

710d

Clinias: Apparently you mean that the best State could develop from a tyranny with an outstanding lawgiver and a well-behaved tyrant, and that this would make the change easiest and quickest. An oligarchy would come second, or is that not what you mean, and a democracy third?

710e

Athenian: Not at all. The easiest change is from tyranny, the next easiest from kingship, and the third from some form of democracy. Oligarchy comes fourth: the best State would develop from it only with the greatest difficulty, because it has the most rulers. Athenian: What I say is that the change takes place when nature provides a true lawgiver and the most powerful people in the State happen to share his policy; wherever the rulers are both strongest and fewest, changes are usually quickest and easiest.

711a

Clinias: How? We do not understand. Athenian: But surely I have said it many times, not just once. Still, you have probably never even seen a State ruled by a tyrant. Clinias: No, and I have no desire to see one.

711b

Athenian: But it would give you an example of what we just discussed. Clinias: What was that? Athenian: When a tyrant decides to change a State’s moral habits, he needs neither great effort nor a very long time. He must first lead the way himself, whether he wants the citizens to practice virtue or the opposite; he must set an example, praising and honoring some things, condemning others, and disgracing those who disobey according to what each has done.

711c

Clinias: Yes, we may perhaps suppose that the rest of the citizens will quickly follow the ruler who adopts such a combination of persuasion and force. Athenian: My friends, let no one persuade us that a State could ever change its laws more quickly or easily than through its rulers’ personal example. No other method could do so, now or in the future. That is not what we find difficult or impossible to achieve. The difficult thing is something that has happened only rarely over long ages, but whenever it happens it brings a State countless blessings of every kind.

711d

Clinias: What result do you mean? Athenian: I mean the rare occasion when a divinely inspired desire for self-controlled and just institutions arises in people in high positions, whether they are tyrants, exceptionally wealthy or well born, or perhaps like Nestor, who, they say, surpassed everyone in eloquence and surpassed them even more in self-control. That was in the Trojan age, they say, certainly not in our time. Still, if such a man has existed, will exist, or exists among us now, his life is blessed, and so are the people who listen together to his words of self-control.

711e

Athenian: The same rule applies to power in general: whenever the greatest power meets wisdom and self-control in one person, the seed of the best constitution is planted. It can never come about in any other way. Take this as a story spoken by an oracle. Let us regard it as established that founding a well-governed State is difficult in one respect, but, given the condition we have described, far easier and quicker than anything else.

712a

Clinias: No doubt.

712b

Athenian: Let us apply the oracle to your State and try, like old men playing at being boys, to shape its laws in our discussion. Clinias: Yes, let us go on without further delay. Athenian: Let us call on God to be present as we establish the State. May he listen and, having listened, come to us with favor and kindness to help us shape the State and its laws. Clinias: Yes, may he come! Athenian: Then what form of constitution do we intend to give the State?

712c

Clinias: What exactly do you mean? Explain more clearly. I mean, is it a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy? Surely you cannot mean a tyranny. We could never suppose that. Athenian: Which of you would like to answer first and tell me which of these types describes his own constitution at home? Megillus: Shouldn’t I answer first, since I am older?

712d

Clinias: No doubt. Megillus: To be honest, Stranger, when I think about the Spartan constitution, I do not know what to call it. It seems to me to resemble a tyranny, since its board of ephors has extraordinarily tyrannical powers; yet sometimes it strikes me as, of all States, the nearest to a democracy. Yet it would be absurd to deny that it is an aristocracy. It also has kingship for life, which everyone, not just we ourselves, calls the oldest of all kingships. But asked so suddenly, I really cannot say, as I told you, exactly which of these constitutions it is.

712e

Clinias: And I, Megillus, am equally puzzled. I find it very difficult to say that our Cnossian constitution is any one of these. Athenian: Yes, my friends, since your systems combine several constitutions. But the systems we just named are not constitutions. They are arrangements in which a State’s parts rule or serve other parts, and each is named after the ruling power. But if the State should be named after anything of that kind, it should take the name of the god who truly rules rational people.

713a

Clinias: Who is that God? Athenian: May we tell another short story to answer that question properly? Clinias: Why not? Athenian: We should. Long before even the cities whose founding we described existed, there was, they say, an exceptionally prosperous government and community in the time of Cronus. The best States now existing are modeled on it.

713b

Clinias: Clearly, hearing about it is very important. Athenian: I, for one, think so; and that is why I mentioned it. Megillus: You were perfectly right to do so; and, since the story is relevant, you should certainly tell it to the end.

713c

Athenian: I must do as you say. Tradition tells us that people in that age lived happily, with everything growing by itself in abundance. The reason, they say, was this: Cronus knew that no human being, as we have explained, can exercise unchecked control of all human affairs without becoming full of pride and injustice; so, reflecting on this, he appointed as kings and rulers of our cities beings from a nobler and more divine race, the daemons, rather than human beings. He acted just as we now do in the case of sheep and herds of tame animals: we do not set oxen as rulers over oxen, or goats over goats, but we rule over them ourselves because we belong to a nobler race. In the same way, the god’s love for humanity led him to place the nobler race of daemons over us. They took charge of us with great ease for themselves and for us, providing abundant peace, modesty, order, and justice, and making human communities happy and free from conflict.

713e

Athenian: Even today this story tells a truth: wherever a State is ruled by a mortal rather than a god, its people have no relief from suffering and hardship; it teaches that we should do everything we can to imitate life in the age of Cronus as tradition describes it. We should govern our homes and States by obeying the immortal element within us, calling the ordering of reason “law.” But suppose an individual, an oligarchy, or a democracy has a soul that pursues pleasures and desires and tries to gorge itself on them, without self-restraint and suffering from an endless disease of insatiable evil. If it rules a State or an individual by trampling on the laws, there is, as I just said, no way to escape destruction. This, Clinias, is the claim we must examine to decide whether to believe it or what else to do.

714b

Clinias: We must, of course, believe it. Athenian: Are you aware that, according to some, there are as many kinds of laws as there are kinds of constitutions? We recently listed the commonly recognized constitutions. Please do not think the problem we have now raised is unimportant. It is extremely important. We again face the question of what justice and injustice should aim at. The people I mean claim that laws should aim neither at war nor at goodness as a whole. They should benefit the established constitution, whatever it is, so that it keeps power forever and is never overthrown. They say the best natural definition of justice is this.

714c

Clinias: In what way? Athenian: That justice is what benefits the stronger. Clinias: Explain yourself more clearly. Athenian: Their argument is this: aren’t a State’s laws always made by the stronger power? Clinias: That is quite true. Athenian: Then, they argue, would a democracy or any other government, even a tyrant, willingly make laws with any primary aim other than preserving its own authority once it has gained control?

714d

Clinias: Certainly not. Athenian: Then the lawgiver will call these enactments just and punish everyone who breaks them as guilty of injustice. Clinias: That is certainly probable. Athenian: So, on this reasoning, these enactments will always constitute justice. Clinias: That is, at any rate, what the argument asserts.

714e

Athenian: Yes, for this is one of those accepted claims about government. Clinias: What claims? Athenian: The claims we examined before about who should govern whom. We said parents should govern children, older people younger ones, and people of noble birth those of low birth. If you remember, there were many other claims, some conflicting. This claim was one of them. Quoting Pindar, we said that the law follows nature when it justifies the rule of the strongest.

715a

Clinias: Yes, that is what was said then. Athenian: Now consider which group we should entrust our State to. The situation I mean has already occurred in States thousands of times. Clinias: What condition? Athenian: When people fight over government offices, the winners monopolize power so completely that they give the defeated party and its descendants no share in office at all; each party watches the other for fear that someone will gain office and start an uprising to avenge earlier wrongs. We deny that such systems are constitutions at all, just as we deny that laws are genuine unless they serve the common good of the whole State. When laws serve only a faction, we call the system factional rule rather than a constitution. Calling such laws just is, we say, an empty use of the word. We say this because, in your State, we shall not assign office to a man because he is wealthy or has some other such advantage, like strength, size, or noble birth; we maintain that service to the gods must be assigned to the man who obeys them best and wins the State’s contest in obedience. The highest office goes to the best, the next to the second-best, and the remaining offices to the others in order. I have called those usually known as magistrates “servants of the laws,” not to invent a new phrase, but because I believe nothing matters more to a State’s survival or destruction. Where the law is subordinate and powerless, I see destruction approaching. Where the law rules the magistrates and the magistrates serve the law, I see safety and all the blessings the gods give States.

715d

Clinias: Yes, by Zeus, Stranger! Your age gives you sharp sight. Athenian: Yes. A man sees these things least clearly when young and most clearly when old.

715e

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Then what should we do next? Shall we assume that our settlers have arrived in the country and go on to address them? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Then let us say to them: “Men, as the old tradition tells us, God holds the beginning, the end, and the center of everything that exists.⁠a Following his natural course, he completes his circuit in a straight, unwavering line.

716a

Justice always follows him, punishing those who fall short of divine law. Everyone who wants to be happy holds firmly to her and follows her humbly and with orderly conduct; but anyone carried away by arrogance, proud of his riches, honors, or physical beauty, whose pride, youth, and foolishness fill his soul with insolence, imagines that he needs no ruler or guide and can guide others himself. God abandons such a man and leaves him behind.

716b

Left behind, he gathers others like himself, and his wild antics throw everything into confusion: many think he is someone great, but before long he pays a deserved penalty to Justice by completely ruining himself, his household, and his country. Given that this is how things are ordered, what should a sensible man do or plan, and what should he avoid doing?” Clinias: The answer is clear: everyone should plan to be among those who follow in God’s steps.

716c

Athenian: Then what conduct is dear to God and follows in his steps? An ancient saying describes it: like is dear to like when it is moderate, while things without moderation are dear neither to one another nor to what is moderate. For us, God is the measure of all things far more truly than the human being whom some people make their measure. Anyone who wants to become dear to such a being must become as much like him in character as possible; on this argument, the self-controlled person among us is dear to God because he is like him. The person without self-control is unlike him and hostile, as is the unjust person. The same reasoning applies to the other qualities. A further rule follows, the noblest and truest of all: for a good man, continual sacrifice and communion with the gods through prayers, offerings, and every kind of worship is supremely noble, good, helpful toward a happy life, and fitting. For a wicked man, it is the exact opposite.

716e

Athenian: A wicked man has an unclean soul, while a good man’s soul is clean. Neither a good man nor a god can rightly accept gifts from someone who is defiled. So all the great effort impious people devote to the gods is wasted, while the effort of the pious greatly benefits them all. That is the target we must aim at. But what arrows should we shoot, and how should they fly? Which arrows do you think would fly straightest to the target? First, we say, after honoring the Olympians and the gods who protect the State, we would aim straightest at piety by giving the gods of the underworld the even and the left as their honors, and giving the former gods their superior opposites. After these gods, the wise man will worship the daemons, and after the daemons, the heroes. After these will come private shrines legally dedicated to ancestral deities; and next, honors paid to living parents. Duty requires a man to repay his parents the first and greatest debt, the most fundamental obligation of all. He should acknowledge that everything he has belongs to those who gave him life and raised him, so he should serve them as fully as possible with his property, body, and soul. In this way he repays the care and suffering they invested in their children in earlier years and rewards them in old age, when they most need help. Throughout his life, above all else, he must take care to speak respectfully to his parents. Light and winged words carry a very heavy penalty, because Nemesis, the messenger of Justice, watches over all such matters; so a son must give way to his parents when they are angry. When they express their anger in words or actions, he must forgive them, since a father is naturally especially angry when he believes his own son has wronged him. When parents die, the most restrained funeral rites are best: a son should neither exceed the customary display nor do less than his ancestors did for their fathers. He should also properly maintain the annual observances that honor the completed funeral rites.

717e

Athenian: He should always honor them, keeping their memory continually alive and assigning the dead a proper share of whatever resources fortune provides for spending. If we acted in this way and followed these rules of life, each of us would always receive a fitting reward from the gods and all beings greater than ourselves, and would spend most of life enjoying hopes of happiness. Next come our duties to children, relatives, friends, and fellow citizens, our service to strangers for the gods’ sake, and our dealings with all these groups. Fulfilling these duties should brighten a man’s life and order it as the law commands. The laws that follow will make our State blessed and prosperous with the gods’ help, partly through persuasion and partly, when people’s habits resist persuasion, through force and just punishment. There are also matters a lawgiver who shares my view must regulate, although they are not well suited to being stated as laws; when dealing with these, I think he should provide a model for himself and for those he is legislating for. After explaining all these other matters as well as he can, he should begin making laws.

718c

Clinias: What particular form should such statements take? Athenian: It is not easy to bring them all into a single pattern of expression, so to speak. But let us think of them in this way and see whether we can say something definite about them. Clinias: Tell us what that something is. Athenian: I would want the people to be as willing as possible to learn virtue. Clearly, that is what the lawgiver will try to achieve through all his laws.

718d

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: I thought our address might help them listen to its advice with souls that are less savage, and in a more civilized and less hostile mood. So, as I say, we may be satisfied if it makes the listener even a little more willing to learn by making him a little less hostile. There are not many people eager to become as good as possible as quickly as possible; most people show how wise Hesiod was when he said the road to wickedness is smooth and takes no sweat to travel, because it is very short (Hesiod, Works and Days 287ff.); but, he says, “In front of goodness the immortal gods have placed the sweat of labor, and the road to it is long and steep, and the first climb is rough. But once you reach the summit, the road is easy, although it was hard.” (Hesiod, Works and Days 287ff.)

719a

Clinias: I would say the poet speaks well. Athenian: He certainly does. Now I want to explain what I think follows from the preceding argument. Clinias: Do so. Athenian: Let us ask the lawgiver: “Tell us, lawgiver, if you knew what we should do and say, wouldn’t you tell us?”

719b

Clinias: Inevitably. Athenian: Didn’t we hear you say a little while ago that the lawgiver should not let poets compose whatever they please? They would probably not know which of their statements might conflict with the laws and harm the State. Clinias: That is quite true. Athenian: Would it be reasonable to address him on the poets’ behalf in these words? Clinias: What terms?

719c

Athenian: These: “Lawgiver, there is an ancient saying that we constantly repeat and everyone else accepts: when a poet sits on the Muses’ tripod, he is not in his right mind, but resembles a fountain that lets its water surge up freely. Because his art is imitation, he is often forced to contradict himself when he creates characters with conflicting feelings. He does not know which of their conflicting statements is true. But a lawgiver cannot make two such statements about a single matter in his law. He must always publish a single statement on each matter. Take one of your own recent statements as an example. A funeral may be excessive, inadequate, or moderate. You chose the moderate alternative, praised it without qualification, and prescribed it. But if, in my poem, I had an exceptionally wealthy wife who asked me to bury her, I would praise an excessively grand tomb. A poor, stingy man would praise an inadequate tomb, while a man of moderate means, if moderate himself, would praise the same tomb you do. But you should not just call something moderate, as you have done. You should explain what moderation is and how much it allows. Otherwise, it is too soon to propose making your statement law.”

719e

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Then should the person we have put in charge of the laws begin without such an introduction, immediately state what must and must not be done and the penalty for disobedience, and move on to another law without adding a single word of encouragement or persuasion? Doctors treat us in different ways. Let us recall their two methods so that we can ask the lawgiver for the gentler treatment, like children begging a doctor to use his mildest method. Shall I give an example? Some men, we say, are doctors and others are doctors’ assistants, but we also call the assistants doctors.

720b

Clinias: We do. Athenian: These assistants, whether freeborn or enslaved, learn their craft under their masters through observation and practice, rather than by studying nature, which is how freeborn doctors have learned it and teach their own students. Would you say that these are two classes of people called doctors? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: You also know that sick people in cities include both enslaved and free people. Enslaved people are usually treated by enslaved doctors, who either go around the town or wait in their clinics; none of these doctors explains or asks about the different household servants’ illnesses. He prescribes whatever his experience suggests, as though he knew exactly, with the confidence of an absolute ruler; then he jumps up and rushes off to another sick servant, relieving his master of some of the work of caring for the sick. But the freeborn doctor mainly visits and treats free people. He investigates their illnesses from the beginning and studies their natural course; he talks to the patient and his friends, learning from the sick and teaching them as much as he can; he gives no prescription until he has the patient’s consent. Only then does he try to restore the patient fully to health, using persuasion to keep him willing to follow the treatment. Which of these methods shows the better doctor, or, in training, the better trainer? Should a doctor carry out the same task using both methods, or use only the worse and less humane one?

720e

Clinias: The double method, Stranger, is by far the better. Athenian: Do you wish us to examine the double method and the single as applied also to actual legislation? Clinias: I certainly do. Athenian: Then tell me, by the gods, what law should the lawgiver make first? Shouldn’t he follow the order of nature and first regulate the starting point of reproduction in States?

721a

Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Isn’t the union and partnership of marriage the starting point of reproduction in every State? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: So it seems that making marriage laws first would be the right course in every State. Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Let us first state the law in its simple form. How would it read? Probably like this: “A man shall marry when he is at least thirty and under thirty-five. If he fails to do so, he shall be punished by a fine and a loss of civic status, with the amount of the fine and the kind of loss specified.” That is the simple form of the marriage law. The double form would be this: “A man shall marry when he is at least thirty and under thirty-five, remembering that this is how the human race naturally shares in immortality, something nature has given everyone a strong desire for. The desire to win glory rather than lie in a nameless grave has a similar aim. Humanity naturally lasts as long as time itself, accompanying it continually now and in the future. It is immortal in this way: by leaving children and grandchildren, and remaining always one and the same, it shares in immortality through reproduction. Voluntarily depriving himself of this is never a pious act. A man who denies himself a wife and children deliberately deprives himself of it. A man who obeys the law may go without penalty. A man who disobeys and has not married by thirty-five shall pay an annual fine of a specified amount, so that he does not think remaining single brings him profit and ease. He shall receive none of the honors the State’s younger men periodically pay their elders.” Hearing and comparing this law with the earlier one lets us judge in each case whether laws should be at least twice as long, combining threats with persuasion, or remain short by using threats alone.

721e

Megillus: Our Spartan custom, Stranger, is always to prefer brevity. But if asked which of these two laws I would want put in writing in my State, I would choose the longer; I would make the same choice for every law that offered these two alternatives. But our friend Clinias must also approve the laws we are making, since his State is the one proposing to use them.

722a

Clinias: I highly approve of all you have said, Megillus. Athenian: Still, arguing about whether writings are long or short is extremely foolish. What matters, I think, is how good they are, not how brief or long-winded; one of the forms of law we just discussed is twice as good in practice as the other, and our example of the two kinds of doctors offers a very close parallel. But no lawgiver seems ever to have noticed that, although they can use two methods in lawmaking, persuasion and force, as far as an uneducated population allows, they actually use only one: they do not soften compulsion with persuasion, but use force alone, without softening it. My friends, I see a third requirement that laws should meet but that is nowhere to be found at present.

722c

Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: Something that has emerged, as though through divine guidance, from the subjects we have been discussing. It was just after dawn when we began talking about laws. Now it is noon, and here we are in this delightful resting place; we have talked about nothing but laws the whole time, yet apparently only just begun to state actual laws. Everything before that was simply a prelude to them. Why do I say this? To explain that all spoken and sung performances have preludes and warm-ups, as we might call them, which provide an artistic preparation to help the subject develop further. We have examples of beautifully worked-out preludes before the kind of lyric ode called the nome and before musical compositions of every kind. But for the true nomes, the laws we call political, no one has ever spoken, composed, or published a prelude, as though such a thing did not exist. I think our present conversation proves that it does exist. It just struck me that the laws we were stating are more than simply double: they combine two things, the law and its prelude.

722e

Athenian: The part we called the despotic prescription, comparing it to those of the enslaved doctors we mentioned, is law alone; the part before it, spoken to persuade people to accept it, is indeed persuasion, but also serves the same purpose as a speech’s prelude. I took the speaker’s clear purpose in all this persuasion to be that whoever receives the law should accept its prescription calmly, and therefore in a willing spirit. So, on my argument, the correct term for it is “prelude,” not “legal statement.” What would I want to say next? That the lawgiver must never fail to provide preludes before both the laws as a whole and each individual statute. They will then surpass their original form as much as our recent double examples surpassed the single ones.

723b

Clinias: For my part, I would instruct the expert in these matters to make laws this way and no other.

723c

Athenian: I think you are right at least in this, Clinias: all laws have preludes, and when beginning a piece of legislation, we should introduce each enactment with its natural prelude, because the statement following the prelude is important, and it matters greatly whether these statements are remembered clearly or vaguely; still, we would be wrong to require preludes equally for all laws, large and small. We should not do that for every kind of song or speech either; they all naturally have preludes, but we cannot always use them. That decision must be left in each case to the speaker, singer, or lawgiver.

723d

Clinias: What you say is, I believe, very true. But let us stop delaying, Stranger, return to our main subject, and, if you agree, start again from the statements you made earlier without treating them as a prelude. Let us start again with the second thoughts that are best, to quote the players’ proverb, treating the whole discussion as a prelude rather than an unplanned conversation. Let us explicitly recognize the opening part as a prelude. What we said about worshiping the gods and caring for ancestors is quite sufficient; try to explain what follows until we think you have set out the whole prelude adequately. After that, you can state the actual laws.

724a

Athenian: So we now agree that our earlier prelude about the gods, those next to the gods, and parents living and dead was sufficient. As I understand it, you are now asking me to bring the rest of the subject into the light of day, so to speak. Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: Surely it is fitting, and greatly benefits both speaker and listeners, to consider next how much care or neglect people should give their souls, bodies, and property. They should reflect on this and understand education as fully as possible. That, then, is what we must discuss and listen to next.

724b

Clinias: Perfectly right.

726a

Athenian: Let everyone who has just heard the rules about the gods and our dear ancestors now listen. Of all a man's own possessions, the most divine, after the gods, is his soul, since it is most truly his own. For everyone, a man's own possessions are always of two kinds. The stronger and better are the ruling elements, and the weaker and worse are those that serve. So among one's own possessions one must always honor those that rule above those that serve.

727a–727e

Athenian: That is why, when I urge people to honor their own souls second, after the gods who rule and the divinities who follow them, I am giving correct advice. But hardly any of us honors the soul correctly, although we think we do. For honor is something divine and good, and nothing evil is worthy of honor. A man may think he can exalt his soul by words or gifts or concessions while doing nothing to make it any better than it was. He thinks he is honoring it, but in fact he is not doing so at all. For example, every boy, as soon as he has grown to be a man, considers himself capable of learning everything. He supposes that he honors his soul by praising it and by eagerly letting it do whatever it likes. But by acting this way, as we now declare, he is not honoring his soul but harming it; whereas, we maintain, he ought to honor it second, after the gods. Again, a man may always hold others, not himself, responsible for his own sins and for most of his evils, including the greatest, and always exempt himself from blame. He imagines that he is honoring his own soul in this way, but he is very far from honoring it, since he is doing it harm. Again, when a man gives in to pleasures contrary to the counsel and approval of the lawgiver, he is in no way honoring his soul. Rather, he dishonors it by filling it with evils and remorse. Again, take the opposite case, when toils, fears, hardships, and pains are recommended, and a man flinches from them instead of enduring them firmly. Then by flinching he does his soul no honor, for by all such actions he makes it dishonored. Again, when a man regards life at any price as a good thing, then too he does not honor his soul but dishonors it. For when his soul imagines that everything in Hades is evil, he gives in to it instead of resisting. He does not teach his soul and convince it that, for all it knows, the realm of the gods below may, on the contrary, hold the greatest of all our blessings. Again, when a man honors beauty above goodness, this is nothing other than a real and complete dishonoring of the soul. Such a view claims that the body is more honorable than the soul, and the claim is false, since nothing born of the earth is more honorable than the things of heaven. Whoever thinks otherwise about the soul does not realize that what he possesses in it, and neglects, is a most admirable thing.

727e–728e

Athenian: Again, a man may be eager to acquire wealth dishonorably, or feel no scruple about acquiring it that way. He does not then honor his soul with his gifts. Far from it! For he is trading away what is honorable and noble in it for a handful of gold; yet all the gold on the earth or under it is not worth as much as goodness. To put it briefly: the lawgiver lists and classifies certain things as shameful and evil on the one hand, and others as noble and good on the other. Whoever refuses to avoid the first kind by every means, and to practice the second kind with all his strength, does not realize what he is doing. Anyone who acts this way is treating his soul, that most divine of things, in the most dishonorable and disgraceful manner. Hardly anyone takes into account what people call the greatest judgment on wrongdoing. That greatest judgment is this: to grow like men who are wicked, and in growing like them, to shun good men and good counsels and cut oneself off from them, while clinging to the company of the wicked and following after them. And whoever is joined to such men inevitably does and suffers what such men by nature do to one another, and says what they say. Now this resulting condition is not a judgment, since justice and judgment are honorable things. It is a punishment, a suffering that follows on injustice. Both the man who undergoes it and the man who does not are equally wretched: the one because he remains uncured, the other because he is destroyed so that many others may be saved. So we declare that honor, generally speaking, consists in following what is better, and in doing our utmost to improve what is worse, when it is capable of improvement. Nothing a human being possesses is better suited by nature than the soul to avoid evil, to track down and seize what is best of all, and, once it has seized it, to live in fellowship with it for the rest of life. That is why the soul is placed second in the order of honor. As for the third place, everyone would realize that it naturally belongs to the honor due to the body. But here again one has to examine the various forms of honor, to see which of them are genuine and which are counterfeit; and this is the lawgiver's task. Now, as I suppose, he declares that the honors are these and of this kind. The honorable body is not the beautiful body, nor the strong, nor the swift, nor the large, nor even the body that is healthy, although many believe it is. Nor is it a body of the opposite kind to any of these. Rather, the bodies that hold the middle position between all these opposite extremes are by far the most balanced and the most stable. For the one extreme makes souls puffed up and arrogant, and the other makes them lowly and spiritless.

728e–729e

Athenian: The same holds for the possession of money and property, and these are to be valued on a similar scale. In each case, when they are excessive, they produce hostilities and feuds both in States and in private life, while when they are deficient they generally produce servitude. And no one should love riches for the sake of his children, in order to leave them as wealthy as possible; for that is good neither for them nor for the State. For the young, the most harmonious and best fortune of all is one that attracts no flatterers yet does not lack necessities. It is in tune and in harmony with us, and so it makes our life free of pain in every respect. A man should leave his children an abundance of modesty, not of money. We imagine that the way to leave them this is to scold the young for their shamelessness. But no such result comes from the advice commonly given to the young nowadays, when people tell them that the young must show reverence to everyone. Instead, the prudent lawgiver will urge the older people to show reverence to the young. Above all, he will urge them to take care that none of the young ever sees or hears any of them doing or saying anything shameful; for where the old are shameless, the young are bound to be extremely impudent too. The most effective way to train the young, and the older people themselves as well, is not by admonition. It is by visibly practicing throughout one's own life the admonitions one gives to others. A man may honor and revere his kindred and everyone who shares in the worship of the tribal gods and is sprung from the same blood. In proportion to his piety, he will win the goodwill of the gods of Birth toward the fathering of his own children. Moreover, a man will find his friends and companions kindly disposed toward him in the dealings of life if he rates the value and importance of the services they do him more highly than they do themselves. At the same time, he must count the favors he does them as worth less than his friends and companions themselves consider them. With regard to his State and fellow citizens, by far the best man is the one who would prefer a reputation for victory in service to the laws of his homeland to a victory at Olympia or in any other contest of war or peace. He would want to be known as the one man above all others who has served those laws with distinction throughout his life. Further, a man should regard contracts made with strangers as especially sacred. For practically all the sins committed by strangers and against strangers, compared with those among citizens, are more closely tied to an avenging god.

729e–730e

Athenian: For the stranger, since he has no companions or kindred, is more to be pitied by men and gods. So the one who is most able to avenge him comes to his aid most readily. And the most able of all, in every case, is the strangers' daemon and god, and these follow in the train of Zeus Xenios. Anyone, then, who has even a little forethought will take the greatest care to go through life to the very end without committing any offense against strangers. Of offenses against strangers or natives, the one involving suppliants is in every case the gravest. When a suppliant has obtained a pledge with a god as witness and is then cheated of it, that god becomes the special guardian of the one who is wronged. So he will never suffer wrong without vengeance being taken for his wrongs. As for a man's social relations with his parents, himself, and his own possessions, and with the State, friends, and kindred, whether foreign or domestic, our account is now fairly complete. It remains next to describe the character that contributes most to a noble life. After that we shall have to state all the matters that are subject not to law but rather to praise and blame. These are the means by which individual citizens are educated and made more manageable and well disposed toward the laws that are to be imposed on them. Of all good things, for gods and men alike, truth comes first. Every man who intends to become blessed and happy should share in it from his earliest days, so that he may live as a truthful man for as long as possible. Such a man is trustworthy; but the man who loves the voluntary lie is untrustworthy, and the man who loves the involuntary lie is senseless, and neither of these two is to be envied. For everyone who is either faithless or foolish is friendless. Since, as time goes on, he is found out, he is preparing for himself in his miserable old age, at the close of life, a complete solitude. In it his life becomes almost equally desolate whether his companions and children are living or dead. The man who does no wrong is indeed worthy of honor. But the man who, in addition, does not allow wrongdoers to do wrong is worthy of more than twice as much honor as he. For the first counts as one man, but the second counts as many, since he informs the magistrates of the wrongdoing of the others. And let the man who also helps the magistrates punish, as far as he is able, be publicly proclaimed the Great Man of the State, the perfect man, the winner of the prize for excellence. The same praise should be given to self-control and to wisdom, and to all the other good things that their possessor can not only keep for himself but also share with others.

730e–731e

Athenian: The man who shares these goods in this way should be honored as highest in merit, and the man who would gladly share them but cannot, as second. But a man may be jealous and unwilling to share any good things with anyone in a friendly spirit. Then the man himself must be blamed, but what he possesses must not be valued any less because of its possessor; rather, one should strive to gain it with all one's might. Let every one of us be ambitious to gain excellence, but without jealousy. For a man of this kind enlarges a State, since he strives hard himself and does not hold others back by slander. The jealous man, however, thinks that slandering others is the best way to secure his own superiority. He makes less effort himself to win true excellence, and he disheartens his rivals by getting them unjustly blamed. In this way he leaves the whole State poorly trained for competing in excellence and, for his part, makes it smaller in good repute. Every man ought to be both passionate and gentle in the highest degree. On the one hand, other men's wrongdoings may be cruel and hard to remedy, or even wholly incurable. Then there is no escaping them except by fighting and defending oneself victoriously and by punishing with the utmost rigor; and no soul can do this without noble passion. On the other hand, when men commit wrongs that can be remedied, one should first recognize that every wrongdoer does wrong involuntarily. For no one anywhere would ever voluntarily take on any of the greatest evils, least of all in his own most precious possessions. And the most precious possession of every man, in very truth, is the soul, as we have said. No one, therefore, will voluntarily take the greatest evil into this most precious thing and live with it all his life long. Now in general the wrongdoer and the person who has these evils are to be pitied. But it is permissible to show pity to the man whose evils are curable, to restrain one's passion and treat him gently, and not to keep on raging like a scolding wife. In dealing with the man who is completely and obstinately perverse and wicked, however, one must give free rein to anger. That is why we say that the good man must always be both passionate and gentle. There is an evil, greater than all others, which most people have implanted in their souls. Each of them excuses it in himself and makes no effort to escape it. It is the evil expressed in the saying that every man is by nature a lover of self, and that it is right for him to be so. But the truth is that the cause of all sins, in every case, lies in a person's excessive love of self.

731e–732e

Athenian: For the lover is blind about the object of his love, so he judges badly what is just and good and noble. He thinks that he should always value what is his own more than what is true. But the man who is to attain the title of Great must be devoted neither to himself nor to his own possessions, but to what is just, whether it happens to be done by himself or rather by someone else. And it is from this same sin that everyone has also derived the notion that his own folly is wisdom. As a result, though we know practically nothing, we imagine that we know everything. And since we will not entrust to others the doing of things we do not understand, we necessarily go wrong in doing them ourselves. So every man must avoid excessive self-love and always follow someone better than himself, never letting any shame hold him back from doing so. There are precepts less important than these, which are often repeated but are no less useful. A man should repeat them to himself as reminders. For where there is a constant outflow, there must also be a matching inflow, and when wisdom flows away, the proper inflow is recollection. So people must refrain from untimely laughter and tears. Every man must urge every other man to try to conceal all display of extreme joy or sorrow, and to conduct himself with decorum, both when their guardian spirit stands with them in prosperity and when spirits oppose their actions, as though they were facing high, steep ground. They should always hope that God, by the blessings he gives, will lessen the troubles that fall on them, and will change their present evils for the better. As for their blessings, they should hope that these, on the contrary, will be increased with the help of good fortune. Every man should live in these hopes and in the recollection of all such truths, sparing no effort. He should constantly recall them clearly both to himself and to his neighbor, at work and at play alike. So, with regard to the right character of institutions and the right character of individuals, we have now laid down practically all the rules that have divine sanction. Those of human origin we have not yet stated, but state them we must, since our conversation is with men, not gods. Pleasures, pains, and desires are by nature especially human. Every mortal creature, so to speak, necessarily hangs from them and depends on them by the strongest cords of influence.

732e–733e

Athenian: So one should praise the noblest life not merely because it is superior in form with respect to good reputation. It is also because, if a man is willing to taste it and does not run from it in his youth, it is superior as well in what all people seek, namely an excess of joy and a shortage of pain throughout the whole of life. That this will clearly be the result, if a man tastes it rightly, will at once become fully evident. But what does this rightness consist of? That is the question we must now consider, taking our Argument as our guide. We must compare the more pleasant life with the more painful, and consider in the following way whether one mode is natural to us and the other unnatural. We want pleasure for ourselves, but pain we neither choose nor want. The neutral state we do not want in place of pleasure, but we do want it in exchange for pain. We want less pain with more pleasure, but we do not want less pleasure with more pain. And when the two are evenly balanced, we cannot state any clear preference. Now all these states, in their number, quantity, intensity, and equality, and in their opposites, either do or do not influence desire in governing its choice of each. Since these things are necessarily ordered in this way, we want the life in which the feelings are many, great, and intense, with those of pleasure predominating. But we do not want the life in which the feelings of pain predominate. Conversely, we do not want the life in which the feelings are few, small, and gentle if the painful ones predominate; but if the pleasurable ones predominate, we do want it. Further, we must regard the life in which pleasure and pain are evenly balanced in the same way that we regarded the neutral state before. We want the balanced life insofar as it exceeds the painful life in what we like, but we do not want it insofar as it exceeds the pleasant lives in the things we dislike. All our human lives must be regarded as naturally bound up with these feelings, and we must determine what kinds of life we naturally want. If we claim to want anything else, we say so only out of ignorance and inexperience of lives as they really are. What, then, are the lives, and how many are there, in which a man may live as happily as a human being can? I mean a man who has chosen the desirable and voluntary in preference to the undesirable and involuntary, and has made this a private law for himself by choosing what is at once congenial and pleasant and best and noblest. Let us declare that one of them is the life of self-control, one the wise, and one the brave, and let us count the healthy life as one;

733e–734e

Athenian: and against these let us set four others: the foolish, the cowardly, the licentious, and the diseased. Whoever knows the life of self-control will describe it as gentle in every respect, offering mild pains and mild pleasures, moderate appetites, and desires free of frenzy. But the licentious life he will describe as violent in every direction, offering extreme pains and pleasures, intense and maddening appetites, and the most frenzied desires possible. In the life of self-control the pleasures outweigh the pains, whereas in the licentious life the pains exceed the pleasures in size, number, and frequency. It necessarily follows that the one life is naturally more pleasant to us and the other more painful. It is no longer possible for a man who wants a pleasant life to live licentiously by choice. Instead, it is now clear (if our argument is right) that no one can possibly be licentious voluntarily. It is because of ignorance or lack of self-control, or both, that the great mass of humankind lives without self-control. Similarly, with regard to the diseased life and the healthy life, one must observe that both have pleasures and pains. But in health the pleasures exceed the pains, while in disease the pains exceed the pleasures. Our wish in choosing lives is not that pain should predominate; the life we have judged the more pleasant is the one in which pain is exceeded by pleasure. We will say, then, that the life of self-control has its feelings smaller, fewer, and lighter than the licentious life, and the wise life than the foolish, and the brave than the cowardly. And since the one life surpasses the other in pleasure but falls short of it in pain, the brave life defeats the cowardly and the wise defeats the foolish. Consequently, the one set of lives ranks as more pleasant than the other: the self-controlled, brave, wise, and healthy lives are more pleasant than the cowardly, foolish, licentious, and diseased. To sum up, the life of bodily and spiritual virtue, compared with the life of vice, is not only more pleasant but also far surpasses it in nobility, rightness, virtue, and good reputation. So it makes the man who lives it live far more happily than the one who lives the opposite life. This is as far as we have taken the prelude to our laws, and here let that statement end. After the prelude the tune must necessarily follow, or rather, to be strictly accurate, a sketch of the organization of the State.

734e–735e

Athenian: Now, in a piece of webbing or any other woven article, it is not possible to make both the warp and the woof from the same materials. The stuff of the warp must be of better quality, since it is strong and is made firm by its twisting, whereas the woof is softer and shows a proper degree of flexibility. From this we may see that in some such way we must mark out those who are to hold high offices in the State and those who are to hold low offices, after applying an adequate educational test in each case. For there are two divisions of State organization: one is the appointment of individuals to office, and the other is the assignment of laws to the offices. But in fact, before we deal with all these matters, we must observe the following. When dealing with a flock of any kind, the shepherd or cowherd, or the keeper of horses or of any such animals, will never attempt to care for it until he has first applied to each group of animals the appropriate purge. That is, he separates the sound from the unsound and the well-bred from the ill-bred, sends the latter off to other herds, and keeps the former under his own care. For he considers that his labor would be pointless and endless if it were spent on bodies and souls that nature and bad rearing have combined to ruin. These animals themselves bring ruin on a stock that is sound and clean in both habits and body, whatever the kind of beast, unless a thorough purge is made in the existing herd. In the case of other animals this matters less and deserves mention only as an illustration. But in the case of human beings it is of the highest importance for the lawgiver to investigate and declare what is proper for each class, both with regard to purging and with regard to all other kinds of treatment. For instance, with regard to purging a State, it would go like this. Of the many possible ways of purging, some are milder and some more severe. A lawgiver who was also a despot might be able to carry out the most severe and best of them. But a lawgiver without despotic power might be well content if, in establishing a new political order and laws, he could carry out even the mildest of purgings. The best purge is painful, like all drastic medicines. It is the purge that drags people to punishment through justice joined with vengeance, crowning the vengeance with exile or death. As a rule, it gets rid of the greatest criminals when they are incurable and do serious damage to the State.

735e–736e

Athenian: A milder form of purge is of the following kind. Because of a scarcity of food, people may be in need and show that they are ready to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the wealthy. Then the lawgiver regards all such people as a disease rooted in the body politic and ships them abroad as gently as possible, giving their removal the euphemistic name of emigration. Every lawgiver must do this in one way or another at the beginning, but in our case the task is even simpler now. For at present we have no need to devise either a form of emigration or any other purging selection. Instead, it is as when floods from many sources, some from springs and some from torrents, flow together into a single pool. We have to take careful precautions to make the water as pure as possible, in some cases by drawing it off and in others by cutting channels to divert its course. Even so, it would seem that toil and risk are involved in every exercise of statecraft. Since, however, our present efforts are in words rather than in deeds, let us assume that our gathering of citizens is now complete and that its purity has been secured to our satisfaction. For we shall test thoroughly, by every kind of test and over a long period, the wicked among those who try to enter our present State as citizens, and so prevent them from arriving. The virtuous, on the other hand, we shall welcome with all possible graciousness and goodwill. And let us not fail to notice this piece of good luck. We said that the colony of the Heraclidae was fortunate in escaping fierce and dangerous strife over the distribution of land and the cancellation of debts, and we are similarly lucky. For when a State is forced to settle such strife by law, it can neither leave established interests unchanged nor alter them in any way. No path is left except what one might call pious hope and cautious change, little by little, over a long period. And that path is this: there must already be a supply of men to bring about the change who themselves, on each occasion, own plenty of land and have many people in their debt. They must be kind enough to want to share these things with those of their debtors who are in need, partly by canceling debts and partly by making distributions. They make a kind of rule of moderation, believing that poverty consists not in decreasing one's property but in increasing one's greed.

736e–737e

Athenian: For this is the main foundation of a State's security, and on it, as on a firm base, it is possible to build whatever civic order may later be built suited to the arrangement described. But if the foundation is rotten, the political operations that follow will prove by no means easy for any State. This difficulty, as we say, we avoid. Still, it is better for us to explain how we might have found a way of escape if we had not in fact avoided it. Let it be said, then, that the way consists in renouncing greed with the help of justice, and that there is no other way of escape, broad or narrow, besides this device. So let this stand fixed for us now as a kind of pillar of the State. The citizens' properties must be established somehow on a basis secure from internal disputes. Otherwise people who have long-standing disputes with one another will not willingly go any further with political construction, if they have a grain of sense. But consider those to whom God has given, as he has given to us now, a new State to found, one still free of internal feuds. For such founders to stir up hostility against themselves over the distribution of land and houses would be a folly combined with utter depravity of which no human being could be capable. What, then, would be the plan of a right distribution? First, we must set the total number of citizens at the right figure. Next, we must agree on how they are to be distributed, into how many sections and of what size each. And among these sections we must distribute the land and the houses as equally as we can. A suitable figure for the population could not be given without reference to the territory and to the neighboring States. We need as much land as can support so many inhabitants with moderate habits, and we need no more. As for population, we need a number large enough to defend themselves against injury from adjoining peoples, and also able to give some help to their neighbors when they are injured. We shall settle these matters, both in word and in fact, once we have inspected the territory and its neighbors. For now, however, our argument will proceed to complete only an outline sketch of our legislation. Let us assume that there are 5,040 men, as a suitable number, who are to hold land and defend their plots. And let the land and houses likewise be divided into the same number of parts, each man and his allotment forming one unit together. First, let the whole number be divided into two, and next into three; after that, in natural order, come four and five, and so on up to ten.

737e–738e

Athenian: Regarding numbers, every lawmaker must understand at least this much: what number, and what kind of number, will be most useful for all States. Let us choose the one that contains the most numerous and most consecutive divisions. Number as a whole admits every division for every purpose. The number 5,040, however, can be divided into no more than 59 sections, consecutive from one up to ten, for purposes of war and, in peace, for all purposes connected with contributions and distributions. Those whom the law appoints to grasp these facts about numbers must grasp them firmly and with deliberate attention. They are exactly as we have stated them, and the reason for stating them when founding a State is this. Consider gods and shrines, the temples to be set up in the State for the various gods, and the gods and daemons the temples are to be named after. No sensible person, whether he is framing a new State or reforming an old one that has become corrupt, will attempt to change the advice from Delphi or Dodona or Ammon, or the advice of ancient sayings in whatever form they take, whether derived from visions or from some reported inspiration from heaven. On this advice people instituted sacrifices combined with rites, whether of native origin or imported from Etruria or Cyprus or anywhere else. By means of such sayings they consecrated oracles and statues and altars and temples, and marked off sacred precincts for each of them. The lawgiver should not alter the least bit of any of these. To each section he should assign a god or daemon, or at least a hero. In distributing the land he should first assign to these divinities choice estates with everything that belongs to them. Then, when the assemblies of each section take place at the appointed times, they may provide an ample supply of everything needed, and the people may become friendly with one another at the sacrifices and come to know one another well. Nothing benefits a State more than this mutual acquaintance. For where people hide their ways from one another in darkness rather than light, no one will ever rightly obtain either the honor or the office he deserves, or the justice that is due him. So every man in every State must above all strive to show himself always true and sincere toward everyone, never a fraud, and also never to let himself be deceived by any such person.

739a–739e

Athenian: The next move in our setting up of the laws might cause surprise when first heard, because it is unusual, like a checkers player moving a piece off his sacred line. Even so, it will be clear to anyone who reasons it out and draws on experience that a State will probably have a constitution no better than second in excellence. Perhaps someone might refuse to accept this because he is unfamiliar with lawgivers who are not also despots. But in fact the most correct plan is to describe the best political order, and the second best, and the third, and after describing them to leave the choice to the individual in charge of founding the settlement. Let us adopt this plan now. Let us state the political orders that rank first, second, and third in excellence, and let us hand the choice over to Clinias. We also hand it to anyone else who may at any time wish, in proceeding to choose among such things, to take over, according to his own disposition, what he values in his own country. The first State and political order, and the best laws, are found where the old saying is observed as fully as possible throughout the whole State: that friends really have all things in common. Consider this condition, whether it exists anywhere now or ever will exist. In it, wives are held in common, and children, and all property, and everything called private is rooted out of life everywhere and by every means. As far as possible, it is arranged that even things naturally private have become common in some way: eyes, for instance, and ears and hands seem to see, hear, and act in common. All people, as far as possible, are united in the praise and blame they give, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and they honor with all their heart those laws that make the State as unified as possible. No one will ever lay down any other definition truer or better than these conditions in point of supreme excellence. In such a State, whether it is inhabited by gods or by children of gods, more than one of them, they live there pleasantly, spending their lives in this way. So one should not look elsewhere for a model of a constitution, but should hold fast to this one and with all one's power seek the constitution that is as much like it as possible. The constitution we are now engaged on, if it came into being, would be very near to immortality and would rank second in merit. The third we shall work out later, God willing. For now, however, what is this second-best political order, and how would it come to have such a character?

739e–740e

Athenian: First, let them divide up the land and houses and not farm in common, since such a course is beyond the capacity of people with the birth, rearing, and training we are assuming. And let the division be made with this intention. The man who receives a portion should still regard it as the common property of the whole State. He should tend the land, which is his homeland, more devotedly than a mother tends her children, since the land, being a goddess, is mistress over its mortal population. And he should have the same attitude toward the local gods and daemons as well. So that these things may remain this way forever, the following further rules must be observed. The number of hearths, as we have now fixed it, must remain unchanged and must never become either more or fewer. This will be securely achieved in every State in the following way. The holder of an allotment shall always leave behind one son, whichever he pleases, as heir to his dwelling. That son is to succeed him in caring for the gods, the family, and the State, attending both to their living members and to those who have already died. As for the rest of a man's children, when he has more than one, he should marry off the daughters according to the law that is to be laid down. The sons he should hand over to those citizens who have no male offspring, by friendly arrangement if possible. But such arrangements may prove insufficient, or a family may have too many daughters or too many sons, or on the other hand too few, because of infertility. In all these cases the magistrates whom we shall appoint as the highest and most distinguished shall consider how to deal with the excess or shortage in families. They shall devise means as best they can to ensure that the 5,040 households remain unchanged. Many devices are possible. Where fertility is high, there are ways of checking it. Conversely, there are ways of encouraging and stimulating the birth rate, through honors and dishonors and through admonitions addressed by the old to the young, which can produce the required effect in every way. Finally, as a last step, we may be in complete desperation about the unequal state of our 5,040 households and faced with an oversupply of citizens, because of the mutual affection of those who live together, which drives us to despair. Even then there still remains that ancient device we have often mentioned: sending out colonies, in a friendly way from a friendly nation, made up of such people as are judged suitable.

740e–741e

Athenian: On the other hand, the State may at some time be struck by a flooding wave of disease or by ruinous wars, and the households may fall far below the appointed number through bereavement. We should not then willingly bring in new citizens trained with a bastard training; but, as the proverb says, not even God himself can force necessity. So let us suppose that our present discussion gives the following advice: My most excellent friends, do not be slack in honoring, as Nature ordains, likeness and equality and sameness and agreement, with respect to number and to every power that produces things fair and good. Above all, now, first of all, guard the stated number throughout your lives. Next, do not dishonor the due measure of the height and size of your property, as it was originally apportioned, by buying and selling among yourselves. Otherwise neither the apportioning Lot, which is divine, will fight on your side, nor will the lawgiver. For now, in the first place, the law lays this command on the disobedient. It has given warning that whoever wishes should accept or refuse an allotment on this understanding: first, that the land is sacred to all the gods, and further, that prayers shall be offered by the priests and priestesses at the first, second, and third sacrifices. Therefore the man who buys or sells the house plot or land plot allotted to him shall suffer the penalty attached to this sin. The officials shall write records on tablets of cypress wood for future reference and shall place them in the shrines. Furthermore, they shall put the enforcement of these matters in the hands of the magistrate who is judged to be the most sharp-sighted. In this way all violations of these rules may come to their notice, and they may punish the man who disobeys both the law and the god. The ordinance now described, when the appropriate organization accompanies it, proves to be a great blessing to all the States that obey it. How great a blessing it is, as the old proverb says, no evil man will ever know, but only the man who has become experienced and practiced in virtuous habits. For in the organization described there is no excessive money-making. It also entails that no one should or can be given any opportunity to make money by any illiberal trade, since what is called contemptible vulgarity corrupts a liberal character. And no one should ever claim the right to pile up riches from any such source.

741e–742e

Athenian: Furthermore, after all this there follows a law that forbids any private person to own any gold or silver. He may own only coin for the kind of everyday exchange that craftsmen almost have to use, and that all who need such things must use to pay wages to hired workers, whether slaves or immigrants. For these reasons we say that our people should own coined money that is legal tender among themselves but worthless elsewhere. As for the common Hellenic currency, it is needed for military expeditions and visits abroad, and for embassies or any other missions necessary for the State, if someone must be sent abroad. For such purposes as these the State must always possess Hellenic money. If a private citizen ever finds that he must go abroad, he may do so after first getting permission from the magistrates. If he comes home with any foreign money left over, he shall deposit it with the State and receive an equivalent amount in local currency. But if anyone is found keeping it for himself, the money shall be confiscated. The man who knows of it and fails to report it, together with the man who brought it in, shall be subject to cursing and reproach and, in addition, to a fine no less than the amount of foreign money brought in. In marrying or giving in marriage, no one shall give or receive any dowry at all. No one shall deposit money with anyone he does not trust, nor lend at interest, since the borrower shall be permitted to refuse entirely to pay back either interest or principal. One would rightly see that these are the best practices for a State to follow by viewing them in relation to the primary intention. The intention of the wise statesman, we say, is not at all what the majority would attribute to him. They would say that the good lawgiver should want the State for which he is benevolently legislating to be as large and as rich as possible, to possess silver and gold, and to rule over as many people as possible both by land and by sea. And they would add that, if he is a true legislator, he should want the State to be as good and as happy as possible. Of these aims, some can be achieved and some cannot. The organizer of the State will want those that are possible; the impossible ones he will neither want in vain nor attempt. That happiness and goodness should go together is almost inevitable, so he will want the people to be both good and happy. But it is impossible for them to be both good and excessively rich, rich at least as most people count riches;

742e–743e

Athenian: for they count as rich those rare few who possess goods worth a great deal of money, and these even a wicked man might possess. Since this is so, I would never concede to them that the rich man is truly happy if he is not also good. And if a man is exceptionally good, it is impossible for him to be exceptionally rich as well. Why is that? someone may ask. Because, we would answer, the gain from both just and unjust sources is more than double the gain from just sources alone. Meanwhile, the spending of those who refuse to spend either nobly or shamefully is only half the spending of those who are noble and are willing to spend on noble objects. Consequently, the men whose conduct in both respects is the exact opposite will never exceed in wealth the men who double their gains and halve their spending. Now of these men, the one is good, and the other is not bad so long as he is frugal, but at other times he is utterly bad, and (as we have just said) he is at no time good. The man who takes both justly and unjustly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, is rich, provided he is also frugal; while the utterly bad man, being extravagant as a rule, is very poor. But the man who spends on noble objects and gains by just means only is unlikely ever to become either exceptionally rich or extremely poor. Accordingly, what we have said is true: the very rich are not good, and since they are not good, they are not happy either. Now the fundamental aim of our laws was this: that the citizens should be as happy as possible and united in the highest degree in mutual friendship. Citizens will never be friendly where they have frequent lawsuits against one another and frequent wrongdoing, but rather where these are as few and as minor as possible. We say that in the State there must be neither gold nor silver. Nor must there be much money-making through vulgar trading or lending at interest or the fattening of castrated livestock. There must be only such profit as farming gives and yields, and of this only so much as will not drive a man, in his money-making, to neglect the things for which money exists. These things are the soul and the body, which without athletic training and the other branches of education would never become worth anything. That is why we have said, and more than once, that the pursuit of money is to be honored last of all. Of the three things that concern every human being, concern for money, rightly directed, comes third and last; concern for the body comes second; and concern for the soul comes first.

743e–744e

Athenian: Accordingly, if the political order we are describing ranks its honors in this order, its laws are correctly laid down. But suppose any of the laws enacted in it clearly makes health more honored in the State than self-control, or wealth more honored than health and self-control. Then it will plainly be a wrong enactment. So the lawgiver must often ask himself: What is it that I intend? And am I succeeding in this, or am I missing the mark? In this way he might perhaps get through the work of legislation himself and spare others the trouble of it; but in no other way could he ever possibly do so. The man who has received an allotment shall hold it, as we say, on the terms stated. It would indeed have been a splendid thing if each person had also had everything else equal when he entered the colony. Since this is impossible, however, and one man will arrive with more money and another with less, there must be unequal valuations of property. This is necessary for many reasons, and for the sake of equal opportunity in public life. In this way offices, contributions, and distributions may be assigned according to the assessed valuation in each case. They will be framed in proportion not only to the moral excellence of a man's ancestors or of himself, or to his bodily strength and good looks, but also to his wealth or poverty. Then, by a rule of symmetrical inequality, people may receive offices and honors as equally as possible and may not quarrel. For these reasons we must create four classes, graded by size of property and called first, second, third, and fourth, or by some other names. This holds both when individuals stay in the same class and when, by changing from poverty to wealth or from wealth to poverty, each moves into the class to which he belongs. The kind of law that I would enact as proper to come next after the foregoing would be this. A State that is to avoid the greatest of plagues, which would be better called disruption than dissension, must, as we maintain, have none of its citizens in a condition of either painful poverty or wealth, since both these conditions produce both these results. So the lawgiver must now declare a limit for each of these conditions. The limit of poverty shall be the value of the allotment. This must remain fixed, and no magistrate should overlook any reduction of it in any particular case, nor should any other citizen who aspires to goodness.

744e–745e

Athenian: Having set this as the (inferior) limit, the lawgiver shall allow a man to possess twice this amount, or three times, or four times. Someone may acquire more than this, whether by finding it, or by gift, or by money-making, or by gaining a sum beyond the proper measure through some other such piece of luck. If he hands the surplus over to the State and to the gods who keep the State, he shall be well regarded and free from penalty. But if anyone disobeys this law, anyone who wishes may inform against him and receive half, and the man who is convicted shall pay an equal amount out of his own property, and the other half shall go to the gods. All of every man's property beyond his allotment shall be publicly recorded in writing and kept by the magistrates appointed by law. In this way lawsuits concerning all matters of property may be easy to decide and perfectly clear. Next, the lawgiver must first place his city as near the center of the country as possible. He must choose a site that also has all the other advantages a city needs, which are easy enough to perceive and specify. After this he must divide off twelve portions of land, first setting apart a sacred precinct for Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, which he shall name the acropolis and enclose with a ring wall. Starting from this, he must divide both the city itself and the whole country into the twelve portions. The twelve portions must be made equal by making those of good land small and those of poorer land larger. He must mark off 5,040 allotments, and he must cut each of these in two and join two pieces to form each separate allotment, so that each contains a near piece and a distant piece. The piece next to the city is joined with the piece farthest away, the second nearest with the second farthest, and so on with all the rest. In dealing with these separate pieces, they must use the device we mentioned a moment ago about poor land and good, securing equality by making the assigned portions larger or smaller. He must also divide the citizens into twelve parts, making all twelve parts as equal as possible in the value of the rest of their property, after a census of everyone has been taken. After this they must also set aside twelve allotments for the twelve gods, and name and consecrate the portion allotted to each god, giving it the name phyle. They must also divide the twelve sections of the city in the same way as they divided the rest of the country. And each citizen must receive as his share two dwellings, one near the center of the country and the other near the outskirts. In this way the settlement shall be completed.

745e–746e

Athenian: But we must by all means notice this: all the arrangements now described are unlikely ever to meet with conditions so favorable that the whole program can be carried out as planned. That would require citizens who will raise no objection to living together in this way. They would have to tolerate being restricted for life to fixed and limited amounts of property and to the numbers of children we have stated, and being deprived of gold and of the other things that the lawgiver is clearly bound, by our regulations, to forbid. They would also have to accept the arrangements he has laid down for the country and the city, with dwellings set in the center and around the circumference. It is almost as if he were telling nothing but dreams, or molding, so to speak, a city and citizens out of wax. These criticisms are not altogether unfair, and the lawgiver should reconsider the points that follow. So the one who is legislating speaks to us again like this: Do not suppose, my friends, that in these discourses of mine I fail to see the truth of what this criticism now sets out. But in dealing with all plans for the future, I think the fairest course is this. The person who displays the pattern on which the undertaking is to be modeled should leave out no detail of perfect beauty and truth. But where any detail is impossible to realize, he should leave that particular detail aside and not carry it out. Instead, he should contrive to carry out whichever of the remaining details comes closest to it and is by nature most closely related to the right course. He should let the lawgiver express his ideal completely. When this is done, then and only then should they both consult together about how far their proposals are useful and how much of the legislation is impracticable. For even the maker of the most trivial object, if he is to be of any worth, must make it consistent with itself in every respect. So now, after deciding on our division into twelve parts, we must try to see how the divisions that come next to these and spring from them, down to the final figure of 5,040, are to be arranged. These divisions determine the phratries and demes and villages, as well as the military companies and platoons, and also the coinage system, dry and liquid measures, and weights. How, I say, are all these numbers to be fixed by the law so as to be of the right size and consistent with one another?

746e–747e

Athenian: Moreover, the lawgiver should not hesitate, for fear of what might seem petty detail, to prescribe that none of the utensils the citizens may own shall be allowed to be of improper size. He must recognize as a universal rule that the divisions and variations of numbers are useful for every purpose. They apply to their own arithmetical variations, to the geometrical variations of surfaces and solids, and also to those of sounds and of motions, whether in a straight line up and down or in a circle. The lawgiver must keep all these in view and instruct all the citizens to hold fast, as far as they can, to this organized numerical system. For in household management, in politics, and in all the arts, no single branch of educational knowledge has as much influence as the study of numbers. Its chief advantage is that it wakes up the man who is by nature drowsy and slow-witted and makes him quick to learn, retentive, and sharp, so that he progresses beyond his natural capacity by a divine art. All these subjects of education will prove fine and fitting, provided that you can remove illiberality and greed, by means of other laws and institutions, from the souls of those who are to acquire them adequately and benefit from them. Otherwise you will find that you have unintentionally produced a cheat, as we call him, instead of a wise man. We can see examples of this today in the effect that the illiberal character of their property and their other institutions has had on the Egyptians and Phoenicians and many other nations. These results may be due to their having had a bad lawgiver, or to some adverse fortune that happened to them, or perhaps to some natural disadvantage. For that too, Megillus and Clinias, is a point we must not fail to notice: some districts are naturally better than others for producing people of a good or bad type, and we must not legislate in conflict with this natural difference. Some districts are badly or well suited because of a variety of winds or because of sunshine, others because of their waters, and others simply because of the produce of the soil. The soil offers produce either good or bad for their bodies, and it is equally able to produce similar effects in their souls as well. Of all these, by far the best districts would be those that have a kind of heavenly breeze, and where the portions of land are under the care of daemons. So they receive those who come at any time to settle there either graciously or ungraciously. The wise lawgiver will examine these districts, as far as a mere human being can examine such matters, and he will try to frame his laws accordingly. And you too, Clinias, must follow the same course: when you intend to colonize the country, you must attend to these matters first.

747e

Clinias: Athenian stranger, what you say is excellent, and I must do as you advise.

751a

Athenian: Well then, after everything that has now been said, you will next come, I suppose, to the task of appointing magistrates for your State. Clinias: That is right. Athenian: This involves two branches of civic organization. The first is the appointment of magistracies and magistrates, which includes fixing the right number required and the proper method of appointing them. The second is assigning to each magistracy the laws, and the number of laws, appropriate to it in each case. But before we make our selection, let us pause for a moment and make a relevant statement about it.

751b

Clinias: What statement is that? Athenian: It is this. Everyone can see clearly that legislation is a great undertaking. Placing unfit officials in charge of well-framed laws in a well-equipped State not only robs those laws of all their value and causes widespread ridicule, but is also likely to become the most fertile source of damage and danger in such States.

751c

Clinias: Undoubtedly. Athenian: Then, my friend, let us take note of this consequence as we now deal with your constitution and State. You see that, in the first place, those who are rightly to undertake official functions must in every case have been fully tested, both themselves and their families, from their earliest years up to the time they are selected. Second, those who are to do the selecting must have been brought up in law-abiding habits and be well trained for the task of rightly rejecting or accepting the candidates who deserve their disapproval or approval. Yet on this point, can we suppose that men who have only recently come together, who do not know one another and have had no training, could ever possibly select their officials without fault?

751d

Clinias: It is practically impossible. Athenian: Yet, as the saying goes, a contest allows no excuses. That is how it must be now with you and me. For you, as you tell me, have given your pledge to the Cretan nation that you, with your nine colleagues, will devote yourself to founding that State; and I, for my part, have promised to help you in the course of our present imaginative sketch.

752a

Athenian: And I would certainly be reluctant to leave our sketch without a head, because if it wandered about in that condition it would look entirely shapeless. Clinias: I heartily approve of what you say, Stranger. Athenian: And more than that, I will act as I say to the best of my ability. Clinias: By all means, let us do as we say. Athenian: It will be done, if God is willing and if we can master our old age to that extent.

752b

Clinias: God will probably be willing. Athenian: Probably he will. And with him as our leader, let us also observe this— Clinias: What? Athenian: How boldly and adventurously we will now have founded this State of ours. Clinias: What do you have particularly in mind just now, and what makes you say so? Athenian: The fact that we are legislating lightheartedly and boldly for inexperienced men, in the hope that they will accept the laws we have now enacted. This much at least is plain, Clinias, to almost everyone, even to the dullest mind: they will not readily accept any of those laws at the start. But suppose those laws could remain unchanged until those who absorbed them in childhood, were brought up in them, and grew fully used to them have taken part in elections to office throughout the State. Then, once this has been accomplished (if any means or method can be found to accomplish it properly), we have, I think, a strong guarantee that, after this transitional period of disciplined adolescence, the State will remain firm.

752d

Clinias: It is certainly reasonable to suppose so. Athenian: Then let us consider whether we might succeed in providing an adequate means to this end along the following lines. I declare, Clinias, that you Knossians, more than all other Cretans, not only ought to deal in no perfunctory way with the land you are now settling, but also ought to take the utmost care that the first officials are appointed in the best and most secure way possible. Selecting the rest of them will be a less serious task, but it is absolutely necessary for you to choose your Law-wardens first, with the utmost care.

752e

Clinias: What means or what rule can we find for this? Athenian: This. I assert, sons of Crete, that since the Knossians take precedence over most of the Cretan cities, they should join with those who have come into this community to select thirty-seven persons in all from their own number and from the community: nineteen from the settlers, and the rest from Knossos itself. The Knossians should hand these men over to your State, and they should make you personally a citizen of this colony and one of the eighteen, using persuasion or perhaps a reasonable degree of compulsion.

753a

Clinias: Why then, Stranger, have you and Megillus not also taken part with us in our constitution? Athenian: Athens is proud, Clinias, and Sparta is proud too, and both are far away. But for you this course is entirely appropriate in every respect, as it is likewise for the rest of the founders of the colony, to whom our recent remarks about you also apply. Let us assume, then, that this would be the fairest arrangement under present conditions. Later on, if the constitution still endures, the selection of officials shall take place as follows. All men who carry arms, as cavalry or infantry, or who have served in war as far as their age and ability allowed, shall take part in selecting the officials. They shall make the selection in whichever shrine the State considers most sacred. Each man shall bring to the altar of the god a tablet on which he has written the name of his nominee, with his father's name, his tribe, and the deme he belongs to; and beside these he shall also write his own name in the same way. Anyone who chooses shall be permitted to remove any tablet that seems to him to be improperly written and to display it in the marketplace for not less than thirty days. The officials shall publicly display, for the whole State to see, the tablets judged to come first, up to 300 in number; and all the citizens shall vote again in the same way, each for whichever of these he wishes. From these, the officials shall again publicly display the names of those judged first, up to 100 in number. The third time, whoever wishes shall vote for whichever of the hundred he wishes, passing between the slain victims as he does so. Then they shall test the thirty-seven men who have received the most votes and declare them magistrates. Who, then, Clinias and Megillus, are the men who will establish in our State all these regulations about the magistracies and the tests for them? We see, do we not, that for States being harnessed together for the first time in this way, there must necessarily be some such persons; but who they could be, before any officials exist, is impossible to see. Yet somehow or other they must be there, and they must be men not of ordinary quality but of the highest quality possible. For, as the saying goes, well begun is half done, and everyone always praises a good beginning;

753e–754a

Athenian: but in truth, as I see it, a beginning is more than half, and no one has ever yet praised a well-made beginning as much as it deserves.

754a

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Then let us not knowingly leave this first step unmentioned, or fail to make it quite clear to ourselves how it is to be brought about. I, however, am by no means rich in suggestions, except for one statement which, given the present situation, is both necessary and useful to make. Clinias: What statement is that? Athenian: I assert that the State whose settlement we are planning has no one to serve as a parent except the State that is founding it. I am well aware, though, that many colonies often have been, and will be, at odds with those that founded them. But now, on the present occasion, it is like a child in the helplessness of childhood. Even though he is likely to quarrel with his parents at some later date, he loves his parents and is loved by them, and he always runs for help to his family and finds in them, and them alone, his allies. In the same way, I assert, this relationship now exists ready-made for the Knossians toward the young State, because of their care for it, and for the young State toward the Knossians. I say once more, as I said just now (for there is no harm in repeating a good statement), that the Knossians must take a share in caring for all these matters. They must choose not less than 100 men from among those who have come into the colony, the oldest and best they are able to select; and let there be another hundred from the Knossians themselves. This joint body, I say, must go to the new State and arrange together that the magistrates are appointed according to the laws and tested after their appointment. When this has been done, the Knossians must live in Knossos, and the young State must try by its own efforts to secure safety and success for itself. As for the men who make up the thirty-seven, let us select them, both now and for all time to come, for the following purposes. First, they shall act as Wardens of the laws; and second, as Keepers of the registers in which every man records for the officials the amount of his property, leaving out four minae if he belongs to the highest property-class, three if he belongs to the second, two if to the third, and one if to the fourth. And if anyone is shown to possess anything else beyond what is registered, all such surplus shall be confiscated. In addition, he shall be liable to be brought to trial by anyone who wishes to prosecute: a trial that is neither noble nor of good name, but disgraceful, if he is convicted of despising the law for the sake of gain. So whoever wishes shall charge him with profiteering and prosecute him by law before the Law-wardens themselves;

754e–755e

Athenian: and if the defendant is convicted, he shall have no share in the public goods, and whenever the State makes a distribution, he shall receive no portion except his allotment. He shall be registered as a convicted offender, where anyone who chooses may read his sentence, for as long as he lives. A Law-warden shall hold office for no more than twenty years, and he shall be voted into office at not less than fifty years of age. If he is elected at the age of sixty, he shall hold office for ten years only; and by the same rule, the more he exceeds the minimum age, the shorter his term of office shall be. So if he lives beyond the age of seventy, he must no longer imagine that he can remain among these officials, holding an office of such great importance. As for the Law-wardens, then, let us state that these three duties are assigned to them; and as we proceed with the laws, each new law will assign to these men whatever additional duties they ought to take on beyond those now stated. And now we may go on to describe the selection of the other officials. Commanders must be selected next, along with their subordinates for purposes of war: hipparchs, phylarchs, and officers to marshal the ranks of the infantry tribes. The name taxiarchs, which is in fact the very name most people give them, would be especially appropriate for these. Of these officers, the commanders shall be nominated by the Law-wardens from among the members of our State only; and from those nominated, the selection shall be made by all who are serving or have served in war at their respective ages. And if anyone thinks that some man who has not been nominated is better than one of those nominated, he shall state the name of his nominee and of the man he is to replace, and, taking an oath on the matter, he shall propose his substitute; whichever of the two is preferred by vote shall be included in the list for selection. The three men appointed by the majority of votes to serve as commanders and supervisors of military affairs shall be tested as the Law-wardens were. The selected commanders shall nominate taxiarchs for themselves, twelve, one for each tribe; and here, in the case of the taxiarchs, just as in the case of the commanders, there shall be a right of counter-nomination and a similar procedure for voting and testing. For the present, before prytaneis and a Boule have been elected, this assembly shall be convened by the Law-wardens, who shall seat it in the holiest and most spacious place available: the hoplites in one section, the cavalry in another, and in a third section, next to these, all others who belong to the military forces.

755e–756e

Athenian: All shall vote for the commanders, and all who carry shields shall vote for the taxiarchs. The entire cavalry shall elect the phylarchs for themselves, and the commanders shall appoint for themselves the captains of the skirmishers, the archers, or any other branch of service. We still have the appointment of hipparchs left. They shall be nominated by the same persons who nominated the commanders, and the method of selection and counter-nomination shall be the same for them as for the commanders. The cavalry shall vote for them in full view of the infantry, and the two who receive the most votes shall be captains of all the cavalry. No more than two challenges of a vote shall be allowed; if anyone makes a third challenge, it shall be decided by those who were in charge of the count on that occasion. The Boule, or Council, shall consist of thirty dozen, since the number 360 is well suited to subdivision. They shall be divided into four groups, and 90 councillors shall be voted for from each of the property-classes. First, all the citizens shall be required to vote for councillors from the highest property-class, and anyone who disobeys shall pay whatever fine has been decided on. When these have been voted for, their names shall be recorded. On the next day, councillors from the second class shall be voted for, by the same procedure as on the first day. On the third day, anyone who chooses shall vote for councillors from the third class; voting shall be compulsory for members of the first three classes, but members of the fourth and lowest class shall be exempt from the fine if any of them do not wish to vote. On the fourth day, all shall vote for councillors from the fourth and lowest class. Any member of the third or fourth class who does not wish to vote shall be exempt from the fine, but any member of the first or second class who fails to vote shall be fined: three times the amount of the first fine for a member of the second class, and four times for a member of the first class. On the fifth day, the officials shall publish the recorded names for all the citizens to see, and every man shall vote from among these or else pay the first fine. When they have selected 180 from each of the classes, they shall choose half of this number by lot and test them; and these shall be the Councillors for the year.

756e–757e

Athenian: A selection of officials made in this way will strike a mean between a monarchic constitution and a democratic one, and our constitution should always stand midway between the two. For slaves will never be friends with masters, nor bad men with good, even when they hold equal positions. When equality is given to unequal things, the result will be unequal unless due measure is applied; and it is because of these two conditions that political communities are filled with factional strife. There is an old and true saying that equality produces friendship, and it is very rightly and fittingly said; but what kind of equality is capable of doing this is a very troublesome question, since it is far from clear. For there are two kinds of equality which, though they share the same name, are often almost opposite in their practical results. Any State or lawgiver is competent to apply the first of these in assigning honors—namely, the equality determined by measure, weight, and number—simply by using the lot to produce even results in the distributions. But the truest and best form of equality is not easy for everyone to discern. It is the judgment of Zeus. It never helps human beings except in small measure, but to the extent that it does help either States or individuals, it produces everything good. For it gives more to the greater and less to the smaller, granting due measure to each according to its nature. In the matter of honors too, it grants the greater honors to those who are greater in goodness, and the lesser to those of the opposite character in goodness and education, and so assigns to each, in proportion, what is fitting. Indeed, it is precisely this that constitutes political justice for us, which is the goal we must strive for, Clinias; this equality is what we must aim at as we settle the State that is now being planted. And whoever founds a State elsewhere at any time must make this same goal the aim of his legislation: not the advantage of a few tyrants, or of one, or of some form of democracy, but always justice. And justice consists in what we have just stated, namely, the natural equality given on each occasion to things that are unequal. Nevertheless, every State must at times use even this equality in a modified form, if it is to avoid involving itself in internal strife in one section or another. For the reasonable and considerate, wherever it is applied, is an infringement on the perfect and exact, since it departs from strict justice. For the same reason, it is necessary also to make use of the equality of the lot, because of the discontent of the masses; and in doing so we must pray, calling on God and Good Luck to guide the lot rightly for them toward the highest justice.

757e–758e

Athenian: That is why necessity compels us to use both forms of equality; but the form that depends on good luck we should use as seldom as possible. The State that means to survive must necessarily act in this way, my friends, for the reasons we have stated. For just as a ship sailing on the sea requires constant watchfulness both night and day, so too a State, when it lives amid the surge of surrounding States and is in danger of being caught by all sorts of plots, needs officials linked to officials from day to night and from night to day, and guardians succeeding guardians and being succeeded in turn, without a break. But since a crowd of people is never capable of performing any of these duties promptly, most of the Councillors must necessarily be left to spend most of their time on their private business, attending to their household affairs. We must assign a twelfth of them to each of the twelve months to supply guards in rotation. These will be ready to meet anyone who comes either from somewhere abroad or from within the State itself, if he wants to give information or to make inquiries about some matter that concerns the State's relations with other States. They will give replies, and, when the State has asked questions, receive the replies. And above all, in view of the many kinds of innovation that constantly tend to arise in States, they will prevent these from occurring if possible, and, if they do occur, make sure that the State perceives and remedies what has happened as quickly as possible. For these reasons, this presiding section of the State must always have control over convening and dissolving assemblies, both the regular legal assemblies and those called in an emergency. So a twelfth of the Council will be the body that manages all these matters, and each such part shall rest in turn for eleven-twelfths of the year. Together with the rest of the officials, this twelfth of the Council must keep continual watch in the State over these matters. This arrangement of affairs in the city will prove reasonable. But what supervision and what system are we to have for all the rest of the country? Now that the whole city and the whole country have each been divided into twelve parts, must we not appoint supervisors for the city's own streets, dwellings, buildings, harbors, market, and springs, and also for the sacred precincts and the temples, and all such things?

758e

Clinias: Certainly.

759a–759e

Athenian: Let us state, then, that the temples must have temple-keepers, priests, and priestesses. And for roads and buildings and their proper order; for people, and for animals too, to keep them from doing wrong; and to make sure that the order proper to States is maintained both within the city limits and in the suburbs, we must select three kinds of officials. Those who deal with the matters just mentioned we shall call city-stewards, and those dealing with the ordering of the market, market-stewards. Priests or priestesses of temples who hold hereditary priesthoods should not be disturbed. But if, as is likely to happen in such matters with a people being organized for the first time, few or none have such priesthoods already established, then we must establish priests and priestesses to be temple-keepers for the gods. In establishing all these offices, we must make the appointments partly by election and partly by lot, mixing democratic with non-democratic methods to secure mutual friendship in every rural and urban district, so that all may be as united in mind as possible. As for the priests, we shall entrust it to the god himself to secure what pleases him, by leaving their appointment to the divine chance of the lot. But we shall test each person who wins the lot: first, whether he is sound in body and legitimately born; and second, whether he comes from households that are as pure as possible, being himself clean of murder and of all such offenses against religion, and born of parents who have lived by the same rule. They ought to bring laws from Delphi about all matters of religion, appoint interpreters of those laws, and make use of them. Each priestly office should last for one year and no longer; and anyone who is to perform sacred rites properly according to the laws of religion should be not less than sixty years old. The same rules shall also apply to priestesses. For the interpreters, the tribes shall vote four at a time, in three rounds of voting, for four men, one from each tribe. When the three men who receive the most votes in each round have been tested, they shall send the nine to Delphi for the oracle to select one from each set of three; and the rules about their age and testing shall be the same as for the priests. These men shall hold office as interpreters for life; and when one of them is lost, the four tribes shall elect a replacement from the tribe he belonged to.

759e–760e

Athenian: As treasurers to control the sacred funds of each of the temples, and the sacred precincts with their produce and rents, we must choose from the highest property-classes three men for the largest temples, two for the smaller ones, and one for the least extensive. The method of selecting and testing them shall be the same as the one adopted for the commanders. These shall be the regulations concerning religious matters. As far as possible, nothing shall be left unguarded. In the city, the task of guarding shall be the responsibility of the commanders, taxiarchs, hipparchs, phylarchs, and prytaneis, and also of the city-stewards and market-stewards, once we have such officials properly selected and appointed. All the rest of the country must be guarded as follows. We have divided the whole country as nearly as possible into twelve equal portions. One tribe shall be assigned to each portion by lot, and each year it shall provide five men to act as land-stewards and phrourarchs (watch-captains). Each of the Five shall select twelve young men from his own tribe, not under 25 years of age and not over 30. The twelve portions of the country shall be assigned to these groups of twelve, one to each in rotation for a month at a time, so that all of them may gain experience and knowledge of every part of the country. The term of office and of service for guards and officers shall be two years. From the portion in which the lot first stations them, they shall move on month by month to the next district under the leadership of the phrourarchs, in a direction from left to right—and that will be from west to east. When the first year is completed, so that as many of the guards as possible may not only become familiar with the country in one season of the year but also learn what happens in each particular district at different seasons, their leaders shall lead them back again in the reverse direction, constantly changing their district, until they have completed their second year of service. For the third year they must elect other land-stewards and phrourarchs, the five overseers of the twelve.

760e–761e

Athenian: During their periods of residence in each district, their duties shall be as follows. First, to ensure that the country is fortified against enemies as well as possible, they shall dig channels wherever needed, excavate trenches, and build cross-walls, so as to keep out, to the best of their ability, those who try in any way to damage the country and its property. For these purposes they shall make use of the draft animals and the servants in each district, using the former and supervising the latter, and always choosing, as far as possible, times when these people are free from their own work. In every respect they must make movement as difficult as possible for enemies, but as easy as possible for friends, whether people, mules, or cattle. They shall do this by attending to the roads, so that all of them become as level as possible, and to the rainwater, so that it benefits rather than harms the country as it flows down from the heights into all the hollow valleys among the mountains. They shall dam the outlets of these flooded valleys with walls and channels, so that by storing up or absorbing the rains from heaven, and by forming pools or springs in all the low-lying fields and districts, they may make even the driest spots abundantly supplied with good water. As for spring water, whether streams or fountains, they shall beautify and adorn it with plantings and buildings; by joining the pools through cut tunnels they shall make them all abundant; and by using water-pipes they shall beautify, at every season of the year, any sacred precinct or grove that may be close at hand, by directing the streams right into the temples of the gods. And everywhere in such places the young men should build gymnasia both for themselves and for the old men, providing warm baths for the old. They should keep a plentiful supply of dry wood there, and give a kindly welcome and a helping hand to the sick and to those whose bodies are worn out by the labors of farming—a welcome far better than a doctor who is none too skillful. They shall carry on these and all similar works in the country districts both for ornament and for use, and also to provide recreation of a by no means ungraceful kind. Their serious duties in this department shall be as follows. The Sixty must each guard their own district, not only because of enemies but also with an eye to those who claim to be friends. And if anyone, whether a foreign neighbor or a citizen, wrongs another citizen, and whether the wrongdoer is a slave or free, the judges for the complainant shall be the Five officers themselves in petty cases, and in more serious cases the Five together with their twelve subordinates, where the damages claimed are up to three minae. No judge or official should hold office without being subject to an audit, except only those who, like kings, form a court of final appeal.

761e–762e

Athenian: The same applies to these land-stewards. If they commit any outrage against those they supervise—by imposing unfair demands, or by trying to take some of their farm produce without their consent, or if they accept a gift meant as a bribe, or decide cases unjustly—they shall be branded with disgrace throughout the whole State for yielding to flattery. For all the other wrongs they have committed against people in the district, up to the value of one mina, they shall voluntarily submit to trial before the villagers and neighbors. And if on any occasion they refuse to submit in this way, whether for a greater or a lesser wrong, trusting that by moving every month to a new district they will escape trial, then the injured party must bring proceedings in the public courts; and if he wins his case, he shall exact a double penalty from the defendant who slipped away and refused to submit voluntarily to trial. The officers and land-stewards shall live in the following way during their two years of service. First, in each district there shall be common meals, at which all shall eat together. If a man is absent from the common meals for even a single day, or sleeps away for a night, without orders from the officers or some urgent necessity, and the Five report him and post his name in the marketplace as guilty of deserting his watch, he shall suffer disgrace for betraying his public duty, and anyone who meets him and wishes to punish him may beat him without penalty. And if any of the officers themselves commits such an act, it will be proper for all the Sixty to keep an eye on him. If any of them notices or hears of such an act but fails to prosecute, he shall be held guilty under the same laws and punished more severely than the young men, and he shall be entirely disqualified from holding positions of command over the young men. The Law-wardens shall supervise these matters with the greatest care, to prevent such things from happening if possible, and, where they do happen, to make sure they meet with the punishment they deserve. Every man must hold this view about people in general: the man who has not been a servant will never become a master worthy of praise, and the right way to win honor is by serving honorably rather than by ruling honorably—serving first the laws, since this is service to the gods, and second, for the young, always serving their elders and those who have lived honorable lives. Next, whoever is made a land-steward must have shared the daily rations, which are coarse and uncooked, during the two years of service.

762e–763e

Athenian: For once the Twelve have been chosen, they shall meet with the Five and resolve that, acting like servants themselves, they will keep no servants or slaves to wait on them, and will not use any attendants belonging to the other farmers or villagers for their own private needs, but only for public requirements. In all other respects they shall resolve to live a self-sufficient life, acting as their own servants and masters, and, besides this, thoroughly exploring the whole country in summer and winter, under arms, for the purpose of both guarding and getting to know each particular district. For an accurate knowledge of one's own country is probably a branch of learning second to none. So the young men ought to practice hunting with hounds and all other forms of hunting, as much for this reason as for the general enjoyment and benefit that come from such sports. As for this branch of service, then—both the men themselves and their duties, whether we choose to call them secret-service men or land-stewards or any other name—every man who means to guard his own State effectively shall carry it out zealously to the best of his ability. The next step in our choice of officials is to appoint market-stewards and city-stewards. After the land-stewards, who number sixty, will come the three city-stewards. They shall divide the twelve sections of the city into three parts, and, following the example of the land-stewards, they shall have charge of the city's streets, of the various roads that run into the city from the country, and of the buildings, to see that all these conform to the requirements of the law. They shall also have charge of all the water supplies that the guards convey and pass on to them in good condition, to ensure that the water is both pure and plentiful as it pours into the cisterns, and may thus both beautify and benefit the city. So these men too must have both the ability and the leisure to attend to public affairs. Therefore, for the office of city-steward, every citizen shall nominate whomever he chooses from the highest property-class. When these have been voted on and the six who received the most votes have been determined, those whose duty it is shall select the three by lot; and after passing the scrutiny, these men shall carry out the office according to the laws established for them. After these, they must elect five market-stewards from the second and first property-classes. In all other respects the method of their election shall be similar to that of the city-stewards: from the ten candidates chosen by vote they shall select the five by lot, and after the scrutiny declare them appointed.

763e–764e

Athenian: Everyone shall vote for every official. Anyone who refuses to do so, if reported to the officials, shall be fined fifty drachmae and also be declared a bad citizen. Whoever wishes shall attend the Ecclesia and the public assembly. For members of the second and first property-classes attendance shall be compulsory, and anyone found absent from the assemblies shall be fined ten drachmae. For a member of the third or fourth class it shall not be compulsory, and he shall go free without a fine, unless the officials, for some urgent reason, order everyone to attend. The market-stewards must see to it that the market is conducted as the law prescribes. They must supervise the temples and fountains in the market to see that no one does any damage. If anyone does damage and is a slave or a foreigner, they shall punish him with blows and fetters; if a native is guilty of such misconduct, they shall have power to impose a fine of up to a hundred drachmae on their own authority, and to fine the wrongdoer up to twice that amount when acting jointly with the city-stewards. Similarly, the city-stewards shall have the power to fine and punish within their own sphere, fining up to a mina on their own authority, and up to twice that sum jointly with the market-stewards. It will be appropriate next to appoint officials for music and gymnastics, two grades for each department: one for education, the other for managing competitions. By education officials the law means supervisors of gymnasia and schools, responsible for their discipline and teaching and for overseeing attendance and accommodations for both girls and boys. By competition officials it means umpires for the competitors in both gymnastics and music, and these too are of two grades. For competitions there should be the same umpires for both men and horses; but in music it will be appropriate to have separate umpires for solo performances and for mimetic performances—I mean, for example, one set chosen for rhapsodists, harpers, flute-players, and all such musicians, and another set for choral performers. We ought first to choose the officials for the playful exercise of choirs of boys, men, and girls in dances and in all the regular forms of music;

764e–765e

Athenian: and for these one official is enough, and he must be not under forty years of age. For solo performances, too, one umpire of not less than thirty years is enough, to act as presenter and to pass adequate judgment on the competitors. The official and director of the choirs must be appointed in the following way. All who are devoted to these subjects shall attend the assembly, and if they refuse to attend they shall be liable to a fine—a matter the Law-wardens shall decide; any others who are unwilling to attend shall be under no compulsion. Every elector must make his nomination from among those who are experts. In the scrutiny, affirmation and denial shall be confined to one point only: on one side, that the candidate is expert; on the other, that he is not expert. And whichever one of the ten who come first in the voting is chosen by lot and passes the scrutiny shall be the official in charge of the choirs for the year according to law. In the same way they shall appoint, by lot, the official who is to preside for that year over those who enter competitions in solos and in joint performances on the flute; and the one so chosen shall refer the verdict to the judges. Next it is appropriate to choose umpires for the athletic contests of horses and men from the third and second property-classes. Attendance at this election shall be compulsory for the first three classes, but the lowest class shall be exempt from fines for not attending. Three shall be appointed: twenty having first been selected by show of hands, three of the twenty shall be chosen by lot, and they must also be approved by the vote of the scrutineers. If any candidate is disqualified in any drawing of lots or testing for office, they shall elect a replacement and carry out the scrutiny in the same way as for the original candidate. In the department we have been dealing with, we still have to appoint an official who will preside over the whole range of education for both girls and boys. For this purpose there shall be one official legally appointed. He shall be not under fifty years of age and shall be the father of legitimate children of either sex, or preferably of both sexes. Both the candidate who is put first and the elector who puts him first must be convinced that this office is by far the most important of the highest offices of State.

765e–766e

Athenian: For in the case of every living thing—plant or animal, tame and wild alike—it is the first shoot, if it sprouts well, that does the most to bring the essential excellence of the creature in question to its proper completion. Man, as we affirm, is a tame creature. Nevertheless, while he usually becomes the most godlike and gentle of animals when he happens to have a fortunate nature combined with right education, if his training is inadequate or bad he turns out the wildest of all the creatures the earth produces. So the lawgiver must not allow them to treat the education of children as a matter of secondary or incidental importance. Since the presiding official must be well chosen, the lawgiver must begin by instructing them to appoint as president, to the best of their ability, the citizen who is most excellent in every way. Therefore all the officials—except the Council and the prytaneis—shall go to the temple of Apollo, and each shall cast a secret ballot for whichever of the Law-wardens he thinks would best control educational affairs. Whoever receives the most votes, after passing a scrutiny held by the officials who elected him, other than the Law-wardens, shall hold office for five years; in the sixth year they shall elect another man to this office in the same manner. If anyone holding a public office dies more than thirty days before his term ends, those whose proper duty it is must appoint a replacement in the same way. If a guardian of orphans dies, the relatives on both the father's and the mother's side who are resident in the country, as far as cousins' children, shall appoint a replacement within ten days; if they fail to do so, each of them shall be fined one drachma per day until they have appointed the guardian for the children. A State would indeed be no State if it had no properly established law courts. But a judge who was speechless and said no more than the litigants do at a preliminary hearing, as arbitrators do, would never prove effective at deciding questions of justice. Consequently it is not easy for a large body of judges to judge well, nor for a small one either, if its members are of poor ability. The matter in dispute on each side must always be made clear, and for clarifying the point at issue, time, deliberation, and repeated questioning are useful.

766e–767e

Athenian: So those who bring charges against each other must first go to their neighbors and friends who know most about the actions in dispute. If someone fails to get an adequate decision from them, he shall go to another court; and if these two courts are unable to settle the matter, the third court shall put an end to the case. In a sense we may say that the establishment of law courts coincides with the election of officials. For every official must also be a judge of certain matters, while a judge, even if he is not an official, may be said to be an official of no small importance on the day when he concludes a case by pronouncing his judgment. Assuming, then, that the judges are officials, let us declare who will make suitable judges, of what matters, and how many shall deal with each case. The court with the greatest authority is the one the two parties set up for themselves, choosing judges by mutual agreement. Of the rest, there shall be two forms of trial: one when a private person accuses another private person of wronging him and wants to obtain a verdict by bringing him to trial, and the other when someone believes that the State is being wronged by one of the citizens and wants to come to the aid of the common good. We must now explain who the judges are and what sort of people they are. First, we must have a court common to all private persons who are having their third dispute with one another. It shall be formed as follows. On the day before a new year of office begins—which begins with the month following the summer solstice—all the officials, whether they hold office for one year only or longer, shall assemble in a single temple and, after swearing by the god, they shall dedicate, so to speak, one judge from each body of officials: namely, the member of each body whom they consider the best man and the most likely to decide the cases of his fellow citizens in the best and holiest way during the coming year. Once these are chosen, they shall undergo a scrutiny before those who chose them; and if any are disqualified, a replacement shall be chosen in the same way. Those who pass the scrutiny shall act as judges for those whose cases have escaped the other courts, and they shall cast their votes openly. The Councillors and all the other officials who elected them shall be required to attend these trials, both to hear and to see, and anyone else who wishes may attend. Anyone who accuses a judge of deliberately giving an unjust judgment shall go to the Law-wardens and lay his charge before them. A judge convicted on such a charge shall be liable to pay the injured party double the amount of the damage; and if he is judged to deserve a greater penalty, the judges of the case shall assess what additional punishment he must suffer, or what payment he must make to the State and to the person who brought the case.

767e–768e

Athenian: In the matter of offenses against the State, it is necessary first of all to give the people a share in the trial. For when a wrong is done to the State, it is the whole people that is wronged, and they would justly resent having no share in such trials. So while it is right that both the beginning and the end of such a case should be assigned to the people, the examination shall take place before three of the highest officials agreed on by both defendant and plaintiff; if they are unable to reach an agreement by themselves, the Council must decide between the choices each of them has made. In private cases too, as far as possible, all the citizens must have a share; for the man who has no share in helping to judge thinks he has no part or lot in the State at all. Therefore there must also be courts for each tribe, and judges appointed by lot on the spur of the moment must judge the cases, unswayed by pleas. But the final verdict in all such cases must rest with the court that we declare to be organized in the most incorruptible way humanly possible, especially for the benefit of those who have failed to get their case settled either before their neighbors or in the tribal courts. So as concerns the law courts—which, as we say, cannot easily be called either offices or non-offices without ambiguity—this outline sketch describes them in part, though it leaves out a good deal; for detailed legislation and definition concerning lawsuits would most properly be placed at the end of the legislative code. So let these matters be told to wait for us at the end. I would say that the other official posts have received most of the legislation they need for their establishment. But a full and precise account of each and all of the State's departments and of the whole civic organization cannot be given clearly until our review has covered every section of its subject, from the first to the very last, in proper order. So now, at the point where we stand—when our exposition has gone far enough to include the election of the officials—we may find a fitting place to end our previous subject and to begin the subject of legislation, which no longer needs any postponements or delays.

768e

Clinias: You have treated the previous subject, Stranger, entirely to our satisfaction; but we welcome even more heartily the way you have linked your past statements with your future ones—the end with the beginning.

769a

Athenian: It seems, then, that up to now our old men's sober game of reason has been finely played. Clinias: You are showing, I think, how fine these men’s serious work is. Athenian: Very likely. But let us see whether you agree with me about another point. Clinias: What is it, and whom does it concern? Athenian: You know how the painter's art, for instance, never seems to come to an end in depicting each particular subject. In its work of embellishment it seems as though it would never stop applying colors or removing them—or whatever professional painters call the process—and reach a point where the picture can no longer be improved in beauty and clarity.

769b

Clinias: I too recall hearing something of what you mention, although I am by no means practiced in that kind of art. Athenian: You are none the worse for that. We can still use this fact, which happened to occur to us, to illustrate the following point. Suppose a man set out to paint an object of extreme beauty, intending that it should never grow worse but always better as time went on. Do you not see that, since the painter is mortal, his endless toil will produce results that last only a short time, unless he leaves a successor who is able to repair the picture if it suffers from the passage of time, and also to improve it in the future by touching up any deficiency left by his own imperfect craftsmanship?

769c–769d

Clinias: True.

769d–769e

Athenian: Well then, do you not think the lawgiver's purpose is similar? He intends, first, to write down the laws with complete precision, as far as he can. Next, as time goes on and he puts his decrees to the test of practice, you surely cannot suppose that any lawgiver will be so foolish as not to see that a great many things must necessarily be left over, which some successor will have to set right, so that the constitution and the order of the State he has organized may always grow better and never in any way worse.

769e

Clinias: Of course, this is what everyone naturally wants. Athenian: Suppose, then, that a man knew of a device showing how he could teach another man, by deed and word, to understand to a greater or lesser degree how he should preserve or amend laws. Surely he would never stop explaining it until he had achieved his purpose.

770a

Clinias: He certainly would not. Athenian: Must not we three act in this way on the present occasion? Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: We are about to make laws, and Law-wardens have been appointed by us. Therefore, since we are in the evening of life and they are young compared to us, we should not only legislate ourselves, as we say, but also make these same men legislators as well as Law-wardens, as far as we can.

770b

Clinias: We should—if, that is, we are capable of doing so. Athenian: At any rate we must try, and try hard. Clinias: By all means. Athenian: Let us address them like this: Beloved Keepers of the Laws, in many areas of our legislation we will leave out a vast number of matters (we have no choice but to do so); yet even so, we will include in our outline sketch, as far as we can, all the important matters as well as the general description. You will need to help fill in this outline, and you must listen to what I say about the aim you should keep before you in doing so. Megillus, Clinias, and I have often stated that aim to one another, and we agree that it is rightly stated. So we want you to be in immediate agreement with us, as our disciples, and to aim at the goals at which, as we three have agreed, the lawgiver and the Law-warden ought to aim. The sum and substance of our agreement was simply this. Whatever the way may be in which a member of our community—whether male or female, young or old—may become a good citizen, possessing the excellence of soul that belongs to a human being, whether it comes from some pursuit or disposition, or from some kind of possession, or from desire or opinion or mental study, all his efforts throughout his whole life shall be directed to achieving this end. Not a single person shall show that he prefers anything that hinders this aim. In short, even where the State is concerned, he must let it be overturned, if that seems necessary, rather than voluntarily submit to the yoke of slavery under the rule of worse men; or else he must himself leave the State as an exile. Men must endure all such sufferings rather than change to a form of government that naturally makes people worse.

770e–771e

Athenian: This is what we agreed on earlier. So now, keep both of these goals of ours in view as you revise the laws. Criticize all the laws that are unable to achieve them, but welcome all those that are able to do so, and, embracing them wholeheartedly, live your lives by them. All other practices, which aim at so-called goods other than these, you must say goodbye to. To begin the laws that follow, we must start with sacred matters. First, we must reconsider the number 5,040 and the many convenient divisions we found it to have, both as a whole and when divided into tribes. The tribal number is, as we said, a twelfth of the whole, being by its nature exactly 20 × 21. Our whole number has twelve divisions, and the tribal number also has twelve. Each such portion must be regarded as a sacred gift of God, corresponding to the months and to the revolution of the universe. That is why every State is guided by natural instinct to hold them sacred, although some people have perhaps made their divisions more correctly than others, or consecrated them more fortunately. We, at any rate, now affirm that we are perfectly correct in first choosing the number 5,040, which can be divided by every number from 1 to 12 except 11. This exception is very easily remedied, since simply subtracting two households from the total restores a whole number as the quotient. That this is really true we could show, at our leisure, with a fairly short explanation. For now, then, we shall trust the oracular statement just made, and we shall use these divisions, give each portion the name of a god or of a child of gods, and grant it altars and everything that belongs to them. At these altars we shall appoint two assemblies every month for sacrifice—twelve (yearly) for the whole tribal division and twelve for its urban section only. Their purpose shall be, first, to give thanks to the gods and their attendants, and second, to promote fellowship among ourselves, the mutual acquaintance we spoke of, and association of every kind. For in view of the partnership and union of marriage, ignorance must be eliminated, both on the husband's part about the woman he marries and the family she comes from, and on the father's part about the man to whom he gives his daughter. In such matters it is all-important to avoid any mistake if possible.

771e–772e

Athenian: To achieve this serious purpose, playful dances should be arranged for boys and girls. At these they should both see and be seen, in a reasonable way and on occasions that offer a suitable pretext, with their bodies unclothed except as far as sober modesty requires. The officials of the choirs shall be the supervisors and directors of all such matters, and also, together with the Law-wardens, the lawgivers for everything we leave unregulated. As we said, in all matters involving a host of small details the lawgiver must necessarily leave gaps, and rules and amendments must be made year by year by those who have constant experience of them from year to year and are taught by practice, until it is decided that a satisfactory code has been worked out to regulate all such proceedings. A fair and sufficient period to assign for this experimental work would be ten years, both for sacrifices and for dances in all their particular details. Each body of officials, acting together with the original lawgiver if he is still alive, or by themselves if he is dead, shall report to the Law-wardens whatever has been left out in their own department, and shall supply it, until each detail seems to have reached its proper completion. When this is done, they shall decree these as fixed rules and use them along with the rest of the laws originally decreed by the lawgiver. They must never willingly make any change in these. But if it should ever be thought that a need for change has arisen, all the people must be consulted, as well as all the officials, and they must seek advice from all the divine oracles. If there is general consent by all, then they may make a change, but under no other conditions at any time; and whoever objects to change shall always prevail according to law. When any man of twenty-five, seeing others and being seen by them, believes he has found somewhere a mate who is to his liking and suitable for having children together, he shall marry, in every case before he is thirty-five. But first let him listen to the guidance on how he should seek what is proper and fitting; for, as Clinias maintains, each law ought to be introduced by a prelude suited to it.

772e

Clinias: A very appropriate reminder, Stranger—and in my opinion you have chosen a most opportune point in your discussion to make it. Athenian: You are right. So let us say to the son of good parents: My child, you must make a marriage that sensible people will approve of. They would advise you neither to avoid a connection with a poor family entirely nor to pursue a connection with a rich one, but, other things being equal, always to prefer an alliance with a family of moderate means. Such a course will benefit both the State and the families that are joined, since where excellence is concerned, what is evenly balanced and symmetrical is infinitely superior to what is undiluted. The man who knows he is unduly hasty and impetuous in all his actions should seek a bride from steady parents, while the man of the opposite nature should go and match himself with someone of the opposite kind. For marriage as a whole there shall be one general rule: each man must seek to make the marriage that will benefit the State rather than the one that most pleases himself. Everyone naturally tends to go after the mate who most resembles himself, and as a result the whole State becomes unbalanced both in wealth and in moral habits; and because of this, the consequences we least want are the very ones that generally happen to most States. To make explicit legal enactments about these matters—that a rich man, for instance, must not marry into a rich family, nor a man of great power into a powerful family, or that men of hasty temper must be required to seek alliances with those of slower temper, and the slow with the hasty—would not only be ridiculous but would also cause widespread resentment. For people do not find it easy to see that a State should be like a bowl of mixed wine: when the wine is first poured in, it foams wildly, but as soon as it is tamed by the sober deity of water, it forms a fine partnership and produces a drink that is good and moderate. That this is exactly what happens in the blending of children is something hardly anyone is able to see. So in the legal code we must leave out such rules and simply try, by the charm of words, to persuade each person to value the equality of his children more highly than equality in a marriage with excessive wealth, and, by means of reproaches, to turn away from his goal anyone who has set his heart on marrying for money, though we may not compel him by a written law.

773e–774e

Athenian: These, then, shall be the exhortations given about marriage, in addition to those given earlier, which declared that it is a duty to lay hold of the ever-living reality by providing servants for God in our place; and we do this by leaving behind us children's children. All this and more might be said in a proper prelude about marriage and the duty to marry. If, however, any man refuses to obey willingly, keeps himself aloof and without a partner in the State, and reaches the age of thirty-five unmarried, an annual fine shall be imposed on him: a hundred drachmae if he belongs to the highest property-class, seventy if to the second, sixty if to the third, and thirty if to the fourth. This fine shall be consecrated to Hera. Anyone who fails to pay the fine in full each year shall owe ten times the amount, and the treasurer of the goddess shall collect this sum; if he fails to collect it, he shall owe it himself, and at his audit he shall in every case be held to account for such a sum. This shall be the money fine imposed on the man who refuses to marry. As for honor, he shall receive none from the younger men, and no young man shall willingly show him any deference. If he tries to punish anyone, everyone shall come to the help and defense of the person mistreated, and anyone present who fails to give such help shall be declared by law to be both a cowardly and a bad citizen. About dowries it has been said before, and it shall be said again, that an equal exchange consists in neither giving nor receiving any dowry, so that the poor do not grow old unmarried for lack of money; for all who belong to this State have the necessities of life provided for them. The result of this rule will be less arrogance on the part of wives, and less humiliation and servility on the part of husbands because of money. Whoever obeys this rule will be acting nobly; but whoever disobeys it, by giving or receiving for clothing a sum of over fifty drachmae, or over one mina, or over one and a half minae, or (if he is a member of the highest property-class) over two minae, shall owe the public treasury an equal sum, and the amount given or received shall be consecrated to Hera and Zeus, and the treasurers of these deities shall collect it—just as the rule was, in cases of refusal to marry, that the treasurers of Hera should collect the fine in each instance or else pay it out of their own pockets. The right of betrothal belongs first to the father, second to the grandfather, and third to brothers by the same father. If there are none of these, it rightly belongs next to relatives on the mother's side, in the same order. In the case of any unusual misfortune, the right shall belong in each case to the nearest of kin, acting together with the guardians.

774e–775e

Athenian: Concerning the preliminary marriage sacrifice and all the other sacred ceremonies that should properly be performed before, during, or after a marriage, each man shall consult the Interpreters, and believe that by obeying their directions he will have done everything properly. As for wedding feasts, each party should invite male and female friends, not more than five on each side, and an equal number of the relatives and in-laws of both households. In no case must the expense exceed what the person's means allow: one mina for the richest class, half that amount for the second, and so on in proportion as the property assessment decreases. Whoever obeys the law should be praised by all; but whoever disobeys it the Law-wardens shall punish as a man of poor taste and untrained in the nomes of the nuptial Muses. Drinking to excess is a practice that is improper anywhere—except at the feasts of the god who gave us wine—and it is not safe either. It is certainly not so for those who take marriage seriously. At such a time, above all, both bride and groom ought to be sober, since the change in their life is a great one, and so that, as far as possible, the child that is conceived may in every case be born of sober parents; for it is quite uncertain which night or day will, with God's help, bring about its conception. Moreover, procreation should not be the work of bodies loosened by excessive wine; rather, the embryo should be formed firmly, steadily, and quietly in the womb. But the man who is steeped in wine moves and is moved in every direction, writhing in both body and soul. So when he is drunk a man is clumsy and bad at sowing seed, and is likely to father unstable and untrustworthy offspring, crooked in form and character. So he must be very careful throughout the whole year and his whole life—and above all during the time he is fathering children—to do nothing that involves either bodily sickness or violence and injustice; for he will inevitably stamp these on the souls and bodies of his offspring and produce children who are in every way inferior. He must especially abstain from acts of this kind on the day and night of his marriage. For the Beginning, enshrined as a goddess among mortals, is the savior of all, provided she receives the honor due to her from each person who approaches her.

775e–776c

Athenian: The man who marries must leave his father and mother and take one of the two houses on his allotment, to be, as it were, the nest and nursery of his chicks. There he must make his marriage and the dwelling and home of himself and his children. For in friendships the presence of some degree of longing seems to cement all kinds of characters and bind them together; but unbroken closeness, since it lacks the longing that comes from time apart, causes friends to drift away from each other through an excessive surfeit of each other's company. So the married couple must leave their own houses to their parents and the bride's relatives, and act as if they themselves had gone off to a colony, visiting and being visited in their own home, fathering and raising children, and so handing on life, like a torch, from one generation to the next, and always worshiping the gods as the laws direct. Next, as to possessions: what should a man own to have a reasonable amount of property? Most possessions are easy enough both to identify and to acquire; but servants present all kinds of difficulties. The reason is that what we say about them is partly right and partly wrong; for the language we use about them both contradicts and agrees with our practical experience of them.

776c

Megillus: What do we mean by this? We still do not understand, Stranger, what you are referring to. Athenian: That is quite natural, Megillus. For probably the most controversial problem in all Hellas is the Helot system of the Lacedaemonians, which some maintain is good and others bad. A less violent dispute surrounds the subjection of the Mariandyni to the slave system of the Heracleotes, and that of the Penestae class to the Thessalians. In view of these and similar instances, what should we do about this question of owning servants? The point I happened to mention in the course of my argument, and about which you naturally asked me what I was referring to, was this. We know, of course, that we would all agree that one ought to own slaves who are as docile and as good as possible; for in the past many slaves have proved better than brothers or sons in every form of excellence, and have saved their masters, their property, and their whole households. Surely we know that this kind of thing is said about slaves?

776e

Megillus: Certainly. Athenian: And is the opposite kind of thing not said as well—that there is nothing sound in a slave's soul, and that a sensible man should never trust that class at all? Our wisest poet, too, speaking of Zeus, declared: Far-thundering Zeus robs of half their wits / those men on whom the day of bondage falls. (Hom. Od. 17.322) So each party adopts a different attitude of mind. The one places no trust at all in the servant class, but treats them like wild beasts and, with goads and whips, makes the servants' souls not merely three times but fifty times enslaved; whereas the other party does precisely the opposite.

777a–777b

Megillus: Just so.

777b

Clinias: Since this difference of opinion exists, Stranger, what should we do about our own country with regard to owning slaves and punishing them? Athenian: Well, Clinias, since man is a difficult creature to manage, it is clear that he is not at all likely to be or become easy to deal with when it comes to the necessary distinction, in actual practice, between slave and freeborn master. Clinias: That is evident. Athenian: The slave is no easy possession. Actual experience shows how many evils result from slavery—as in the frequent revolts in Messenia, and in States where many servants who speak the same language are kept, not to mention the crimes of all sorts committed by the so-called Corsairs who haunt the coasts of Italy, and the reprisals for them. In view of all these facts, it is truly a puzzle to know how to deal with all such matters. Only two means are left for us to try. One is not to allow the slaves, if they are to tolerate slavery quietly, to be all of the same nation, but, as far as possible, to have them of different races and languages. The other is to give them proper treatment, not only for their sake but even more for our own. Proper treatment of servants consists in using no violence toward them and in wronging them even less, if possible, than our own equals. For it is the way a man deals with people whom it is easy for him to wrong that shows most clearly whether his reverence for justice and his hatred of injustice are genuine or hypocritical. So the man who, in his character and his actions toward slaves, proves himself unstained by anything unholy or unjust will be best able to sow a crop of goodness. And this we may say, and rightly say, of every master, or king, and of everyone who holds any kind of absolute power over someone weaker than himself.

777e–778a

Athenian: We ought to punish slaves justly, and not make them conceited by merely admonishing them as we would free men. What we say to a servant should be almost entirely a simple command. There should be no joking with servants, male or female; for by excessively foolish indulgence in their treatment of their slaves, masters often make life harder both for themselves, as rulers, and for their slaves, as those who are ruled.

778a

Clinias: That is true. Athenian: Suppose, then, that we are now provided, to the best of our ability, with servants sufficient in number and quality to help with every kind of task. Should we not next describe our dwellings? Clinias: Most certainly.

778b–778c

Athenian: It seems that our city, being new and until now without houses, must provide for practically all of its house-building, arranging every detail of its architecture, including temples and walls. These things really come before marriage, Clinias; but since our construction is now a verbal one, this is a very suitable place to deal with them. When we come to the actual construction of the State, we shall, God willing, have the houses come before marriage and crown all our architectural work with our marriage laws. For the present we shall limit ourselves to a brief outline of our building regulations.

778c

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: The temples we must build all around the marketplace and in a circle around the whole city, on the highest sites, for ease of defense and for cleanliness. Next to the temples we will place the houses of the officials and the law courts, where, as in the holiest places, they will give and receive judgments—partly because they deal there with holy matters, and partly because these are the seats of holy gods. In these courts trials for murder and for all crimes deserving death will fittingly be held. As for walls, Megillus, I would agree with your Sparta in letting the walls lie asleep in the ground and not waking them up, for the following reasons. The poet has a fine saying, often repeated, that walls should be made of bronze and iron rather than of earth.

778e–779d

Athenian: But our plan, in addition, would deserve to be met with roars of laughter—I mean the plan of sending young men into the country every year to dig and trench and build, so as to keep the enemy out and prevent them from ever setting foot on the borders of the land—if we were also to build a wall around the city. For in the first place, a wall is by no means good for a city's health; and moreover it usually produces a soft habit of soul in the inhabitants, by inviting them to take refuge inside it instead of driving back the enemy. Instead of securing their safety by keeping watch night and day, it tempts them to believe that their safety is assured if they are fenced in by walls and gates and go to sleep, like men born to avoid toil. They little realize that ease is really the fruit of toil, whereas a fresh crop of toils is, I think, the inevitable result of dishonorable ease and laziness. But if men really must have a wall, then the private houses must be built from the start in such a way that the whole city forms a single wall. All the houses must have good walls, built uniformly and in a similar style, facing the streets, so that the whole city will have the form of a single house. This will make its appearance not unpleasant, besides being by far the best plan for ensuring safety and ease of defense. Seeing that the original buildings remain will fittingly be the special responsibility of the occupants; and the city-stewards should supervise them, compel the negligent by fines, and also watch over the cleanliness of everything in the city, and prevent any private person from encroaching on State property, either by building or by digging. These officials must also keep watch over the proper drainage of rainwater, and over all other matters, whether inside or outside the city, that it is right for them to manage. All such details—and everything else the lawgiver is unable to deal with and leaves out—the Law-wardens shall regulate by supplementary decrees, taking practical needs into account. And now that these buildings and those of the marketplace, the gymnasia, and all the schools have been built and await their occupants, and the theaters their spectators, let us proceed to the subject that comes next after marriage, taking our legislation in order.

779d

Clinias: By all means. Athenian: Let us regard the marriage ceremony as now completed, Clinias. Next comes the period before childbirth, which will last a full year. How the bride and groom ought to spend this time in a State that will be unlike most other States—that is to be our next topic, and it is not the easiest of things to explain. We have said many hard things before, but the general public will find none of them harder to accept than this. All the same, what we believe to be right and true must by all means be said, Clinias.

779e

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Suppose someone proposes to publish laws for States regulating how the citizens should conduct themselves in State affairs and public matters, but thinks there is no need to make laws for their private conduct, even in necessary matters. He thinks everyone should be allowed to spend his day just as he pleases, instead of everything, public and private, being required to follow a regular rule; and he supposes that if he leaves private conduct unregulated by law, the citizens will still agree to regulate their public and civic life by law. That man is wrong in what he proposes. Why have I said this? For this reason: because we shall assert that married people must take their meals at the public messes neither more nor less than they did during the time before marriage. When the custom of public messes first arose in your countries—probably dictated by a war or by some event of equal force, when you were short of men and in dire straits—it seemed an astonishing institution. But after you had experienced these public messes and had been obliged to adopt them, the custom seemed to contribute admirably to security; and in some such way as that, the public mess came to be one of your established institutions.

780c

Clinias: That is likely enough. Athenian: So although this was once, as I said, an astonishing and alarming institution to impose on people, a man who tried to impose it as a law nowadays would not find it an equally difficult task. But there is a practice that follows from this institution and that would be truly successful if carried out. At present it is carried out nowhere, and so it makes the lawgiver, if he tries, practically card his wool into the fire, as the proverb says, and labor in vain at an endless series of tasks. This practice is neither easy to state nor, once stated, easy to put into effect.

780d

Clinias: Why do you show so much hesitation, Stranger, about mentioning this? Athenian: Listen now, so that we do not spend a lot of time on the matter to no purpose. Everything that takes place in the State, if it shares in order and law, confers every kind of blessing; but most things that are either without order or badly ordered undo the effects of the well-ordered. And it is into this predicament that the practice we are discussing has fallen. In your case, Clinias and Megillus, public meals for men are, as I said, rightly and admirably established by a divine necessity; but for women this institution is quite wrongly left unregulated by law, and public meals for them have not been brought into the light of day;

781a–781d

Athenian: instead, the female sex—that very section of humanity which, because of its weakness, is in other respects the most secretive and crafty—is abandoned to its disorderly condition through the misguided indulgence of the lawgiver. Because you have neglected that sex, you have had an influx of many consequences that would have been much better than they now are if they had been under legal control. For leaving women unregulated is not simply, as one might suppose, leaving half of our whole task undone. To the extent that women are inferior in goodness to men, the harm from neglecting them is more than twice what it would be from neglecting men. So it is better for the welfare of the State to revise and reform this institution, and to regulate all institutions for men and women in common. At present, however, the human race is so far from having reached this happy position that a man of discretion must actually avoid all mention of the practice in districts and States where even the existence of public meals has no formal recognition at all. How, then, will anyone try, without being laughed at, actually to compel women to take food and drink in public, exposed to the view of all? The female sex would more readily endure anything rather than this. Accustomed as they are to living a retired and private life, women will use every means to resist being led out into the light, and they will prove much too strong for the lawgiver. So elsewhere, as I said, women would not even listen to the right rule being mentioned without shrieks of indignation; but in our State perhaps they will. So if we agree that our discussion of the constitution as a whole must not, as far as theory goes, end in failure, I am willing to explain how this institution is good and fitting, if you are both equally willing to listen; but otherwise I will leave it alone.

781d

Clinias: Why, Stranger, we are both inexpressibly eager to listen. Athenian: Let us listen, then. And do not be surprised if you find me taking up the subject again from an early point. For we are now enjoying leisure, and there is no pressing reason to keep us from considering laws from every possible point of view.

781e

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Let us go back, then, to our first statements. Every man ought to understand this much at least: either the human race never had a beginning at all and will never have an end, but always was and always will be; or else it must have existed for an incalculable length of time since it first began.

782a

Clinias: Undoubtedly. Athenian: Well then, do we not suppose that all over the world and in all sorts of ways there have been risings and fallings of States, institutions of every variety of order and disorder, appetites for every kind of food and drink, and all sorts of variations in the seasons, during which the animals probably underwent countless changes?

782b

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Are we to believe, then, that vines, which did not exist before, appeared at a certain stage, and olives likewise, and the gifts of Demeter and Kore? And that some Triptolemus was the minister of such fruits? And during the period when these fruits did not yet exist, must we not suppose that the animals turned, as they do now, to eating one another? Clinias: Of course.

782c–782d

Athenian: In fact, the custom of human beings sacrificing one another survives even now among many peoples. Among others, by contrast, we hear that the opposite custom existed: they were forbidden even to eat an ox, and their offerings to the gods were not animals but cakes of meal and grain soaked in honey, and other such bloodless sacrifices. They abstained from meat as though it were unholy to eat it or to stain the altars of the gods with blood. Instead, those of us human beings who lived then lived what is called an Orphic life, keeping entirely to food without life and, on the other hand, abstaining entirely from living things.

782d

Clinias: What you say is certainly widely reported and easy to believe. Athenian: Someone might ask us: For what purpose have you just said all this? Clinias: A correct guess, Stranger. Athenian: So I will try, if I can, Clinias, to explain the subject that comes next. Clinias: Go on. Athenian: I observe that among human beings everything depends on a threefold need and desire; if they are guided rightly in these, the result is goodness, and if badly, the opposite. Of these desires, they have those for food and drink as soon as they are born. In the whole sphere of food every creature has an instinctive lust and is full of craving, and is quite deaf to any suggestion that it ought to do anything other than satisfy its tastes and desires for all such things, and so rid itself entirely of all pain.

783a–783c

Athenian: Third comes our greatest need and keenest lust, which, though the last to emerge, inflames human souls with the most raging frenzy: the lust for sowing offspring, which burns with the utmost violence. We must direct these three morbid states toward what is best, instead of toward what is called most pleasant, trying to check them by means of the three greatest forces—fear, law, and true reason—reinforced by the Muses and the Gods of Games, so as to quench by these means their growth and influx. So let us place the subject of producing children next after that of marriage, and after their production, their upbringing and education. If our discussion proceeds along these lines, each of our laws may perhaps be brought to completion. And when we come to the public meals, by approaching them at close range we shall probably see more clearly whether such associations should be for men only or for women as well. In this way we shall not only lay down the preliminaries that are still without legal regulation and place them as fences in front of the common meals, but also, as I said just now, we shall discuss the character of the common meals more exactly, and so be more likely to lay down laws for them that are suitable and fitting.

783c

Clinias: You are perfectly right. Athenian: Then let us keep in mind the things we mentioned a moment ago; for we will probably need them all soon. Clinias: What are the things you are telling us to remember? Athenian: The things we distinguished by the three terms we used. We spoke, you recall, of eating, second of drinking, and third of sexual excitement.

783d

Clinias: We shall certainly remember what you are now asking us to, Stranger. Athenian: Very good. Let us now come to the newly married, so as to instruct them how and in what way they ought to produce children, and, if we fail to persuade them, to threaten them with certain laws. Clinias: How? Athenian: The bride and groom must set their minds on producing for the State children of the greatest possible goodness and beauty. All people who are partners in any action produce fine and good results whenever they apply their minds to themselves and to the action, but the opposite results when they either have no minds or fail to apply them.

783e–784e

Athenian: So the groom shall pay attention both to the bride and to the work of procreation, and the bride shall do the same, especially during the period when they have no children yet. The women-inspectors whom we have chosen shall be in charge of them—more or fewer of them, according to the number and timing of their appointments as decided by the officials. They shall meet every day at the temple of Eileithyia for a third of an hour or more, and at their meetings they shall report to one another any case they may have noticed of any man or woman of procreative age who is attending to other things instead of to the rules laid down at the marriage sacrifices and ceremonies. The period of procreation and supervision shall be ten years and no longer, whenever there is an abundant issue of offspring. But if any couple remain childless to the end of this period, they shall consult together with their relatives and the women officials to decide on terms advantageous to both parties, and be divorced. If any dispute arises about what is fitting and advantageous for each party, they shall choose ten of the Law-wardens and abide by whatever regulations these permit or impose. The women-inspectors shall enter the houses of the young people and, partly by threats and partly by admonition, stop them from their wrongdoing and folly. If they cannot do so, they shall go and report the case to the Law-wardens, and the Law-wardens shall restrain them. If they too prove unable, they shall inform the public authority, posting up a sworn statement that they are truly unable to reform So-and-so. The man who is posted in this way, if he fails to defeat in the law courts those who posted him, shall suffer the following disqualifications: he shall not attend any wedding or children's birthday celebrations, and if he does, anyone who wishes may punish him with blows without penalty. The same law shall apply to women: if a woman has been similarly posted as disorderly and has lost her case, she shall have no part in women's outings, honors, or invitations to weddings or birthday celebrations. And when they have finished producing children according to the laws, if the man has sexual intercourse with another woman, or the woman with another man, while the latter are still within the procreative age, they shall be liable to the same penalty as was stated for those still producing children.

784e–785b

Athenian: After that, the man and woman who are self-controlled in these matters shall be held in good repute in every way, but the opposite kind of esteem—or rather disesteem—shall be shown to persons of the opposite character. Sexual conduct shall be left unmentioned and unregulated by law when most people behave with due propriety in it; but if they are disorderly, then the rules prescribed in this way shall be enforced according to the laws then enacted. For everyone the first year is the beginning of his whole life, and it ought to be recorded as life's beginning for both boy and girl in their ancestral shrines. Beside it, on a whitewashed wall in every phratry, there should be written the number of the archons who give their number to the years; and the names of the living members of the phratry shall always be written close together, and those of the deceased shall be erased. The limit of the marriage age shall be from sixteen to twenty years—the longest time allowed—for a girl, and from thirty to thirty-five for a boy. The age limit for official posts shall be forty for a woman and thirty for a man. For military service the age limit shall be from twenty up to sixty years for a man. For women, they shall prescribe whatever is possible and fitting in each case, after they have finished bearing children and up to the age of fifty, in whatever kind of military work it is thought right to employ their services.

788a–788c

Athenian: Now that our children of both sexes have been born, the proper course will be to deal next with their nurture and education. This subject cannot possibly be passed over, but clearly it can be handled more suitably through instruction and admonition than through legislation. In the private life of the family, many trivial things tend to happen that escape general notice. They arise from each person's feelings of pain, pleasure, or desire, and they run counter to the lawgiver's instructions, and they will produce in the citizens a multitude of conflicting tendencies. This is bad for a State. On the one hand, it is improper and undignified to impose legal penalties on these practices, because they are so trivial and happen so often. On the other hand, when people grow used to breaking the law repeatedly in trivial matters, the authority of the written law suffers as well. So while it is impossible to pass over these practices in silence, it is difficult to legislate about them. I will try to make clear which practices I mean by bringing some samples, so to speak, out into the light. At the moment my words are rather like an obscure riddle.

788c

Clinias: That is quite true. Athenian: We said that right nurture must clearly be able to make both bodies and souls as beautiful and as good as possible in every respect. We were speaking the truth there, I take it? Clinias: Certainly we were.

788d

Athenian: And I suppose that, to take the simplest point first, the most beautiful bodies must grow up from earliest infancy as straight as possible. Clinias: Absolutely. Athenian: Well then, do we not notice that in every living creature the first growth is by far the largest and most abundant? It is so large that many people firmly maintain that a person’s height does not double in the twenty years after the age of five. Clinias: That is true. Athenian: But we know, don't we, that when growth comes on rapidly without plenty of suitable exercise, it produces countless evils in the body?

789a

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: And bodies need the most exercise at the time when they take in the most food? Clinias: What do you mean, Stranger? Are we to prescribe the most exercise for newborn babies and tiny infants? Athenian: No, even earlier than that. We shall prescribe it for those still being nourished inside their mothers' bodies. Clinias: What do you mean, my dear sir? Are you talking about unborn babies?

789b

Athenian: I am. It is not at all surprising that you know nothing about this prenatal gymnastics. Strange as it is, though, I would like to explain it to you. Clinias: Please do. Athenian: In our country a practice of this kind is easier to understand, because some people there carry their pastimes to excess. In Athens you find not only boys but sometimes old men raising birds and training them to fight one another. These men are far from thinking that the training they give the creatures by stirring up their combativeness is enough exercise. In addition, each man picks up his bird and keeps it tucked in his fist if it is small, or under his arm if it is large, and in this way they walk many long miles to improve the condition, not of their own bodies, but of these creatures. In this way they show clearly to anyone observant that all bodies benefit, as if from a tonic, when they are moved by any kind of shaking or motion. This is true whether they move by their own action, or are rocked in a swing or on a boat at sea, or are carried on horseback or by any other moving bodies in any way at all. They also show that this is why bodies are able to master their supplies of food and drink and give us health and beauty, and strength as well. Since this is how matters stand, what should we do next? Shall we risk ridicule and lay down a law that the pregnant woman shall walk? Shall the law say that the child, while it is still soft, shall be molded like wax and kept in swaddling clothes until it is two years old? And shall we also compel the nurses by legal penalties to keep carrying the children somewhere, whether to the fields or to the temples or to their relatives, the whole time until they are able to stand upright? And after that, shall they keep on carrying them until they are three years old, taking care that the children's legs are not twisted by bearing too much weight while they are still young?

789e–790a

Athenian: And shall the law require that the nurses be as strong as possible, and that there be more than one of them? And shall we impose a written penalty for every failure to carry out these instructions? Such a course is completely out of the question, for it would bring on an overabundance of the consequence we mentioned a moment ago.

790a

Clinias: What was that? Athenian: The consequence that we would become a great laughingstock. On top of that, the nurses, with their feminine and servile attitudes, would flatly refuse to obey. Clinias: Then why did we say that these rules ought to be stated? Athenian: For this reason: the minds of the masters and free men in the States might perhaps listen, and so reach the right conclusion. They might see that unless private affairs in a State are rightly managed, it is useless to expect any stable code of laws to exist for public affairs. When the individual citizen realizes this, he may adopt on his own as laws the rules we have just stated. By doing so, and so managing both his household and his State well, he may achieve happiness.

790b

Clinias: That result seems quite likely. Athenian: So we must not stop this kind of legislation until we have described in detail the treatment suited to the souls of young children, in the same way that we began our advice about their bodies.

790c

Clinias: You are quite right. Athenian: Let us take this, then, as a basic principle for both cases. For both the body and the soul of the very young, a process of nursing and moving that goes on as continuously as possible, by day and by night, is beneficial in all cases, and especially for the youngest. It would be like having them always rocked on the sea, if that were possible. As things are, with newborn infants one should come as close to this condition as possible. Further evidence of this can be seen in the fact that this practice is adopted, and its usefulness recognized, both by those who nurse small children and by those who administer cures for Corybantic frenzy. When mothers have children who cannot sleep and want to lull them to rest, the treatment they apply is not quiet but motion, for they keep rocking them in their arms. Instead of silence, they use a kind of crooning tune. In this way they literally cast a spell over the children, as with the victims of Bacchic frenzy, using the combined movements of dance and song as a remedy.

790e

Clinias: And what, Stranger, should we suppose is the main cause of this? Athenian: It is easy enough to see. Clinias: How so? Athenian: Both these conditions are forms of fear, and fears arise from a poor condition of the soul. So whenever someone applies an external shaking to conditions of this kind, the external motion applied overpowers the internal motion of fear and frenzy. By overpowering it, it brings about a visible calm in the soul and an end to the painful pounding of the heart that existed in each case. So it produces very satisfying results. The children it puts to sleep. The Bacchants, who are awake, it brings into a sound state of mind in place of their frenzied condition, by means of dancing and pipe music, with the help of whatever gods they happen to be honoring with sacrifice. This, to put it briefly, is a quite plausible account of the matter.

791b

Clinias: Very plausible. Athenian: Since these causes produce the effects described in the people mentioned, we should note this point. Every soul that is exposed to fear from youth will become especially prone to timidity. And this, as everyone would agree, is practice not in courage but in cowardice. Clinias: Of course it is.

791c

Athenian: The opposite course, practicing courage from youth up, consists, we shall say, in conquering the frights and fears that assail us. Clinias: That is true. Athenian: Let us say, then, that this factor, namely the exercise of very young children through the various motions, contributes greatly to developing one part of the soul's virtue. Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Moreover, cheerfulness of soul and its opposite will make up no small part of stoutheartedness and faintheartedness. Clinias: Of course.

791d

Athenian: How, then, can we instill right away in the newborn child whichever of these qualities we want? We must try to explain how, and to what extent, they are under our control. Clinias: By all means. Athenian: The doctrine we hold among ourselves, let me explain, is this. Luxurious living makes the disposition of the young sullen and irritable and too easily upset by trifles. Its opposite, harsh and brutal enslavement, makes them humble, mean-spirited, and misanthropic, and so unfit to live with others.

791e

Clinias: In what way, then, should the State as a whole bring up infants who cannot yet understand speech or receive any other kind of education? Athenian: In this way. Every newborn creature, and the human child as much as any, usually lets out a loud cry right away. What is more, the child is more prone than all the others to be afflicted with tears as well as cries. Clinias: Quite true. Athenian: When nurses are trying to figure out what a baby wants, they judge by these very signs when they offer it things. If it stays silent when something is offered, they conclude that it is the right thing; but if it weeps and cries out, the wrong thing. So infants show what they like and dislike by weeping and crying, which are certainly not happy signals. This period lasts no less than three years, which is no small part of one's life to spend badly or well.

792a

Clinias: You are right. Athenian: When a man is ill-tempered and not at all cheerful, don't you both regard him as a gloomy person, and generally more full of complaints than a good man ought to be?

792b

Clinias: I certainly do. Athenian: Well then, suppose someone tried by every available means, during those three years, to make sure that our nursling experienced as little grief, fear, or pain of any kind as possible. Would we not expect this to make the nursling's soul brighter and more cheerful? Clinias: Clearly it would, Stranger, and most of all if one provided him with many pleasures.

792c

Athenian: There, my good sir, I must part company with Clinias. In our view such a practice is the worst corruption of all, because in every case it happens at the very beginning of the child's upbringing. But let us see whether I am right. Clinias: Explain your view. Athenian: I believe the question before us is of great importance. You too, Megillus, please consider the matter and help us judge it. What I maintain is this: the right life should neither pursue pleasures nor, on the other hand, avoid pains altogether. Instead, it should embrace the middle state, which I just now called cheerfulness. As we all rightly suppose, on the strength of an inspired utterance, this is the very condition of God himself. And I maintain that whoever among us means to become godlike must pursue this state of soul. He must not himself become wholly given to pleasures, since he will not be free of pain either. Nor should he allow anyone else, old or young, male or female, to be in this condition, and least of all, as far as possible, the newborn baby. For it is in infancy, through the force of habit, that the whole character is most decisively formed. I would even say, if it would not be taken as a joke, that pregnant women above all others should be cared for during the year of their pregnancy. The aim is that none of them should indulge in repeated and intense pleasures or pains, but that each should spend that whole time cultivating a cheerful, bright, and calm disposition.

792e–793a

Clinias: There is no need for you, Stranger, to ask Megillus which of us two has spoken more truly. I myself grant you that everyone ought to avoid a life of unmixed pain and pleasure and always follow a middle path. So all is well, both with what you said and with my reply.

793a

Athenian: You are perfectly right, Clinias. So now let the three of us consider this next point together. Clinias: What is that? Athenian: All the regulations we are now setting out are what people commonly call unwritten laws. And taken as a whole, they are just the same as what people call ancestral customs. Moreover, the view that struck us a little while ago, that we should neither call these things laws nor leave them unmentioned, was a correct one. For these are the bonds of every constitution. They link all its laws, both those already enacted in writing and those still to be enacted. They are exactly like ancestral customs of great antiquity: when they are well established and practiced, they wrap the written laws in complete security. But if they stray from the right path, they are like builders' props that give way under the middle of a house. They bring everything else crashing down with them, one thing buried under another, first the props themselves and then the fine superstructure, once the ancient supports have collapsed. Keeping this in mind, Clinias, we must clamp together this State of yours, since it is a new one, by every possible means. We must omit nothing great or small among laws, customs, and institutions, for it is by all such means that a State is clamped together, and neither kind of law lasts without the other. So we should not be surprised if a flood of many seemingly trivial customs or usages makes our laws rather long.

793d

Clinias: What you say is quite true, and we will keep it in mind. Athenian: If someone could carry out these regulations precisely, and not merely apply them casually, in the case of girls and boys up to the age of three, they would contribute greatly to the benefit of our infant nurslings.

793e–794d

Athenian: To form the character of a child from three up to six years old, games will be needed. By then punishment must be used to keep children from being pampered. It must not, however, be degrading punishment. We said earlier, in the case of slaves, that one should avoid enraging those punished by using degrading punishments, or spoiling them by leaving them unpunished; the same rule holds for the freeborn. Children of this age have games that come to them by natural instinct, and they usually invent these by themselves whenever they get together. As soon as they reach the age of three, all the children from three to six must gather at the village temples, the children of each village assembling at the same place. The nurses of these children must watch over their behavior, whether it is orderly or disorderly. And over the nurses themselves and the whole band of children, one of the twelve women already elected shall be appointed each year to take charge of each band, the appointment resting with the Law-wardens. These women shall be elected by the women who are in charge of supervising marriages, one from each tribe, and all of the same age as the electors. The woman appointed shall visit the temple officially every day. She shall use a State servant and deal summarily with male or female slaves and foreigners. In the case of citizens, if the person disputes the punishment, she shall bring him to trial before the city stewards; but if no dispute is raised, she shall inflict summary punishment on citizens as well. After the age of six, the two sexes shall be kept separate, boys spending their time with boys, and girls likewise with girls. When it is time for them to begin lessons, the boys must go to teachers of riding, archery, javelin-throwing, and slinging. The girls too, if they agree to it, must share in the lessons, at least as far as learning goes, and especially in those relating to the use of weapons. For the view now prevalent on these matters rests on almost universal ignorance.

794d

Clinias: What view? Athenian: The view that in our hands, right and left are by nature different in their usefulness for particular tasks. In fact, in the feet and lower limbs there is plainly no difference in working capacity. It is through the foolishness of nurses and mothers that we have all become, so to speak, lame in our hands. In natural ability the two limbs are almost equally balanced, but we ourselves have made them different by habitually using them the wrong way.

794e–796a

Athenian: In actions of little importance this does not matter, for example whether a man holds the lyre in his left hand and the plectrum in his right, and things of that sort. But to follow these precedents and use the hands this way on other occasions, when there is no need to, is close to foolishness. This is shown by the Scythian custom: they do not only use the left hand to draw the bow and the right to fit the arrow to it, but use both hands alike for both actions. There are countless other examples of the same kind, in driving horses and in other occupations, which teach us that those who treat the left hand as weaker than the right are acting against nature. As we said, this matters little with horn plectrums and similar implements. But when it comes to using iron weapons of war, bows, javelins, and the like, it matters a great deal, and most of all when weapons are to be used against weapons at close quarters. Here there is a vast difference between the taught and the untaught, between the trained and the untrained fighter. Consider the athlete who is thoroughly practiced in the pancratium, or in boxing or wrestling. He is able to fight with his left side, and does not move that side as if it were numb or lame whenever his opponent shifts to the other side and forces him to bring it into action. In exactly the same way, I take it, in the use of weapons of war and in everything else, it should be regarded as correct that a man who possesses two sets of limbs, fit for both attack and defense, should as far as possible leave neither of them unpracticed or untaught. Indeed, if a man were born with the frame of a Geryon or a Briareus, he ought to be able to throw a hundred darts with his hundred hands. So all these matters must be the responsibility of the female and male officials, the women overseeing the children's games and feeding, and the men their lessons. The goal is that all the boys and girls may be sound of hand and foot, and may not, if possible, have their natures warped in any way by their habits. For practical convenience, the lessons may be divided into two kinds: the gymnastic, which concern the body, and the musical, which aim at excellence of soul. Gymnastics has two kinds, dancing and wrestling. One branch of dancing imitates the style of the Muse, preserving both freedom and nobility. The other aims at physical fitness, agility, and beauty, by giving the various parts and limbs of the body the proper degree of bending and stretching. It also gives each of them its own rhythmical motion, which accompanies the whole of the dance and runs through it completely.

796a–796e

Athenian: As for the tricks Antaeus or Cercyon introduced into the art of wrestling for the sake of empty glory, or that Epeius or Amycus introduced into boxing, these are useless in war and deserve no praise. But the exercises of stand-up wrestling, with the twisting free of neck, hands, and sides, when practiced with eagerness and a firm and graceful stance, and aimed at strength and health, must not be omitted, since they are useful for every purpose. When we reach this point in our legislation, we must instruct both the pupils and their teachers: the teachers to teach these lessons kindly, and the pupils to receive them gratefully. Nor should we omit the imitative dances that are fitting for our choirs to perform, such as the sword dance of the Curetes here in Crete and that of the Dioscuri in Lacedaemon. And in Athens too, our Maiden and Lady, delighted by the pastime of the dance, did not think it fitting to play with empty hands, but chose to perform her dance arrayed in full armor. It would be very fitting for the boys and girls to copy these examples, and so honor the favor of the goddess, both for service in war and for use at festivals. From the age of six until they reach military age, the children, whenever they approach any god and form processions, shall always be equipped with arms and horses. With dances and marches, now quick, now slow, they shall make their supplications to the gods and the children of gods. Contests too, and preliminary trials, if held at all, must be held only for the purposes stated; for these are useful both in peace and in war, both for the State and for private households. All other kinds of bodily work, play, and exercise are unworthy of free men. And now, Megillus and Clinias, I have described fairly fully the gymnastic training that, as I said early in our discussion, needed to be described; here it is in its full completeness. So if you know of a better gymnastic than this, bring it forward.

796e

Clinias: It is no easy thing, Stranger, to reject your account of gymnastic training and competition and produce a better one. Athenian: The subject that comes next deals with the gifts of Apollo and the Muses. We previously thought we had finished with it, and that only gymnastics was left. But I now see clearly not only what still remains to be said to everyone, but also that it ought to come first. Let us, then, state these points in order. Clinias: By all means let us do so.

797a

Athenian: Listen to me now, even though you have already heard this before. All the same, one must take great care, now as before, both in telling and in hearing something extremely strange and unfamiliar. Making the statement I am about to make is a frightening task; but I will summon up my courage and not shrink from it. Clinias: What statement do you mean, Stranger? Athenian: I assert that in every State there is complete ignorance about children's games. People do not realize that these games are decisive for legislation, since they determine whether the laws enacted will last or not. When the program of games is prescribed and ensures that the same children always play the same games and enjoy the same toys in the same way and under the same conditions, it allows the serious laws too to remain undisturbed. But when these games change and are subjected to innovations, among other constant alterations, the children keep shifting their liking from one game to another. As a result, they have no fixed and agreed standard of what is proper and improper, either in their own bodily postures or in their equipment. Instead, the man they especially honor is the one who is always innovating or introducing some novelty in shape or color or something of the sort. Yet it would be perfectly true to say that a State can have no worse plague than a man like that, since he secretly changes the characters of the young and makes them despise what is old and value what is new. And I repeat that there is no greater harm a State can suffer than such talk and such a doctrine. Just listen while I tell you how great an evil it is.

797d

Clinias: Do you mean the way people disparage antiquity in States? Athenian: Exactly. Clinias: On that subject you will find us no grudging listeners, but the most sympathetic possible. Athenian: I would certainly expect so. Clinias: Just go on. Athenian: Come, then, let us listen to one another and speak to one another on this subject with more care than ever. We shall find that nothing is more dangerous than change in everything except what is bad: in the seasons, the winds, the diet of the body, the disposition of the mind, in short in everything, with the sole exception, as I just said, of what is bad. So consider the human body. It grows used to all kinds of food, drink, and exercise, even though at first it is upset by them. Then in time it grows flesh out of these very materials that is akin to them, and, coming to know and like all this diet and grow accustomed to it, it lives a very healthy and pleasant life;

798a–798d

Athenian: and further, if a man is forced to change back again to one of the highly regarded diets, he is upset and ill at first and recovers with difficulty as he gets used to the food again. We must suppose that exactly the same thing happens with men's minds and the nature of their souls. Suppose there are laws under which men have been brought up, and which, by the blessing of Heaven, have remained unchanged for many centuries, so that there is no memory or report of their ever having been different from what they are now. Then the whole soul is held back by reverence and fear from changing any of the things established long ago. By hook or by crook, then, the lawgiver must devise a means of making this true of his State. And here is where I find the means I am looking for. All lawgivers regard changes in children's games, as we said earlier, as mere matters of play, and not as causes of serious harm; so instead of forbidding them, they give in to them and adopt them. They fail to consider that the children who innovate in their games grow up into men different from the children before them. Being different themselves, they seek a different way of life; and having sought this, they come to desire other institutions and laws. And none of them fears the coming of the result we just described as the greatest of all evils for a State. The harm done by changes in outward forms would be less important; but frequent changes in matters of moral approval and disapproval are, I maintain, of the greatest importance and require the utmost caution.

798d

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Well then, do we still trust our earlier statements, in which we said that rhythms and music in general are imitations of the characters of good or bad men? Or where do we stand?

798e

Clinias: Our view, at least, remains unchanged. Athenian: We assert, then, that every means must be used, not only to keep our children from wanting to copy different models in dancing or singing, but also to keep anyone from tempting them by offering pleasures of all sorts. Clinias: Quite right.

799a

Athenian: To achieve this, can any of us suggest a better method than that of the Egyptians? Clinias: What method is that? Athenian: The method of consecrating all dancing and all music. First, they should fix the sacred festivals by drawing up a list for the year of what festivals are to be held, on what dates, and in honor of which particular gods, children of gods, and daemons. Next they should prescribe what hymn is to be sung at each of the sacrifices, and with what dances each sacrifice is to be honored. Certain persons should first make these arrangements. Then the whole body of citizens, after offering a public sacrifice to the Fates and all the other gods, should consecrate these arrangements with a libation, dedicating each of the hymns to its respective god or divinity. If anyone introduces other hymns or dances besides these for any god, the priests and priestesses, together with the Law-wardens, will be acting in accordance with both religion and law when they expel him from the festival. If the man resists expulsion, he shall be liable for the rest of his life to prosecution for impiety by anyone who wishes.

799b–799c

Clinias: That is right.

799c

Athenian: Since we have now reached this point in our argument, let us behave in a way that suits ourselves. Clinias: In what respect? Athenian: Any young man, to say nothing of an old one, on seeing or hearing anything unusual and strange, is likely to avoid rushing to a hasty and impulsive resolution of his doubts about it; he will stop and stand still. He is like a man who has come to a crossroads and is not quite sure of his way. If he is traveling alone, he will question himself; if he is traveling with others, he will question them too about the matter in doubt. He will not go on until he has made sure, by investigation, which way his road leads. We must do the same now. The point that has now come up in our discussion of laws is a strange one, so we are bound to investigate it closely. In a matter so weighty, we, at our age, must not lightly assume or assert that we can say anything reliable about it on the spur of the moment.

799d–799e

Clinias: That is very true.

799e

Athenian: So we shall give this subject some time, and only when we have investigated it thoroughly shall we regard our conclusions as certain. But so that we are not pointlessly prevented from completing the arrangement that accompanies the laws we are now dealing with, let us go on to the end of them. For quite possibly, God willing, this exposition, once it is fully completed, may also clear up the problem now before us. Clinias: Well said, Stranger. Let us do just as you say. Athenian: Let us grant this strange idea, we say: that our songs have now become nomes, that is, laws. The men of old, it seems, gave this name to songs sung to the lyre, so perhaps they too would not wholly disagree with our present suggestion. One of them may have vaguely foreseen it, as in a dream at night or a waking vision. In any case, let this be the decree on the matter: no one shall utter a note or move a limb in the dance in violation of the public tunes, the sacred songs, and the whole choral performance of the young, any more than in violation of any other nome, or law. Whoever obeys shall be free of all penalty; but whoever disobeys shall, as we said just now, be punished by the Law-wardens, the priestesses, and the priests. Shall we now lay down these enactments in our account?

800b

Clinias: Yes, lay them down. Athenian: How can we enact these rules by law without becoming ridiculous? Let us consider one more point about them. The safest plan is to begin by shaping in our discussion some models, so to speak. One such model I might describe like this. Suppose that a sacrifice is being performed and the offerings have been duly burned, and some private worshiper, a son or a brother, standing beside the altar and the offering, utters every kind of blasphemy. Would his voice not bring despair and evil forebodings upon his father and the rest of the family?

800c

Clinias: It would. Athenian: Well, in our part of the world this is what happens in nearly every one of the States, one might almost say. Whenever a magistrate holds a public sacrifice, next comes not one choir but a whole crowd of choirs. They take their stand not at a distance from the altars but often right beside them. Then they pour out a flood of blasphemy over the sacred offerings, racking the souls of their audience with the most mournful words, rhythms, and tunes; and the one that succeeds in making the sacrificing city weep the most on the spot carries off the prize. Must we not reject such a custom? If it is ever really necessary for the citizens to listen to such laments, it would be more fitting for the choirs that perform to be hired from abroad. And this should happen not on holy days but only on ill-omened days, just as hired mourners escort a corpse with Carian music. Music of this sort would also be the fitting accompaniment for songs of this kind. And the dress suitable for these funeral songs would not be crowns or gilded ornaments, but just the opposite. I want to be finished with this subject as soon as I can. I would only ask us this one question again: are we satisfied to lay this down as the first of our models for songs?

800e

Clinias: What model? Athenian: That of auspicious speech. Must we have a kind of song that is auspicious in every respect? Or shall I simply lay it down that way without asking any further?

801a

Clinias: By all means lay it down that way; this law is carried by a unanimous vote. Athenian: What, then, after auspicious speech, should be the second law of music? Is it not that prayers should be made on each occasion to the gods to whom offering is made? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: The third law, I suppose, will be this. The poets know that prayers are requests addressed to the gods, so they must take the greatest care not to ask unknowingly for something bad as if it were good. If such a prayer were made, it would, I imagine, turn out to be a ridiculous blunder.

801b

Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Did our argument not convince us a little while ago that no Plutus, whether of gold or of silver, should dwell enshrined within the State? Clinias: It did. Athenian: What, then, shall we say that this statement serves to illustrate? Is it not this, that the tribe of poets is not entirely capable of telling clearly what is good and what is not? Surely when a poet makes this error and composes prayers, whether in words or in song, he will make our citizens contradict us in their prayers about matters of the greatest importance. Yet, as we said, few errors are greater than this. So shall we also lay this down as one of our laws and models concerning music?

801c

Clinias: What law? Explain it to us more clearly. Athenian: The law that the poet shall compose nothing that goes beyond the limits of what the State holds to be lawful and just, beautiful and good. Nor shall he show his compositions to any private person until they have first been shown to the judges appointed to deal with these matters and to the Law-wardens, and have been approved by them. In fact, we already have judges appointed in those we selected to be the legislators for music and in the supervisor of education. Well then, I repeat my question: shall this be laid down as our third law, model, and pattern? What do you think?

801d

Clinias: Let it be laid down, by all means. Athenian: Next after these, it will be most fitting to sing hymns and praises to the gods combined with prayers. After the gods will come prayers combined with praises to daemons and heroes, as befits each of them. Clinias: Of course.

801e

Athenian: That done, we may at once and without hesitation lay down this law: all citizens who have reached the end of life, who have accomplished noble and laborious works with body or soul, and who have been obedient to the laws, shall be regarded as fit subjects for praise. Clinias: Certainly.

802a–802d

Athenian: But it is not safe to honor those still living with hymns and praises before they have run through the whole of life and reached a noble end. All such honors shall be shared equally by women and men who have been conspicuous for their excellence. As for the songs and dances, they should be arranged in the following way. Among the works of the ancients there are many fine old pieces of music, and likewise dances, from which we may freely select what is fitting and suitable for the constitution we are founding. To examine these and make the selection, we shall choose men no younger than fifty. Whatever ancient songs they approve we shall adopt; whatever fall short of our standard, or are altogether unsuitable, we shall either reject entirely or revise and rework. For this purpose we shall call in poets and musicians and make use of their poetic ability, without, however, trusting to their tastes or desires except in a few cases. By explaining the intentions of the lawgiver to them, we shall arrange dancing, singing, and all choral performance as closely as possible to his liking. Truly, every disorderly musical pursuit becomes a thousand times better once it is brought under order, even when no sweet music is served up; pleasure comes from all kinds alike. If a man has been brought up from childhood to the age of steadiness and good sense on music that is sober and orderly, he detests the opposite kind whenever he hears it and calls it vulgar. But if he has been brought up on the common, sweet kind of music, he declares the opposite of this to be cold and unpleasant. So, as we said just now, neither kind excels the other in the pleasure or displeasure it causes. The superiority lies in the fact that the one kind always makes those brought up in it better, and the other worse.

802d

Clinias: Well said! Athenian: Further, it will be right for the lawgiver to set apart songs suitable for males and for females by making a rough division between them. He must also necessarily fit them to harmonies and rhythms, for it would be a terrible thing for discord to exist between words and tune, or between meter and rhythm, because the songs were given unsuitable accompaniments. So the lawgiver must of necessity lay down at least the outlines of these. He must assign both words and music to both types of song, as determined by the natural difference between the two sexes, but he must also state clearly what the feminine type consists of. We may declare that what is noble and tends toward manliness is masculine, while what inclines more toward orderliness and modesty is to be regarded as more feminine, both in law and in discussion.

803a–803c

Athenian: Such, then, is our arrangement of the matter. Next we must discuss the teaching and transmission of these subjects: how, by whom, and when each of them should be practiced. A shipwright, at the start of construction, outlines the shape of his vessel by laying down her keel. I seem to myself to be doing exactly the same thing. I am trying to frame the shapes of lives according to the characters of their souls, and so literally laying down their keels, by considering rightly by what means and by what ways of living we shall best steer our ship of life through this voyage of existence. Human affairs are unworthy of serious effort, yet necessity compels us to be serious, and that is our misfortune. Still, since we are where we are, it is no doubt fitting that we should show this seriousness in a suitable direction. But I may well be asked, and rightly asked, what I mean by this.

803c

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: What I assert is this. A man ought to be serious about serious things, and not about trifles. The object truly worthy of all serious and blessed effort is God, while man, as we said earlier, has been made to be a plaything of God, and this is really the best thing about him. So I say that every man and woman should go through life in keeping with this character, playing the noblest of games, with a frame of mind different from the one they have now.

803d

Clinias: How so? Athenian: At present they think that serious work should be done for the sake of play. For they think that the serious business of war must be well conducted for the sake of peace. But in fact, it seems, we find in war neither real play nor education worthy of the name, whether existing now or likely to exist, and education is what we assert to be the most serious thing of all. It is the life of peace that everyone should live as much and as well as he can. What, then, is the right way? We should live out our lives playing at certain games, sacrificing, singing, and dancing, so as to be able to win the favor of Heaven and to repel our enemies and defeat them in battle.

803e–804b

Athenian: What kinds of song and dance will achieve both these aims has been stated in part, in outline, and the paths to follow have been marked out, in the belief that the poet is right when he says: Telemachus, your own mind will in part / Instruct you, and the rest Heaven will supply; / For to the will of Heaven you owe your birth / And all your nurture, as I would gladly believe. (Homer, Odyssey 3.26.) Our nurslings too should have this same frame of mind. They should believe that what we have said is sufficient, and that the divine powers will suggest to them everything else concerning sacrifices and dances: in honor of which gods and at what seasons they are to play and win their favor. In this way they will shape their lives according to their nature, since they are mostly puppets, though they share in a little truth now and then.

804b

Megillus: Stranger, you have a very low opinion of the human race. Athenian: Do not be surprised, Megillus, but forgive me. When I spoke that way, I had my mind fixed on God, and I was expressing the feeling that came over me. But let us grant, if you like, that the human race is not something low, but worthy of serious attention. To continue our subject: we have described buildings for public gymnasia and schools in three locations within the city. We have also described, in three locations around the city, training grounds and racecourses for horses, laid out for archery and other long-range shooting, and for the teaching and practice of the young. If our previous description of these was inadequate, let them now be described and regulated by law. In all these establishments there should be resident teachers for each subject, attracted from abroad by pay, to instruct the pupils in everything relating to war and to music. No father shall either send his son to school or keep him away from the training school just as he pleases. Rather, every man and boy, as the saying goes, must as far as possible be compelled to be educated, since they are children of the State even more than children of their parents. For females, too, my law will lay down the same regulations as for males, and training of an identical kind. I will say without hesitation that neither riding nor gymnastics, which are proper for men, is improper for women.

804e–805b

Athenian: I believe the old stories I have heard, and I now know for a fact, that there are practically countless thousands of women called Sauromatides in the region of Pontus. On them, equally with the men, is imposed the duty of handling bows and other weapons, as well as horses, and they practice it equally. In addition to this, I offer the following argument. Since such a state of affairs can exist, I maintain that the practice now prevailing in our part of the world is a most irrational one: that men and women do not all pursue the same activities together, with one mind and with all their strength. In this way, from the same taxes and labor, there arises and exists only half a State instead of a whole one, in nearly every case. And surely this would be an astonishing blunder for a lawgiver to make.

805b

Clinias: So it would seem. And yet a great many of the things now mentioned, Stranger, conflict with our usual constitutions. Athenian: Well, I said that we should let the argument run its full course, and when that is done we should adopt the conclusion we approve. Clinias: In that you spoke very reasonably, and you have made me reproach myself now for what I said. So go on and say whatever seems good to you.

805c–805d

Athenian: What seems good to me, Clinias, as I said before, is this. If the possibility of such a state of affairs had not been sufficiently proved by facts, it might have been possible to dispute our statement. But as it is, the man who rejects our law must try some other method, and this will not stop us from asserting in our doctrine that the female sex must share with the male, as fully as possible, both in education and in everything else. For truly we ought to think of the matter this way. Suppose that women do not share with men in their whole way of life: must they not have some different system of their own?

805d

Clinias: They must. Athenian: Then which of the systems now in use shall we prescribe in preference to the partnership we are now imposing on them? Shall it be that of the Thracians and many other peoples, who use their women to farm the land and tend cattle and sheep and toil just like slaves? Or the system followed by us and all the people of our region? The way women are treated among us at present is this: we pile all our goods together, as the saying goes, within four walls, and then hand them over to the women to manage, along with control of the shuttles and all kinds of wool-work.

805e–806c

Athenian: Or again, Megillus, shall we prescribe for them the Laconian system, which lies midway between these? Shall the girls share in gymnastics and music, and the women be free from wool-work, but weave themselves instead a life that is not at all trivial or useless, but strenuous? Under that system they go about halfway in the work of household care, management, and child-rearing, but take no part in military service. So even if they should ever have to fight in defense of their city and their children, they will be unable to handle with skill either a bow, like the Amazons, or any other missile. Nor could they take up spear and shield in the manner of the Goddess, so as to resist nobly the ravaging of their native land and strike terror, if nothing more, into the enemy at the sight of them drawn up in battle order. Living this way, they certainly would not dare to imitate the ways of the Sauromatides, whose women would seem like men beside them. So on this matter, let whoever wishes praise your Laconian lawgivers; as for my view, it must stand as it is. The lawgiver ought to be whole-hearted, not half-hearted. He should not let the female sex live in luxury and expense and disorderly ways while supervising the male sex; for in that way he actually leaves the State only half of a life of complete prosperity instead of the whole.

806c–806d

Megillus: What are we to do, Clinias? Shall we let the Stranger run down our Sparta like this?

806d

Clinias: Yes. Now that we have granted him freedom of speech, we must leave him alone until we have discussed the laws fully. Megillus: You are right. Athenian: May I, then, try without further delay to continue my exposition? Clinias: By all means. Athenian: What kind of life would men lead if they had a moderate supply of all the necessities, if they had entrusted all the crafts to others, and if their farms were hired out to slaves and yielded them enough produce for their modest needs? Let us further suppose that they had common dining halls, separate ones for the men, and others close by for their households, including the girls and their mothers,

806e–807e

Athenian: and that each of these halls was in the charge of a master or mistress, whose duty was to dismiss the company and watch over their behavior every day. Suppose also that at the end of the meal the master and all the company poured a libation in honor of the gods to whom that night and day were dedicated, and then went home. If they are organized in this way, is there no necessary and truly appropriate work left for them to do? Must each of them go on fattening himself like a beast? That, we assert, is neither right nor good; nor is it possible for one who lives this way to escape what he deserves. And what an idle beast fattened in laziness generally deserves is to fall prey to another beast, one of those worn to skin and bone by toil endured with courage. Now if we look to find this state of leisure fully realized exactly as described, we shall probably be disappointed, as long as women, children, and houses remain private and all these things are established as the private property of individuals. But if the second-best State, as now described, could come about, we might be quite content with it. And, we assert, there does remain for men living this life a task that is by no means small or trivial, but one that a just law imposes on them as the weightiest task of all. Compared with the life that strives for a Pythian or Olympian victory and is wholly without leisure for other tasks, the life we speak of, which most truly deserves the name of life, is twice as lacking in leisure, and indeed far more than twice, since it is occupied with the care of bodily and spiritual excellence in general. No other side task should be allowed to hinder the work of giving the body its proper exercise and nourishment, or the soul its learning and moral training. In fact, every night and day is not enough for the man engaged in this to gain from them their fruit in full and ample measure. Since this is nature's law, a schedule must be drawn up for all free men, prescribing how they shall spend their time continuously, from dawn to dawn and sunrise, day after day. It would be undignified for a lawgiver to mention a host of petty details about household arrangements, especially the rules about wakefulness at night that are proper for men who intend to guard a whole State thoroughly and continuously.

807e–808e

Athenian: That any citizen should spend the whole of any night asleep, instead of setting an example to his household by always being the first to wake and rise, must be regarded by everyone as shameful and unworthy of a free man, whether one calls it a custom or a law. Likewise, that the mistress of a house should be awakened by her maids, instead of being the first to wake all the others herself, is a shameful practice. All the servants must say so to one another, male slave, female slave, and boy, and even, if it were possible, every stone in the house. When awake at night, they must certainly carry out a large share of business, both public and domestic, the magistrates in the city, and the masters and mistresses in their own houses. For much sleep is not naturally suited either to our bodies or to our souls, nor to activities concerned with any such matters. When asleep, no one is worth anything, any more than if he were dead. On the contrary, every one of us who cares most about living and thinking stays awake as long as possible, reserving only as much time for sleep as his health requires, and that is very little once the habit is well formed. Rulers who are watchful at night in cities are a terror to wrongdoers, whether citizens or enemies, but are respected and admired by the just and self-controlled, and they benefit both themselves and the whole State. A night spent in this way will, in addition to all the other benefits described, give greater courage to the souls of all who live in these States. When daylight returns, the children should go to their teachers. For just as no sheep or any other witless creature ought to live without a herdsman, so children cannot live without a tutor, nor slaves without a master. And of all wild creatures, the child is the hardest to manage. Precisely because it, more than any other, possesses a spring of reason that is not yet disciplined, it is a treacherous, sly, and most insolent creature. So the child must be strapped up, as it were, with many bridles: first, when he leaves the care of nurse and mother, with tutors, to guide his childish ignorance; and after that with teachers of all sorts of subjects and lessons, treating him as befits a freeborn child. On the other hand, he must be treated as a slave: any free man who comes across him shall punish both the child himself and his tutor or teacher, if any of them does wrong.

808e–809e

Athenian: And if anyone who comes across them fails to punish them as they deserve, he shall in the first place be subject to the deepest disgrace. The Law-warden chosen to be in charge of the children shall keep an eye on the man who has encountered the wrongdoings mentioned and has either failed to inflict the needed punishment at all or failed to inflict it properly. Moreover, this Law-warden shall supervise the upbringing of the children with special care and a sharp eye, keeping their growing natures on the straight path by always turning them toward goodness, as the laws direct. But how is the law itself to give this Law-warden of ours an adequate education? Up to now the law has not made any clear or adequate statement; it has mentioned some things but left out others. In dealing with this warden, however, it must leave nothing out, but fully explain every rule, so that he may be both interpreter and nurturer for the rest. Matters of choral performance, of tunes and dancing, and what types are to be selected, revised, and consecrated, have already been dealt with. But concerning writings in prose, without meter, we have never asked: most excellent supervisor of children, what sort ought this prose to be, and how are those in your charge to deal with it? You know from our discussion the military exercises they ought to learn and practice. But the matters the lawgiver has not yet fully explained to you, my friend, are these: first, letters; next, playing the lyre; and also arithmetic, of which I said everyone should learn as much as he needs for war, household management, and civic administration. Along with these goes what it is useful for the same purposes to learn about the courses of the heavenly bodies, stars, sun, and moon, insofar as every State is obliged to take them into account. What I mean is this: the arranging of days into monthly periods, and of months into a year, in each case, so that the seasons, with their sacrifices and festivals, may each be given its proper place by being held as nature dictates. In this way they may create fresh liveliness and alertness in the State, pay due honors to the gods, and make the citizens more intelligent about these matters. Not all of these points, my friend, have yet been explained to you sufficiently by the lawgiver. Now pay close attention to what is to be said next. First, as we said, you are not yet sufficiently instructed about letters. What we complain of is this: the law has not yet told you clearly whether the man who is to be a good citizen must pursue this study to the point of precision or neglect it altogether; and the same is true of the lyre. We now affirm that he must not neglect them.

809e–810c

Athenian: For a child of ten, about three years is a reasonable period for the study of letters. For the lyre, he should begin at thirteen and continue at it for three years. Whether he likes or dislikes the study, neither the child nor his father shall be permitted either to cut short or to prolong the years of study contrary to the law; and anyone who disobeys shall be disqualified from the school honors we will mention shortly. As for what the children must learn and the teachers teach during these periods, this is what you yourself must learn first. They must work at letters until they are able to read and write. But superior speed or beauty of handwriting need not be required of those whose progress within the appointed period is too slow. With regard to reading lessons, there are written compositions not set to music, some in meter and some without rhythmical divisions, compositions merely spoken in prose, without rhythm or harmony. Some of the many writers of this sort have left us writings of a dangerous character. What will you do with these, my most excellent Law-wardens? Or what method of dealing with them could the lawgiver rightly prescribe? I truly believe he will be very much at a loss.

810c

Clinias: What does this mean, Stranger? Clearly you are talking to yourself and are genuinely at a loss. Athenian: Your impression is correct, Clinias. Since you are my partners in this inquiry into laws, I am bound to explain to you both what seems easy and what seems hard.

810d

Clinias: Well then, what is it about these writings that you are now referring to, and what has come over you? Athenian: I will tell you: it is no easy matter to contradict tens of thousands of tongues. Clinias: Come now, do you think the points in which our earlier conclusions about laws contradicted ordinary opinion were few and trivial? Athenian: Your observation is very just. I take it that you are urging me on, since the path that many find hateful is welcome to others who are perhaps no fewer, or, if fewer, certainly no less competent. You are urging me, I say, to take the risk with this second group and proceed boldly, without flinching, along the path of legislation marked out in our present discussion.

810e

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Then I will not flinch. I truly affirm that we have countless poets who write in hexameters, trimeters, and every meter you could name, some aiming at the serious, others at the comic. Our tens of thousands of people tell us that we must raise the young on their writings and soak them in them if we are to give them a correct education. They would make them, by means of recitations, listen at length and learn a great deal, so that they learn whole poets by heart. Others compile selected summaries of all the poets and piece together whole passages. They tell us that a boy must commit these to memory and learn them by heart if he is to turn out good and wise as a result of a wide and varied range of instruction. Do you want me now to tell these poets frankly what is wrong in their claims and what is right?

811a

Clinias: Of course. Athenian: What single statement can I make about all these people that will be adequate? Perhaps this one, which everyone will grant me: every poet has said much that is good and much that is bad. If this is so, I maintain that a wide range of learning is a danger to children.

811b

Clinias: What advice, then, would you give the Law-warden? Athenian: About what? Clinias: About the pattern he should be guided by in deciding which particular subjects he will allow all the children to learn and which he will forbid. Tell us, and don't hold back.

811c

Athenian: My good Clinias, it seems I have had a stroke of luck. Clinias: How so? Athenian: In that I am not entirely at a loss for a pattern. Looking back now at the discussions we have been carrying on from dawn up to this very hour, and not, I think, without some guidance from Heaven, it seemed to me that they had been composed exactly like a poem. And perhaps it is not surprising that I felt intense delight in viewing our discussions all drawn up, as it were, in close array. Of all the many discussions I have listened to or learned about, whether in poems or in a loose flood of speech like ours, they struck me as not only the most adequate but also the most suitable for the ears of the young. I could find no better pattern than this, I think, to put before the Law-warden who is educator. He should instruct the teachers to teach the children these discussions of ours, and whatever resembles them and agrees with them. And if in his search he happens upon poems by poets, or prose writings, or even words merely spoken and not written down, that are akin to these discussions of ours, he must by no means let them go, but have them written down.

811e–812a

Athenian: First, he must compel the teachers themselves to learn these discussions and praise them. If any of the teachers do not approve of them, he must not employ them as colleagues. Only those who agree with his praise of the discussions should he employ, and to them he should entrust the teaching and training of the young. Here, and in this way, let me end my account of writing teachers and writings.

812a

Clinias: Judged by our original plan, Stranger, I certainly do not think we have strayed from the line of argument we intended. But whether we are right about the matter as a whole is no doubt hard to say with certainty. Athenian: That, Clinias, as we have often said, will probably become clearer of itself when we reach the end of our whole exposition of the laws.

812b

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: After the writing teacher, must we not address the lyre teacher next? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: In assigning to the lyre teachers their proper duties in teaching and in all training in these subjects, we must, I think, keep in mind what we declared earlier. Clinias: What we declared about what? Athenian: We said, I believe, that the sixty-year-old singers of hymns to Dionysus ought to be exceptionally keen in their perception of rhythms and harmonic structures. When they deal with musical imitations of a good or bad kind, by which the soul is emotionally affected, they must be able to pick out the likenesses of the good kind and of the bad. Having rejected the bad, they can present the good in public, charm the souls of the young by singing them, and so invite them all to follow along with them in acquiring virtue by means of these imitations.

812c–812d

Clinias: Very true.

812d–812e

Athenian: To achieve this, then, both the lyre teacher and his pupil must use the notes of the lyre, because of the clarity of its strings, matching the notes of the song note for note. But there should be no different sounds and variety on the lyre, as when the strings play one tune and the composer of the melody another, or consonant and contrasting parts are combined, or there is a combination of close and wide intervals, of quick and slow time, of high and low pitch, and all sorts of rhythmical variations are fitted to the notes of the lyre. None of these complications should be used with pupils who have to absorb the useful elements of music quickly, within three years. For opposites clashing with one another make learning difficult, and the young should above all learn easily, since the necessary lessons imposed on them are neither few nor small. Our discussion will point these lessons out in time as it proceeds.

812e–813a

Athenian: So let our educator regulate these matters in the way stated. As for the character of the actual tunes and words that the choir masters ought to teach, we have already explained all this at length. We said that each should be fitted to a suitable festival and dedicated, and so benefit the States by providing them with happy enjoyment.

813a

Clinias: This too you have explained truly. Athenian: Yes, very truly. Let the official appointed as our Director of Music take over these matters as well and supervise them, with the help of kindly fortune. And let us add to our earlier statements about dancing and bodily gymnastics in general. Just as, in the case of music, we have supplied the missing rules about instruction, let us now do the same for gymnastics. Shall we not say that both girls and boys must learn both dancing and gymnastics?

813b

Clinias: Yes. Athenian: Then for their practice it would be most suitable for the boys to have dancing masters and the girls dancing mistresses. Clinias: I grant that. Athenian: Let us once more call on the man who will have most of these duties to perform, the Director of the Children, who will have little time to spare, since he supervises both music and gymnastics.

813c

Clinias: How will he be able, at his age, to supervise so many things? Athenian: Quite easily. The law has granted him, and will continue to grant him, whatever citizens, men or women, he wishes to take on to assist him in this supervision. He will know himself the right people to choose, and he will be anxious to make no blunders in these matters. He will recognize the greatness of his office and wisely hold it in high respect. He will also hold the reasoned conviction that when the young have been, and are being, well brought up, everything sails smoothly for us; but otherwise, the consequences are such as it is not right to speak of, and we will not mention them in dealing with a new State, out of consideration for the overly superstitious. On these matters too, which concern dancing and gymnastic movements, we have already said a great deal. We are establishing gymnasia and all the physical exercises connected with military training: the use of the bow and every kind of missile, light skirmishing and heavy-armed fighting of every kind, tactical maneuvers, company marching, encampments, and all the details of cavalry training.

813e–814b

Athenian: In all these subjects there should be public instructors, paid by the State. Their pupils should be not only the boys and men in the State, but also the girls and women, who should understand all these matters. While still girls they should be practiced in all armed dancing and fighting; and once grown to womanhood they should take part in maneuvers, forming ranks, and grounding and shouldering arms. They should do this, if for no other reason, at least for this one: if the whole citizen force should ever be obliged to leave the city and march out to war, these women should at least be competent to guard the children and the rest of the city in their place. Or, on the other hand, and this is quite possible, an invading army of enemies from outside, whether barbarians or Greeks, fierce and strong, might force a battle around the city itself. Then it would be a great disgrace to the State if its women had been so badly brought up that they were not even willing to do what mother birds do, which fight the strongest beasts in defense of their young. Instead of facing every danger, even death itself, they would run straight to the temples, crowd all the altars and shrines, and cover the human race with the disgrace of being the most cowardly of all living creatures.

814b–814c

Clinias: By Zeus, Stranger, if this ever happened in a city, it would be a most disgraceful thing, quite apart from the harm it would do.

814c

Athenian: Shall we, then, lay down this law: that up to the point stated, women must not neglect military training, but all citizens, men and women alike, must attend to it? Clinias: I, for one, agree. Athenian: As for wrestling, some points have been explained. But we have not explained what is, in my opinion, the most important point, and it is not easy to put it into words without a practical demonstration. So we shall decide about this point when word accompanied by action can clearly demonstrate this, among the other things mentioned: that wrestling of this kind is of all movements by far the most closely related to fighting in war; and also that it is not fighting that should be learned for the sake of wrestling, but, on the contrary, wrestling that should be practiced for the sake of fighting.

814d

Clinias: There, at any rate, you are right. Athenian: For the present, let this suffice as an account of the functions of the wrestling school. As for motion of the whole body other than wrestling, its main part may rightly be called dancing. We ought to consider it as consisting of two kinds: one representing the solemn movement of beautiful bodies, the other the ignoble movement of ugly bodies. And each of these in turn has two subdivisions.

814e–815e

Athenian: Of the noble kind, there is on the one hand the motion of fighting, the motion of fair bodies and brave souls engaged in violent effort. On the other hand, there is the movement of a self-controlled soul living in prosperity and moderate pleasures; and one will call this latter kind of dancing, in accordance with its nature, peaceful. The warlike kind, being distinct from the peaceful, one may rightly call pyrrhiche. It represents ways of dodging all kinds of blows and shots by swerving, ducking, and leaping sideways, either upward or crouching. It also represents the opposite kinds of motion, which lead to active postures of attack, when it tries to represent the movements involved in shooting with bows or javelins, and blows of every kind. In all these cases, the action and the tension of the muscles are correct when the representation is of fair bodies and souls, with most of the limbs of the body extended straight. This kind of representation is right, but the opposite kind we declare to be wrong. In peaceful dancing, what we must consider in every case is whether the performer in his dances always keeps properly or improperly to the noble kind of dancing, in the way that befits law-abiding men. So first we must draw a line between questionable dancing and dancing that is beyond question. What, then, is the questionable kind, and how should each be separated off? All the dancing that is of a Bacchic kind, and practiced by those who follow such rites, who, as they say, imitate drunken Nymphs, Pans, Sileni, and Satyrs while performing certain rites of purification and initiation, all this class of dancing cannot easily be defined as either peaceful or warlike, or as of any one distinct kind. The most correct way of defining it seems to me to be this: to separate it off from both peaceful and warlike dancing, and to declare that this kind of dancing is unfit for our citizens. Having thus disposed of it and dismissed it, we will now return to the warlike and peaceful kinds, which unquestionably belong to us. The dancing of the unwarlike Muse, in which men honor the gods and the children of the gods with dances, will consist, broadly speaking, of all dancing performed with a sense of prosperity. We may divide this into two: one kind is more joyful and belongs to men who have escaped from toils and dangers into a state of bliss; the other has to do rather with the preservation and increase of blessings already possessed, and accordingly shows a less ardent joy.

815e–816e

Athenian: Under these conditions every man moves his body more violently when his joys are greater, and less violently when they are smaller. Also, he moves it less violently when he is more orderly and better trained in courage; but when he is cowardly and untrained in self-control, he makes greater and more violent changes of motion. And in general, no one who is using his voice, whether in song or in speech, is able to keep his body entirely still. So when the representation of things spoken by means of gestures arose, it produced the whole art of dancing. In all these cases one of us moves in harmony with his theme, another out of harmony. Many of the names given in ancient times deserve notice and praise for their excellence and accuracy. One such is the name given to the dances of men who are prosperous and enjoy moderate pleasures. How true and how musical was the name so rationally given to those dances by the man, whoever he was, who first called them all Emmeleiai. He established two species of fine dances, the warlike, called pyrrhiche, and the peaceful, called emmeleia, giving each its appropriate and harmonious name. The lawgiver should describe these dances in outline, and the Law-warden should search them out. Having investigated them, he should combine the dancing with the rest of the music and assign what is proper of it to each of the sacrificial festivals, distributing it over all the festivals. When he has thus consecrated all these things in proper order, he should from then on make no change in anything concerning either dancing or singing. This one and the same city and body of citizens should continue in one and the same way, enjoying the same pleasures and living alike in every way possible, and so pass their lives happily and well. What concerns the actions of fair and noble souls in the kind of choral performance we have approved as right has now been fully discussed. But the actions of ugly bodies and ugly ideas, and of the men engaged in ridiculous comic acting, in both speech and dance, and the representations given by all these comedians, are a subject we must necessarily consider and evaluate. For it is impossible to learn the serious without the comic, or any one of a pair of opposites without the other, if one is to be a wise man. But it is equally impossible to practice both, if one is to share in even a small measure of virtue. In fact, it is precisely for this reason that one should learn them: to avoid ever doing or saying anything ridiculous through ignorance when one should not. We will assign such imitation to slaves and hired foreigners. No serious attention shall ever be paid to it, no free man or free woman shall be seen learning it, and there must always be some new feature in these imitations.

816e–817e

Athenian: Let these, then, be the regulations, laid down both by law and by argument, for all those laughable amusements we all call comedy. Now as to our so-called serious poets, the tragedians, suppose some of them were to come to us and ask something like this: Strangers, are we or are we not to visit your city and country and bring our poetry with us? Or what have you decided to do about such matters? What would be the right answer to give these inspired men? In my judgment, this should be the answer: Most excellent of strangers, we ourselves, to the best of our ability, are the authors of a tragedy that is at once the finest and the best. At any rate, our whole constitution is constructed as a representation of the finest and best life, which we assert is in reality the truest tragedy. So we are poets of the same things as you, your rivals as artists and actors of the finest drama, which, as we hope, true law alone is by nature able to bring to completion. Do not imagine, then, that we will ever lightly allow you to set up your stage beside us in the marketplace. We will not give your imported actors, with their sweet tones and voices louder than ours, permission to harangue women and children and the whole populace, saying not the same things as we do about the same institutions but, for the most part, just the opposite. Truly, both we ourselves and the whole State would be completely mad to allow you to do what I have described before the magistrates had decided whether your compositions are worth hearing and suitable for public presentation. So now, you children and offspring of the gentle Muses, first display your songs side by side with ours before the rulers. If what you say seems the same as ours or better, we will grant you a chorus; but if not, my friends, we can never do so. Let these, then, be the customs ordained to go with the laws concerning all choral performance and the learning of it, keeping those for slaves separate from those for masters, if you agree.

817e

Clinias: Of course we agree to it now. Athenian: There still remain three subjects of study for the freeborn. The first is calculation and arithmetic; the second is the art of measuring length, surface, and solid; the third deals with the course of the stars and how they naturally travel in relation to one another. The majority of pupils should not study all these sciences with minute accuracy, but only a select few; who these are we shall say near the end, since that will be the proper place. For the bulk of the pupils, it would be shameful for most of them not to understand those parts of these sciences that are most truly called necessary; yet it is neither easy nor even at all possible for every student to go into them in detail. The necessary part of them cannot be rejected. This is probably what the original author of the proverb had in mind when he said that not even God will ever be seen fighting against Necessity. He meant, I suppose, all the kinds of necessity that are divine. In relation to human necessities, which most people have in mind when they quote the saying, it is by far the silliest of all sayings.

818b

Clinias: What necessities, then, Stranger, belong to these sciences that are not of this sort, but divine? Athenian: Those, I believe, which every god, daemon, and hero must practice and learn if he is to be capable of seriously caring for mankind. A man would certainly be far from becoming godlike if he were unable to learn the nature of one, two, and three, and of even and odd numbers in general; if he knew nothing at all about counting and could not even count day and night as distinct; and if he were ignorant of the revolutions of the sun, moon, and other stars. So to suppose that all these studies are not necessary for a man who means to understand almost any of the finest sciences is a most foolish supposition. The first thing we must grasp correctly is this: which of these branches of study must be learned, how many, and at what periods; which together with which, and which separately from all the others; and the method of combining them. Once this is done, with these studies leading the way, we may go on to learn the rest. For this is the natural order of procedure as determined by Necessity, against whom, as we declare, no god fights now or ever will fight.

818e

Clinias: Yes, Stranger, this account of yours does seem to be in accord with nature, and true. Athenian: That is indeed the truth of the matter, Clinias; but it is difficult to give legal form to this program of ours. If you agree, we will legislate on this more precisely at a later time. Clinias: You seem to us, Stranger, to be afraid of the neglect of such studies that is habitual in our countries; but you are wrong to be afraid. Do not let that deter you, but try to continue with your statement.

819a

Athenian: I am indeed afraid of the habit you mention, but I am even more alarmed about the people who take up these very sciences and do so badly. Complete and absolute ignorance of them is never frightening, nor is it a very great evil. Far more harmful is a wide range of knowledge and learning combined with bad training. Clinias: That is true. Athenian: We ought to declare, then, that the freeborn children should learn as much of these subjects as the vast crowd of children in Egypt learn along with their letters. First, in counting, lessons have been invented for mere infants to learn through play and fun. There are ways of dividing up apples and garlands, so that the same totals are fitted to larger and smaller groups, and ways of arranging boxers and wrestlers in byes and pairs, taking them in turn or consecutively, in their natural order. Moreover, as a game, the teachers mix together bowls made of gold, bronze, silver, and the like, while others distribute them, as I said, in groups of a single kind, fitting the rules of elementary arithmetic into play. In this way they help the pupils with their future tasks of drawing up, leading, and marching armies, or of household management, and they make them more useful to themselves in every way and more alert. Next, through lessons in weights and measures, the teachers clear away a certain kind of ignorance, both ridiculous and disgraceful, which is naturally present in all human beings concerning lines, surfaces, and solids.

819d

Clinias: What ignorance do you mean, and what sort is it? Athenian: My dear Clinias, when I learned only late in life about our condition in this matter, I was utterly astonished myself. It seemed to me more like the condition of swinish creatures than of human beings, and I was ashamed not only for myself but for the whole Greek world.

819e

Clinias: Why? Tell us what you mean, Stranger. Athenian: I am doing so. But I can explain it better by asking a question. Answer me briefly: you know what a line is? Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And a surface? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: And do you know that these are two things, and that the third, after these, is the solid? Clinias: I do. Athenian: Then don't you believe that all these are commensurable with one another? Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And you believe, I suppose, that line is truly commensurable with line, surface with surface, and solid with solid?

820a

Clinias: Absolutely. Athenian: But suppose that some of them are commensurable neither fully nor even approximately, some being commensurable and others not, while you regard them all as commensurable. What do you think of your state of mind about them? Clinias: Obviously it is a sorry state. Athenian: Again, what about the relation of line and surface to solid, or of surface and line to each other? Don't all of us Greeks imagine that these are somehow commensurable with one another?

820b

Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: But if they cannot be measured in this way by any means at all, while, as I said, all of us Greeks imagine they can, are we not right to be ashamed on behalf of them all and to say to them: Most noble Greeks, this is one of those necessary things that we said it is disgraceful not to know, although there is nothing very grand in knowing such things? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: In addition to these, there are other closely related matters in which many errors arise that are close kin to the errors just mentioned.

820c

Clinias: What are they? Athenian: Problems concerning the essential nature of the commensurable and the incommensurable. Students who are not to be utterly worthless must examine these and distinguish the two kinds, and, by setting such problems to one another, compete in a game worthy of them; for this is a far more refined pastime than the checkers old men play.

820d

Clinias: No doubt. And after all, checkers and these studies do not seem to be so very far apart. Athenian: I say, then, Clinias, that the young must learn these subjects. They are, in truth, neither harmful nor hard, and when learned through play they will do our State no damage at all, but will do it good. If anyone disagrees, however, we must listen to him. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Well then, if this is clearly the case, we shall obviously adopt these subjects; but if it clearly seems otherwise, we shall rule them out.

820e

Clinias: Yes, obviously. Athenian: My friend, shall we not, then, lay these down as necessary subjects of instruction, so that there may be no gap in our code of laws? Yet we should lay them down provisionally, like pledges that can be redeemed, apart from the rest of our constitution, in case they fail to satisfy either us who enact them or you for whom they are enacted. Clinias: Yes, that is the right way to lay them down. Athenian: Next, consider whether or not we approve of the children learning astronomy. Clinias: Just tell us your opinion. Athenian: There is a very strange fact about this, one that is quite intolerable.

821a

Clinias: What is that? Athenian: We commonly say that men ought not to inquire into the greatest god and the universe, or busy themselves searching out their causes, since it is actually impious to do so. Yet in all likelihood the right course is exactly the opposite. Clinias: Explain yourself. Athenian: What I say sounds paradoxical, and it might be thought unbecoming in an old man. But the fact is that when a man believes a science to be beautiful and true, beneficial to the State, and altogether pleasing to God, he cannot possibly keep from declaring it any longer.

821b

Clinias: That is reasonable. But what science of this kind shall we find concerning the stars? Athenian: At present, my good sirs, nearly all of us Greeks say what is false about those mighty gods, the Sun and the Moon. Clinias: What is the falsehood? Athenian: We say that they, and certain other stars along with them, never travel along the same path, and we call them planets.

821c

Clinias: Yes, by Zeus, Stranger, that is true. During my life I myself have often noticed how Phosphorus and Hesperus and other stars never travel on the same course but wander in all directions. And as for the Sun and Moon, we all know that they are constantly doing this. Athenian: It is precisely for this reason, Megillus and Clinias, that I now say our citizens and our children ought to learn enough about all these facts concerning the gods of the heavens to keep them from blaspheming about them, and to enable them always to speak piously when they sacrifice and when they pray reverently.

821d–821e

Clinias: You are right, provided, first, that it is possible to learn the subject you mention, and provided also that learning it will make us correct any mistakes we may now be making about these gods. In that case I too agree that a subject of such importance should be learned. Since this is so, please make every effort to explain the matter, and we will try to follow you and learn.

821e

Athenian: Well, the matter I speak of is not easy to learn, nor is it altogether difficult or in need of very prolonged study. Here is proof: although I heard about it neither in my youth nor long ago, I may be able to explain it to you in a fairly short time. Whereas if it were a difficult subject, I could never explain it to you at all, I at my age to you at yours. Clinias: Very true. But what is this science that you call marvelous and fitting for the young to learn, and that we know nothing about? Do try to tell us at least this much about it, as clearly as possible.

822a–822c

Athenian: I must try. The opinion, my friends, that the Sun, the Moon, and the rest of the stars wander is not correct; the truth is precisely the opposite. Each of them always travels one and the same path in a circle, not many paths, although it appears to move along many. And the fastest of them is wrongly thought to be the slowest, and the slowest the fastest. If these are the real facts and we imagine otherwise, consider this. Suppose we held a similar notion about horses racing at Olympia, or about long-distance runners, and declared the fastest to be the slowest and the slowest the fastest, and sang songs praising the loser as the winner. Then the praises we gave the runners would be neither right nor welcome to them, even though they were only mortal men. But in the present case, when we commit the same error about gods, do we not think that what would have been ridiculous and wrong there and then is, here and now and in this subject, by no means ridiculous, but certainly not pleasing to the gods, when we repeat a false tale about gods?

822c

Clinias: Very true, if the facts are as you say. Athenian: Then, if we demonstrate that they really are so, shall all these subjects be learned up to the point mentioned, and, if we fail to demonstrate it, be left alone? Is that to be our agreement?

822d

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: We may now say that our regulations concerning subjects of education are complete. The subject of hunting, and similar pursuits, must now be dealt with in the same way. The duty laid on the lawgiver probably goes beyond the bare task of enacting laws. In addition to laws, there is something else that falls naturally between advice and law, something that has often come up in the course of our discussion, as, for example, in connection with the nurture of very young children. Such matters, we say, should not be left unregulated, but it would be most foolish to regard such regulations as enacted laws. When, then, the laws and the whole constitution have been written down in this way, our praise of the citizen who is outstanding in virtue will not be complete if we say that the virtuous man is the one who serves the laws best and obeys them most;

822e–823e

Athenian: a more complete statement will be this: that the virtuous man is the one who passes through life consistently obeying the written rules of the lawgiver, as given in his legislation, his approval, and his disapproval. This statement is the most correct way of praising the citizen. In this way, moreover, the lawgiver must not only write down the laws, but in addition to the laws, and combined with them, he must write down his judgments about what things are good and what bad; and the perfect citizen must hold to these judgments no less than to the rules enforced by legal penalties. We may bring forward the subject now before us as a witness to show more clearly what we mean. Hunting is a large and complex matter, all of which is now generally covered by this single name. There are many varieties of hunting water animals, and many of hunting birds; and very many varieties also of hunting land animals, not of beasts only, but also, notice, of men, both in war and often in friendship too, a kind of hunting that is partly approved and partly disapproved. And then there are thefts, the hunts of brigands, and the hunts of army against army. When the lawgiver is making laws about hunting, he can neither leave these things unexplained nor lay down threatening regulations, with rules and penalties, for all these kinds. What, then, ought to be done about these matters? The lawgiver, for his part, will be right to praise or blame hunting with an eye to the toils and pursuits of the young. And the young man will be right to listen and obey, allowing neither pleasure nor toil to hinder him, and to hold in greater respect the instructions sanctioned by praise, and carry them out, rather than those enacted by law under threat of penalties. After these prefatory remarks there will follow fitting praise and blame of hunting: praise of the kind that makes the souls of the young better, and blame of the kind that does the opposite. Our next step will be to address the young with a prayer: Friends, may you never be seized by any desire or passion for hunting at sea, or for angling, or for ever pursuing water animals with fish traps that do your lazy hunting for you, whether you are asleep or awake.

823e–824a

Athenian: And may no longing for man-hunting at sea and for piracy come over you and make you cruel and lawless hunters; and may the thought of committing theft in country or city never so much as cross your minds. Nor may any of the young be seized by the crafty passion for snaring birds, no very gentlemanly pursuit! That leaves our athletes only the hunting and capture of land animals. Of this branch of hunting, the kind called night-stalking, the job of lazy men who sleep in shifts, deserves no praise. Nor does the kind that has intervals of rest from toil, in which men master the wild strength of beasts with nets and traps instead of by the victorious might of a toil-loving soul. So the only kind left for all, and the best kind, is the hunting of four-footed animals with horses and dogs and the hunter's own limbs, in which men hunt in person and subdue all the creatures by their own running, striking, and shooting: all those men, that is, who cultivate the courage that is divine. On this whole subject, the account we have now given will serve as praise and blame; and the law shall read as follows: No one shall hinder these truly sacred hunters from hunting wherever and however they wish; but no one shall ever allow the night-trapper who trusts in nets and snares to hunt anywhere. No one shall hinder the bird-catcher on fallow land or in the mountains, but whoever finds him on cultivated fields or on sacred uncultivated land shall drive him off. The fisherman shall be allowed to fish in all waters except harbors, sacred rivers, marshes, and lakes, but only on condition that he makes no use of plant juices that muddy the water. So now, at last, we may say that all our laws about education are complete.

824a

Clinias: You may rightly say so.

828a

Athenian: Our next task is to arrange the festivals and establish them by law, with the help of the Delphic oracles, prescribing which sacrifices, and to which deities, it will be good and right for the State to offer. When they are held and how many there are is, in some cases at least, our own business to decide for ourselves. Clinias: Very likely, as far as the number is concerned. Athenian: Then let us state the number first. There shall be no fewer than 365 feasts, so that some official will always be sacrificing to some god or daemon on behalf of the State, its people, and their property. The interpreters, the priests and priestesses, and the prophets shall meet and, together with the Law-wardens, shall establish whatever the lawgiver is obliged to leave out; and these same persons shall also decide what those omissions are. For the law will state that there are to be twelve feasts for the twelve gods after whom the various tribes are named. To each of these gods they shall offer monthly sacrifices and assign choirs and musical contests, as well as gymnastic contests, as suits both the gods themselves and the various seasons of the year. They shall also establish women's festivals, determining how many of them shall be for women only and how many shall be open to men as well. Further, in keeping with the law, they must determine the rites proper to the gods of the underworld, how many of the celestial gods should be invoked, and which of the rites connected with them should not be mixed but kept separate; and they shall place these in the twelfth month, which is sacred to Pluto. Men who are warriors should not dislike this god, but should honor him as the one who is always best to the human race; for, as I would maintain in all seriousness, union is in no way better for soul and body than separation.

828d–829e

Athenian: Moreover, if these persons are to arrange these matters properly, they must believe that no other State now in existence can compare with ours in the amount of leisure it enjoys and in its command of the necessities of life; and they must also believe that the State, like an individual, ought to live a good life. But the first requirement for a good and happy life is neither to do wrong oneself nor to be wronged by others. The first of these is not very hard, but it is very hard to secure protection from being wronged; in fact, it cannot be gained completely except by becoming completely good. In the same way, a State that becomes good can have a life of peace, but if it is bad, it will have a life of war both abroad and at home. Since this is so, all men must train for war not in wartime, but while they are living in peace. So a sensible State must go out on a military march every month for at least one whole day, or for more, as the rulers decide, paying no attention to cold or hot weather. Everyone shall take part, men, women and children, whenever the rulers decide to march them out all together, and at other times they shall go out in sections. Along with the sacrifices, they must keep devising fine games to serve as festival contests, modeled as closely as possible on the battles of war. At each of these they must hand out prizes and awards for merit, and compose speeches of praise and blame for one another, according to the character each person shows not only in the contests but in his life as a whole, honoring the one who is regarded as best and blaming the one who is not. Not everyone shall compose such speeches. First, no one under fifty years of age shall compose one; and further, no one shall do so who, however skilled he may be in poetry and music, has never yet performed any noble or notable deed. But the poems composed by men who are good themselves and honored in the State as doers of noble deeds shall be sung, even if the poems are not musically accomplished. The judging of these shall rest with the Educator and the other Law-wardens, who shall grant these men the special privilege of being the only ones with freedom of speech in song, while no one else shall be given any such permission. Nor shall anyone dare to sing an unauthorized song, not even if it is sweeter than the hymns of Orpheus or of Thamyris, but only those sacred poems that have won the judges' approval and been dedicated to the gods, and those by good men that have been judged to distribute praise or blame fittingly. I declare that the same rules shall apply equally to men and to women, both in military expeditions and in freedom of poetic speech.

829e–830c

Athenian: The lawgiver ought to take counsel with himself and reason like this: 'Come now, what kind of men am I raising, once I have prepared the whole State? Are they not to be competitors in the greatest of contests, in which they will face countless opponents?' 'Certainly,' anyone would rightly answer. 'What then? Suppose we had been training boxers or pancratiasts or competitors in some similar branch of athletics: would we have gone straight into the contest without first fighting against someone every day? If we were boxers, we would have spent a great many days before the contest learning how to fight and working hard, practicing in imitation all the methods we meant to use on the day we would be fighting for victory, and copying the real thing as closely as possible. So we would put on padded gloves instead of proper boxing thongs, in order to get the best possible practice in landing blows and dodging them. And if we happened to be very short of sparring partners, do you suppose that fear of being laughed at by fools would stop us from hanging up a lifeless dummy and practicing on it? In fact, if we were ever in a desert with no sparring partners, either living or lifeless, would we not resort to shadow-boxing in the most literal sense, against ourselves? Or what else should anyone call the practice of boxing gestures?'

830c

Clinias: There is no other name for it, Stranger, than the one you have just given it. Athenian: What then? Is the fighting force of our State to venture into battle each time, fighting for their lives, their children, their property, and the whole State, with less thorough preparation than the competitors we have been describing? And is their lawgiver, for fear that these practice bouts may look ridiculous to some people, to hold back from making laws that order field exercises? Under such laws, the minor exercises without heavy arms will take place daily if possible, and both choral dancing and all gymnastics shall be directed to this end. He shall order the other exercises, both larger and smaller, to be held in full armor at least once a month. In these exercises they will compete with one another throughout the whole country, contending in capturing strongholds and in ambushes and in every kind of mock warfare;

830e–831b

Athenian: in fact, they shall spar with padded gloves and with darts as close to real ones as possible, though the points of the darts shall be made less dangerous, so that their combat games may not be entirely free of fear, but may produce real alarm and show to some extent who is brave and who is not. To the brave the lawgiver shall rightly assign honors, and to the others disgrace, so that in this way he may prepare the whole State to be useful throughout life in the real contest. Moreover, if a man is killed in these mock fights, since the killing was involuntary, the lawgiver shall declare the killer clean of hands once he has been purified according to law. For he will reflect that when a few men die, others just as good will grow up in their place; whereas once fear is, so to speak, dead, he will be unable to find a test to tell the good from the bad in all such cases, and that is a far greater evil for a State than the other.

831b

Clinias: We, at least, Stranger, would certainly agree that every State should both make laws for these things and practice them. Athenian: Do we all know the reason why such choral dancing and such contests hardly exist anywhere in the States at present, except to a very small extent? Shall we say that it is because of the ignorance of the general public and of those who make their laws? Clinias: Possibly. Athenian: Not at all, my ingenious Clinias! What we ought to say is that there are two causes, and both of them very weighty.

831c

Clinias: What are they? Athenian: The first comes from a lust for wealth that leaves a man no time to attend to anything except his own private property. When every citizen's soul hangs on this, it cannot attend to anything other than the day's gain. Whatever branch of learning or pursuit leads to this, each man privately is most eager to learn and practice, while he laughs everything else to scorn. We must declare this to be one particular reason why a State is unwilling to take this, or any other fine and noble pursuit, seriously; and why, on the other hand, every individual, out of his greed for silver and gold, is willing to toil at every art and scheme, noble or disgraceful, if it is likely to make him rich. He is willing, too, to do deeds holy and unholy, and indeed utterly shameful, without a qualm, provided only that he can glut himself to the full, like a beast, with all kinds of food and drink and sexual pleasure.

831e

Clinias: True. Athenian: Then let this cause I am describing be set down as one that prevents the States from adequately practicing either military exercises or any other noble pursuits. It turns men of a quiet nature into merchants, ship-owners, and servants, while it makes the bold into pirates, burglars, temple-robbers, fighters and despots, and this although some of them are not ill-natured, but merely unfortunate.

832a

Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: Well, how could I describe them as anything other than utterly unfortunate, when they are compelled to go through life with their souls always hungry? Clinias: That, then, is one cause. What is the second cause you mention, Stranger? Athenian: You are right to remind me. Megillus: One cause, as you claim, is this lifelong, insatiable pursuit, which keeps every man completely busy and prevents each and all from properly practicing military exercises. Granted; now tell us the second cause.

832b

Athenian: Do you think I am putting it off because I do not know what to say? Megillus: No; but we think that, out of a kind of hatred for the character you describe, you are punishing it more severely than the argument at hand requires. Athenian: Your rebuke is fair, Strangers; it seems you want to hear what comes next. Clinias: Just go on. Athenian: I maintain that a cause lies in those non-polities I have often mentioned in our earlier discussion, namely democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. None of these is a polity; the most accurate name for all of them would be 'faction-State.' For none of them is a voluntary rule over willing subjects; each is a voluntary rule over unwilling subjects, always accompanied by some kind of force. And the ruler, because he fears his subjects, will never willingly allow them to become noble or wealthy or strong or brave, or warlike in any way at all. These, then, are the two main causes of nearly everything, and certainly of the conditions we have described. The polity we are now legislating for, however, has escaped both causes. For not only does it enjoy a great deal of leisure, but its citizens are also free from one another's domination, and as a result of these laws of ours they will be the least likely of all men to be lovers of money. So it is both natural and logical that, of all existing polities, this type alone should welcome the system described above, which combines military training with sport, once we have properly completed that description.

832d

Clinias: Very good. Athenian: The next step, then, is to remind ourselves, regarding all gymnastic contests, that every contest that gives training for war should be instituted and have prizes assigned to it, while all those that do not should be set aside. It will be best to describe and establish at the outset what these contests are. First, then, should we not establish contests in running and in speed generally?

832e

Clinias: We should. Athenian: No doubt the most important thing of all for war is general agility of the body, of the hands as well as the feet: agility of foot for flight and pursuit, and of hand for close-quarters grappling and stand-up fighting, which call for sturdiness and strength.

833a

Clinias: No doubt. Athenian: Yet surely neither of these is of the greatest use without weapons. Clinias: Certainly not. Athenian: So at our contests the herald, as is the present custom, shall call the sprinter first. He shall enter fully armed, and we shall offer no prize to a competitor without arms. First, then, the runner of the stadion sprint in armor shall enter; second, the runner of the diaulos double course; third, the runner of the hippios course; fourth, the runner of the dolichos long-distance race; and fifth, the runner whom we shall send off first, fully armed, to run a distance of sixty stades to a temple of Ares and back. He shall be in heavier armor and be called a hoplite, and he shall run over a smooth course, while his rival shall wear the full equipment of an archer and run a course of a hundred stades over hills and varied country to a temple of Apollo and Artemis. Having set up the contests in this way, we shall wait for these runners to return, and we shall award the prize to the winner of each race.

833c

Clinias: Quite right. Athenian: Let us plan these contests in three divisions: one for children, one for youths, and one for men. For the youths' races we shall set the course at two-thirds of the full length, and for the children at one-half, whether they compete as archers or as hoplites. For females, we shall establish stadion, diaulos, hippios, and dolichos races for girls who have not yet reached puberty; they shall race naked, on the course itself. Girls over thirteen shall continue to take part until they marry, up to the age of twenty at most, or eighteen at the least; but when these come forward to compete in these races, they must be dressed in decent clothing. Let these, then, be the rules for races for men and women. As for contests of strength, in place of wrestling and the other heavy events now in fashion, we shall establish fencing in armor, both in contests of one against one and in team competitions of anything from two to ten a side.

833e–835a

Athenian: As for which blows a winner must land or avoid, and how many points he must score: just as those who deal with the art of wrestling have now laid down by law what counts as good and bad wrestling, so we must call in the experts in armed fencing and ask them to help us draw up laws to decide who is the rightful winner in such fights, what he must do and what he must avoid, and likewise the rules for determining the loser. The same laws shall be laid down for females too, up to the age of marriage. In place of the pancratium we must establish a general contest for peltasts, who shall compete with bows, light shields, javelins, and stones thrown either by hand or by sling; for these too we shall lay down laws for awarding the honors and prizes to the man who best keeps the rules governing such contests. After these, the next thing to establish will be horse-racing. In a country like Crete there is not much need for horses, at least not in large numbers, so inevitably less attention is paid to raising and racing them. As for chariots, no one here keeps them, and no one is likely to have any great ambition regarding them, so that establishing contests for them would go against local custom and would not only seem foolish but be foolish. If, however, we establish prizes for races of riding-horses, for young colts, for three-year-olds, and for full-grown horses, we shall be adapting the sport of horse-racing to the character of the country. Let a competitive contest among these riders be established by law, and let the phylarchs and hipparchs act as public judges of all the races and of the competitors who enter in armor. We would be wrong to establish prizes for competitors without arms, either here or in the gymnastic contests. And since a Cretan earns credit by being a mounted archer or javelin-thrower, we shall also have contests and matches of a sporting kind among these. As for women, it is not worthwhile to make compulsory laws and rules about their taking part in such sports; but if, as a result of earlier training that has become a habit, their nature permits it and does not forbid it, let girls or maidens take part without blame. So now at last we have reached the end both of competition and of instruction in gymnastics, as far as concerns our education by means of contests and of daily teaching. Most of our account of music has likewise been completed. The regulations for rhapsodes and their followers, however, and the choral contests that must accompany festivals, are matters to be arranged once the gods and demigods have had their months, days and years assigned to them; then it will be seen whether these contests should be held every other year or every four years, or in whatever manner and order the gods may suggest.

835a–835d

Athenian: Then also, we may expect, the musical contests will be held in their turn, as arranged by the Masters of the Games, the Educator of the young, and the Law-wardens, who shall meet together for this very purpose and themselves act as legislators to determine when, by whom, and with whom the contests are to be held for all the choruses and choral dancing. The character each of these ought to have in words, songs and tunes, blended with rhythm and dance, has often been stated by the original lawgiver. The secondary lawgivers should follow him in their enactments, and they should arrange the contests at convenient times to suit the various sacrifices, and so appoint festivals for the State to celebrate. Now it is not at all hard to see how these and similar matters should be given legal regulation, nor would shifting their positions bring much gain or loss to the State. But the things that do make no small difference, and about which it is hard to persuade people, are a task above all for God, if it were possible for the commands to come from him. As things are, they are likely to need some bold man who, valuing frankness above everything else, will declare what he thinks best for the city and its citizens. Among corrupted souls he will prescribe what is fitting and consistent with the whole constitution, and he will oppose the mightiest lusts, acting entirely alone, with no human being to help him and Reason as his only guide.

835d

Clinias: What argument are we pursuing now, Stranger? We are still in the dark. Athenian: Naturally; but I will try to explain myself more clearly. When my discussion came to the subject of education, I saw young men and young women associating affectionately with one another. Naturally, a feeling of alarm came over me as I asked myself how anyone is to manage a State like this, in which young men and women are well fed but free from the severe and menial labors that most surely quench wantonness, and where everyone's chief occupation all through life consists of sacrifices, feasts and dances. In such a State, how will the young keep away from those desires that often plunge many people into ruin, all those desires that reason, in its effort to become law, commands them to abstain from?

835e–836e

Athenian: It is not surprising that the laws already established should keep most desires in check. For example, the ban on excessive wealth is of no small benefit in promoting self-control, and our entire system of education contains laws useful for the same purpose. Besides this, there is the watchful eye of the magistrates, trained always to fix its gaze on this point and to keep constant watch on the young. These means, then, are sufficient, as far as any human means can be, to deal with the other desires. But when we come to sexual desire for boys and girls, and the desire of men for women and women for men, passions that have caused countless woes both to individuals and to whole States, how is one to guard against them, or what remedy can one apply to find a way of escape from such a danger in all these cases? It is extremely difficult, Clinias. For while in many other matters Crete as a whole and Lacedaemon give us considerable help, and rightly so, in framing laws that differ from those in common use, in the matter of sexual passion (since we are alone among ourselves) they flatly contradict us. Suppose we were to follow in nature's footsteps and enact the law that held good before the days of Laius, declaring that it is right to refrain from the same kind of intercourse with men and boys as with women, citing as evidence the nature of wild animals and pointing out that male does not touch male for this purpose, since it is unnatural. In doing all this we would probably be using a persuasive argument, but one in no way consistent with your States. Moreover, the goal that we say the lawgiver ought always to keep in view does not agree with these practices. For the question we always ask is this: which of the proposed laws leads toward virtue, and which does not? Come, then: suppose we grant that this practice is now made lawful, and that it is noble and in no way shameful. How far would it promote virtue? Will it produce a courageous character in the soul of the one who is seduced, or the quality of self-control in the soul of the seducer? No one would ever believe that. On the contrary, just as everyone will blame the cowardice of the man who always gives in to pleasures and can never hold out against them, will they not likewise reproach the man who plays the woman's part for the resemblance he bears to his model? Is there anyone, then, who will make such a practice law? No one, I should say, who has any idea of what true law is. What, then, do we declare to be the truth about this matter?

836e–837a

Athenian: If we are to judge these things rightly, we must see the real nature of friendship and desire and what is called love. What causes the greatest confusion and obscurity is the fact that this single term covers these two things and also a third kind compounded of both.

837a

Clinias: How so? Athenian: Friendship is the name we give to the affection of like for like in point of goodness, and of equal for equal; we also give it to the affection of the needy for the rich, which is of the opposite kind. And when either of these feelings is intense, we call it love.

837b

Clinias: True. Athenian: The friendship that arises between opposites is terrible and fierce and is seldom mutual among us, while the friendship based on likeness is gentle and mutual throughout life. The kind that arises from a blend of these two presents difficulties: first, it is hard to discover what the man affected by this third kind of love really wants to obtain; and second, the man himself is at a loss, being pulled in opposite directions by the two tendencies, one of which urges him to enjoy the bloom of his beloved while the other forbids him. For the man who loves the body and hungers after its bloom, as if it were a ripening peach, urges himself on to take his fill of it, paying no respect to the character of the beloved. But the man who treats bodily desire as only secondary, who looks with longing rather than loving, and whose soul truly desires the other's soul, regards the bodily satisfaction of the body as an outrage. Reverently honoring self-control, courage, nobility and wisdom, he will want to live always in chastity together with the chaste object of his love. And the love that is blended of these two kinds is the one we have just described as the third. Since, then, love has so many varieties, should the law forbid them all and prevent them from existing among us? Or is it not clear that we would want the kind of love that belongs to virtue, and that desires the young to become as good as possible, to exist within our State, while we would forbid the other two kinds, if possible? Or what is our view, my dear Megillus?

837d–837e

Megillus: Your account of the subject, Stranger, is perfectly correct.

837e

Athenian: It seems that I have won your agreement, as I expected; so there is no need for me to examine your law and its attitude toward such matters, but simply to accept your agreement with my statement. Later on I will try to charm Clinias, too, into agreeing with me on this subject. So let what you two have granted me stand at that, and let us by all means go on with our laws. Megillus: Quite right. Athenian: At present I know of a device for enacting this law that is in one way easy, but in another the hardest possible.

838a

Megillus: Explain what you mean. Athenian: Even now, as we know, most men, however lawless they are, are effectively and strictly kept from sexual relations with beautiful persons, and not against their will, but with their own most willing consent. Megillus: On what occasions do you mean? Athenian: Whenever a man has a brother or sister who is beautiful. So too in the case of a son or daughter: the same unwritten law is most effective in keeping men from sleeping with them, either openly or secretly, or from wishing to have any such contact with them. In fact, most men never so much as feel any desire for such relations.

838b

Megillus: That is true. Athenian: Is it not, then, by a brief saying that all such pleasures are quenched? Megillus: What saying do you mean? Athenian: The saying that these acts are not holy at all, but hated by God and the most shameful of shameful things. And does the reason not lie in this: that nobody speaks of them otherwise, but every one of us, from the day of his birth, hears this opinion expressed always and everywhere, not only in comic speech but often also in serious tragedy? We hear it, for instance, when a Thyestes or an Oedipus is brought on stage, or a Macareus who has had secret relations with a sister, and all of them are seen readily inflicting death on themselves as punishment for their sins.

838c–838d

Megillus: This much, at least, you are quite right to say: public opinion has a surprising power, when no one ever attempts to breathe a word that contradicts the law.

838d–838e

Athenian: Then is it not true, as I said just now, that when a lawgiver wants to subdue one of the lusts that most subdue men, it is easy for him at least to learn how to master them? He will secure the firmest foundation for this law by making this public opinion sacred in the eyes of all alike: slave and free, women and children, and the whole State.

838e

Megillus: Certainly; but how will it ever be possible for him to bring it about that everyone is willing to say such a thing... Athenian: A very fair remark. That was exactly why I said that, with respect to this law, I know of a device for making natural use of the intercourse that produces children: on the one hand, by abstaining from males and not deliberately killing off the human race, nor sowing seed on rocks and stones, where it can never take root and grow into fruitful increase; and on the other hand, by abstaining from every female field in which you would not want the seed to spring up. Once this law becomes permanent and prevails, if it rightly comes to rule in other cases as well, just as it now prevails regarding intercourse with parents, it is the source of countless blessings. For, in the first place, it follows the dictates of nature; it keeps men from erotic rage and frenzy and all kinds of fornication, and from all excess in food and drink; and it makes husbands affectionate toward their own wives. Countless other blessings would also follow, if one could make this law secure. Possibly, however, some rash young man standing by, bursting with virility, on hearing that this law had been passed, would denounce us for making foolish and impossible rules and fill the whole place with his shouting. It was with this in view that I said I knew of a device for making this law last once it is passed, one that is at once the easiest of all devices and the hardest. For it is very easy to see that this is possible, and how it is possible, since we maintain that this rule, once properly consecrated, will master every soul and make it fear the enacted laws and obey them completely. Yet things have now come to the point where people think that, even so, it is unlikely to happen. In the same way, in the case of the institution of common meals, people refuse to believe that a whole State could keep up the practice constantly, and this despite the evidence of the facts and the existence of the practice in your countries; and even there, when it is applied to women, the practice is regarded as unnatural. So it was because of the strength of this disbelief that I said it is extremely difficult to get both of these matters permanently established by law.

839d

Megillus: And you were right about that. Athenian: Still, to show that it is not beyond human power but possible, would you like me to try to state an argument that has some plausibility? Clinias: Certainly.

839e

Athenian: Would a man be more ready to abstain from sexual indulgence, and to agree to carry out the law on this matter with moderation, if his body were well trained and in good condition, or if it were in poor condition? Clinias: He would be much more ready if it were well trained. Athenian: Have we not all heard of Iccus of Tarentum, famous for his contests at Olympia and elsewhere? We know how, spurred on by ambition and skill, and having courage combined with self-control in his soul, he never touched a woman, or a boy either, during the whole period of his training, as the story goes. And the same story is told about Crison and Astylus and Diopompus and very many others. And yet, Clinias, these men were not only far worse educated in soul than your citizens and mine, but they also had far more sexual vigor of body.

840b

Clinias: It is indeed true, as you say, that the ancients confidently affirm that this really happened in the case of these athletes. Athenian: Well then, if those men had the fortitude to abstain from what most men regard as bliss, for the sake of victory in wrestling, running and the like, shall our boys be unable to hold out in order to win a much nobler victory? This is the noblest of all victories, as we shall tell them from their childhood on, charming them, we may expect, into believing it by stories, sayings and songs.

840c

Clinias: What victory? Athenian: Victory over pleasures. If they win it, they will live a life of bliss; but if they lose, just the opposite. Furthermore, will the fear that this is an utterly unholy thing not give them the power to master impulses that men inferior to themselves have mastered? Clinias: It is certainly reasonable to suppose so. Athenian: Since we have reached this point in our regulation, but have run into difficulty because of the cowardice of the many, I maintain that our regulation on this point must go forward and declare that our citizens must not be worse than birds and many other animals. These are born in large broods and live chaste and celibate lives without sexual intercourse until they reach the age for breeding. When they reach this age they pair off as instinct moves them, male with female and female with male, and from then on they live in a holy and just way, remaining faithful to their first compacts of love. Surely our citizens should at least be better than these animals. If, however, they are corrupted by most of the other Hellenes or barbarians, through seeing and hearing that among them the lawless Love (as it is called) has very great power, and so become unable to overcome it, then the Law-wardens, acting as lawgivers, must devise a second law for them.

841a

Clinias: What law do you advise them to make if the one now proposed slips out of their grasp? Athenian: Evidently the law that ranks next after it, as second, Clinias. Clinias: What is that? Athenian: One ought to keep the force of the pleasures as far as possible out of practice, diverting its increase and nourishment to another part of the body by means of physical labor. This would come about if sexual indulgence were free of shamelessness; for if, out of shame, people indulged in it only seldom, this rare indulgence would make it a less tyrannical mistress. So let them regard secrecy in such acts as honorable, sanctioned both by custom and by unwritten law; and let them regard lack of secrecy as dishonorable, though not the failure to abstain from such acts altogether. In this way we shall have a second standard of the honorable and the shameful established by law, with a second degree of rightness; and those people of corrupted nature whom we describe as inferior to themselves, who form a single kind, will be hemmed in by three kinds of force and compelled to refrain from breaking the law.

841c

Clinias: What kinds? Athenian: The fear of God, the love of honor, and a desire for beautiful qualities of soul rather than beautiful bodies. What I am now describing is perhaps like the wishful dreams in a story; yet in very truth, if only they were realized, they would prove a great blessing in every State. Possibly, if God grants it, we might enforce one of two things in this matter of sexual relations. Either no one would dare to touch any noble and freeborn person except his own wedded wife, or to sow unholy and bastard seed with concubines, or unnatural and barren seed in sodomy; or else we would abolish love of males entirely. And as for love of women, suppose we enact a law that any man who has intercourse with any women other than those brought into his house with the sanction of the gods and holy marriage, whether purchased or acquired in some other way, and who is detected in it by any man or woman, shall be barred from any public commendation in the State, as being in reality an alien. Such a law would probably be approved as right.

841e–842a

Athenian: So let this law, whether we ought to call it one law or two, be laid down concerning sexual relations and love affairs in general, with regard to right and wrong conduct in our dealings with one another that arise from these desires.

842a

Megillus: For my own part, Stranger, I would warmly welcome this law; but Clinias must tell us himself what his view of the matter is. Clinias: I shall do so, Megillus, when I think the occasion is suitable; but for now let us allow the Stranger to proceed further with his laws. Megillus: You are right.

842b–842e

Athenian: Well, we have now reached this point in our progress: the common meals have been established, something that we say would be difficult elsewhere, though in Crete no one would question that it is right. As for their form, whether we should adopt the Cretan style or the Lacedaemonian, or whether we can find a third style better than either, this does not seem to me a hard problem to settle, nor would settling it bring much benefit, since these meals are already established in a satisfactory way. Next comes the question of organizing the food supply and how to fit it to the meals. In other States the food supply would include all kinds of food and come from many sources, certainly from twice as many as in our State; for most Greeks get their food from both land and sea, but our people will get theirs from the land alone. This makes the lawgiver's task easier, for here half as many laws, or fewer, will suffice, and the laws will also be better suited to free men. For the lawgiver of our State is free, for the most part, of shipping, trading, peddling, innkeeping, customs duties, mines, loans, interest, and countless other matters of the same kind. He can say goodbye to all of these and make laws for farmers, shepherds and beekeepers, and for the preservation and supervision of the tools used in these occupations. He will do this now that he has already enacted the most important laws, those dealing with marriage, with the birth, rearing and education of children, and with the appointment of magistrates in the State. For now, in his lawmaking, he must turn to the subject of food and of those whose labor helps supply it. First, then, let there be a code of laws called agricultural.

842e–843e

Athenian: The first law, the law of Zeus the Boundary-god, shall be stated as follows: No one shall move the boundary markers of land, whether they belong to a neighbor who is a native citizen or to a foreigner (when the owner holds adjoining land on a frontier), recognizing that to do this is truly to be guilty of moving what is sacred and must not be moved. A man should rather try to move the largest rock that is not a boundary marker than a small stone that marks the boundary, sanctioned by the gods, between friendly and hostile ground. For Zeus the god of kinsmen is witness to the one, and Zeus the god of strangers to the other; and when these gods are roused, they bring the deadliest wars. Whoever obeys the law shall not suffer the evils it inflicts; but whoever despises it shall be liable to a double penalty, the first from the hand of the gods, the second from the law. No one shall willingly move the boundary markers of his neighbors' land. If anyone does move them, anyone who wishes shall report him to the landholders, and they shall bring him to the court. If a man is convicted, since such an act means that the convicted man is secretly and violently merging lands into one, the court shall assess what the losing party must suffer or pay. Further, many small wrongs are done against neighbors which, through constant repetition, breed an immense amount of hostility and make living as neighbors a harsh and bitter thing. So every neighbor must take the greatest care not to do anything unfriendly to his neighbor, and above all must always take special care never to encroach in the least on his land; for doing harm is easy and open to anyone, but doing good is by no means open to everyone. Whoever encroaches on his neighbor's land, overstepping the boundaries, shall pay for the damage; and, as a cure for his shamelessness and lack of civility, he shall also pay the injured party twice the cost of the damage. In all such matters the land-stewards shall act as inspectors, judges and assessors: the whole staff of the district, as we said earlier, in the more important cases, and in the less important ones, those of them who are phrourarchs. If anyone encroaches on pasture land, these officials shall inspect the damage, decide the case, and assess it. And if anyone, giving in to his fondness for bees, gets another man's swarm for himself by attracting it with the rattling of pans, he shall pay for the damage. And if a man, while burning his own brush, fails to take care for his neighbor's property, he shall pay whatever fine the officials decide.

843e–844e

Athenian: The same applies if a man planting trees fails to leave the proper distance between them and his neighbor's plot. Many lawgivers have dealt with this adequately, and we should make use of their laws rather than require the chief organizer of the State to legislate on all the many small details that are within the competence of any ordinary lawgiver. In the same way, there are excellent old laws about water supplies already laid down for farmers, which we need not draw into our discussion. Let this suffice: whoever wants to bring water to his own land may do so, starting from the public water sources, but he must not undercut any private person's exposed wells. He may lead it by whatever route he wishes, except through a house, a temple or a tomb, and he must do no damage beyond the actual work of digging the channel. If, in some places, the rainwater soaks away because of the natural dryness of the soil, and there is a shortage of necessary drinking water, the owner shall dig on his own land down to the clay; and if he finds no water at that depth, he shall get from his neighbors just as much as he needs for drinking for all his household. If his neighbors too are short of supply, he shall apply to the land-stewards for a ration of water, fetch it day by day, and so share the water with his neighbors. If, when rain falls, anyone living on lower ground damages the farmer above him, or the neighbor next door, by blocking its outflow, or, conversely, if the man on higher ground damages the man below by carelessly letting out the floodwater, and if as a result they refuse to cooperate with each other in this matter, anyone who wishes shall call in a city-steward if it is in the city, or a land-steward if it is in the country, and obtain an order as to what each party must do. Whoever does not abide by the order shall be liable to prosecution for envy and a perverse spirit, and if convicted he shall pay the injured party double the damage, for refusing to obey the magistrates. As for the fruit harvest, the rule of sharing for everyone shall be this. This goddess has given us two gifts: one, the plaything of Dionysus, which is not stored; the other, produced by nature for storing. So let this law be enacted concerning the fruit harvest: whoever tastes the common crop of grapes or figs before the vintage season, which coincides with the rising of Arcturus, whether on his own land or on that of others, shall owe fifty sacred drachmas to Dionysus if he picked them from his own trees; a mina if from his neighbor's trees; and two-thirds of a mina if from anyone else's.

844e–845e

Athenian: If anyone wants to harvest choice grapes or choice figs, as they are now called, he may gather them however and whenever he likes if they come from his own trees; but if they come from another man's trees, and without his consent, he shall be fined every time, in accordance with the law, 'You shall not move what you did not set down.' If a slave touches any such fruit without the consent of the owner of the land, he shall be flogged with as many lashes as there are grapes in the bunch or figs on the fig tree. If a resident alien buys a choice crop, he may harvest it if he wishes. If a foreigner visiting the country wants to eat some of the crop as he travels along the road, he may, if he wishes, take some of the choice fruit for himself and one attendant free of charge, as a gift of hospitality; but the law shall forbid our foreigners to share in the so-called common fruit and the like. If either a master or a slave touches it in ignorance, the slave shall be punished with lashes, and the free man shall be sent away with a warning and told to touch only the other crop, which is unsuitable for storing to make raisins for wine or dried figs. As for pears, apples, pomegranates and all such fruits, it shall be no disgrace to take them secretly; but a man who is caught at it, if he is under thirty years of age, shall be beaten and driven off without being wounded, and a free man shall have no right to sue over such blows. A foreigner shall be allowed to share in these fruits in the same way as in the grape crop. If a man over thirty touches them, eating them on the spot and taking none away, he shall share in all such fruits as the foreigner does; but if he disobeys the law, he shall be liable to be disqualified from competing for honors, if anyone brings these facts to the attention of the judges at that time. Water is more nourishing than anything else in a garden, but it is easily spoiled. For soil, sun and wind, which together with water nourish growing plants, are not easy to spoil by sorcery, diversion or theft; but all these things can happen to water, and so it needs the help of law. So let this be the law about it: if anyone deliberately spoils another man's water, whether in a spring or in a pond, by sorcery, digging or theft, the injured party shall sue him before the city-stewards, recording the amount of the damage he has suffered; and anyone convicted of doing damage by poisons shall, in addition to paying the fine, cleanse the springs or the water basin in whatever way the laws of the interpreters declare that the purification should be carried out on each occasion and for each plaintiff.

845e–846e

Athenian: Concerning bringing home all the crops, anyone who wishes shall be allowed to carry his own produce through any place, provided either that he does no damage or that he himself gains three times as much profit as the damage he causes his neighbor. The magistrates shall have authority in this matter, as in all other cases where a man willingly injures an unwilling party, whether by force or secretly, by means of his own property, whether he injures the person himself or some of his property. In all such cases the plaintiff must report to the magistrates to obtain redress, where the damage is under three minas; but if one man has a larger claim than this against another, he shall bring a suit before the public courts and punish the wrongdoer. If any of the magistrates is thought to have given an unjust verdict in deciding the penalties, he shall be liable to pay the injured party double the amount; and anyone who wishes shall bring the magistrates' wrongdoing before the public courts in each case of complaint. There are countless petty matters for which penalties must be laid down, concerning written complaints, summonses, and witnesses to summonses (whether a summons requires two witnesses or more), and all matters of that kind. These cannot be left without legal regulation, yet they do not deserve the attention of an aged lawgiver. So the young lawgivers shall make laws for them, modeling their small rules on the great ones of our earlier enactments, and learning by experience how far they are needed in practice, until it is decided that all of them have been adequately laid down. Then, having made them permanent, they shall live by them, now that they are set out in proper form. Moreover, we ought to regulate the craftsmen in the following way. First, no resident citizen shall be counted among those who work at technical crafts, nor shall any servant of a resident citizen. For a citizen already has a sufficient craft, one that requires long practice and much study: preserving and maintaining the public order of the State, a task that needs his full attention. And hardly any human being has the capacity to carry on two pursuits or two crafts thoroughly, or even to practice one himself while supervising someone else practicing another.

846e–847e

Athenian: So we must first of all lay down this fundamental rule in the State: no smith shall also work as a carpenter, nor shall a carpenter supervise others doing smith's work instead of practicing his own craft, on the pretext that, since he supervises many servants working for him, he naturally supervises them more carefully because he earns more from that source than from his own craft. Instead, every craftsman in the State shall have one single craft and earn his living from it. The city-stewards shall work hard to uphold this law. If a resident citizen turns aside to any craft rather than to the pursuit of virtue, they shall punish him with reproaches and disgrace until they bring him back to his own proper course; and if a foreigner practices two crafts, they shall punish him with imprisonment, fines and expulsion from the State, and so compel him to be one man and not many. As for wages owed to craftsmen, the cancellation of work ordered, and any wrongs done to them by others or by them to others, the city-stewards shall act as arbitrators up to a value of fifty drachmas; for larger sums, the public courts shall decide as the law directs. No one in the State shall pay any duty on either exported or imported goods. No one shall import frankincense or any other such foreign spices used in religious rites, or purple and other dyes not produced in the country, or anything belonging to any other craft that requires imported foreign materials for some unnecessary use; nor, on the other hand, shall anyone export any of the goods that must necessarily remain in the country. The inspectors and supervisors of all these matters shall be the twelve Law-wardens who come next in order when the five oldest are left out. As for weapons and all instruments of war, if there is need to import any craft, plant, metal, rope or animal for military purposes, the hipparchs and generals shall control both imports and exports, when the State is both giving and receiving, and the Law-wardens shall enact suitable and adequate laws for this; but no trading for the sake of profit, in this or in any other matter, shall be carried on anywhere within the borders of our State and country. Regarding the food supply and the distribution of agricultural produce, a system close to the one established by law in Crete would probably prove satisfactory. Everyone must divide the whole produce of the land into twelve parts, according to how it is to be consumed.

847e–848b

Athenian: Each twelfth part, of wheat and barley, for example (and all the other crops must be distributed in the same way as these, as well as all the animals for sale in each district), must be divided proportionally into three shares. The first shall be for the freeborn citizens, and the second for their servants. The third share shall be for craftsmen and for foreigners in general, including any resident aliens who may be living among them and need basic sustenance, and all who have come into the country at any time to do either public or private business. This third share of all the necessities shall be the only one subject to compulsory sale; it shall be forbidden to make compulsory sale of any part of the other two shares. What, then, will be the best way to make these divisions? To begin with, it is plain that our division is equal in one way and unequal in another.

848b

Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: Of each of these products of the land, some parts are necessarily worse and some better. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: In this respect none of the three shares shall have an unfair advantage, neither the share given to the masters, nor the slaves' share, nor the foreigners', but the distribution shall give the same equality of likeness to all. Each citizen shall take two shares and have control over distributing them to slaves and free men, in whatever quantity and of whatever quality he chooses. The surplus beyond this must be distributed by weight and number as follows: the owner must take the number of all the animals that are to be fed from the produce of the land, and distribute accordingly. Next, the citizens must have dwellings arranged separately. The following arrangement will suit them. There should be twelve villages, one in the middle of each of the twelve districts. In each village we shall first set apart temples and a marketplace for the gods and demigods; and if there are any local deities of the Magnesians, or shrines of other ancient gods whose memory is still preserved, we shall pay them the same worship that the people of old did. Everywhere we shall build temples to Hestia, Zeus and Athena, and to whatever other deity is the patron of the district concerned. First, buildings shall be put up around these temples, wherever the ground is highest, to form a stronghold for the garrison, as well fortified as possible. All the rest of the land we shall provide for by dividing the craftsmen into thirteen sections. One of these shall settle in the city, and this section shall in turn be subdivided into twelve parts, like the whole city itself, and distributed around it in the suburbs; and in each village we shall settle the kinds of craftsmen who are useful to farmers. The chiefs of the land-stewards shall supervise all of these, determining how many and which craftsmen each place needs, and where they shall live so as to cause the least trouble and be of the greatest use to the farmers.

849a–849e

Athenian: In the same way, the board of city-stewards shall carefully supervise the craftsmen in the city. All matters concerning the markets must be managed by the market-stewards. Besides supervising the temples next to the market, to prevent any damage being done to them, their second duty shall be to supervise personal conduct, keeping an eye on restrained and outrageous behavior, so as to punish whoever needs punishment. They shall watch over the goods offered for sale, to make sure that the sales the citizens are directed to make to foreigners are always conducted lawfully. There shall be this one law: on the first day of the month, the managers, that is, the foreigners or slaves who act as managers for the citizens, shall bring out the portion of the goods that is to be sold to foreigners. The first commodity shall be the twelfth share of grain, and at this first market the foreigner shall buy grain, and everything that goes with it, for the whole month. On the tenth day of the month, enough liquids to last the whole month shall be sold by the one party and bought by the other. Third, on the 20th day, there shall be a sale of livestock, as much as each party needs to buy or sell, and also of all the utensils or goods the farmers have for sale, such as skins or any kind of clothing, woven material, felt, or other such material; and the foreigners must obtain these by buying them from others. But neither these goods, nor barley or wheat ground into flour, nor any other kind of food whatever, may be sold by retail to the citizens or their slaves, nor may anyone buy them from any such retailer. (In the foreigners' market, however, a foreigner may sell wine and grain to the craftsmen and their slaves, by what is generally called retail trade.) The butchers shall cut up the animals and sell the meat to the foreigners, the craftsmen and their servants. Any foreigner who wishes may buy any kind of fuel in bulk, on any day, from the managers in the districts, and he may sell it to the foreigners in whatever quantity and at whatever time he likes. All other goods and utensils that each party needs shall be brought for sale to the public market, each kind to its appointed place, wherever the Law-wardens and market-stewards, with the help of the city-stewards, have marked out suitable sites and set up the stalls for goods on sale. There they shall exchange money for goods and goods for money, and no one shall hand over his part to the other without receiving its equivalent;

849e–850d

Athenian: and if anyone does hand it over in this way, on credit, he must make the best of his bargain, whether or not he recovers what is owed him, since in such transactions he can no longer sue. If a purchase or sale is larger or more costly than is allowed by the law that states the limits of increase or decrease of property beyond which both of these transactions are forbidden, the amount of the difference must at once be registered with the Law-wardens in the case of an excess, and canceled in the case of a deficiency. The same rule shall apply to the registration of property in the case of resident aliens. Anyone who wishes may take up residence as an alien on fixed terms, since residence is permitted to a foreigner who is willing and able to live here, provided that he has a craft and stays in the country no more than twenty years from the date of his registration. He shall pay no aliens' tax, not even a small one, except good conduct, nor any other tax on any buying or selling; and when his time has expired, he shall leave, taking his own property with him. If, during those twenty years, he happens to have proved his merit by doing some notable service to the State, and if he believes he can persuade the Council and the Assembly to grant his request and authorize a postponement of his departure, or even permission to stay for life, then whatever he succeeds in persuading the State to grant him shall be carried out for him in full. For the children of resident aliens who are craftsmen and over fifteen years of age, the period of residence shall begin from their fifteenth year. Such a person, after staying for twenty years from that point, shall go wherever he likes; or if he wishes to remain, he may do so after obtaining permission in the same way. Whoever leaves shall go only after first canceling the entries he previously made in the register at the magistrates' office.

853a–853b

Athenian: The method of our legislation requires us to deal next with the judicial proceedings connected with all the transactions described so far. We have already stated some of the matters that call for such proceedings (namely, those concerning farming and all the industries that depend on it), but we have not yet stated the most important of them. So our next step must be to state them in full, setting out in detail what penalty must attach to each offense and before what court it must be tried.

853b

Clinias: True. Athenian: In a sense, it is a shameful thing to make all the laws we are now proposing to make in a State like ours, which, as we say, is to be well managed and supplied with everything that is right for the practice of virtue. In such a State, merely to suppose that some citizen will grow up to share in the worst forms of depravity practiced in other States, so that one has to forestall and denounce by law the appearance of any such character, and to enact laws against such people to warn them off or punish them, as though they were certain to appear, is, as I said, shameful in a sense. But we are not now legislating as the ancient lawgivers did, for heroes and sons of gods, when, as the story goes, both the lawgivers themselves and their subjects were men of divine descent. We, on the contrary, are only mortal men legislating for the seed of men, and so we may be permitted to fear that one of our citizens might turn out horn-hearted, with a temper so hard that it is beyond melting; and just as those horn-struck beans cannot be softened by boiling on the fire, so such men would remain unaffected by laws, however powerful. So, for the sake of these gentlemen, the first law we shall state, concerning temple robbery, will be no very gentle one, in case anyone dares to commit this crime. We should neither wish nor expect that a rightly raised citizen would catch this disease; but their servants, and foreigners and foreigners' slaves, might often make such attempts.

853d–854e

Athenian: Chiefly on their account, then, but also as a precaution against the general weakness of human nature, I will state the law about temple robbery and about all other crimes of a similar kind that are hard, if not impossible, to cure. And in keeping with the rule we have already approved, we must place before all such laws preludes that are as brief as possible. By way of argument and admonition, one might speak in the following terms to the man whom an evil desire urges on by day and wakes at night, driving him to rob some sacred object: "My good man, the evil force that now moves you and prompts you to go robbing temples is neither of human nor of divine origin. It is some impulse bred in men long ago from ancient, unexpiated wrongs, which goes around wreaking ruin, and you must guard against it with all your strength. Now learn how you must guard against it. Whenever any such intention comes over you, go to the rites that avert guilt; go as a suppliant to the shrines of the gods who lift curses; go and keep company with the men who are reputed to be virtuous. And in this way learn, partly from others and partly by teaching yourself, that every man is bound to honor what is noble and just. But shun the company of evil men completely, and do not turn back. And if, by acting this way, you find your disease grows less, well and good; but if not, regard death as the nobler course, and rid yourself of life." As we chant this prelude to those who intend all these unholy deeds that destroy civic life, we must leave the law itself unspoken for the man who obeys; but for the man who disobeys, we must let the law, following the prelude, chant aloud as follows: Whoever is caught robbing a temple, if he is a foreigner or a slave, shall have his curse branded on his forehead and on his hands, and he shall be flogged with as many lashes as the judges decree, and he shall be cast out naked beyond the borders of the country; for after paying this penalty he might perhaps be disciplined into a better life. For no penalty imposed by law aims at harm; as a rule, it produces one of two results: it makes the person who suffers it either better or less bad. But if any citizen is ever convicted of such an act (that is, of committing some great and infamous wrong against the gods, his parents, or the State), the judge shall regard him as already incurable, considering that, despite all the training and upbringing he has had from childhood, he has not held back from the worst iniquity.

854e–855e

Athenian: For him, then, the penalty is death, the least of evils; and besides, by serving as an example, he will benefit others when he himself is disgraced and removed from sight beyond the borders of the country. But his children and family, if they shun their father's ways, shall be honored, and honorable mention shall be made of them, since they have done well and bravely in leaving the ways of vice for those of virtue. It would not be fitting for the property of any such criminal to be confiscated in a State in which the allotments must always remain the same and equal in number. Anyone judged to have committed a wrong that deserves a money fine must pay the fine imposed, so long as it falls within the surplus he has left over once his allotment has been equipped, but not anything beyond that. In such cases the Law-wardens must find out the precise facts from the registers and inform the judges of the true state of each case, so that no allotment ever falls out of cultivation for lack of money. And if anyone is judged to deserve a larger fine, then, if none of his friends are willing to stand bail for him or to club together to pay the sum and set him free, we must punish him with a long imprisonment of a public kind and with measures of degradation. But no one shall be completely outlawed for any single crime, even if he is banished from the country. The punishments to be inflicted, where such punishments are required, shall be death, imprisonment, flogging, degrading forms of sitting, standing, or exposure at temples or at the outermost boundaries of the country, or money fines of the kind we have stated. In cases where the penalty is death, the judges shall be the Law-wardens together with the court made up of last year's magistrates selected by merit. For these cases, the younger lawgivers must attend to the indictments and summonses and all such matters, and the procedure involved, while it is our task to regulate by law the method of voting. The votes shall be cast openly. Before the vote, our judges shall be seated facing the plaintiff and the defendant, in a closely packed row in order of seniority, and all the citizens who have the leisure shall attend and listen attentively to the trials. The plaintiff shall make one speech first, and the defendant one speech second. After these speeches, the oldest judge shall begin with his examination of the case, reviewing in detail what has been said; and after the oldest, each of the other judges in turn must go through every point he has noticed in which either of the litigants has in any way left something out or made a mistake in his statement; and any judge who has no such criticism to make shall pass the task of examination on to his neighbor;

855e–856e

Athenian: and when the judges have confirmed those of the statements they have pronounced relevant, by affixing the seals of all the judges to the documents, they shall deposit them at the altar of Hestia. On the next day they shall assemble again at the same place and examine the case, make their pronouncements in the same way, and again set their seals on the statements. And after they have done this three times (paying full attention throughout to the evidence and the witnesses), each of the judges shall cast a sacred vote, promising by Hestia to judge justly and truly to the best of his ability; and in this way they shall bring this kind of trial to an end. After cases that concern religion come those that concern the overthrow of the constitution. Whoever enslaves the laws by making them subject to men, and makes the State subject to a faction, and acts illegally in doing all this by violence and in stirring up civil strife, must be regarded as the worst enemy of the whole State. And the man who takes no part in any of these doings but, while holding a share in the chief offices of the State, either fails to notice them or, though he notices them, fails out of cowardice to defend his country and punish them, must be counted a citizen second in badness. Every man who is worth anything at all shall inform the magistrates by bringing the plotter to trial on a charge of violent and illegal revolution. These cases shall have the same judges as the temple robbers had, the whole trial shall be conducted just as it was in their case, and the death penalty shall be imposed by a majority of votes. As a general rule, the disgrace or punishment of a father shall not pass on to his children, except in a case where not only the father but his father and grandfather before him have all been condemned on a capital charge. In such a case the State shall deport the children to their original country and State, while they keep their own property, except only the allotment with its full equipment. And from among the sons of those citizens who happen to have more than one son at least ten years old, ten shall be chosen by lot from those whom the father or the paternal or maternal grandfather has put forward, and the names of those chosen shall be sent to Delphi; and the one whom the oracle names shall be installed as holder of the allotment in the house of those who have departed—may it be with better fortune!

856e

Clinias: Very good. Athenian: Furthermore, a third general law shall be laid down concerning the judges to be employed and the manner of trial in cases where one man prosecutes another on a charge of treason. Likewise, regarding whether the offspring are to remain in their country or be expelled, this one law shall apply to the three cases of the traitor, the temple robber, and the man who destroys the laws of the State by violence. For the thief, too, whether he steals a large thing or a small one, a single law and a single legal penalty shall be enacted for all alike. First, if he loses his case and has enough property over and above his allotment to pay with, he must pay twice the value of the stolen article; if not, he must be imprisoned until he has either paid the sum or been let off by the prosecutor. And if a man loses a suit for theft from the State, he shall be released from prison once he has obtained pardon from the State or paid double the amount stolen.

857b

Clinias: How is it, Stranger, that we are ruling that it makes no difference to the thief whether what he steals is large or small, or whether the place it is stolen from is sacred or unconsecrated, or whatever other differences there may be in the way a theft is committed? Surely the lawgiver ought to match the punishment to the crime by imposing different penalties in these varying cases. Athenian: Well said, Clinias! You have run into me while I was charging full steam ahead, so to speak, and have woken me up. You have reminded me of something I had reflected on before: that none of the attempts at legislation made so far have ever been carried out correctly, as in fact we may infer from the case before us. What do I mean by this remark? It was no bad comparison when we compared all existing legislation to the doctoring of slaves by slaves. For we should note carefully that if one of the doctors who practice medicine by purely empirical methods, without any theory, were to come upon a freeborn doctor conversing with a freeborn patient, using arguments much as a philosopher would, tracing the illness from its origin and surveying the natural constitution of the human body, he would immediately burst into loud laughter, and the language he would use would be just what always comes ready to the tongue of most so-called doctors. "You fool," he would say, "you are not doctoring your patient but schooling him, so to speak, as though what he needed was to be made not a healthy man but a doctor."

857e

Clinias: And in saying so, wouldn't he be right? Athenian: Perhaps, provided he also took the view that anyone who treats laws the way we are now doing is schooling the citizens rather than legislating. Wouldn't he seem to be right in saying that, too? Clinias: Probably. Athenian: How fortunate we are in the conclusion we have now reached! Clinias: What conclusion? Athenian: This: that there is no need for us to legislate, but only to become students ourselves and try to discern, with regard to every constitution, how the best form might come about, and how the least elaborate form possible might. In fact, it seems we are now free to study, if we choose, the best form of legislation, or, if we choose, the least elaborate. So let us choose between these two.

858a–858c

Clinias: The choice we are proposing, Stranger, is an absurd one. We would be acting like legislators driven by some overpowering necessity to pass laws on the spot because they cannot do so tomorrow. But for us (God willing) it is quite possible to do what bricklayers do, or men beginning any other kind of construction: that is, to gather material piece by piece, from which we can select what suits the building we intend to put up, and, what is more, select it at our leisure. Let us assume, then, that we are not now building under compulsion, but are still at leisure, partly gathering material and partly putting it together, so that we may rightly say that our laws are in part already being built and in part still being gathered.

858c

Athenian: In this way, Clinias, our survey of laws will at any rate follow the course of nature more closely. Now, I beg you by the gods, let us consider the following point about legislators. Clinias: What point? Athenian: In our States we have not only the writings and written speeches of many other people, but also the writings and speeches of the lawgiver. Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Are we, then, to pay attention to the compositions of the others (the poets, and all who, with or without meter, have composed and recorded their advice about life) but pay no attention to those of the lawgivers? Or should we not pay attention to them above all others?

858d

Clinias: Yes, far above all. Athenian: But surely we do not mean that the lawgiver alone of all writers is not to give advice about what is noble, good, and just, teaching what these things are and how those who intend to be happy must practice them. Clinias: Of course he must do so.

858e

Athenian: Well then, is it more disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and the rest of the poets to lay down bad rules in their writings about life and its pursuits, and less disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and all the legislators who have put things in writing? Athenian: Or rather, isn't it right that, of all the writings that exist in States, those concerning laws should be found, when unrolled, to be by far the finest and best, and all other writings should either follow their model or, if they disagree with them, be held in contempt? Should we think that the written laws in our States should resemble persons moved by love and wisdom, such as a father or a mother, or that they should command and threaten like some tyrant and despot, who writes his decree on the wall and is done with it? So let us now consider whether we are going to try to discuss laws with this intention, showing zeal at any rate, whether or not we turn out to be successful; and if, in following this course, we have to meet with some mishap, so be it. Yet we pray that all may go well with us, and if God wills, it shall go well.

859b

Clinias: You are right; let us do as you say. Athenian: First of all, since we have started on it, we must examine closely the law about temple robbers and about all forms of theft and wrongdoing. And we should not be troubled by the fact that, although we have enacted some points in the course of legislating, other points are still under consideration; for we are in the process of becoming lawgivers, and may perhaps become so, but we are not lawgivers yet. So if we agree to consider the matters I have mentioned in the way I have mentioned, let us consider them that way.

859c

Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: With regard to goodness and justice as a whole, let us try to discern this: how far we now agree with ourselves and how far we differ (for we would certainly say that we want, if nothing else, at least to differ from the majority of men), and also how far the majority agree or differ among themselves.

859d

Clinias: What differences of ours do you have in mind? Athenian: I will try to explain. Concerning justice in general, and just men, things, or actions, we all agree that they are all beautiful, so that no one would be thought to be saying anything wrong even if he insisted that just men, however ugly in body, are thoroughly beautiful in respect of their supremely just character.

859e

Clinias: Wouldn't that be right? Athenian: Perhaps. But let us observe this: that if all things that belong to justice are beautiful, then for us that "all" includes what is suffered nearly as much as what is done. Clinias: Well, what of it? Athenian: Every just action, insofar as it shares in justice, partakes of beauty in practically the same degree. Clinias: Yes. Athenian: It is also agreed, if our argument is to be consistent, that a suffering that shares in justice becomes, to that extent, beautiful.

860a

Clinias: True. Athenian: But if we agree that a suffering, though just, is shameful, then justice and beauty will be at odds, since just things will be called most shameful. Clinias: What do you mean by that? Athenian: It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to command the exact opposite of what we are now saying. Clinias: What statements?

860b

Athenian: We laid it down that it is just to put to death the temple robber and the enemy of rightly enacted laws; and then, when we were about to enact a great many similar rules, we held back, because we saw that such rules involve sufferings infinite both in number and in magnitude, and that, although they are supremely just, they are also supremely shameful. So the just and the beautiful will seem to us at one moment wholly identical and at another utterly opposed, won't they? Clinias: I am afraid so.

860c

Athenian: That is how the many come to fling the beautiful and the just apart and to speak about them inconsistently. Clinias: It certainly seems so, Stranger. Athenian: Then, Clinias, let us look again at our own view and see how consistent it is on this point. Clinias: What kind of consistency do you mean, and with respect to what? Athenian: I believe I stated expressly in our earlier discussion—or, if I did not do so before, please assume that I now assert— Clinias: What?

860d

Athenian: That all bad men are, in every respect, bad against their will; and since this is so, our next statement must agree with it. Clinias: What statement do you mean? Athenian: This: that the unjust man is indeed bad, but the bad man is bad against his will. But it makes no sense to suppose that a voluntary act is done involuntarily; so, in the view of anyone who holds that injustice is involuntary, the man who commits an unjust act does so against his will. And I too must now accept this conclusion, for I agree that all men do unjust acts against their will. Since I hold this view, and do not share the opinion of those who, out of contentiousness or arrogance, assert that while some men are unjust against their will, there are also many who are unjust willingly, how am I to be consistent with my own statements? Suppose you two, Megillus and Clinias, put this question to me: "If this is how things stand, Stranger, what advice do you give us about legislating for the Magnesian State? Shall we legislate or not?" "Legislate by all means," I shall reply.

860e–861a

Athenian: "Will you, then, distinguish between voluntary and involuntary wrongs, and are we to enact heavier penalties for the offenses and wrongs that are voluntary and lighter ones for the others? Or shall we enact equal penalties for all, on the view that there is no such thing as a voluntary act of injustice?"

861a

Clinias: What you say is quite right, Stranger. So what use are we to make of the arguments we are now presenting? Athenian: A very proper question! The first use we shall make of them is this— Clinias: What? Athenian: Let us recall how, a moment ago, we rightly said that on the subject of justice we are suffering from the greatest confusion and inconsistency. Keeping this fact in mind, let us question ourselves again. We are perplexed about these matters: we have neither cleared up our perplexity nor defined the point of difference between those two kinds of wrongdoing, the voluntary and the involuntary, which every legislator who has ever appeared treats as legally distinct in every State. Given this, is the statement we made just now to stand like a divine oracle, as a mere ex cathedra pronouncement unsupported by any proof, and to serve as a kind of master enactment? That is impossible. Before we legislate, we are bound first to make it clear somehow that these wrongs are of two kinds, and in what their difference consists, so that when we impose the penalty on either kind, everyone may follow our rules and be able to form some judgment about whether our enactments are suitable or not.

861c–861d

Clinias: What you say, Stranger, seems excellent to us. We ought to do one of two things: either not assert that all unjust acts are involuntary, or else first make our distinctions and then prove that this assertion is correct.

861d

Athenian: Of these alternatives, the first, not asserting what I hold to be the truth, is quite intolerable to me, for that would be neither lawful nor pious. But as for the question of how such acts are of two kinds: if the difference does not lie in the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary, then we must try to explain it by some other distinction. Clinias: Well, certainly, Stranger, there is no other plan we can possibly adopt on this matter.

861e

Athenian: So it shall be. Come now: in the dealings and interactions of citizens with one another, injuries committed by one against another happen often, and there is plenty of the voluntary as well as of the involuntary in them. Clinias: Of course! Athenian: No one should classify all injuries as acts of injustice and then regard the unjust acts involved as being of two kinds in the way described, namely, partly voluntary and partly involuntary (for the involuntary injuries, taken all together, are no fewer and no smaller than the voluntary ones). Instead, consider whether what I am about to say makes sense or is complete nonsense. What I assert, Megillus and Clinias, is not that if one man harms another involuntarily and without wishing to, he acts unjustly, though involuntarily. Nor shall I legislate in that way, declaring this to be an involuntary act of injustice. Rather, I shall declare that such an injury is not an injustice at all, whether the injury is greater or smaller. And if my view prevails, we shall often say that a man who confers a benefit in the wrong way commits an injustice. For as a rule, my friends, neither when a man gives some material object to another, nor when he takes it away, should one call such an act simply just or unjust. What matters is whether a man of just character and disposition benefits or injures another; that is what the lawgiver must look at. He must consider these two things, injustice and injury. The injury inflicted he must make good by legal means as far as possible: he must preserve what is lost, restore what has been knocked down, and make whole what has been wounded or killed. And when the various injuries have been atoned for by compensation, he must always try, by means of the laws, to bring those who have inflicted them and those who have suffered them from a state of discord into a state of friendship.

862c

Clinias: He will be right to do that. Athenian: As for unjust injuries and gains (as when one man causes another to gain by acting unjustly toward him), all such cases as are curable we must cure, regarding them as diseases of the soul. And we should declare that our cure for injustice points in this direction— Clinias: What direction?

862d–862e

Athenian: In this: that whenever anyone commits an unjust act, great or small, the law shall instruct him and absolutely compel him, in addition to paying for the injury, either never again to dare to do such a deed willingly or else to do it very much less often. To achieve this, whether by action or by speech, by means of pleasures and pains, honors and dishonors, money fines and money gifts, and in general by whatever means one can use to make men hate injustice and love justice (or at any rate not hate it)—this is precisely the task of the noblest laws. But for all those whom the lawgiver perceives to be incurable in these respects, what penalty and what law shall he enact?

862e–863a

Athenian: The lawgiver will recognize that in all such cases it is not only better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but that they will also be of double benefit to others by departing from life, since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly and rid the State of wicked men. So in cases of this kind, and of this kind only, he will necessarily impose death as the punishment for their sins.

863a

Clinias: What you have said seems very reasonable; but we would be glad to hear a still clearer explanation of the difference between injury and injustice, and of how the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary applies in these cases. Athenian: I must try to do as you ask and explain the matter. No doubt, when you talk with one another, you say and hear at least this much about the soul: that one element in its nature (whether it is an affection or a part) is passion, an inborn quality of a contentious and combative kind, which overturns many things by its irrational force.

863b

Clinias: Of course. Athenian: Moreover, we distinguish pleasure from passion, and we say that its mastering power is of the opposite kind, since it accomplishes whatever its will desires by a mixture of persuasion and deceit. Clinias: Exactly.

863c–863d

Athenian: Nor would it be untrue to say that the third cause of sins is ignorance. The lawgiver, however, would do well to divide this cause into two. Ignorance in its simple form he should count as the cause of minor sins. Its double form arises when a man's folly comes from being gripped not only by ignorance but also by a conceit of wisdom, as though he had full knowledge of things he knows nothing at all about. When this is joined with strength and might, he should count it as the cause of great and brutal sins; when it is joined with weakness, as the cause of the sins of children and old men. These last he will count as sins, and he will enact laws for those who commit them as for sinners, but laws that will be the mildest and most merciful of all.

863d

Clinias: That is reasonable. Athenian: And practically everyone speaks of one man as being superior, and another as inferior, to pleasure or to passion; and so they are. Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: But we have never heard anyone say that one man is superior, and another inferior, to ignorance.

863e

Clinias: Quite true. Athenian: And we say that all these things often drive each man to go against the actual bent of his own inclination. Clinias: Very often. Athenian: Now I will define for you, clearly and without complication, what I mean by justice and injustice. The domination of passion, fear, pleasure, pain, envies, and desires in the soul, whether or not it does any injury, I call injustice in every case. But as for the belief in the highest good, in whatever way either States or individuals think they can attain it: if this prevails in their souls and governs every man, then even if some harm is done, we must say that everything done in this way is just, and that the part of each man that is subject to this rule is also just and best for the whole life of mankind, although most people suppose that such harm is an involuntary injustice. But we are not concerned now with a dispute over words. Since, however, it has been shown that there are three kinds of sin, we must first recall these to mind still more clearly. One kind, as we know, is painful, and this we call passion and fear.

864b

Clinias: Quite so. Athenian: The second kind consists of pleasure and desires; the third, which is a distinct kind, consists of hopes and untrue belief about the attainment of the highest good. And when this last kind is divided into three, five classes result, as we now say; and for these five classes we must enact distinct laws of two main types.

864c

Clinias: What are they? Athenian: One type concerns acts done in each case by violent and open means; the other, acts done secretly under cover of darkness and deceit, or sometimes acts done in both these ways. For acts of this last kind the laws will be most severe, if they are to be adequate. Clinias: Naturally. Athenian: Let us next go back to the point from which we digressed, and continue enacting our laws. We had, I believe, laid down the laws dealing with those who rob the gods and with traitors, and also with those who destroy the laws with the intent of overthrowing the existing constitution. A man might commit an act of this kind while insane, or while suffering from some disease or from extreme old age, or in a state of childishness that makes him no better than a madman. If any case of this kind is ever brought to the attention of the selected judges, either on the information of the person who did the act or of someone pleading on his behalf, and if it is judged that he was in this state of madness when he broke the law, then he shall certainly pay for the damage he has done, but only the exact amount, and he shall be cleared of the other charges—unless he has killed a man and has not cleansed his hands of the blood. In that case he shall go away to another country and place and live there in exile for a year; and if he returns before the time fixed by the law, or sets foot anywhere at all in his own country, the Law-wardens shall put him in the public jail for two years, and he shall not be released from jail until after that time.

865a–865e

Athenian: Now that we have made a beginning, we need not hesitate to enact laws on similar lines about every class of homicide. First we shall deal with the cases that are violent and involuntary. If a man unintentionally kills a friend in a contest or in public games, whether death is immediate or follows later from the wounds; or similarly, if he kills him in war or in some military training exercise, whether practicing javelin work without armor or engaged in some warlike maneuver in heavy armor, then once he has been purified as the Delphic rule on this matter directs, he shall be regarded as pure. So too with all doctors: if a patient dies against the will of his doctor, the doctor shall be regarded as legally pure. And if one man kills another with his own hand, but involuntarily—whether with his own unarmed body, or with a tool or a weapon, or by giving a drink or solid food, or by applying fire or cold, or by depriving him of air, and whether he does it himself with his own body or by means of other bodies—in all cases it shall be regarded as his own personal act, and he shall pay the following penalties. If he kills a slave, he shall protect the master from damage and loss, treating the matter as though it were a slave of his own that had been destroyed; or else he shall be liable to a penalty of double the value of the dead man, and the judges shall assess that value. He must also use purifications greater and more numerous than those used by persons who kill a man at the games, and the interpreters whom the oracle names shall be in charge of these rites. But if it is a slave of his own that he has killed, he shall be cleared after the legal purification. And if anyone kills a free man involuntarily, he shall undergo the same purifications as the man who has killed a slave; and there is an ancient tale, told long ago, which he must not fail to heed. The tale is this: that the man slain by violence, who has lived with a free and proud spirit, is angry with his slayer when newly slain; and being filled also with fear and horror on account of his own violent end, he is horror-stricken when he sees his murderer going about in the very places he himself used to frequent; and being disturbed himself, he takes conscience as his ally and with all his might disturbs his slayer, both the man himself and his doings. That is why it is right for the slayer to withdraw before his victim for a full year, through all its seasons, and to vacate all the places he owned in every part of his native land;

865e–866e

Athenian: and if the dead man is a Stranger, the slayer shall also be barred from the Stranger's country for the same period. If a man willingly obeys this law, the nearest relative of the dead man, who oversees the performance of all these rules, shall pardon him and live at peace with him, and in doing so he will be acting with perfect propriety. But if a man disobeys, and first of all dares to approach the altars and offer sacrifice while still unpurified, and further refuses to complete the appointed periods of exile, then the nearest relative of the dead man shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and if he is convicted, all the penalties shall be doubled. And if the nearest relative fails to prosecute for the crime, it shall be as though the pollution had passed over to him, since the victim is demanding atonement for his fate; anyone who wishes shall bring a charge against him and compel him by law to leave his country for five years. And if a Stranger involuntarily kills a Stranger who is living in the State, anyone who wishes shall prosecute him under the same laws. If he is a resident alien, he shall be exiled for a year; while if he is altogether a Stranger, then, whether the man slain is a Stranger, a resident alien, or a citizen, in addition to the purifications imposed, he shall be barred for life from the country that ordains these laws. If he breaks the law and comes back to it, the Law-wardens shall punish him with death, and if he has any property, they shall hand it over to the nearest relative of the victim. And if he comes back unwillingly, then if he is shipwrecked off the coast of the country, he shall camp with his feet in the sea and watch for a ship to take him away; or if he is brought in forcibly by some people over land, the first magistrate of the State who comes across him shall release him and send him out over the border unharmed. If a person kills a free man with his own hand, and the deed is done in passion, we must begin in a case of this kind by distinguishing two varieties of the crime. For murder is committed in passion by those who suddenly, and without intending to kill, destroy a man by blows or some such means in an immediate attack, when the deed is at once followed by remorse; and it is also murder done in passion whenever men who have been insulted by shameful words or actions seek revenge, and end by killing a man with the deliberate intent to kill, and feel no remorse for the deed.

866e–867c

Athenian: It seems we must lay it down that these murders are of two kinds, both generally done in passion, and most properly described as lying midway between the voluntary and the involuntary. Nevertheless, each kind tends to resemble one or the other of these opposites. The man who nurses his passion and takes revenge, not suddenly on the spur of the moment but after some time has passed and with deliberate intent, resembles the voluntary murderer; whereas the man who does not hoard his rage but gives way to it at once, on the spur of the moment and without deliberate intent, is like the involuntary murderer. Yet even he is not wholly involuntary; he only bears a resemblance to the involuntary. So murders done in passion are hard to define, as regards whether one should treat them in law as voluntary or involuntary. The best and truest way is to classify both as resemblances, to distinguish them by the mark of deliberate intent or its absence, and to impose more severe penalties on those who kill with intent and in anger, and milder penalties on those who do so without intent and suddenly. For what resembles a greater evil must be punished more heavily, and what resembles a lesser evil more lightly. So our laws, too, must do likewise.

867c

Clinias: They must, most certainly. Athenian: Returning, then, to our task, let us make this pronouncement: If a man kills a free man with his own hand, and the deed is done in anger without deliberate intent, he shall suffer the other penalties that are appropriate for a man who has killed without passion, and he shall be compelled to go into exile for two years, and in this way chastise his own passion. And the man who kills in passion and with deliberate intent shall be treated in other respects like the former, but shall be exiled for three years instead of the other's two, receiving a longer period of punishment because of the greatness of his passion. As for the return home in such cases, it shall be as follows. (It is a difficult matter to legislate for precisely; for sometimes, of the two murderers, the one the law treats as more dangerous may prove the gentler, and the gentler one the more dangerous, and the latter may have committed the murder more savagely and the former more gently; although as a rule things turn out the way we have stated. So the Law-wardens must act as supervisors in all these matters.) When the period of exile in each case has ended, the Law-wardens must send twelve of their number to the borders of the country to act as judges, after they have made a still closer investigation in the meantime into the conduct of the exiles;

867e–868e

Athenian: and these men shall also act as judges on the question of granting them pardon and readmitting them; and the exiles must abide by the verdicts of these magistrates. And if either of them, after his return, again gives way to rage and commits the same act, he shall be exiled and never return again; and if he does return, he shall suffer the same fate as the Stranger who returns. Whoever kills a slave of his own shall purify himself; and if he kills another man's slave in rage, he shall pay the owner twice the damage. And if any of these kinds of killers disobeys the law and, while unpurified, defiles the market, the games, and the other sacred gatherings, anyone who wishes shall prosecute both the member of the dead man's family who permits this and the killer himself, and shall compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, double the amount of the money fines and of the other penalties; and the prosecutor shall keep the sum so paid for himself, as the law directs. If a slave kills his own master in rage, the relatives of the dead man may treat the killer however they please—except that they must not in any way let him live—and they shall be held guiltless. And if a slave kills a free man other than his master in rage, the slave's masters shall hand him over to the relatives of the dead man, and they shall be required to put the criminal to death, in whatever manner they choose. If in a fit of rage a father or mother kills a son or daughter by blows or some other kind of violence (something that happens rarely, but does sometimes happen), the killer must undergo the same purifications as the other killers and be exiled for three years. When the killers have returned, the wife must be separated from the husband and the husband from the wife, and they must never again have a child together; nor shall they ever share a home with those whom the killer has robbed of a child or a brother, nor take part in their worship. Anyone who is disobedient and impious in this matter shall be liable to a charge of impiety brought by anyone who wishes. And if a husband in a fit of rage kills his wedded wife, or a wife does the same to her husband, they must undergo the same purifications and remain in exile for three years. And when one who has committed such a crime returns, he shall never take part in worship with his children or sit at table with them; and if either the parent or the child disobeys, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety brought by anyone who wishes.

868e–869e

Athenian: And if in rage a brother kills a brother or a sister, or a sister kills a brother or a sister, let it be declared that they must undergo the same purifications and banishment as have been prescribed for parents and children: namely, that the killer shall never share a home or worship with those brothers or parents whom he has robbed of brothers or of children. And if anyone disobeys, he will rightly and justly be liable under the law laid down concerning such cases of impiety. If any man falls into such an uncontrollable rage against his parents that he actually dares to kill one of them in the madness of his rage, then, if the dead person, before dying, voluntarily releases the culprit from the charge of murder, he shall be held pure once he has purified himself in the same way as those who have committed an involuntary homicide and has done as they do in all other respects. But if the dead person does not release him in this way, then whoever has done such a deed is liable under many laws: he will be liable to the heaviest penalties for outrage, and likewise for impiety and temple robbery, since he has robbed his parent of life. So if it were possible for one man to die a hundred deaths, it would be a most just fate for a parricide or a matricide who committed the deed in rage to suffer a hundred deaths. For every law will forbid a man to kill his father or mother, the very authors of his existence, even to save his own life, and will require that he suffer and endure anything rather than commit such an act. In what other way, then, can such a man be fittingly dealt with by law and receive what he deserves? Let it be enacted, therefore, that for the man who in rage kills his father or mother, the penalty is death. If a brother kills a brother in a fight during a civil war, or in some similar way, acting in self-defense against the other, who started the fight, he shall be regarded as one who has killed an enemy and shall be held guiltless; so too when a citizen kills a citizen in the same way, or a Stranger a Stranger. And if a citizen kills a Stranger in self-defense, or a Stranger a citizen, he shall be regarded as pure in the same way. So also if a slave kills a slave; but if a slave kills a free man in self-defense, he shall be liable to the same laws as one who kills his father. And what has been said about releasing a man from the charge in the case of the murder of a father shall hold equally good in all such cases: if anyone voluntarily releases any culprit from this charge, the purifications for the culprit shall be performed as though the homicide were involuntary, and one year of exile shall be imposed by law. Let this be taken as an adequate statement about homicides that involve violence and are involuntary and done in passion. After these, we must state the regulations concerning such acts when they are voluntary, involve iniquity of every kind, and are premeditated—acts caused by giving in to pleasure, desire, or envy.

869e

Clinias: You are right. Athenian: First, let us once more state, as best we can, how many these causes are likely to be. The greatest is desire, which masters a soul made savage by cravings. It arises especially in connection with the object for which the most frequent and intense longing afflicts the majority of people: the power that wealth has over them, owing to their bad nature and lack of culture, to breed in them countless cravings for its insatiable and endless acquisition. And the cause of this lack of culture lies in the false praise of wealth in the common talk of both Greeks and barbarians; for by exalting it as the first of goods, when it should come only third, they ruin both their descendants and themselves. The noblest and best course of all, in every State, is to state the truth about wealth: namely, that it exists for the sake of the body, and the body for the sake of the soul, so that, while the things for which it naturally exists are goods, wealth itself will come third, after excellence of body and of soul. So this statement will serve as an instructor, teaching that the man who intends to be happy must seek not to be wealthy, but to be wealthy in a just and self-controlled way; and if this were so, no murders requiring purification by murders would occur in States. But as things now stand, this love of riches is, as we said when we began this subject, one cause, and a very great one, that produces the most serious trials for willful murder. A second cause is the disposition of the ambitious soul, which breeds envies that are dangerous companions, first for the man who feels the envy himself, and then also for the best citizens in the State. Third, fears bred of cowardice and iniquity have caused many murders, in cases where men are doing or have done things they want no one to share the secret of; so if there are any who might reveal their secret, they get rid of them by death whenever they cannot do so by any other means. Concerning all these matters, let the preludes mentioned be pronounced; and, in addition to them, the story that many believe when they hear it from those who seriously relate such things at their mystic rites: that vengeance for such acts is exacted in Hades, and that those who come back to this earth are bound to pay the natural penalty—each culprit, that is, the same penalty he inflicted on his victim—and to end their life on earth by meeting a similar fate at the hands of another.

870e–871e

Athenian: For the man who obeys and fully dreads such a penalty, there is no need to add the law on the subject to the prelude; but for the disobedient, let this law be stated in the written code: Whoever, with deliberate intent and unjustly, kills any of his fellow tribesmen with his own hand shall, in the first place, be barred from the lawful gatherings, and shall not defile temples, market, harbors, or any other place of assembly, whether or not anyone warns the doer of such deeds away; for the law warns him away, and it does so, and always will continue to do so, publicly on behalf of the whole State. And any relative of the dead man, on either the male or the female side, no more distant than a cousin, who fails to prosecute him when he ought to, or fails to warn him that he is barred in this way, shall, first, take upon himself the pollution and the anger of the gods, since the curse of the law brings upon him the curse of the divine voice as well; and, second, he shall be liable to prosecution by anyone who wishes to punish him on behalf of the dead man. And whoever wishes to punish him shall duly perform everything concerning the observance of the purifications proper for these cases, and whatever else the god prescribes as lawful in them, and he shall recite the proclamation of warning; and then he shall go and compel the culprit to submit to the execution of the penalty according to law. It is easy for the lawgiver to show that these proceedings must be accompanied by certain prayers and sacrifices to those gods whose concern it is that murders should not occur in States. Who these gods are, and what method of bringing such prosecutions would be most correct in point of ritual, the Law-wardens shall ordain together with the interpreters and seers and the god; and so they shall bring these prosecutions. And the judges in these cases shall be the same persons who, as we described, form the court of final decision for temple robbers. Whoever is convicted shall be punished with death, and he shall not be buried in the victim's country, because of the shamelessness as well as the impiety of his act. If the culprit flees and refuses to stand trial, he shall be exiled forever; and if any such person sets foot in the murdered man's country, whichever of the dead man's relatives or of the citizens first comes across him shall kill him with impunity, or else bind him and hand him over to the magistrates who judged the case, to be put to death. The prosecutor in a murder charge must at once demand bail from the defendant, and the defendant shall provide three substantial sureties, approved by the court of judges for such cases, who guarantee to produce him at the trial; and if a man is unwilling or unable to provide these sureties, the court must take him, bind him, and keep him in custody, and produce him at the trial of the case.

872a–872e

Athenian: If a man does not kill another with his own hand, but plots his death, and after killing him by design and plotting goes on living in the State, being responsible for the murder and not innocent or pure of heart in respect of it, then the prosecutions on this charge shall proceed in the same way in his case, except in the matter of bail. The convicted person shall be allowed burial in his own country, but everything else shall be carried out in his case in the same way as in the case just described. And these same regulations shall govern all cases where Strangers go to law with Strangers, or citizens and Strangers with each other, or slaves with slaves, concerning both actual murder and plotting to murder, except as regards bail. As to bail, just as it has been said that those who kill with their own hand must provide guarantors, so these persons too must provide security to the person who proclaims the murder. If a slave willfully kills a free man, either with his own hand or by plotting, and is convicted at the trial, the public executioner of the State shall drag him toward the tomb of the dead man, to a spot from which he can see the tomb, and there flog him with as many lashes as the prosecutor prescribes; and if the murderer is still alive after the beating, the executioner shall put him to death. And if anyone kills a slave who has done nothing wrong, out of fear that the slave might expose his own foul and evil deeds, or for some other such reason, he shall be liable for the death of such a slave in the same way that he would have been liable to a charge of murder for killing a citizen. Suppose cases occur for which it is a terrible and most unwelcome task to legislate, and yet impossible not to legislate: murders of kinsfolk, whether by a man's own hand or by plotting, that are wholly willful and wicked—crimes that occur mostly in States where government and upbringing are bad, but may occasionally occur even in a country where one would not expect them. In such cases we must again recite the story we told a moment ago, in the hope that someone who hears us may, as a result, become more inclined to abstain voluntarily from murders of the most impious kind. The myth or story (or whatever one should call it) has been clearly handed down from ancient priests: that Justice, the avenger of kindred blood, acting as overseer, employs the law just mentioned and has ordained that whoever does such a deed must necessarily suffer the same thing he has done. If a man has ever killed his father, he must in time to come endure suffering the same violent fate at the hands of his own children; or if he has killed his mother, he must necessarily be born sharing in the female nature, and once born, be deprived of life at the hands of his offspring in later days;

872e–873e

Athenian: for there is no other purification for the pollution of shared blood, and the stain of pollution cannot be washed away until the soul that committed the act pays back murder for murder, like for like, and by this atonement lays to rest the anger of the whole family. So a man should restrain himself out of dread of such vengeance from Heaven. If, however, any should be overtaken by a misfortune so wretched that they have the audacity, deliberately and of their own free will, to tear the soul from the body of a father, mother, brothers, or children, then in such cases the ordinance of the law of the mortal lawgiver stands as follows: The warnings of exclusion from customary places, and the sureties, shall be the same as those prescribed for the earlier cases. And if anyone is convicted of such a murder, that is, of having killed any of the persons named, the officers of the judges and the magistrates shall kill him and cast him out naked at an appointed crossroads outside the city; and all the magistrates, acting on behalf of the whole State, shall each take a stone and throw it at the head of the corpse, and so make atonement for the whole State; and after this they shall carry the corpse to the borders of the land and cast it out unburied, according to law. Now what penalty should a man suffer who kills the one who is, as people say, nearest and dearest of all? I mean the man who kills himself, violently robbing himself of his share of life ordained by Fate, when this is not legally ordered by the State, and when he is not compelled to it by being struck by some intolerable and inescapable misfortune, nor by falling into some disgrace that is beyond remedy or endurance, but who simply imposes this unjust penalty on himself out of sloth and unmanly cowardice. In this case, the remaining matters, concerning the rules for rites of purification and burial, fall within the knowledge of the god, and on these the nearest relatives must seek information from the interpreters and from the laws dealing with these matters, and act in accordance with their instructions. But for those who have perished in this way, the tombs shall, first, be set apart, with not even one grave beside them; and, second, they shall be buried in those border areas of the twelve districts that are barren and nameless, without honor, with neither headstone nor name to mark the tombs. If a mule or any other animal kills anyone—except when it does so while taking part in a public competition—the relatives shall prosecute the killer for murder, and such land-stewards, and as many of them, as the relatives appoint shall decide the case; and the convicted beast they shall kill and cast out beyond the borders of the country.

873e–874e

Athenian: If a lifeless thing deprives a man of life—unless it is lightning or some other bolt from heaven—if it is anything other than these that kills someone, either by his falling against it or by its falling on him, then the relative shall appoint the nearest neighbor to pass judgment on it, and so make atonement on behalf of himself and his whole family; and the thing convicted they shall cast beyond the borders, as was stated in the case of animals. If anyone is found clearly dead, and his killer is unknown and cannot be discovered after a careful search, the warnings shall be the same as in the other cases, including the warning of death to the doer of the deed; and the prosecutor, once he has proved his claim, shall give public warning in the marketplace to the killer of So-and-so, convicted of murder, not to set foot in holy places or anywhere in the victim's country, since, if he appears and is recognized, he shall be put to death and cast out of the victim's country without burial. Let this stand, then, as one section of our code of law dealing with murder. So far we have dealt with crimes of the kind described; in what follows we shall describe the cases and circumstances in which the killer will rightly be declared guiltless. If a man catches and kills a thief who is entering his house at night to steal goods, he shall be guiltless; and if a man kills a street robber in self-defense, he shall be guiltless. Whoever rapes a free woman or boy may be killed with impunity by the person so violently outraged, or by that person's father, brothers, or sons. And if a man discovers his wedded wife being raped and kills the rapist, he shall be guiltless before the law. And if a man kills anyone while warding off death from his father (when the father is doing no wrong), or from his mother, children, brothers, or the mother of his children, he shall be wholly guiltless. Let this be laid down by law, then, concerning the nurture and training of living souls—training which, when gained, makes life livable, and when missed, unlivable—and concerning the punishments that ought to be imposed in cases of violent death. The regulations regarding the nurture and training of the body have been stated; but what comes next, namely acts of violence, both voluntary and involuntary, done by one person to another, we must define as clearly as we can, stating their character and number and what punishment each duly deserves. Such enactments, it seems, will rightly follow those that came before. Next after cases of death, even the least competent of those who attempt legislation would place cases of wounds and maiming. Wounds, just like murders, must be classified under several heads: the involuntary, those done in passion, those done in fear, and all those that are voluntary and deliberate.

874e–875e

Athenian: Concerning all such cases we must make a preliminary pronouncement to this effect: It is truly necessary for men to make laws for themselves and to live according to laws; otherwise they will differ in no way from the most savage of beasts. The reason for this is that no man's nature is naturally capable both of perceiving what benefits the civic life of human beings and, having perceived it, of being both able and willing to put the best into practice. For, in the first place, it is difficult to perceive that a true political art must necessarily care for the public interest, not the private (for the public interest binds States together, while the private interest tears them apart), and to perceive also that it benefits both the public and the private interest alike when the public interest, rather than the private, is well established. And, second, even if a man fully grasps the truth of this as a principle of the art, should he afterward gain control of the State and become an unaccountable autocrat, he would never be able to abide by this view and go on always fostering the public interest in the State as the thing of first importance, with the private interest following as secondary. Instead, his mortal nature will always drive him toward greed and self-interested action, irrationally avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure; it will put both these ahead of justice and goodness, and by creating darkness within itself it will fill both itself and the whole State to the utmost with every kind of evil. Yet if a man should ever arise who was competent by nature, and by a birthright of divine grace, to take on such an office, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for no law or ordinance is more powerful than Knowledge, nor is it right for Reason to be subject or enslaved to anything; it should be master of all things, if it is truly genuine and really free by nature. But as it is, such a nature exists nowhere at all, except to a small degree; so we must choose what is second best, namely ordinance and law, which see and discern the general principle but are unable to see every instance in detail. This declaration has been made for the sake of what follows. Now we shall ordain what a man who has wounded another, or injured him in some way, must suffer or pay. And here, of course, anyone may interrupt us on any case, and quite properly, with the question, "What wounds has the man you speak of inflicted, and on whom, and how, and when?" For cases of wounding are countless in their variety and differ enormously from one another. So it is impossible for us either to entrust all these cases to the law courts for trial or to entrust none of them.

875e–876a

Athenian: Yet in all of them there is one point that we must necessarily entrust to the courts for decision: the question of fact, whether or not each of the alleged acts took place. And it is practically impossible for the lawgiver to refuse in every case to entrust to the courts the question of what penalty or fine the culprit should suffer or pay, and to legislate himself on all such cases, great and small.

876a

Clinias: What, then, is our next statement to be? Athenian: This: that some matters are to be entrusted to the courts, while others are not to be entrusted to them but enacted by the lawgiver. Clinias: Which matters are to be enacted, and which are to be handed over to the law courts for decision? Athenian: The best thing will be to say the following next. In a State where the courts are worthless and voiceless, and decide their cases in secret, concealing their own opinions, or (what is still more dangerous) where they make their decisions not in silence but full of uproar, like theaters, roaring out praise or blame of each speaker in turn—then, as a rule, the whole State faces a grave situation. To be compelled by some necessity to legislate for law courts of this kind is no happy task; but when one is so compelled, one must entrust to them the right to fix penalties in only a very few cases, and deal with most cases oneself by express legislation, if indeed one ever legislates at all for a State of that description. On the other hand, in a State where the courts are as well constituted as possible, and those who are to be judges are well trained and very strictly tested, there it is right, and most fitting and proper, to entrust to such judges the decision of most questions about what penalties convicted criminals should suffer or pay. On the present occasion we may well be pardoned if we refrain from laying down by law for them the most important and most numerous points, which even poorly educated judges could discern, assigning to each offense the penalty merited by the wrong as suffered and as committed. And since we suppose that the people for whom we are legislating are likely to become by no means the least capable judges of such matters, we must entrust most of them to them. Nevertheless, the course we frequently adopted, in both word and deed, when laying down our earlier laws—stating an outline and typical cases of punishment, and giving the judges examples, so that they would never overstep the bounds of justice—was a perfectly right course then, and we ought to adopt it now as well, as we return at last to the task of legislation.

876e–877e

Athenian: So let our written law concerning wounding run as follows: If anyone, deliberately intending to kill a person who is friendly (other than one against whom the law sends him), wounds him but is unable to kill him, the man who has so intended and inflicted the wound does not deserve pity; rather, he is to be regarded exactly as a killer and must be compelled to stand trial for murder. Yet out of respect for his escape from sheer misfortune, and for his guardian spirit, which in pity both for him and for the wounded man kept the wound of the one from proving fatal and the fortune and crime of the other from proving accursed—in gratitude to this spirit, and in compliance with it, the wounder shall be spared the death penalty, but shall be deported for life to a neighboring State, while enjoying the income of all his own possessions. If he has done damage to the wounded man, he shall pay for it in full to the injured party; the damage shall be assessed by the court that decides the case, and that court shall consist of those who would have tried the culprit for murder if the man had died of the wound he received. If, in the same way, a son deliberately wounds his parents or a slave his master, the penalty shall be death; and if a brother similarly wounds a brother or sister, or a sister wounds a brother or sister, and is convicted of deliberate wounding, the penalty shall be death. A wife who has wounded her husband, or a husband his wife, with intent to kill, shall be exiled for life. If they have sons or daughters who are still children, the guardians shall manage their property and take charge of the children as orphans; but if the children are already grown men, they shall be compelled to support their exiled parent, and they shall possess his property. If anyone overtaken by such a calamity is childless, the relatives of the exile on both sides, male and female, as far as cousins' children, shall meet and appoint an heir for the house in question, the 5040th in the State, in consultation with the Law-wardens and priests. And they shall keep in mind this principle: that no house of the 5040 belongs, by either private or public right, so much to its occupant or to his whole family as it belongs to the State; and the State must keep its own houses as holy and happy as possible.

877e–878e

Athenian: So whenever a house is both unfortunate and unholy, in that its owner leaves no children but dies, whether unmarried or married but childless, after being convicted of willful murder or of some other offense against gods or citizens for which death is the penalty expressly laid down in the law; or if any man without male offspring is exiled for life; then, in the first place, they shall be obliged to perform purifications and expiations for this house; and next, the relatives, as we said just now, must meet and, in consultation with the Law-wardens, consider which family in the State is preeminent for goodness, prosperous as well, and has several children. From the family selected they shall adopt one child as a son for the dead man's father and ancestors, and name him after one of them for the sake of the omen, with a prayer that in this way he may become for them a father of offspring, a keeper of the hearth, and a minister of holy and sacred things, and be blessed with better fortune than his (official) father. They shall establish him legally as holder of the allotment in this way, and the offender they shall leave nameless, childless, and without a share, whenever such calamities overtake him. It is not the case, it seems, that with all things one boundary directly adjoins another; where there is a neutral strip lying between the two boundaries and touching each, it will be midway between both. And that is exactly how we described action done in passion: as lying midway between involuntary and voluntary actions. So let the law concerning wounds inflicted in anger stand as follows: If a person is convicted, in the first place he shall pay double the damage if the wound proves curable, and four times the damage for incurable wounds. And if the wound is curable but causes great shame and disgrace to the wounded person, the culprit shall pay three times the damage. And whenever a person, in wounding someone, damages not only the victim but also the State, by making him incapable of helping his country against its enemies, such a person shall, in addition to the other damages, pay for the damage done to the State as well: besides his own military service, he shall also serve as a substitute for the disabled man and carry out the military duties in his place; or if he fails to do so, he shall be liable by law to prosecution for evading military service by anyone who wishes. The proper proportion of the damages payable, whether two, three, or four times the actual amount, shall be fixed by the judges who voted on the case. If a kinsman wounds a kinsman in the same way as the person just mentioned, the members of his clan and his relatives, both men and women, as far as cousins' children on both the male and the female side, shall meet and, after reaching a decision, shall hand the case over to the natural parents to assess the damages; if the assessment is disputed, the relatives on the male side shall have authority to make a binding assessment; and if they themselves are unable to do so, they shall finally refer the matter to the Law-wardens.

878e–879e

Athenian: When wounds of this kind are inflicted by children on their parents, the judges must be men over sixty years of age who have real, not merely adopted, children of their own; and if a person is convicted, they shall assess the penalty: whether such a person should be put to death, or suffer some other punishment still more severe, or perhaps one a little less severe. But none of the culprit's relatives shall act as judge, not even if he is of the full age stated in the law. If a slave wounds a free man in rage, his owner shall hand the slave over to the wounded man to treat however he pleases; and if he does not hand the slave over, he shall make good the damage in full himself. And if anyone alleges that the deed was a trick concocted by the slave in collusion with the wounded party, he shall contest the case; if he fails to win, he shall pay three times the damage, but if he wins, he shall hold the man who devised the trick with the slave liable for kidnapping. Whoever wounds another involuntarily shall pay simple damages for the harm (since no lawgiver can control fortune), and the judges shall be those designated for cases of children wounding parents; and they shall assess the proper amount of damages. All the cases we have now dealt with involve suffering caused by violence, and the whole class of cases of outrage involves violence. Regarding such cases, everyone—man, woman, and child—should hold this view: that the older is greatly more revered than the younger, both among the gods and among people who intend to live safely and happily. An outrage committed by a younger person against an older one is a shameful thing to see happening in a State, and a thing hateful to God; when a young man is beaten by an old man, it is fitting in every case that he should quietly bear the old man's anger, and so store up honor for his own old age. Therefore let the law stand as follows: Everyone shall show reverence to his elders in both deed and word. Anyone, man or woman, who is twenty years older than himself he shall regard as a father or mother and keep his hands off that person; and he shall always refrain, for the sake of the gods of birth, from laying hands on anyone of the generation old enough to have borne or fathered him. So likewise he shall keep his hands off a Stranger, whether long resident or newly arrived; he shall never venture to correct such a person with blows, either as aggressor or in self-defense. If he believes that a Stranger has shown insolent audacity in beating him and needs correction, he shall seize the man and take him before the board of city-stewards, but refrain from beating him, so that the Stranger may be far from ever daring to strike a native. And the city-stewards shall take charge of the Stranger and examine him, with due respect for the God of Strangers; and if he really appears to have beaten the native unjustly, they shall give the Stranger as many lashes of the whip as he himself inflicted, and put a stop to his foreign insolence; but if he has not acted unjustly, they shall threaten and rebuke the man who arrested him, and dismiss them both.

879e–880e

Athenian: If a man beats someone of his own age, or someone older than himself who is childless—whether it is an old man beating an old man or a young man beating a young man—the man attacked shall defend himself with his bare hands, as nature dictates, and without a weapon. But if a man over forty ventures to fight anyone, whether as aggressor or in self-defense, he shall be called a lout and a boor, and if he finds himself incurring a degrading sentence, he will be getting what he deserves. Anyone who readily listens to such exhortations will prove easy to manage; but the one who is intractable and pays no attention to the prelude will readily accept a law to this effect: If anyone beats a person who is twenty or more years older than himself, then, in the first place, whoever comes upon them, if he is neither the same age as the fighters nor younger, shall try to separate them, or else be regarded as a coward in the eyes of the law; and if he is the same age as the man assaulted or still younger, he shall defend the one who is being wronged as he would a brother or a father or an even older ancestor. Furthermore, the one who dares to strike the older man in the way described shall also be liable to a charge of outrage, and if he is convicted, he shall be imprisoned for at least a year; and if the judges set a longer period, the period so set shall be binding on him. And if a Stranger or a resident alien beats a man who is twenty or more years older than himself, the same law about help from bystanders shall be equally binding; and anyone who loses a suit of this kind, if he is a non-resident Stranger, shall be imprisoned for two years and serve out this sentence; and a resident alien who disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years, unless the court sets his penalty at a longer period. And any bystander in any of these cases of assault who fails to give help as the law prescribes shall be fined a mina if he belongs to the highest property class, fifty drachmae if he belongs to the second class, thirty drachmae if to the third, and twenty drachmae if to the fourth. And the court for such cases shall consist of the generals, taxiarchs, phylarchs, and hipparchs. Laws, it seems, are made partly for the sake of good people, to instruct them in the kind of dealings with one another that will best allow them to live together in friendship, and partly for the sake of those who have avoided education and who, being of a stubborn nature, have had no softening treatment to keep them from turning to every kind of wickedness. It is because of these people that the laws that follow have to be stated—laws the lawgiver must enact out of necessity on their account, though he wishes that the need for them may never arise.

880e–881e

Athenian: Whoever dares to lay hands on his father or mother, or on their ancestors, and to use outrageous violence, fearing neither the anger of the gods above nor that of the so-called Avengers of the underworld, but scorning the ancient and universal traditions (thinking he knows what he does not know at all), and in this way breaks the law—for such a man some extremely severe deterrent is needed. Death is not the most severe penalty; and the punishments we are told of in Hades for such offenses, although more severe than death and described with the greatest truth, nevertheless fail to deter souls like these; otherwise we would never find cases of matricide and of impiously audacious assaults on other ancestors. Consequently, the punishments inflicted on these men here, during their lifetime, for crimes of this kind must, as far as possible, fall in no way short of the punishments in Hades. So the next pronouncement shall run as follows: Whoever dares to beat his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers, unless he is afflicted with madness—in the first place, the bystander shall give help, as in the earlier cases. A resident Stranger who helps shall be invited to a front-row seat at the public games, but one who fails to help shall be banished from the country for life. A non-resident Stranger shall receive praise if he helps and blame if he does not. A slave who helps shall be set free, but if he fails to help he shall be beaten with 100 lashes of a whip by the market-stewards, if the assault occurs in the market; if it occurs in the city but outside the marketplace, the punishment shall be inflicted by the city-steward in residence; and if it occurs anywhere in the country districts, by the officers of the country-stewards. And a bystander who is a native, whether man, woman, or boy, shall in every case drive off the attacker, crying out against his impiety; and anyone who fails to drive him off shall be liable by law to the curse of Zeus, guardian god of kinship and parentage. And if a man is convicted on a charge of outrageous assault on his parents, in the first place he shall be banished for life from the city to other parts of the country, and he shall keep away from all sacred places; if he fails to keep away, the country-stewards shall punish him with lashes and in any other way they choose, and if he comes back again he shall be punished with death. And if any free man voluntarily eats or drinks or has any similar dealings with such a person, or even merely greets him when he meets him, he shall not enter any holy place, the market, or any part of the city until he has been purified, but shall regard himself as having incurred a share of contagious guilt;

881e–882c

Athenian: and if he disobeys the law and unlawfully defiles sacred things and the State, any magistrate who notices his case and fails to bring him to trial shall have this omission counted as one of the gravest charges against him at his audit. If it is a slave who strikes a free man, whether a Stranger or a citizen, the bystander shall help, or else pay the penalty fixed according to his property assessment; and the bystanders, together with the person assaulted, shall bind the slave and hand him over to the injured person; and he shall take charge of him, bind him in fetters, and give him as many lashes of the whip as he pleases, provided he does not reduce his value to the loss of his master, to whose ownership he shall then hand him over according to law. The law shall stand as follows: Whoever, being a slave, beats a free man without an order from the magistrates, his owner shall take him over in bonds from the person assaulted and shall not release him until the slave has convinced the person assaulted that he deserves to live free of bonds. The same laws shall apply to all such cases when both parties are women, or when the plaintiff is a woman and the defendant a man, or the plaintiff a man and the defendant a woman.

884a

Athenian: After cases of outrage, we shall next lay down for cases of violence a single, universally inclusive principle of law, to this effect: No one shall carry or drive off anything that belongs to others, nor shall he use any of his neighbor's goods unless he has obtained the owner's consent. All the evils mentioned above, past, present, and to come, spring from conduct of this kind. Of the remaining offenses, the gravest are the licentious and outrageous acts of the young. Outrages are most serious when they are directed against sacred things, and they are especially serious when directed against objects that are both public and holy, or partly public, being shared by the members of a tribe or of some other similar community. Athenian: Second in order, and second in gravity, come offenses against sacred objects and tombs that are private; and third, offenses against parents, when someone commits outrage against them in ways other than those already described. A fourth kind of outrage occurs when a man, in defiance of the magistrates, drives off, carries off, or uses any of their things without their consent; and a fifth kind will be an outrage against the civic rights of an individual private citizen, which calls for redress in court. To all of these, each in turn, one all-embracing law must be assigned. As for temple robbery, whether committed by open violence or in secret, we have already stated in summary what the punishment should be. But for all the outrages of word or deed that a man commits against the gods, whether with his tongue or with his hand, we must state the punishment he should suffer, after first delivering our admonition. It shall be as follows: No one who believes in the existence of the gods, as the laws prescribe, has ever yet done an impious deed voluntarily or uttered a lawless word. Anyone who acts this way is in one of three states of mind: either he does not believe in what I have just said; or, second, he believes that the gods exist but do not care about human beings; or, third, he believes that they are easy to win over when they are bribed with offerings and prayers.

885c

Clinias: Then what should we do or say to such people? Athenian: My good friend, let us first listen to what I imagine they say mockingly, in their contempt for us. Clinias: What is that? Athenian: In derision they would probably say this: "Strangers from Athens, Lacedaemon, and Knossos, what you say is true. Some of us do not believe in gods at all, while others of us believe in gods of the kinds you describe. So we now claim, just as you claimed in the matter of laws, that before you threaten us harshly, you should first try to convince and teach us, by producing adequate proofs, that gods exist, and that they are too good to be coaxed by gifts and turned aside from justice. For as things stand, this is the kind of account of them that we hear, along with others like it, from those who are reputed to be the best poets, orators, seers, and priests, and from thousands upon thousands of others. As a result, most of us, instead of trying to avoid wrongdoing, do the wrong and then try to make amends. Now from lawgivers like you, who claim to be gentle rather than severe, we ask that you deal with us first by way of persuasion. If what you say about the existence of the gods is not much better than what others say, but is at least better in truth, perhaps you might convince us. So, if you think this reasonable, try to meet our challenge."

885e–886a

Clinias: Surely, Stranger, it seems easy to state truthfully that gods exist?

886a

Athenian: How so? Clinias: First, there is the evidence of the earth, the sun, the stars, and the whole universe, and the beautiful ordering of the seasons, marked out by years and months; and then there is the further fact that all Greeks and barbarians believe that gods exist. Athenian: My dear friend, these bad men alarm me (for I will never call it awe), for fear that they may somehow scoff at us. The cause of the corruption in their case is one you are not aware of, since you imagine that it is only their lack of self-control with regard to pleasures and desires that drives their souls toward that impious life of theirs.

886b

Clinias: What other cause could there be besides this, Stranger? Athenian: One that you, who live elsewhere, could hardly know about or notice at all. Clinias: What is this cause you are now speaking of? Athenian: A very serious kind of ignorance, which is reputed to be the height of wisdom. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: We in Athens have accounts preserved in writing (though I am told that such things do not exist in your country, because of the excellence of your political system), some of them in a kind of meter and others without meter, that tell about the gods. The oldest of these accounts relate how the first substance of Heaven and of everything else came into being, and shortly after the beginning they go on to give a detailed theogony, telling how the gods, once they were born, associated with one another. Whether these accounts are good or bad for their hearers in other respects, it is hard for us to criticize them, because they are so ancient. But as regards the care and respect owed to parents, I certainly would never praise them or say that they are either helpful or entirely true. Such ancient accounts, however, we may pass over and dismiss; let them be told in whatever way is most pleasing to the gods. It is rather the novel views of our modern scientists that we must hold responsible as the cause of the harm. For the result of these people's arguments is this: when you and I try to prove the existence of the gods by pointing to these very objects, the sun, moon, stars, and earth, as instances of deity and divinity, people who have been converted by these scientists will claim that these things are simply earth and stone, incapable of paying any attention to human affairs, and that these beliefs of ours are dressed up with specious arguments to make them plausible.

886e

Clinias: The claim you mention, Stranger, is indeed a dangerous one, even if it stood alone; but now that such claims are countless, the danger is still greater. Athenian: What then? What shall we say? What must we do? Are we to make our defense as if before a court of impious men, where someone had accused us of doing something dreadful by assuming in our legislation that gods exist? Or should we rather dismiss the whole subject and turn back to our laws, so that our prelude does not turn out to be actually longer than the laws? For our discussion would grow to no small length if we were to give those men who wish to be impious an adequate demonstration, by means of argument, of the subjects that they claimed ought to be discussed, and so convert them to fear of the gods, and then finally, once we had made them shrink from irreligion, proceed to enact the appropriate laws.

887b–887c

Clinias: Even so, Stranger, we have often (considering how short a time we have been talking) made this very statement: that on the present occasion we have no need to prefer brevity of speech to length (for, as the saying goes, no one is chasing at our heels); and that to show ourselves choosing the briefest course in preference to the best would be contemptible and ridiculous. And it is of the highest importance that our arguments showing that the gods exist, and that they are good and honor justice more than human beings do, should by all means carry some degree of persuasiveness; for such a prelude is the best we could have in defense, so to speak, of all our laws. So without any reluctance or undue haste, and with all the ability we have to make such arguments persuasive, let us set them out as fully as we can, holding nothing back.

887c–887e

Athenian: This speech of yours seems to me to call for a prayer as a preface, since you are so eager and ready; nor can we put off our statement any longer. Come, then: how can one argue for the existence of the gods without anger? For we cannot help being vexed and indignant with the men who have been, and still are, responsible for laying on us this burden of argument. They do not believe the stories they used to hear, while they were still infants at the breast, from the lips of their nurses and mothers, stories chanted to them, as it were, in lullabies, whether in play or in earnest. They heard the same stories repeated in prayers at sacrifices, and they saw spectacles that illustrated them, of the kind the young most delight to see and hear when they are performed at sacrifices. They saw their own parents showing the utmost zeal on behalf of themselves and their children as they addressed the gods in prayers and supplications, as though the gods most certainly existed. And at the rising and setting of the sun and moon they heard and saw the prostrations and devotions of all the Greeks and barbarians, under every condition of misfortune and prosperity, directed to these heavenly lights, not as though they were not gods, but as though they most certainly were gods beyond the shadow of a doubt—

887e–888d

Athenian: all this evidence these people despise, and for no adequate reason, as everyone with a grain of sense would affirm; and so they are now forcing us to take up our present argument. How, I ask, can anyone possibly use gentle language in admonishing such men, and at the same time teach them, to begin with, that the gods do exist? Yet one must bravely attempt the task; for it would never do for both sides to be enraged at once, the one through greed for pleasure, the other through indignation at men like these. So let our prefatory address to men whose minds are corrupted in this way be free of anger in tone; and, quenching our anger, let us speak gently, as though we were conversing with one particular person of the kind described, in the following terms: My child, you are still young, and as time goes on it will lead you to reverse many of the opinions you now hold. So wait until then before passing judgment on matters of the gravest importance; and the gravest of all, though at present you think it worth nothing, is whether you hold a right view about the gods and so live well, or the opposite. Now, first of all, I would be saying what is irrefutably true if I pointed out this striking fact to you: neither you alone nor your friends are the first and foremost to adopt this opinion about the gods. Rather, people who suffer from this disease are always springing up, in greater or smaller numbers. And I, who have met many of these people, would tell you this: not a single man who adopted in his youth this opinion, that the gods do not exist, has ever yet remained constant in that view until old age. The other two false notions about the gods, however, do persist, not in many people, it is true, but still in some: namely, the notion that the gods exist but pay no attention to human affairs, and the other notion that they do pay attention but are easily won over by prayers and offerings. If you take my advice, you will wait for a doctrine about them that will prove to be the truest you can possibly form, considering in the meantime whether the truth stands this way or otherwise, and making inquiries not only of all other men, but especially of the lawgiver; and in the meantime do not dare to commit any impiety toward the gods. For the one who is making laws for you, both now and in the future, must try to teach you the truth about these matters.

888d

Clinias: What we have said so far, Stranger, is excellent. Athenian: Very true, Megillus and Clinias; but without realizing it we have plunged into an astonishing argument. Clinias: What do you mean?

888e

Athenian: The argument that most people consider the most scientific of all. Clinias: Explain more clearly. Athenian: Some people say that all things that are coming into existence, have come into existence, or will come into existence do so partly by nature, partly by art, and partly by chance. Clinias: Is that not a correct statement? Athenian: It is likely enough, of course, that what men of science say is true. In any case, let us follow them up and consider what the people in their camp actually mean.

889a

Clinias: By all means, let us do so. Athenian: It is evident, they claim, that the greatest and most beautiful things are the work of nature and chance, and the lesser things the work of art. For art receives from nature the great and primary works already in existence, and itself molds and shapes all the smaller ones, which we commonly call artificial. Clinias: What do you mean?

889b–889e

Athenian: I will explain it more clearly. Fire, water, earth, and air, they say, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art; and by means of these, which are entirely without soul, the bodies that come next, namely those of the earth, sun, moon, and stars, have been brought into existence. All these elements move by chance, through the interplay of their respective powers; and according as they happen to meet and combine in a fitting way, hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard, along with all the necessary mixtures that result from the chance combination of these opposites, in this way and by these means they have produced the whole Heaven and everything in the Heaven, and all animals and plants as well, after all the seasons had arisen from these elements. And all this, as they claim, came about not through reason, nor through any god or art, but, as we have said, through nature and chance. Art, as a later product of these, comes later; and, being mortal itself and of mortal birth, it produces later playthings that share very little in truth, images of a sort akin to the arts themselves, such as the images that painting produces, and music, and the arts that accompany these. The arts that really produce something serious are those that share their power with nature, such as medicine, agriculture, and gymnastics. Politics too, they say, shares to a small extent in nature, but mostly in art; and in the same way all legislation is due not to nature but to art, and its assumptions are untrue.

889e

Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: The first claim these people make about the gods, my dear friend, is that they exist by art and not by nature, by certain legal conventions that differ from place to place, according to what each tribe agreed on when it framed its laws. They claim, moreover, that there is one class of things that are beautiful by nature and another class that are beautiful by convention; and as for things just, these do not exist by nature at all, but people are constantly disputing about them and continually altering them, and whatever change they make at any given time is authoritative at that time, though it owes its existence to art and the laws and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views that young people absorb from men of science, both prose writers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to win by force. As a result, the young are struck by a plague of impiety, as though the gods were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and because of this, factions also arise, as these teachers draw them toward the life that is right according to nature, which consists in actually being master over others instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention.

890b

Clinias: What a horrible doctrine you have described, Stranger! And what widespread corruption of the young, both in private families and publicly in the states! Athenian: That is indeed true, Clinias. What, then, do you think the lawgiver ought to do, given that these people have been armed in this way for a long time? Should he simply stand up in the city and threaten all the people? Should he declare that unless they affirm that the gods exist and conceive them in their minds to be such as the law maintains, and likewise with regard to the beautiful and the just and all the greatest things, as many as relate to virtue and vice, they must regard and perform these things in the way the lawgiver prescribes in his writings; and that whoever fails to show himself obedient to the laws must either be put to death or else be punished, in one case by flogging and imprisonment, in another by loss of civic rights, in others by poverty and exile? And as for persuasion, should the lawgiver, while enacting laws for the people, refuse to blend any persuasion with his statements, and in this way tame them as far as possible?

890d

Clinias: Certainly not, Stranger. On the contrary, if persuasion can be applied to such matters even in the smallest degree, no lawgiver of the slightest worth must ever grow weary; he must (as they say) leave no stone unturned in supporting by argument the ancient law that gods exist, and everything else you recounted just now. He must also defend law itself and art, as things that exist by nature, or by a cause not inferior to nature, since according to right reason they are the offspring of mind, as you, I think, are now asserting; and I agree with you. Athenian: What now, my most eager Clinias? Are not statements made in this way to the masses hard for us to follow through in argument, and do they not also involve us in arguments of enormous length?

890e–891a

Clinias: Well, Stranger, if we were patient with ourselves when we talked at such length about drinking and music, shall we not be patient in dealing with the gods and similar subjects? Besides, such a discussion is of the greatest help to intelligent legislation, since legal ordinances, once written down, remain entirely unchanged, as though ready to submit to examination for all time. So one need not be afraid if they are hard to listen to at first, since even the slowest learner can come back to examine them again and again; nor if they are long, provided they are beneficial. Consequently, in my opinion, it could not possibly be either reasonable or pious for any man to refuse to support such arguments to the best of his ability.

891a–891b

Megillus: What Clinias says, Stranger, seems to me excellent.

891b

Athenian: It certainly is, Megillus, and we must do as he says. For if the claims I mentioned had not been sown broadcast over nearly the whole human race, there would have been no need for counterarguments defending the existence of the gods; but as it is, they are necessary. For when the greatest laws are being destroyed by wicked men, who has a greater duty to come to their rescue than the lawgiver? Megillus: No one. Athenian: Come now, Clinias, you answer me again too, for you also must take part in the argument. It appears that the person who makes these claims holds fire, water, earth, and air to be the first of all things, and that it is precisely these things that he calls nature, while he claims that soul is a later product derived from them. In fact, he probably does not merely appear to do this, but actually makes it clear to us in his account.

891c

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: In Heaven's name, then, can it be that we have now discovered, as it were, the very fountainhead of irrational opinion in all the men who have ever yet taken up investigations of nature? Consider, and examine each statement. For it is a matter of no small importance if it can be shown that those who take up impious arguments, and lead others after them, use their arguments not only badly but erroneously. And this seems to me to be the state of affairs.

891d

Clinias: Well said; but try to explain where the error lies. Athenian: We will probably have to take up a rather unusual argument. Clinias: We must not shrink from it, Stranger. I see that you think we will be crossing foreign ground, outside legislation, if we take up such arguments. But if there is no other way for us to affirm the truth of what the law now says about the gods, except this way, then this is the way, my good friend, that we must speak.

891e

Athenian: Then it seems that I may proceed at once with an argument that is somewhat unusual. It is this: the arguments that have produced the soul of the impious declare that what is the first cause of the coming into being and perishing of all things is not first but was generated later, and that what is later is earlier. And because of this they have fallen into error about the real nature of divine existence.

892a

Clinias: I still do not understand. Athenian: As regards the soul, my friend, nearly everyone appears to be ignorant of its real nature and its power, and ignorant not only of other facts about it, but especially of its origin: that it is among the first of existing things, prior to all bodies, and that it, more than anything else, governs all the changes and modifications of bodies. And if this is really the case, must not the things that are akin to soul necessarily be prior in origin to the things that belong to body, since soul is older than body?

892b

Clinias: Necessarily. Athenian: Then opinion and reflection and thought and art and law will be prior to things hard and soft and heavy and light. And further, the great and primary works and actions will be those of art, while the things that are natural, and nature itself, which they wrongly call by this name, will be secondary and will derive their origin from art and reason.

892c

Clinias: How are they wrong? Athenian: By "nature" they mean the production of the primary things. But if soul is shown to have come into being first (not fire or air, but soul first and foremost), it would most truly be described as natural in the highest degree. This is how matters stand, provided one can prove that soul is older than body, but not otherwise. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Shall we, then, turn next to the task of proving this?

892d

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Let us be on our guard against an utterly deceptive argument, so that it does not somehow seduce us old men with its plausible youthfulness, and then slip away from us and make us a laughingstock, so that we get a reputation for missing even small things while aiming at big ones. Consider, then. Suppose the three of us had to cross a river in violent flood, and I, being the youngest of the party and having often had experience of currents, were to suggest that the proper course is for me to make an attempt first by myself, leaving you two in safety, to see whether it is possible for you older men to cross as well, or how matters stand. Then, if the river proved clearly fordable, I would call you and help you across by my experience; while if it proved impassable for men like you, the risk would be mine alone. Such a suggestion on my part would have sounded reasonable. So too in the present case: the argument now in front of us is too violent, and probably impassable, for such strength as you possess;

892e–893a

Athenian: so, to keep it from making you faint and dizzy as it rushes past and confronts you with questions you are not used to answering, and so causing an unpleasant lack of grace and decorum, I think that I ought now to act in the way described. I will question myself first, while you remain listening in safety, and then give myself the answer, and in this way go through the whole argument until it has discussed the subject of soul in full and demonstrated that soul is prior to body.

893a–893b

Clinias: We think your suggestion excellent, Stranger; so do as you suggest.

893b–893e

Athenian: Come then: if ever we ought to call on God for help, now is the time to do it. Let the gods be called on with all earnestness to aid in the demonstration of their own existence. And let us hold fast, so to speak, to a secure cable as we embark on the present discussion. It seems to me safest to adopt the following method of reply when questions like this are put on these subjects. For instance, suppose a man asks me, "Stranger, do all things stand still, and nothing move? Or is the exact opposite the truth? Or do some things move and some remain at rest?" My answer will be, "Some things move, and others remain at rest." "Then do not the things that stand still stand, and the things that move move, in some place?" "Of course." "And some will do this in one location, and others in several." "You mean," we will say, "that those that have the property of being at rest at the center move in one location, as when the circumference of circles that are said to stand still revolves?" "Yes." "And we observe that motion of this kind, which in this revolution turns both the largest circle and the smallest at the same time, distributes itself proportionally to small and great, altering its own quantity in proportion. In this way it serves as the source of all the marvels that result from its supplying great and small circles at the same time with harmonizing rates of slow and fast speed, a state of things that one might suppose to be impossible." "Quite true." "And by things moving in several places you seem to me to mean all things that move by locomotion, continually passing from one spot to another, sometimes resting on one axis and sometimes, by revolving, on several. And whenever one such object meets another, if the other is at rest, the moving object is split apart; but if they collide with others moving to meet them from the opposite direction, they form a combination midway between the two." "Yes, I affirm that these things are so, just as you describe."

893e–894b

Athenian: Further, things increase when they combine and decrease when they separate, in all cases where the established constitution of each persists; but if it does not remain, then both these processes cause them to perish. And what is the condition that must occur in anything to bring about its coming into being? Obviously, it occurs whenever a starting point, having received increase, passes to the second change, and from this to the next, and on reaching the third becomes perceptible to those capable of perceiving. Everything comes into being through this process of change and alteration; and a thing truly exists whenever it remains fixed, but when it changes into another constitution it is utterly destroyed. Have we now, my friends, named all the forms of motion that can be classified by number, except for two?

894b

Clinias: Which two? Athenian: The two, my good friend, for whose sake, one might say, our whole present inquiry was undertaken. Clinias: Explain more clearly. Athenian: It was undertaken for the sake of soul, was it not? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: As one of the two, let us count the motion that is always able to move other things but unable to move itself; and the motion that is always able to move both itself and other things, by way of combination and separation, increase and decrease, coming into being and perishing, let us count as another separate unit in the total number of motions.

894c

Clinias: Agreed. Athenian: So we will count as ninth on the list the motion that always moves another object and is moved by another; while the motion that moves both itself and another, which is harmoniously suited to all forms of acting and being acted upon, and is called the real change and motion of all that really exists, this, I suppose, we will call the tenth.

894d

Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: Of our ten motions in all, which shall we most correctly judge to be the most powerful of all and superior in effectiveness? Clinias: We are bound to say that the motion that is able to move itself is infinitely superior, and that all the rest come after it. Athenian: Well said. Must we, then, correct one or two of the wrong statements we have just made? Clinias: Which do you mean? Athenian: What we said about the tenth seems wrong. Clinias: How? Athenian: Logically it is first in origin and in power; and the next one is second to it, although a moment ago we absurdly called it ninth.

894e

Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: This: when we find one thing changing another, and that in turn changing another, and so on, will we ever find among these a first cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever itself be the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible. Athenian: But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion spreads in this way through thousands upon thousands of things, will the primary source of all their motions be anything other than the change of that which has moved itself?

895a

Clinias: Excellently put, and we must agree with your argument. Athenian: Further, let us question and answer ourselves in this way: Suppose the whole of things were to unite and stand still, as most of these thinkers dare to maintain; which of the motions we have mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? The self-moving motion, of course; for it will never be shifted beforehand by something else, since no shifting force exists in things beforehand. Therefore we shall assert that, since the self-moving motion is the starting point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is necessarily the oldest and most powerful change of all, while the motion that is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second.

895b

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Now that we have reached this point in our discussion, here is a question we may answer.

895c

Clinias: What is it? Athenian: If we were to see this motion arise in something made of earth, water, or fire, whether separate or combined, what condition should we say exists in such a thing? Clinias: You are asking me whether we are to say that a thing is alive when it moves itself? Athenian: Yes. Clinias: It is alive, of course. Athenian: Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive? Clinias: We must.

895d

Athenian: Now stop a moment, in Heaven's name! Would you not want to observe three points about every object? Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: One point is the substance, one is the definition of the substance, and one is the name; and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked. Clinias: What two? Athenian: Sometimes each of us puts forward the name by itself and asks for the definition; at other times he puts forward the definition by itself and asks for the name. Clinias: Is it something of this kind that we now mean to convey? Athenian: Of what kind?

895e

Clinias: There are things divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere. In arithmetic the name of this is "even," and the definition is "a number divisible into two equal parts." Athenian: Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object that we describe, is it not, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition, describing one and the same object by the name "even" and by the definition "a number divisible into two halves"? Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: What is the definition of the thing whose name is "soul"? Can we give it any definition other than the one just stated, "the motion able to move itself"?

896a

Clinias: Do you assert that self-movement is the definition of that very same substance which has "soul" as the name we all apply to it? Athenian: That is what I assert. And if this is really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and will be, and of all that is opposite to these, since it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?

896b

Clinias: We make no such complaint. On the contrary, it has been proved quite sufficiently that soul is the oldest of all things, since it is the first principle of motion. Athenian: Then is not the motion that arises in one thing because of another, and never gives anything the power to move itself, second in order, or indeed as far down the list as anyone cares to put it, since it is the change of a body that truly has no soul? Clinias: True. Athenian: Truly and finally, then, it would be a most accurate and complete statement to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and later, with soul governing and body being governed according to the order of nature.

896c

Clinias: Yes, most accurate. Athenian: We remember, of course, that we previously agreed that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things belonging to soul would also be older than those belonging to body. Clinias: Certainly we do.

896d

Athenian: Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth, and strength, if soul is prior to body. Clinias: Necessarily. Athenian: Must we, then, necessarily agree next that soul is the cause of things good and bad, noble and shameful, just and unjust, and of all the opposites, if we are to take it to be the cause of all things? Clinias: Of course we must. Athenian: And since soul in this way controls and dwells in all things everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily say that it controls Heaven as well?

896e

Clinias: Yes. Athenian: One soul, or several? I will answer for you: several. In any case, let us assume no fewer than two, the beneficent soul and the one capable of producing results of the opposite kind. Clinias: You are perfectly right. Athenian: Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, whose names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are primary motions. These, taking over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease, separation and combination, and, following on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all the qualities that soul uses, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in union with reason, and when, in association with unreason, it produces results that are in every respect the opposite. Shall we take it that this is so, or do we still suspect that it may possibly be otherwise?

897b

Clinias: Not at all. Athenian: Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circuit? The one that is wise and full of goodness, or the one that has neither quality? Shall we answer this as follows?

897c

Clinias: How? Athenian: If, my good friend, we are to assert that the whole course and motion of Heaven and of everything it contains has a motion like the motion, revolution, and calculations of reason, and proceeds in a kindred way, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it along its course, which is of the kind described. Clinias: You are right.

897d

Athenian: But if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way, then it is the bad soul. Clinias: That is also right. Athenian: Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we reach a question that is hard to answer wisely; so it is only fair that you should now call me in to help you with the answer. Clinias: Very good. Athenian: In giving our answer, let us not bring on night at midday, as it were, by looking straight into the eye of the sun, as though we could ever see reason with mortal eyes and know it fully. The safer way to see the object our question concerns is to look at an image of it.

897e

Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: Let us take as our image the one of the ten motions that reason resembles; I will recall it together with you, and so give our answer. Clinias: You will probably put it admirably. Athenian: Do we still remember this much about the things described then: that we assumed that, of the whole number, some were in motion and others at rest? Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And further, that of those in motion, some move in one place and others in several places?

898a

Clinias: That is so. Athenian: And that, of these two motions, the one that moves in one place must necessarily always move around some center, being a copy of wheels turned on a lathe; and that this has the closest possible kinship and resemblance to the revolution of reason? Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: If we described both of them, namely reason and the motion that spins in one place (likened to the spinning of a globe turned on a lathe), as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, around the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system, we would never be in danger of being thought unskilled at crafting beautiful images in words.

898b

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: On the other hand, will not the motion that is never uniform or regular, never in the same place, nor around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order or system or rule, will not this motion be akin to complete unreason?

898c

Clinias: It will, most truly. Athenian: So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating explicitly that, since soul is what we find driving everything around, we must say that this circuit of Heaven is necessarily driven around under the care and ordering of either the best soul or its opposite. Clinias: But, Stranger, judging by what has just been said, it is actually impious to make any other claim than that these things are driven around by one or more souls possessing every kind of goodness. Athenian: You have followed our argument admirably, Clinias. Now pay attention to this further point.

898d

Clinias: What is that? Athenian: If soul drives around the whole sum of sun, moon, and all the other stars, does it not also drive each single one of them? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Then let us construct an argument about one of these stars that will clearly apply equally to them all. Clinias: About which one? Athenian: Everyone sees the sun's body, but no one sees its soul. The same is true of the soul of any other body of living beings, whether alive or dead. There is, however, strong reason to suppose that this kind of thing, which is entirely imperceptible to the senses, has grown around all the senses of the body and is an object of reason alone. So by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it:

898e

Clinias: What fact? Athenian: If soul drives the sun around, we will be fairly sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things. Clinias: What things? Athenian: Either it exists everywhere inside this visible spherical body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in every way; or, having provided itself with a body of fire or air (as some argue), it pushes forcibly, body against body, from outside; or, third, being itself free of body but possessing other surpassingly marvelous powers, it guides the body.

899a

Clinias: Yes, it must necessarily be the case that soul acts in one of these ways when it propels all things. Athenian: Stop here, please. This soul, whether it brings light to us all by riding in the sun as in a chariot, or from outside, or in some other way, every man is bound to regard as a god. Is that not so?

899b

Clinias: Yes, at least everyone who has not reached the farthest limit of folly. Athenian: Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all the seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same one? Namely, that since it has been shown that one soul or several souls are the cause of all of them, and that these souls are good with every kind of goodness, we shall declare them to be gods, whether they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the manner and method. Is there anyone who agrees with this view who will put up with hearing it denied that all things are full of gods?

899c

Clinias: There is no one, Stranger, so out of his mind as that. Athenian: Then, Megillus and Clinias, let us lay down limiting terms for the man who until now has not believed in gods, and so be done with him. Clinias: What terms? Athenian: Either he must teach us that we are wrong in laying down that soul is the first of all things to come into being, along with all the statements we made that follow from this; or, if he cannot give a better account than ours, he must believe us and live the rest of his life in reverence for the gods. So let us consider whether our argument for the existence of the gods, addressed to those who do not believe in them, has been stated adequately or deficiently.

899d

Clinias: Anything but deficiently, Stranger. Athenian: Then let our argument end here, insofar as it is addressed to these men. But the man who holds that gods exist but pay no attention to human affairs is the one we must now admonish. Let us say to him: My good friend, the fact that you believe in gods is probably due to a divine kinship that draws you toward what is of a nature like your own, to honor it and to recognize its existence. But the fortunes of evil and unjust men, both in private and in public, which, though not truly happy, are excessively and improperly praised as happy by public opinion, drive you to impiety by the wrong way in which they are celebrated, not only in poetry but in stories of every kind.

899e–900c

Athenian: Or again, when you see men reaching the goal of old age and leaving behind them grandchildren in the highest offices, very likely you are disturbed when you find among them, whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation, some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, precisely because of these, have risen from a humble position to tyrannical power and the highest rank. Then the clear consequence of all this is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship with them, and since on the other hand you are driven by faulty reasoning and by your inability to repudiate the gods, you have arrived at your present diseased state of mind, in which you believe that the gods exist but despise and neglect human affairs. So, in order that your present opinion may not grow into a still greater disease of impiety, and that we may succeed in warding off the approach of its pollution by argument (if we somehow can), let us try to attach our next argument to the one we set out in full at the start for the man who utterly disbelieves in gods, and in this way make use of that one as well. And you, Clinias and Megillus, take the young man's part in answering, as you did before; and if anything difficult comes up in the course of the argument, I will take over and answer for you, as I did just now, and carry you across the stream.

900c

Clinias: A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out, and you do the same. Athenian: Well, it will probably not be difficult to prove to this man that the gods care for small things no less than, indeed more than, for things of surpassing greatness. For of course he was present at our recent argument and heard that the gods, being good with every kind of goodness, have such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.

900d

Clinias: He certainly heard that. Athenian: Next let us inquire together what that goodness of theirs is, in virtue of which we agree that they are good. Come now: do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and their opposites parts of badness? Clinias: We do say so. Athenian: And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice part of badness? Clinias: Certainly.

900e

Athenian: And shall we say that some of these are shameful and others noble? Clinias: Necessarily. Athenian: And shall we say that all the worthless ones belong to us, if to anyone, while the gods have no share in any such things, great or small? Clinias: Everyone would agree to this too. Athenian: Well then, shall we count neglect, idleness, and indolence as goodness of soul? Or what do you say? Clinias: How could we? Athenian: As the opposite, then? Clinias: Yes.

901a

Athenian: And their opposites as belonging to the opposite quality of soul? Clinias: To the opposite quality. Athenian: What then? Will the man who is indolent, careless, and idle be, in our eyes, what the poet described, a man most like stingless drones? Clinias: A very true description. Athenian: We must certainly deny that God has such a character, since he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so. Clinias: We could not possibly allow that. Athenian: When a person whose special duty is to act on behalf of some object and to care for it has a mind that cares for great things but neglects small ones, on what principle could we praise such a person without the greatest impropriety? Let us consider the matter this way: the conduct of someone who acts like this, whether he is a god or a man, takes one of two forms, does it not?

901b

Clinias: What forms? Athenian: Either he thinks that neglecting the small things makes no difference to the whole, or else, though he thinks they do make a difference, he neglects them out of laziness and indolence. Or is there some other way in which neglect comes about? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person, whether a god or an ordinary man, fails to care for things he lacks the power and capacity to care for.

901c

Clinias: Of course not. Athenian: Now let these two men answer us three, both of whom agree that gods exist, but one of whom claims that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect small things. First, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things, and that nothing apprehended by the senses or the sciences can escape their notice. Do you say that this is so, or what?

901d

Clinias: That is what we say. Athenian: And further, that they can do everything that can be done by mortal or immortal beings? Clinias: They will of course admit that this too is so.

901e

Athenian: And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the gods are good, indeed supremely good. Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: Since they are such as we agree they are, then, is it not impossible to allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent way? For certainly among us mortals idleness is the child of cowardice, and laziness the child of idleness and indolence. Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Then none of the gods is neglectful out of idleness and laziness, since none has any share in cowardice. Clinias: You are quite right.

902a

Athenian: Further, if they do neglect the small and slight things of the All, they will do so either because they know that there is no need at all to care for any such things, or else... well, what other alternative is there except the opposite of knowing? Clinias: There is none. Athenian: Then, my most worthy and excellent friend, shall we take you to be saying that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care? Or that they do know what is needed, yet act as the worst of men are said to act, who know that there are other things better to do than what they are doing, yet fail to do them because they are somehow overcome by pleasures or pains?

902b

Clinias: Impossible. Athenian: Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is not man himself also the most god-fearing of all living creatures? Clinias: That certainly seems likely. Athenian: We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of the gods, to whom the whole heaven also belongs. Clinias: Of course. Athenian: That being so, it makes no difference whether someone says that these things are small or great in the eyes of the gods; for in neither case would it be fitting for those who own us to be neglectful, since they are most careful and most good. For let us note this further fact:

902c

Clinias: What is it? Athenian: As regards perception and power, are not these two naturally opposed to each other with respect to ease and difficulty? Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: It is harder to see and hear small things than great ones; but everyone finds it easier to move, control, and care for things that are small and few than for their opposites.

902d

Clinias: Much easier. Athenian: When a physician is entrusted with curing a whole body, if, while he is willing and able to care for the large parts, he neglects the small parts and members, will he ever find the whole in good condition? Clinias: Certainly not. Athenian: Nor will pilots or generals or household managers, nor statesmen or anyone else of this kind, find that the many and great things thrive apart from the few and small; for even masons say that big stones are not laid well without little stones.

902e

Clinias: They cannot be. Athenian: Let us never suppose that God is inferior to mortal craftsmen, who, the better they are, the more precisely and perfectly they carry out their proper tasks, small and great, by one single art. Nor let us suppose that God, who is most wise, and both willing and able to care, does not care at all for the small things, which are the easier to care for, like someone who shirks the labor because he is idle and cowardly, but cares only for the great.

903a

Clinias: Let us by no means accept such an opinion of the gods, Stranger; that would be to adopt a view that is neither pious nor true in any way. Athenian: And now, I think, we have argued quite sufficiently with the man who loves to accuse the gods of neglect. Clinias: Yes. Athenian: And we did it by forcing him, through our arguments, to acknowledge that what he says is wrong. Still, it seems to me, he also needs some words of counsel to act on him like a charm.

903b

Clinias: What kind of words, my good friend? Athenian: Let us persuade the young man by our argument that all things are systematically ordered by Him who cares for the World, all with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole, of which each part also, as far as it can, does and undergoes what is proper to it. Over each of these parts, down to the smallest fraction, rulers of its action and passion have been appointed, who bring about fulfillment even to the last fraction. Your own portion, perverse man, is one of these, and so, tiny as it is, it always strives toward the All. But you fail to perceive that all partial generation takes place for the sake of the Whole, so that a blessed existence may be secured for the life of the World-all: it is not generated for your sake, but you for its sake. For every physician and every trained craftsman always works for the sake of a whole and strives after what is best in general; he produces a part for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part. But you are resentful, because you do not know how what is best for the All in your case turns out best for you as well, in accordance with the power of your common origin. And since soul, joined now with one body and now with another, is always undergoing changes of every kind, either through itself or through another soul, there is no further task left for the player of the board game except to move the character that grows better to a better place, and the worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that each may receive its appropriate destiny.

903e

Clinias: In what way do you mean? Athenian: The way I am describing is, I believe, the one in which supervising all things is easiest for the gods. For if someone were to shape all things without constantly keeping the Whole in view, by transforming them (turning fire into water, for instance), instead of merely making many out of one or one out of many, then once things had shared in a first, a second, or even a third generation, they would be countless in number in such a system of transformations. But as things are, the task before the Supervisor of the All is wonderfully easy.

904a

Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: This: Our King saw that all actions involve soul and contain much good and much evil; that body and soul, once generated, are indestructible but not eternal, as the gods established by law are (for if either soul or body had been destroyed, there would never have been any generation of living creatures); and He perceived that all soul that is good naturally tends always to benefit, while bad soul tends to injure. Observing all this, He devised a place for each of the parts where it might secure the victory of goodness and the defeat of evil in the Whole most completely, easily, and well. For this purpose He has devised the rule that prescribes what kind of character should be set to dwell in what kind of position and in what regions; but the causes of the generation of any particular kind He left to the wills of each one of us. For according to the direction of our desires and the nature of our souls, each one of us generally becomes of a corresponding character.

904c

Clinias: That is certainly likely. Athenian: All things that share in soul change, since they possess within themselves the cause of change; and in changing they move according to the order and law of destiny. The smaller the change of character, the less the movement across the surface of space; but when the change is great and toward great wickedness, they move toward the depths and the so-called lower regions, about which, under the names of Hades and the like, people are haunted by the most fearful imaginings, both while they are alive and after they have been separated from their bodies. And whenever the soul acquires a specially large share of either virtue or vice, through the force of its own will and the influence of its associations growing strong, then, if it is united with divine virtue, it becomes in this way exceptionally virtuous and moves to an exceptional region, being carried along a holy road to another and better place; whereas if the opposite is the case, it shifts the dwelling place of its life to the opposite region.

904e–905d

Athenian: "This is the just decree of the gods who inhabit Olympus" (Homer, Odyssey 19.43), you child and youth who think you are neglected by the gods: the decree that as you become worse, you go to the company of the worse souls, and as you become better, to the better souls; and that, both in life and in every form of death, you both do and undergo what it is fitting for like to do to like. Neither you nor any other unfortunate person will ever boast of having escaped this decree of Heaven; for the gods who established it have established it above all others, and it is fitting that it be observed most strictly. For you will never be neglected by it: not if you should dive, small as you are, into the depths of the earth below, nor if you should soar up to the height of Heaven above; but you will pay the gods the penalty due from you, whether you remain here on earth, or have passed on to Hades, or are carried off to a place more fearsome still. And the same rule, let me tell you, will also apply to those whom you saw rising from small beginnings to great fortune after committing impious acts or other evils of this kind. You thought that they had risen from misery to happiness, and so you imagined that in their actions, as in mirrors, you could see the gods' complete neglect, not knowing how they make their joint contribution and how it contributes to the All. And surely, boldest of men, you cannot help supposing that this is something you must learn. For if a man does not learn it, he can never see even an outline of the truth, nor will he be able to contribute any account of life with regard to its happiness or its unhappy fortune. If Clinias here and this whole gathering of elders of ours succeed in convincing you of this fact, that you do not know what you are saying about the gods, then God Himself will graciously help you; but if you still need further argument, listen to us as we argue with the third unbeliever, if you have any sense at all. For we have proved, I would maintain, by fairly sufficient argument that the gods exist and care for human beings. The next claim, that the gods can be won over by wrongdoers when they receive bribes, is one that no one should admit, and we must try to refute it by every means in our power.

905d

Clinias: Admirably spoken; let us do as you say. Athenian: Come now, in the name of these gods themselves I ask: in what way would they come to be seduced by us, if they were seduced? What would they have to be in their essence and character? They must necessarily be rulers, if they are to be in continual control of the whole heaven.

905e

Clinias: True. Athenian: But which kind of rulers do they resemble? Or which rulers resemble them, among those we can fairly compare with them, as small with great? Would drivers of competing teams resemble them, or pilots of ships? Or perhaps they might be likened to commanders of armies; or possibly they might be compared to physicians watching over a war against bodily disease, or to farmers anxiously awaiting the seasons that are usually difficult for the growth of plants, or else to masters of flocks. For since we have agreed among ourselves that heaven is full of many things that are good, and also of things of the opposite kind, and that those not good are the more numerous, such a battle, we affirm, is undying and needs wonderful watchfulness. The gods and daemons are our allies, and we are the possession of the gods and daemons. What destroys us is wickedness and insolence combined with folly; what saves us is justice and self-control combined with wisdom, which dwell in the animate powers of the gods, and of which some small trace may clearly be seen residing here in us as well. But there are certain souls that live on earth and have acquired unjust gain, which, being plainly bestial, fall at the feet of the souls of the guardians, whether these are watchdogs or herdsmen or the most exalted of masters, trying to convince them by flattering words and prayerful incantations that (as the tales of evil men relate) they can profiteer among men on earth without any severe penalty. But we assert that the sin now mentioned, profiteering or grasping for more, is what is called disease in bodies of flesh, pestilence in seasons and years, and, in states and political systems, by a change of word, this same sin is called injustice.

906c

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Such must necessarily be the account of the matter given by the man who says that the gods are always merciful to unjust men and to those who act unjustly, provided one gives them a share of one's unjust gains. It is just as if wolves were to give small bits of their prey to watchdogs, and the dogs, softened by the gifts, were to let them go ravaging among the flocks. Is this not the account given by the man who claims that the gods are open to bribes?

906d

Clinias: It is. Athenian: To which of the guardians mentioned earlier could anyone compare the gods without making himself ridiculous? Is it to pilots who, turned aside themselves by libations of wine and the savor of sacrifices, capsize both ships and sailors?

906e

Clinias: By no means. Athenian: And surely not to drivers lined up for a race, who are seduced by a gift to throw the victory to other teams? Clinias: If that were the account you gave of them, it would indeed be a horrible comparison. Athenian: Nor, surely, to generals or physicians or farmers or herdsmen; nor yet to dogs charmed by wolves? Clinias: Hush! That is quite impossible.

907a

Athenian: Are not all the gods the greatest of all guardians, and over the greatest things? Clinias: Yes, by far. Athenian: Shall we say that those who guard the most beautiful things, and who are themselves exceptionally good at guarding, are inferior to dogs and ordinary men, who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts impiously offered by unjust men?

907b

Clinias: By no means. It is an intolerable thing to say, and whoever holds such an opinion would most justly be judged the worst and most impious of all the impious men who practice impiety in all its forms. Athenian: May we now say that we have fully proved our three propositions, namely, that the gods exist, that they are caring, and that they are wholly incapable of being seduced into violating justice? Clinias: Certainly we may; and in these statements you have our vote. Athenian: And indeed they have been made in rather vehement terms, my dear Clinias, because of our desire to win against those wicked men; and our desire to win was due to our fear that if they gained the upper hand in argument, those men who wickedly hold all those false notions about the gods might suppose they had gained the right to act as they please. For this reason we have been eager to speak with unusual vehemence; and if we have produced any good effect, however small, toward persuading these men to hate themselves and to feel some love for the opposite kind of character, then our prelude to the laws concerning impiety will have been well spoken.

907d

Clinias: Well, there is hope; and if not, at any rate the lawgiver will not be blamed for the nature of the argument. Athenian: After the prelude it will be proper for us to have a statement suited to serve as the interpreter of the laws, warning all the impious in advance to leave their own ways for those of the pious. For those who disobey, this shall be the law concerning impiety: If anyone commits impiety, whether by word or by deed, whoever encounters it shall defend the law by informing the magistrates; and the first magistrates who hear of it shall bring the man before the court appointed to decide such cases, as the laws direct. And if any magistrate, on hearing of the matter, fails to do this, he himself shall be liable to a charge of impiety brought by anyone who wishes to punish him on behalf of the laws.

907e–908e

Athenian: And if a man is convicted, the court shall assess one penalty for each separate act of impiety. Imprisonment shall be imposed in every case. There are three prisons in the state: one public prison near the marketplace for most cases, to secure the persons of the ordinary criminals; a second, located near the meeting place of the officials who hold nightly assemblies, and called the reformatory; and a third, located in the middle of the country, in the wildest and loneliest spot possible, and named after retribution. And since men are involved in impiety from the three causes we have described, and two forms of impiety result from each such cause, those who sin in matters of religion fall into six classes that need to be distinguished, since they require penalties that are neither equal nor alike. For some, though they utterly disbelieve in the existence of the gods, have by nature a just character: they hate the wicked, and because of their dislike of injustice they cannot be induced to commit unjust actions, but they shun unjust men and love the just. Others, on the other hand, besides holding that the world is empty of gods, are afflicted by a lack of self-control with regard to pleasures and pains, and also have powerful memories and sharp wits. Though both these classes share alike in the disease of atheism, yet in the amount of ruin they bring on other people, the latter class would do more evil and the former less. For the one class will be entirely outspoken in its language about the gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and by ridiculing other people it will probably convert others to its views, unless it meets with punishment. The other class holds the same opinions as the former, yet is specially gifted by nature and full of craft and guile; it is the class out of which many diviners and experts in every kind of trickery are manufactured, and from it there also spring at times tyrants and demagogues and generals, and those who plot by means of private mystery rites of their own, and the devices of those who are called sophists. There may be many kinds of these; but those that call for legislation are two. Of these, the ironic kind commits sins that deserve not merely one death or two, while the other kind requires both admonition and imprisonment.

908e–909e

Athenian: Likewise, the belief that the gods are neglectful produces two other kinds of impiety, and the belief that they are open to bribes another two. With these kinds distinguished in this way, those offenders who suffer from folly, but are free of evil disposition and character, the judge shall place in the reformatory according to law for a period of no less than five years. During this time no other citizen shall associate with them except those who take part in the nightly assembly, and these shall associate with them to care for the salvation of their souls by admonition. When the term of their imprisonment has expired, if any of them seems to be reformed, he shall live among those who are reformed; but if not, and if he is convicted again on a similar charge, he shall be punished with death. But as for all those who have become like ravening beasts, and who, besides holding that the gods are negligent or open to bribes, despise men, charming the souls of many of the living and claiming that they charm the souls of the dead, and promising to persuade the gods by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers, and incantations, and who in this way try to ruin utterly not only individuals but whole families and states for the sake of money: if any of these men is found guilty, the court shall order him to be imprisoned according to law in the prison in the middle of the country, and shall order that no free man shall ever visit such criminals, and that they shall receive from the servants a ration of food fixed by the Law-wardens. And when one of them dies, he shall be cast out beyond the borders unburied; and if any free man helps to bury him, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety brought by anyone who chooses to prosecute. And if the dead man leaves children fit for citizenship, the guardians of orphans shall take them too under their care from the day of their father's conviction, just as much as any other orphans. For all these offenders one general law must be laid down, such as will cause most of them not only to offend less against the gods in word and deed, but also to become less foolish, because they will be forbidden to trade in religion illegally. To deal comprehensively with all such cases, the following law shall be enacted: No one shall possess a shrine in his own house. When anyone is moved in spirit to offer sacrifice, he shall go to the public places to sacrifice, and he shall hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses whose duty it is to consecrate them; and he himself, together with any associates he may choose, shall join in the prayers.

909e–910d

Athenian: This procedure shall be followed for the following reasons. It is no easy task to found temples and gods, and doing it rightly requires much deliberation. Yet it is customary for all women especially, and for sick people everywhere, and for those in danger or distress (whatever the nature of the distress), and conversely for those who have had a stroke of good fortune, to dedicate whatever happens to be at hand at the moment, and to vow sacrifices and promise to found shrines to gods and demigods and children of gods. And through terrors caused by waking visions or by dreams, and in the same way as they recall many visions and try to provide remedies for each of them, they are in the habit of founding altars and shrines and filling every house and every village with them, and open places too, and every spot that was the scene of such experiences. For all these reasons their conduct should be governed by the law now stated. A further reason is this: to keep impious men from acting fraudulently in these matters too, by setting up shrines and altars in private houses, thinking to win the favor of the gods secretly by sacrifices and vows, and so increasing their own wickedness infinitely. In this way they make both themselves and the better men who permit them guilty in the eyes of the gods, so that the whole state reaps the consequences of their impiety to some degree, and deserves to reap them. The lawgiver himself, however, will not be blamed by the god; for this shall be the law laid down: No one shall possess shrines of the gods in a private house. If anyone, whether man or woman, is shown to possess and worship at any shrine other than the public shrines, and if he is guilty of no serious act of impiety, whoever notices the fact shall inform the Law-wardens, and they shall order the private shrines to be removed to the public temples; and if the owner disobeys the order, they shall punish him until he removes them. And if anyone is shown to have committed an impious act that is not the venial offense of children but the serious irreligion of grown men, whether by setting up a shrine on private ground or by sacrificing on public ground to any gods whatever, he shall be punished with death for sacrificing in a state of impurity. And the Law-wardens shall judge what is a childish or venial offense and what is not, and shall then bring the offenders before the court and impose on them the due penalty for their impiety.

913a–913d

Athenian: Next, our business dealings with one another will need proper regulation. A comprehensive rule like this will serve: as far as possible, no one shall touch my goods or move them in the slightest, if he has not obtained my consent in any way at all; and I must act the same way regarding the goods of everyone else, keeping a prudent mind. Let us mention treasure as the first of such things. If a man has stored up treasure for himself and his family (if he is not one of my parents), I must never pray to the gods to find it. Nor, if I do find it, may I move it, and I may never tell the so-called soothsayers about it, who may advise me in one way or another about taking up what has been deposited in the ground. For I would never gain as much financial profit by removing it as I would gain growth in virtue of soul and in justice by not removing it. By preferring to acquire justice in my soul rather than money in my purse, I would be gaining a greater possession in place of a lesser one, and in a better part of myself as well. The rule “You shall not move the immovable” rightly applies to many cases, and the case before us is one of them. People ought also to believe the stories told about these matters, that such conduct harms the begetting of children. But suppose a man proves to be both careless of children and neglectful of the lawgiver. Without the consent of the depositor, he takes up a treasure that neither he himself nor any of his ancestors deposited. In this way he breaks a most excellent law, and that most comprehensive ordinance of the noble man who said, “Do not take up what you did not lay down.” This man despises these two lawgivers and takes up what he did not lay down himself, and it is no small thing but sometimes an enormous quantity of treasure. What penalty should such a man suffer?

913d–914e

Athenian: What he should suffer at the hands of the gods, God knows. But the man who first notices an act of this kind shall report it. If it happens in the city, he shall report it to the city-stewards; if it happens in the city's public market, to the market-stewards; and if it happens in the countryside outside, he shall declare it to the rural stewards and their officers. When such reports are made, the State shall send to Delphi, and whatever the god pronounces about the goods and about the man who moved them, the State shall carry out, acting as agent for the oracles of the god. If the informer is a free man, he shall gain a reputation for virtue, but a reputation for vice if he fails to inform. If he is a slave, it will be right for him to be set free as a reward for informing, with the State paying his price to his master; but he shall be punished with death if he fails to give information. Next after this, to reinforce it, should come a similar rule about matters great and small. If a man leaves any of his goods behind anywhere, whether willingly or unwillingly, whoever comes upon them shall let them lie, believing that the Goddess of the Wayside guards them, since such things are dedicated by the law to her divinity. If anyone breaks this rule, disobediently picks up such things and carries them home, and he is a slave and the article is of small value, then the person who meets him, being at least thirty years old, shall whip him with many lashes. But if he is a free man, he shall not only be regarded as ungentlemanly and as a rebel against the laws, but he shall also pay ten times the value of the article moved to the man who left it behind. If one man charges another with possessing any of his goods, whether much or little, and the man so charged admits that he has the article but denies that it belongs to the other man, then, if the article in question has been registered with the magistrates according to law, the plaintiff shall summon its possessor before the magistrate, and the possessor shall produce it in court. Once the article has been displayed in this way, if the records clearly show to which of the disputants it belongs, that person shall take it and go. But if it belongs to some third party who is not present, whichever of the two claimants provides an adequate guarantor shall take it away on behalf of the absent party, exercising that party's right of removal, in order to hand it over to him. But if the disputed article is not registered with the magistrates, it shall be kept in the custody of the three senior magistrates until the trial. If the article held in pledge is an animal, the party who loses the case concerning it shall pay the magistrates for its keep, and the magistrates shall decide the case within three days. Anyone of sound mind may, if he wishes, seize his own slave, to use him for any lawful purpose; and on behalf of another person, one of his relatives or friends, he may seize a runaway slave in order to keep him safe. If someone tries to claim as free a person who is being led off as a slave, the man leading him off shall let him go, and the claimant shall take him only after providing three adequate sureties, and not otherwise;

914e–915e

Athenian: and if anyone takes a slave away contrary to these conditions, he shall be liable for violence, and if convicted he shall pay the man deprived double the damages stated in the charge. A man may also arrest a freedman if he fails to attend, or to attend adequately, on those who freed him. This service shall consist in the freedman coming three times a month to the home of the man who freed him, and offering there to do whatever duties are both just and feasible; and in matters of marriage, too, he shall act as his former master approves. The freedman shall not be permitted to become wealthier than the man who freed him; if he does, the excess shall be made over to his master. A man who has been set free shall not remain in the country more than twenty years. He shall leave, like all other foreigners, taking all his property with him, unless he obtains the consent of the magistrates and also of the man who freed him. If a freedman, or any other foreigner, acquires property exceeding the amount of the third property class, then within thirty days from the day on which he acquires this excess he shall take his own property and leave, and he shall have no further right to ask the magistrates for permission to stay. If he disobeys these rules, is brought to court and is convicted, he shall be punished with death, and his goods shall be confiscated. Such cases shall be tried before the tribal courts, unless the parties first settle their charges against one another before neighbors or chosen jurors. If anyone claims as his own an animal belonging to another man, or any other of his possessions, the man who holds it shall refer the matter back to the person who sold it to him, gave it to him, or made it over to him in some other way, as its substantial and lawful owner. He shall do this within thirty days if the reference is made to a citizen or a metic in the city, or, in the case of a delivery from abroad, within five months, of which the middle month shall be the one that includes the summer solstice. When one person makes an exchange with another by buying or selling, the exchange shall be made by handing over the article in the place appointed for it in the market, and nowhere else, with payment of the price on the spot, and no purchase or sale shall be made on credit. If anyone makes an exchange with another in any other way or in other places, trusting the person he is dealing with, he shall do so on the understanding that no lawsuits are allowed concerning things not sold in accordance with the laws now prescribed. As for club collections, anyone who wishes may collect contributions as a friend among friends; but if any dispute arises about the collection, they must act on the understanding that no legal actions at all are possible in these matters.

915e–916e

Athenian: If anyone receives a price of not less than fifty drachmas for the sale of any article, he shall be compelled to remain in the city for ten days, and the buyer shall be informed where the seller lives. This is because of the complaints usually brought in connection with such transactions, and because of the returns of goods that the law permits. Such legal return, or refusal of return, shall be as follows. A man may sell a slave who suffers from consumption, or stone, or strangury, or the so-called sacred disease, or from any other ailment, mental or physical, that most people would fail to notice even though it is long-lasting and hard to cure. If the buyer is a doctor or a trainer, he shall not be able to obtain restitution in such a case; nor shall he if the seller told the buyer the facts beforehand. But if a professional sells any such slave to a layperson, the buyer shall claim restitution within six months, except in the case of epilepsy, for which he shall be permitted to claim within twelve months. The case shall be tried before a panel of doctors nominated and chosen jointly by both parties, and the party that loses shall pay double the price at which the slave was sold. If a layperson sells to a layperson, there shall be the same right of restitution and trial as in the cases just mentioned, but the losing party shall pay only the selling price. If a man knowingly sells a murderer to a buyer who is aware of the fact, the buyer shall have no claim to restitution for such a purchase. But if the buyer is unaware of it, he shall have the right of restitution as soon as he discovers the fact, and the trial shall take place before a court of the five youngest Law-wardens. If it is decided that the seller acted knowingly, he shall purify the buyer's houses as the interpreters prescribe, and he shall pay the buyer three times the selling price. Whoever exchanges money for money, or for anything else, living or not living, shall give and receive every such article unadulterated, in conformity with the law. Regarding all dishonesty of this kind, as with other laws, let us listen to a prelude. Every man should regard adulteration as belonging to the same class as falsehood and fraud. About this class of actions the masses commonly say, wrongly, that any such action will often be right if it is done at the right moment; but they leave that right moment, the when and the where, unprescribed and undefined, so that by this saying they often bring harm both on themselves and on others. But the lawgiver may not leave this matter undefined. He must always state clearly the limits, whether broader or narrower, and that shall be done now:

916e–918a

Athenian: No one who does not intend to be most hateful to the gods shall commit any falsehood, fraud, or adulteration, in word or deed, while calling on the gods as witnesses. Such a person is, first, the man who swears false oaths with no regard for the gods, and, second, the man who lies in the presence of his superiors. Now the better are the superiors of the worse, and, generally speaking, the older of the younger; and so parents are superior to their offspring, men to women and children, and rulers to the ruled. It will be proper for everyone to revere all these classes of superiors, both in other positions of authority and above all in offices of State; and this is the very point from which our present discussion has arisen. For everyone who adulterates any goods in the market lies and deceives, and, calling on Heaven as witness, swears an oath in defiance of the laws and cautions of the market-stewards, neither respecting people nor revering gods. It is certainly a good practice not to defile divine names lightly, and to behave with the purity and holiness that most of us generally show in matters of religion. If, however, this rule is disobeyed, the law runs as follows: Whoever sells any article in the market shall never name two prices for what he is selling. He shall name one price only, and if he does not get it, he may rightly take the article away again; but on that same day he shall not set any other price on it, higher or lower. And there shall be no talking up of anything offered for sale, and no swearing of oaths about it. If anyone disobeys these rules, any townsman who is present and not under thirty years of age shall punish the seller who swears by beating him, and he shall do so with impunity; but if he disregards the rule and fails to do so, he shall be liable to criticism for betraying the laws. If a man is selling an adulterated article and cannot obey our present instructions, anyone present who knows the facts and is able to expose him shall expose him before the magistrates. If that person is a slave or a metic, he shall take the adulterated article for himself. But if he is a citizen, he shall be declared wicked, as one who robs the gods, if he fails to expose the guilty man; while if he does expose him, he shall dedicate the article to the gods who preside over the market. The man found selling any such article, in addition to being deprived of the adulterated article, shall be whipped in the marketplace, one lash for every drachma of the price he asks for the article, after the herald has first proclaimed the offenses for which the seller is to be beaten. Concerning frauds and wrongful acts by sellers, the market-stewards and the Law-wardens, after inquiring from experts in each trade, shall write out rules about what the seller must do and must avoid doing. They shall post these on a pillar in front of the market-stewards' office, to serve as written laws and clear guides for those doing business in the market.

918a–918c

Athenian: The duties of the city-stewards have already been fully stated. If any addition seems necessary, they shall consult the Law-wardens and write out what seems to be missing, and they shall post on the pillar at the city-stewards' office both the primary and the secondary regulations relating to their office. Close on the heels of adulteration come the practices of retail trade. On this subject as a whole, we shall first offer advice and argument, and then impose a law on it. By nature, all retail trade arises in a State not for the sake of harm but for exactly the opposite. For how can a man be anything but a benefactor if he makes even and proportionate the distribution of any kind of goods that was previously disproportionate and uneven? We must say that this is the effect produced by the power of money, and we must declare that the merchant is appointed for this purpose. The hired worker, the innkeeper, and the rest, some more and some less respectable occupations, all serve this function: to provide everyone with full satisfaction of their needs and with evenness in their possessions. Let us see, then, why trade is thought to be neither noble nor even respectable, and what has caused it to be disparaged, so that we may remedy at least parts of it by law, if not the whole. This is apparently no trivial undertaking, and one that calls for no small virtue.

918c

Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: My dear Clinias, it is only a small class of people, few by nature and trained with an exceptional training, who, when they fall into various needs and desires, are able to hold out firmly for moderation, and who, when they have the chance to take a great deal of wealth, stay sober and choose what is within due measure rather than what is large. The disposition of the mass of mankind is the exact opposite. When they want something, they want it without limit, and when they could make moderate gains, they prefer to gain insatiably. That is why all the classes engaged in retail trade, commerce, and innkeeping are disparaged and subjected to violent abuse. Now suppose someone did what never will be done (Heaven forbid!), though I shall make the supposition, ridiculous as it is. Suppose he compelled the best men everywhere to keep inns for a time, or to peddle, or to carry on any such trade, or even compelled women by some necessity of fate to take part in such a way of life. Then we would learn that each of these occupations is friendly and desirable; and if all of them were carried on by a rule free from corruption, they would be honored with the honor one pays to a mother or a nurse.

919a–919e

Athenian: But as things are now, a man sets up his house for retail trade in a deserted place, with long roads leading from it in every direction. In this welcome lodging he receives travelers in distress, providing quiet and calm to those battered by fierce storms, or restful coolness after scorching heat. But then, instead of treating them as companions and offering friendly gifts along with his hospitality, he holds them for ransom as if they were captured enemies in his power, demanding enormous sums of unjust and unclean ransom money. It is crimes such as this, in all these trades, that give grounds for complaint against this way of relieving distress. For these evils, then, the lawgiver must in each case provide a remedy. It is an old and true saying that it is hard to fight against two enemies attacking from opposite directions, as with diseases and many other things. Indeed, our present fight in this matter is against two enemies, poverty and wealth: wealth corrupts people's souls with luxury, while poverty, through pain, drives them into shamelessness. What remedy, then, can be found for this disease in a State endowed with understanding? First, to make use of the trading class as little as possible; second, to assign to that class people whose corruption would be no great loss to the State; and third, to find a means by which the characters of those engaged in these occupations may not so easily become infected with shamelessness and meanness of soul. After what has now been said, let our law on these matters (Heaven prosper it!) run as follows: Among the Magnesians, whom the god is restoring and founding anew, none of the landholders who belong to the 5040 households shall, either willingly or unwillingly, become a retail trader or a merchant, or perform any menial service for private persons who do not make an equal return to him. The only exceptions are his father and mother, and those of still earlier generations, and all who are older than himself, provided they are gentlemen and his service is a gentleman's service. It is not easy to fix by law precisely what befits a gentleman and what does not; but it shall be decided by those who have won public distinction for their aversion to what is ungentlemanly and their devotion to what is gentlemanly.

919e–920e

Athenian: If any citizen engages, through some craft, in ungentlemanly peddling, anyone who wishes shall indict him for disgracing his family before a panel of those judged to be first in virtue. If he is found to be defiling his ancestral hearth by an unworthy occupation, he shall be imprisoned for a year and so restrained from it. If he repeats the offense, he shall be imprisoned for two years, and with each further conviction the term of imprisonment shall continue to be doubled. Now comes a second law: Whoever intends to engage in retail trade must be a resident alien or a foreigner. And third, this third law: so that such a person, residing in our State, may be as good as possible, or as little bad as possible, the Law-wardens must keep in mind that they are guardians not only of those who, being well trained by both birth and upbringing, are easy to guard from lawless and evil ways, but also of those who are not, and who follow pursuits that strongly tend to push them toward vice; these they must guard all the more. Accordingly, retail trade is a many-sided occupation that includes many callings of a similar kind. With respect to it—I mean, with respect to as many branches as are allowed to remain because they are judged absolutely necessary to the State—the procedure shall be the same as that previously prescribed for the related matter of adulteration. The Law-wardens must meet in consultation with experts in every branch of retail trade, and at their meetings they must consider what ratio of receipts to expenses yields a moderate profit for the trader. They must prescribe in writing the standard of receipts and expenses arrived at in this way, and it must be enforced by the market-stewards, the city-stewards, and the rural stewards, each in their own sphere. In this way, perhaps, retail trade would benefit all classes and do very little harm to those in the States who practice it. Regarding agreements: a man may undertake an agreement and fail to fulfill it. Excluded are agreements forbidden by the laws or by a decree, or made under forcible and unjust compulsion, and cases in which he is involuntarily prevented from fulfilling it by some unforeseen accident. In all other cases of unfulfilled agreements, actions may be brought before the tribal courts, if the parties cannot first reach a settlement before arbitrators or neighbors. The class of craftsmen who have equipped our life with the arts is sacred to Hephaestus and Athena; and those who safeguard the products of these craftsmen by other, defensive arts belong to Ares and Athena; rightly is this class, too, sacred to these deities. All of these continually serve both the country and the people: the one class as leaders in the contests of war, the other by producing tools and works for pay;

920e–921e

Athenian: and it would be improper for these men to lie about their crafts, since they revere the gods who are their ancestors. A craftsman may fail, through baseness, to finish his work within the time agreed, showing no reverence for the god who gives him his livelihood, but supposing in his blindness of mind that the god will be lenient because he is his kinsman. Such a man shall, first, pay a penalty to the god; and, second, a law shall be enacted to fit his case: He shall owe the price of the work about which he has deceived the person who ordered it, and within the stated time he shall do it all over again free of charge. Just as the law advised the seller, so it advises the contractor who undertakes a work not to put too high a price on it, but to value it as simply as possible at its real worth. The law, I say, gives this same instruction to the contractor, for as a craftsman he certainly knows what it is worth. In States made up of free people, a craftsman must never use his art, which is by nature clear and truthful, to try to get the better of laypeople by trickery; and in such cases the wronged party shall be entitled to sue the wrongdoer. On the other hand, a man who has given an order to a craftsman may fail to pay him his wages properly according to the lawful agreement, and so dishonor Zeus, the Patron of the State, and Athena, who are partners in the constitution, dissolving great partnerships out of love for a little gain. In that case, with the help of the gods, the following law shall come to the aid of the bonds that hold the State together: Whoever has already received the work he ordered and does not pay the price within the agreed period shall be required to pay double the price. If a year has passed, then, although all other money lent out bears no interest, this man shall pay as interest one obol on each drachma for every month of arrears; and actions in these cases shall be held before the tribal courts. Now that we have mentioned craftsmen in general, it is right to refer in passing to those whose craft is military security, that is, generals and all experts in such matters. As with the former craftsmen, so with these men, who are craftsmen of another kind. Whenever any of them, either voluntarily or under orders, undertakes any public work and carries it out well, the law will never tire of praising the man who duly pays them the honors that are the soldier's wages;

921e–922c

Athenian: but if a man has already received some noble work of war and fails to pay for it, the law will blame him. So, on this matter, let this law be laid down, combined with praise. It advises rather than compels the mass of citizens to honor in the second rank of merit those brave men who protect the State, either by bold deeds or by military devices. For the first rank of merit belongs to those who must receive the greatest reward, namely those who have proven exceptionally able to honor the written code of the good lawgivers. We have now regulated most of the more important business dealings between people, except those concerning orphans and the care of orphans by their guardians; so after the matters now dealt with, these must necessarily receive some kind of regulation. All these matters originate either in the wishes of those about to die to dispose of their property, or in the chance circumstances of those who die without making any will at all. It was in view of how complex and difficult these cases are, Clinias, that I used the word “necessarily.” Indeed, it is impossible to leave them unregulated. Suppose any will a man makes, whatever his state of mind at the end of his life, were simply granted absolute and unconditional validity. Then individuals might set down many wishes that conflict with one another and run counter both to the laws and to the dispositions of the living, as well as to their own earlier dispositions, in the days before they set about making a will. For most of us are in a somewhat dull and enfeebled state of mind when we think we are about to die.

922c

Clinias: What do you mean by this, Stranger? Athenian: A man who is about to die, Clinias, is a difficult subject, and full of talk that is very alarming and troublesome for a lawgiver. Clinias: How so? Athenian: Since he insists on being master of everything he has, he tends to speak angrily.

922d

Clinias: What will he say? Athenian: “Good heavens,” he cries, “what a monstrous outrage it is if I am not allowed at all to give my own things, or not give them, to whomever I wish, and more to one and less to another, depending on whether they have proven good to me or bad, when they were thoroughly tested in times of sickness, or in old age, and in all kinds of other circumstances!” Clinias: And don't you think, Stranger, that what they say is right?

922e

Athenian: What I think, Clinias, is this: the old lawgivers were weak, and they made laws with a short view and slight consideration of human affairs. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: It was out of fear of that angry speech, my good sir, that they made the law allowing a man to dispose of his goods by will without any condition, exactly as he pleases. But you and I will give a more fitting answer to those in your State who are about to die.

923a

Clinias: In what way? Athenian: “Friends,” we will say, “you who are truly creatures of a day, it is hard for you at present to know your own possessions, and your own selves as well, as the inscription at Delphi declares. So I, as lawgiver, make this ruling: neither you yourselves nor this property of yours belong to you. You and it belong to your whole family, both past and future; and still more truly, all your family and its property belong to the State. That being so, if anyone flatters you and attends on you when you are afflicted by disease or age, and persuades you to make a will contrary to what is best, I will not willingly consent. Instead, I will legislate with a general view to what is best for your whole family and for the State, justly treating the interest of the individual as of lesser importance. May you feel kindly and at peace with us as you journey toward the destination to which, by the natural law of our human life, you are now traveling. The rest of your affairs shall be our concern, and we will watch over them all, without exception, to the best of our ability.” Let this serve, Clinias, both as consolation and as prelude for the living and the dying, and the law shall run as follows: Whoever writes a will disposing of his property shall, if he is the father of children, first write down the name of whichever of his sons he judges worthy to be his heir; and if he offers any of his other children to another man to be adopted by him, he shall write this down as well. He may also have a further son who has not been adopted into any lot, and whom he expects to be sent out to a colony by law. To that son the father shall be allowed to give as much of his other property as he wishes, except the ancestral lot and all the equipment of that lot; and if there are several more sons, the father shall divide among them, in whatever way he chooses, the property that remains beyond the lot. If a son already has a house, the father shall not assign him any goods; and the same applies to a daughter: if she is betrothed to a husband, he shall not assign her any goods, but if she is not betrothed, he shall. If, after the will is made, it turns out that one of the sons or daughters owns a lot in the country, that person shall give up his legacy in favor of the heir of the man who made the will. If the testator leaves no male children but only females, he shall leave to whichever daughter he chooses a husband, and to himself a son, and shall write him down as his heir;

923e–924e

Athenian: and if a man has a son, whether his own or adopted, who dies in childhood before reaching manhood, then in this case too the man making the will shall state in writing who is to succeed as his son, with better fortune. If any testator is entirely childless, he may take out a tenth of his surplus property and give it to anyone he chooses; but all the rest he shall hand over to his adopted heir, and he shall make him his son, with mutual goodwill and the blessing of the law. When a man's children need guardians, he may die after making a will and naming which persons, and how many, he wishes to act as guardians to his children. If they are willing and consent to act, then the choice of guardians made in this document shall be final. But if a man dies either entirely without a will or having left the choice of guardians out of his will, then the nearest relatives on both the father's and the mother's side, two from each side, together with one of the friends of the deceased, shall act as official guardians, and the Law-wardens shall appoint them for each orphan who needs them. Everything concerning guardianship and the orphans shall be supervised by fifteen of the Law-wardens, who shall be the eldest of the whole body. They shall divide themselves into groups of three by seniority, three acting one year and another three the next, until the five yearly periods have gone around in rotation; and this process shall continue, as far as possible, without a break. If a man dies entirely without a will, leaving children who need guardianship, his unprovided-for children shall share in these same laws. And if a man meets with some unforeseen misfortune and leaves daughters, he shall forgive the lawgiver if he arranges the betrothal of the daughters with an eye to two points out of three, namely closeness of kinship and the security of the lot, and leaves out the third point, which a father would take into consideration: choosing, from among all the citizens, someone suited by character and conduct to be a son to himself and a husband for his daughter. He shall forgive him, I say, if the lawgiver passes this over because it is impossible for him to consider it. Accordingly, the law we shall enact on such matters, the best within our power, will be this: If a man dies without a will and leaves daughters, the brother born of the same father, or the brother born of the same mother who has no lot, shall take the daughter and the lot of the deceased. If there is no brother but there is a brother's son, the procedure shall be the same, provided the two are of suitable ages for each other. If there is none of these, the same rule shall apply to a sister's son; then, fourth, to the father's brother; fifth, to that man's son; and sixth, to the son of the father's sister.

925a–925e

Athenian: In the same way, if a man leaves female children, the right of kinship shall always proceed by degrees of blood relationship, going up through siblings and their children, first the males and then the females of the same line. The judge shall decide by inspection whether the time is suitable for marriage or not, viewing the males naked and the females naked down to the navel. If the family has no relatives as far as a brother's grandchildren, and likewise as far as a grandfather's children, then whichever of the other citizens the girl chooses with the help of her guardians shall, if both he and the girl are willing, become the heir of the deceased and the husband of his daughter. But obstacles often arise, and there may be times when there is an unusual shortage of such men in the city itself. So a girl, at a loss to find a husband on the spot, may see someone who has emigrated to a colony and want him to become heir to her father's property. If he is a relative, he shall proceed to the lot according to the order prescribed by law. But if he is outside the family, and there is no near relative in the State, he shall be entitled, by the choice of the guardians and of the daughter of the deceased, to marry her and to take the lot of the man who died without a will when he returns home. When someone dies without a will, having no children at all, male or female, all other matters in his case shall be governed by the previous law. In each such instance a man and a woman from the family shall go into the deserted house as joint occupants, and their claim to the lot shall be made valid. The women's claims to the inheritance shall come in this order: first, a sister; second, a brother's daughter; third, a sister's daughter; fourth, a father's sister; fifth, a father's brother's daughter; sixth, a father's sister's daughter. These women shall share the home with the male relatives according to degree of kinship and right, as we enacted earlier. Now we must not overlook how burdensome such a law may prove. Sometimes it harshly orders the next of kin of the deceased to marry his kinswoman, and it seems to ignore the thousands of obstacles in human life that make people unwilling to obey such orders and lead them to prefer any other alternative, however painful, in cases where either of the parties ordered to marry suffers from diseases or defects of body or mind. Some might suppose that the lawgiver pays no attention to these considerations, but they would be wrong.

925e–926a

Athenian: Therefore, on behalf of both the lawgiver and those to whom the law applies, let a sort of general prelude be spoken. It asks those to whom the order is given to forgive the lawgiver, because in caring for the public interest he cannot also manage the private misfortunes that happen to individuals; and it also asks forgiveness for those subject to the law, since they are naturally unable at times to carry out the ordinances that the lawgiver laid down without knowledge of their circumstances.

926a

Clinias: In that case, Stranger, what would be the most reasonable course to take? Athenian: For laws of this kind, Clinias, and for those whom they affect, it is necessary to choose arbitrators. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: It might happen that a nephew with a rich father would be reluctant to marry his uncle's daughter, putting on airs and having his mind set on a grander match. Or again, when what the lawgiver commands would be a terrible calamity, a man might be compelled to disobey the law; for instance, when the law would force him to marry into madness or some other dreadful affliction of body or soul, the kind that makes life unbearable for the person so joined. Let this statement of ours now be laid down as a law in the following terms: Some people may have a complaint against the established laws concerning wills on some point, especially those relating to marriage, and may swear that the lawgiver himself, if he were alive and present, would truly never have compelled the parties to act as they are now being compelled to act in marrying and in being given in marriage. If, on the other hand, some relative or guardian supports the compulsion of the law, we declare that the lawgiver has left us the fifteen Law-wardens to act for the orphans, male and female, as both arbitrators and parents. All who dispute about any such matters shall go to them for judgment, and their decisions shall be carried out as final. If, however, anyone thinks that this gives the Law-wardens too much power, he shall summon his opponents before the court of select judges and obtain a decision on the disputed points. On the one who loses, the lawgiver shall impose condemnation and disgrace, a penalty heavier than a large fine in the eyes of a man of sound mind. Accordingly, orphaned children will undergo a kind of second birth. We have already described how each of them should be reared and educated after their first birth. Now we must devise some means by which, after their second birth, in which they are left without parents, their orphaned condition may be as free as possible from pitiful misery for those who have become orphans. First, we must legally appoint the Law-wardens to take the place of those who fathered them, as parents in no way inferior; and we instruct three of them each year to care for the orphans as their own, having already given both these men and the guardians a suitable prelude of directions concerning the upbringing of orphans.

926e–927e

Athenian: The account we gave earlier was timely, I think: how the souls of the dead have a certain power after death by which they care for human affairs. The stories that contain this doctrine are true, though long. And while it is right to believe the other traditions about such matters, which are so numerous and extremely old, we must also believe those who lay it down by law that these things are so, unless they plainly appear to be utter fools. So if this is really how things are, the guardians shall fear, first, the gods above, who take notice of the loneliness of orphans; second, the souls of the dead, whose natural instinct is to care especially for their own offspring, and to be well disposed toward those who respect them and hostile toward those who disrespect them; and third, the souls of the living who are old and held in the highest esteem. For where the State flourishes under good laws, their grandchildren revere them with affection and live in happiness. These old people have sharp eyes and sharp ears for such matters; they are gracious toward those who deal justly in them, but they are very angry with those who abuse orphans and the abandoned, regarding these as a most solemn and sacred trust. To all these authorities the guardian and official, if he has even a spark of sense, must pay attention. He must take as much care over the upbringing and education of the orphans as if he were contributing to his own support and that of his own children, and he must do them good in every way to the utmost of his power. So the man who obeys the story placed before the law, and does no wrong whatever to an orphan, will have no direct experience of the lawgiver's anger against such offenses. But the disobedient man, and whoever wrongs anyone who has lost a father or mother, shall in every case pay double the penalty owed by the man who offends against a child whose parents are both living. As for further legal directions, either to guardians concerning orphans or to magistrates concerning the supervision of the guardians: if they did not already have a model for raising free children in the way they raise their own children and manage their own household property, and if they did not also have laws governing these same matters in detail, then it would have been reasonable enough to lay down laws on guardianship as a separate and distinct branch of law, marking off the life of the orphan from that of the non-orphan with special regulations of its own. But as things stand, in all these respects the condition of orphanhood among us does not differ much from that of being under a father's control, although, as a rule, in public esteem and in the care given to the children, the two stand on quite different levels.

928a–928e

Athenian: Therefore, in its regulations concerning orphans, the law has stressed this very point, both by encouragement and by threat. Moreover, a threat of the following kind will be very timely: Whoever is guardian of a boy or a girl, and whichever of the Law-wardens is appointed to supervise a guardian, shall show as much affection for the child whom Fate has made an orphan as for his own children, and shall care for his ward's property as zealously as for his own, or rather more so. Every guardian shall observe this one law in carrying out his office. If anyone acts in such matters contrary to this law, the magistrate shall punish him if he is a guardian; and if he is a magistrate, the guardian shall bring him before the court of the select judges and fine him double the penalty the court assesses. If the child's relatives, or any other citizen, consider a guardian guilty of neglecting or mistreating his ward, they shall bring him before the same court, and he shall pay four times the damages assessed, half of which shall go to the child and half to the successful prosecutor. When an orphan has come of age, if he thinks he has been badly cared for, he shall be allowed to bring an action concerning the guardianship within five years after it has ended. If the guardian loses his case, the court shall assess his penalty or fine. If it is a magistrate who is judged to have harmed the orphan by neglect, the court shall assess what sum he shall pay the child; but if the harm was due to unjust dealing, then in addition to the fine he shall be removed from his office of Law-warden, and the public authority of the State shall appoint another in his place to serve as Law-warden for the country and the State. Between fathers and their children, and between children and their fathers, greater differences arise than is right. In these, fathers are apt to think that the lawgiver should give them legal permission, if they wish, to have a herald proclaim publicly that their sons have legally ceased to be their sons; and sons, for their part, claim permission to indict their fathers for insanity when illness or old age has put them in a shameful condition. Such things tend to happen among people whose characters are wholly bad; for where only half of them are bad, where the son is bad and the father not, or the reverse, such hostility does not lead to calamitous consequences.

928e–929e

Athenian: Now, under a different constitution a disinherited son would not necessarily cease to be a citizen; but in our State, of which these are to be the laws, the fatherless man must necessarily emigrate to another country, since not a single household can be added to our 5040. Consequently, the person who is to suffer this punishment legally must be disinherited not by his father alone but by the whole family. Such cases should be handled under a law like this: If any man is driven by a most unhappy impulse of anger to want, rightly or wrongly, to expel from his family a son he has fathered and raised, he shall not be permitted to do this casually or immediately. First, he shall assemble his own relatives as far as cousins, and likewise his son's relatives on the mother's side, and in their presence he shall accuse his son, showing why he deserves to be expelled from the family by all of them. He shall give the son an equal amount of time to argue that he does not deserve to suffer any such treatment. If the father convinces them and wins the votes of more than half the family, the votes being cast by all the other adults of both sexes except the father, the mother, and the son who is the defendant, then in this way and on these conditions, and in no other way, the father shall be permitted to disinherit his son. As for the disinherited man, if any citizen wishes to adopt him as a son, no law shall prevent him from doing so (for the characters of young people naturally undergo many changes during their lives). But if no one has offered to adopt the disinherited man within ten years, then the officials in charge of the surplus children destined for emigration shall take charge of these persons too, so that they may be properly included in the same scheme of emigration. Again, a man may become unusually deranged through illness, old age, or bad temper, or a combination of these afflictions, while his condition goes unnoticed by everyone except those who live with him. If he regards himself as master of his own property and squanders his estate, while his son is at a loss and hesitates to indict him for insanity, then a law shall be enacted on the son's behalf. First, he shall go to the eldest Law-wardens and report his father's condition to them. After a full inquiry, they shall advise whether or not he ought to bring an indictment; and if they advise him to bring one, they shall act for him, when he brings it, as both witnesses and advocates. A father who is convicted shall from then on have no power to dispose of even the smallest bit of his property, and he shall be treated as a child in the house for the rest of his life.

929e–930e

Athenian: If a husband and wife, because of unhappy temperaments, cannot agree at all, it is right that they should be under the constant supervision of ten middle-aged members of the Board of Law-wardens, together with ten of the women in charge of marriage. If these officials can bring about a reconciliation, that arrangement shall stand; but if their passions run too high for harmony, the officials shall, as far as possible, look for other suitable partners for each of them. Since such people are probably not of a gentle disposition, the officials must try to pair them with partners of a more gentle and settled character. If those who quarrel are childless, or have only a few children, they must form new unions with a view to children; but if they have enough children, then the purpose of both the separation and the new union should be companionship and mutual support in old age. If a man's wife dies, leaving both male and female children, there shall be a law, advisory rather than compulsory, directing the husband to raise the children without bringing in a stepmother; but if there are no children, the widower must marry, until he has fathered enough children for both his household and the State. If the husband dies leaving enough children, the children's mother shall remain there and raise them. But if she is judged too young to be able to live in good health without a husband, her relatives shall report the case to the women in charge of marriage, and they shall take whatever action seems good to those women and to themselves; and if there is a shortage of children, they shall also act with a view to providing children. The law shall fix the bare sufficiency of children at one of each sex. Sometimes it is agreed who a child's parents are, but a decision is needed as to which parent the child should follow. The rule is this: in all cases where a slave woman has had relations with a slave, or with a free man or a freedman, the child shall belong to the slave woman's master; but if a free woman has relations with a slave, the offspring shall belong to the slave's master. If the child is a master's by his own slave woman, or a mistress's by her own slave, and the facts of the case are quite clear, then the women officials shall send the woman's child, together with its father, away to another country, and the Law-wardens shall send the man's child away together with its mother. Neither any god nor any sensible person would ever advise anyone to neglect his parents. One should recognize how fittingly a prelude of the following kind, dealing with the worship of the gods, would apply to the honors and dishonors paid to parents:

930e–931b

Athenian: The ancient laws of all people concerning the gods are twofold. Some of the gods we honor we see clearly; of others we set up statues as images, and we believe that when we worship these, lifeless as they are, the living gods beyond them feel great goodwill and gratitude toward us. So if anyone has a father or mother, or one of their fathers or mothers, laid up in his house, bedridden with age, let him never suppose that, while he has such a figure as this at his hearth, any statue could be more potent, provided that its owner tends it duly and rightly.

931b

Clinias: And what do you say the right way is? Athenian: I will tell you; for truly, my friends, matters of this kind deserve a hearing. Clinias: Go ahead. Athenian: Oedipus, as our story goes, when he was dishonored, called down curses on his children, curses that, as everyone says, were heard and fulfilled by Heaven. We also tell how Amyntor in his anger cursed his son Phoenix, and Theseus cursed Hippolytus, and countless other parents cursed countless other sons; and it has been clearly proved that the gods grant such curses of parents on their sons. For a parent's curse laid on his children is more potent than any other person's curse against anyone else, and most justly so. When a father or mother is dishonored by the children, God naturally pays special attention to their prayers. Are we to suppose, then, that when the parent is honored and highly pleased, and earnestly prays the gods to bless his children, the gods do not listen equally to prayers of this kind and grant them to us? For if not, they could never be just distributors of blessings; and that, we assert, would be most unfitting for gods.

931d

Clinias: Most unfitting indeed. Athenian: Let us hold, then, as we said a moment ago, that in the eyes of the gods we can possess no image more worthy of honor than a father or an ancestor laid low by old age, or a mother in the same condition. When a person honors them with gifts, God is well pleased, for otherwise He would not grant their prayers. For the shrine that is an ancestor is marvelous to us, far beyond one that is lifeless. The living ones pray for us when we tend them and pray against us when we dishonor them, while the lifeless images do neither. So if a man treats his father and his ancestors and all such kin rightly, he will possess images more potent than any others for winning him a lot blessed by Heaven.

931e

Clinias: Excellent! Athenian: Every sensible person fears and respects the prayers of parents, knowing that they have proven effective many times and in many cases. Since nature has ordered things this way, aged ancestors are a heavenly treasure to good people while they live, up to the very last hours of life, and when they depart they are deeply missed; but to the wicked they are truly fearsome. Therefore let everyone, obeying these counsels, honor his own parents with all the honors the law prescribes. If, however, report shows that anyone is deaf to such preludes, the following law will rightly be enacted to deal with them: If anyone in this State is more neglectful of his parents than is right, and fails to defer to them in all things and to fulfill their wishes more than those of his sons or any of his offspring, or even his own, the parent who suffers any such neglect shall report it, either in person or through a messenger, to the three eldest Law-wardens and to three of the women in charge of marriage. These shall take the matter in hand and shall punish the wrongdoers with lashes and imprisonment if they are still young: men up to the age of thirty, while women shall suffer the same punishment up to the age of forty. If, after passing these age limits, they do not give up the same neglect of their parents, but some of them even mistreat them, they shall be brought before a court of 101 citizens, who shall be the oldest citizens of all. If a person is convicted, the court shall assess what fine or punishment he must undergo, ruling out no penalty that a human being can suffer or pay. If a parent who is mistreated is unable to report it, any free person who hears of it shall inform the magistrates; if he fails to do so, he shall be considered base and shall be liable to an action for damages brought by anyone who wishes. If a slave gives information, he shall be set free. He shall be freed by the Board of Magistrates if he is a slave of either the injured party or the offenders; but if he belongs to any other citizen, the State Treasury shall pay his owner his price; and the magistrates shall make sure that no one harms such a man in revenge for giving information. We have already dealt fully with cases in which one person harms another with poisons so that death results; but we have not yet dealt fully with any of the lesser cases in which willful and deliberate harm is done by means of drinks, foods, or ointments. Our treatment of poisoning cases requires a division, since, given the nature of humankind, they are of two distinct kinds.

932e–933e

Athenian: The kind we have just expressly mentioned is the one in which bodies harm bodies according to the laws of nature. Distinct from this is the kind that works by sorceries, incantations, and so-called binding spells. It convinces those who attempt to cause harm that they really can do so, and it also convinces their victims that they are certainly being harmed by people who have the power of bewitchment. In all such matters it is neither easy to perceive the real truth, nor, if one does perceive it, easy to convince others. And it is futile to approach the souls of people who regard one another with dark suspicion about such things, if they happen to see molded wax figures at doorways, or at crossroads, or perhaps at the tomb of some ancestor, and to tell them to make light of all such portents, when we ourselves have no clear opinion about them. Consequently, we shall divide the law on poisoning into two parts, according to the way in which the attempt is made. As a preliminary, we shall plead, urge, and advise that no one should attempt to commit such an act, or frighten the mass of people, as if they were children, with bogeymen, and so compel the lawgiver and the judge to cure people of such fears. For, first, the man who attempts poisoning does not know what he is doing, either with respect to bodies, unless he is a medical expert, or with respect to sorceries, unless he is a prophet or diviner. So let this statement stand as the law on poisoning: Whoever poisons anyone so as to cause harm that is not fatal, either to that person himself or to his household servants, or so as to cause harm, fatal or not, to his flocks or his hives, shall be punished with death if he is a doctor and is convicted of poisoning; but if he is a layperson, the court shall assess in his case what he shall suffer or pay. If a man is judged to be acting like one who causes harm through binding spells, enchantments, incantations, or any such form of poisoning, then, if he is a prophet or diviner, he shall be put to death; but if he has no knowledge of the prophetic art and is convicted of poisoning, he shall be treated the same way as a layperson convicted of poisoning. That is, the court shall assess in his case too what seems right to them for him to suffer or pay.

933e–934e

Athenian: In all cases where one person causes damage to another by theft or violence, he shall pay the damaged party a large sum in compensation if the damage is great, and a small sum if it is small. As a general rule, everyone shall in every case pay a sum equal to the damage done, until the loss is made good; and in addition, everyone shall pay the penalty attached to his crime as a corrective. The penalty shall be lighter for one who has done wrong through another's folly, having been overpersuaded because of his youth or for some similar reason. It shall be heavier when a person has done wrong through his own folly, because of his lack of self-control regarding pleasures and pains, or under the overpowering influence of cowardly fears, or of incurable desires, envies, and rages. He shall pay the penalty not because of the wrongdoing, for what is done can never be undone, but so that in the future both he himself and those who see him punished may either utterly loathe his wrongdoing or at least largely give up such lamentable conduct. For all these reasons, and with a view to all these aims, the law, like a good archer, must aim in each case at the amount of the punishment, and above all at its fitting amount. The judge must help the lawgiver in this same task whenever the law entrusts him with assessing what the defendant must suffer or pay, while the lawgiver, like a painter, must sketch in outline cases that illustrate the rules of the written code. That, Megillus and Clinias, is the task we must now carry out as finely and as well as we can. We must state what penalties should be ordained for all cases of theft and violence, as far as the gods and the sons of gods allow us to ordain them by law. If anyone is insane, he shall not appear openly in the city. The relatives of such people shall keep them at home, by whatever means they know, or else they shall pay a penalty. A person of the highest property class shall pay one hundred drachmas, whether the person he is neglecting is a free man or a slave; one of the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina; one of the third class, three-fifths; and one of the fourth class, two-fifths. There are many different forms of madness. In the cases just mentioned it is caused by disease, but there are also cases in which it results from a naturally bad temper, reinforced by upbringing, that leads people in the course of a trivial quarrel to slander one another with loud shouting, a thing that is improper and entirely out of place in a well-ordered State. Concerning abuse there shall be this one law covering all cases: No one shall abuse anyone. If one person is disputing with another in argument, he shall either speak or listen, and he shall refrain entirely from abusing either his opponent or the bystanders.

934e–935e

Athenian: For from words, those light things, come in fact the heaviest of burdens, hatreds and feuds, when people begin by cursing one another and hurling foul abuse at each other like fishwives. The man who utters such words is gratifying a most ungracious thing, his passion, and gorging it on foul fare. By turning savage again the part of his soul that was once tamed by education, he makes a wild beast of himself through his bitter life, and wins only gall as thanks from his passion. In such disputes everyone commonly tends to go on to ridicule his opponent; but everyone who has ever made a habit of this has either failed to attain a virtuous character or else has lost much of his former nobility of mind. Therefore no one shall ever, in any way, utter such words in any holy place, or at any public sacrifice or public games, or in the market, the court, or any public assembly. In every such case the magistrate in charge shall punish the offender; if he fails to do so, he shall be disqualified from any public distinction, for disregarding the laws and failing to carry out the lawgiver's commands. If in other places anyone does not refrain from such language, whether he is the aggressor or is defending himself, any older person who meets him shall uphold the law by driving off with blows the man who indulges his passion, that evil companion; if he fails to do so, he shall be liable to the appointed penalty. We are now saying that a man caught up in the habit of abuse cannot help trying to resort to ridicule, and this is what we condemn when it is uttered in passion. What, then? Are we to accept the eagerness of comic writers to ridicule people, provided that in their comedies they use this sort of language about citizens without any show of passion? Or shall we divide ridicule into jest and earnest, and allow anyone to ridicule another in jest and without passion, but forbid anyone, as we have already said, to do so in real earnest and with passion? We must by no means go back on what we said; but we must determine by law who is to be granted this permission and who is to be refused.

935e–936e

Athenian: A composer of comedy, or of any iambic or lyric song, shall be strictly forbidden to ridicule any of the citizens, either in words or by mimicry, whether with or without passion. If anyone disobeys, the Presidents of the Games shall banish him from the country entirely on the same day; if they fail to do so, they shall be fined three minas, to be dedicated to the god whose festival is being held. Those who, as we said earlier, have been given permission to write songs about one another shall be allowed to ridicule others in jest and without passion, but not with passion and in earnest. The task of making this distinction shall be entrusted to the official in charge of the general education of the young. Whatever he approves, the composer shall be allowed to present in public; but whatever he rejects, the composer shall be forbidden either to perform himself before anyone or to be found teaching to anyone else, slave or free. If he does so, he shall be considered a base man and disobedient to the laws. The one who deserves pity is not the person who suffers from hunger or something similar, but the one who, while possessing self-control or some other virtue, or a share of it, suffers misfortune as well. So it would be a strange thing indeed if, in a constitution and State that is even moderately well ordered, a person of this kind, whether slave or free, were so completely neglected as to fall into utter beggary. Therefore the lawgiver will be safe in enacting for such cases a law something like this: There shall be no beggar in our State. If anyone tries to beg, gathering a livelihood by endless entreaties, the market-stewards shall expel him from the market, the Board of city-stewards from the city, and from any other district the country-stewards shall drive him across the border, so that the land may be wholly cleansed of such a creature. If a slave, male or female, does any damage to another person's goods, when the injured person himself has had no share in causing the damage through his own clumsy or careless handling, then the master of the one who did the damage shall either make good the damage in full or hand over the offender himself. But the master may bring a countercharge, claiming that the complaint was made by secret agreement between the offender and the injured party in order to rob him of his slave. Then he shall prosecute the person who claims to have been injured on a charge of conspiracy. If he wins his case, he shall receive double the value at which the court assesses the slave; but if he loses, he shall both make good the damage and hand over the slave. If a mule, horse, dog, or any other animal damages any property belonging to a neighbor, its owner shall pay compensation in the same way.

936e–938a

Athenian: If anyone is unwilling to serve as a witness, the person who needs his testimony shall summon him, and the person summoned shall attend the trial. If he knows the facts and is willing to testify, he shall testify; but if he denies knowing them, he shall swear by the three gods, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, that he truly has no knowledge, and once he has done so, he shall be dismissed from the case. If a person summoned as a witness does not appear with the one who summoned him, he shall be legally liable to an action for damages. If one of the judges is summoned as a witness, he shall not vote in the case after giving evidence. A free woman over forty years old shall be allowed to give evidence and to support a plea, and, if she has no husband, to bring an action; but if her husband is alive, she shall be allowed only to give evidence. A slave, male or female, and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and support a plea in murder cases only, provided they furnish adequate security that they will remain until the trial if their evidence is challenged as false. Either party in a lawsuit may challenge all or part of the evidence, provided he claims that false testimony has been given before the case is finally decided. The magistrates shall keep the challenges, sealed by both parties, and shall produce them at the trial for false testimony. If anyone is twice convicted of false testimony, no law shall compel him to testify any longer; and if three times, he shall not be allowed to testify any longer. If, after three convictions, a man dares to testify, anyone who wishes shall report him to the magistrates, and they shall hand him over to the court; and if he is found guilty, he shall be punished with death. Some people's evidence may be condemned at the trial, since they are judged to have given false testimony and so to have brought victory to the winner. In all such cases, if more than half of their evidence is condemned, the case lost because of them shall be annulled, and there shall be a dispute and a trial on whether or not the case was decided on the evidence in question; and the verdict then given, whichever way it goes, shall finally determine the outcome of the earlier lawsuits. Although there are many fine things in human life, most of them have a kind of blight growing on them that poisons and corrupts them. No one would deny that justice among people is a fine thing, and that it has civilized all human affairs. And if justice is fine, how can we deny that advocacy is also a fine thing? Yet these fine things are brought into disrepute by a kind of foul practice that cloaks itself under the fine name of an art. It claims, first, that there is a technique for handling lawsuits, and further, that this technique, by pleading one's own case and helping another to plead, is able to win the victory, whether the matters at issue in each case are just or unjust;

938a–938c

Athenian: and it also claims that both this art itself and the arguments that come from it are a gift available to anyone who gives money in return. This art, whether it is really an art or merely an artless knack acquired by habit and practice, must if at all possible never arise in our State. The lawgiver asks for compliance and for no speaking against justice, or else for such practitioners to leave for another country. If they comply, the law for its part shall keep silent; but if they do not comply, its pronouncement shall be this: If anyone is judged to be trying to turn the force of just pleas the other way in the minds of the judges, or to be multiplying lawsuits unduly or helping others to do so, anyone who wishes shall indict him for malicious litigation or for aiding malicious litigation, and he shall be tried before the court of select judges. If he is convicted, the court shall determine whether he appears to be acting from greed or from ambition. If from ambition, the court shall determine for how long such a person shall be barred from bringing an action against anyone or helping anyone to do so. If greed is his motive, then, if he is an alien, he shall be sent out of the country and forbidden to return on pain of death; but if he is a citizen, he shall be put to death because of his unscrupulous devotion to the pursuit of gain. And anyone who has twice been found guilty of committing such an act from ambition shall be put to death.

941a–941d

Athenian: If anyone, while serving as an ambassador or herald, falsely represents his State in his dealings with another State, or fails to deliver the actual message he was sent to deliver, or is shown to have brought back a false version of the reply of some nation, whether friendly or hostile, while acting as ambassador or herald, an indictment shall be brought against all such persons for breaking the law by committing impiety against the sacred messages and commands of Hermes and Zeus. If they are convicted, the penalty they are to suffer or pay shall be assessed. Theft of property is mean and unworthy of a free man; open robbery is shameless. None of the sons of Zeus has ever practiced either of these out of delight in fraud or force. So let no one be deceived on this subject, or be persuaded by poets or by any other misguided tellers of myths into believing that when he steals or robs by force he is doing nothing shameful, but only what the gods themselves do. That is neither likely nor true. Whoever acts unlawfully in this way is neither a god at all nor a child of gods, and the lawgiver, as is his duty, knows this better than the whole tribe of poets. So whoever listens to our argument is blessed, and may he be blessed for all time; but whoever does not listen shall from then on have to contend with this law: If anyone steals any piece of public property, he shall receive the same punishment whether the theft is great or small. For the one who steals something small steals with the same greed, though with less power, while the one who carries off something large that he did not put there does wrong in full. So the law does not think it right to punish either offender less than the other on the ground that his theft is smaller, but rather on the ground that one may still be curable while the other is incurable.

941d–942e

Athenian: So if anyone convicts either a resident alien or a slave in a court of law of stealing any piece of public property, the court shall decide what punishment he is to suffer or what fine he is to pay, since he is probably curable. But in the case of a citizen who has been brought up in the way he is to be brought up, if he is convicted of plundering his fatherland or doing violence to it, whether he was caught in the act or not, he shall be punished with death, as being practically incurable. Military organization calls for much deliberation and many appropriate laws. The main principle is this: nobody, male or female, should ever be left without a commander over them, and no one, whether at work or at play, should let his mind grow used to acting alone and on his own initiative. Instead, in war and in peace alike, he should always live with his eyes fixed on his commander, following his lead, and he should be guided by him even in the smallest details of his actions: for example, standing still when ordered, marching, exercising, washing, eating, getting up at night for sentry duty and for carrying dispatches, and, in moments of danger, waiting for the commander’s signal before either pursuing an enemy or retreating before one. In a word, he must train his soul by habit to avoid all thought or idea of doing anything at all apart from the rest of his company, so that the life of all is lived together as a body and in common. For there is not, and never will be, any rule superior to this, or better or more effective in securing safety and victory in war. This practice of ruling others and being ruled by others must be cultivated in peacetime from earliest childhood; but anarchy must be utterly removed from the life of all mankind, and also from that of the animals subject to human beings. Moreover, with a view to excellence in war, they shall dance all kinds of dances, and for the same purpose they shall cultivate suppleness and dexterity in general, and endurance as well, in going without food and drink, in bearing cold and heat, and in sleeping on hard beds. And, most important of all, they shall train themselves not to ruin the natural powers of the head and feet by wrapping them in coverings of foreign material, and in this way destroying the production and growth of their own natural hair and soles.

942e–943e

Athenian: For when these extremities are preserved, they keep the power of the whole body at its highest, but when they are ruined they have the opposite effect. Of these two extremities, one is the chief servant of the whole body and the other its chief master, since, by nature’s arrangement, it contains all the body’s governing senses. This is the praise of the military life that, in our view, the young ought to listen to, and its laws are these: Anyone who has been enrolled, or assigned to some duty roster, shall perform military service. If anyone, out of cowardice, fails to report without leave from the commanders, he shall be indicted for shirking service before the military officers when they return from camp. Those who served shall sit as judges, each branch by itself — hoplites, cavalry, and each of the other branches likewise — and they shall bring hoplites before hoplites, cavalrymen before cavalry, and all others in the same way before soldiers of their own branch. Anyone who is convicted shall be barred from ever competing for any distinction, from ever prosecuting another man for shirking service, and from acting as accuser on such charges; and in addition, the court shall determine what further penalty he is to suffer or pay. Next, when the suits for shirking service have been fully decided, the officers shall again hold a review of each branch, and anyone who wishes shall be judged before a court of his own comrades on his claim to an award of merit. But any proof or testimony of witnesses that the claimant produces must concern not any earlier war but only the campaign in which they have just been engaged. The prize for each branch shall be a wreath of olive leaves, which the winner shall hang up, with an inscription, in whichever temple of the war gods he chooses, to serve throughout his life as evidence that he has won the first, second, or third prize, as the case may be. If a man goes on campaign but returns home before the time without leave from the officers, he shall be liable to be indicted for desertion before the same court that deals with cases of shirking service, and if he is convicted, the same penalties already prescribed shall be imposed on him. Everyone who brings an action against another ought rightly to fear bringing a wrongful punishment on him, whether intentionally or unintentionally (for Justice is called, and truly called, the daughter of Reverence, and falsehood and wrong are by nature hateful to Reverence and Justice). He should also take care not to offend against Justice in any matter, and especially in regard to the loss of arms in battle, so that he does not, by mistakenly condemning such losses as shameful when they were really unavoidable, bring undeserved charges against an undeserving man.

943e–944e

Athenian: It is by no means easy to draw distinctions between such cases; but the law should nevertheless try somehow to distinguish one case from another. To illustrate, we may cite the story of Patroclus. Suppose he had been brought to his tent without his arms and had recovered — as has happened to thousands — while the arms he had had (which, as the poet tells us, the gods gave to Peleus as a dowry with Thetis) were in the hands of Hector. Then all the base men of that time would have been free to reproach the son of Menoetius with the loss of his arms. Moreover, there are cases of men losing their arms by being hurled down from cliffs, or at sea, or in ravines, when a sudden great rush of water overwhelmed them, or through other mishaps, countless in number, which one could mention by way of consolation, and so excuse an evil that easily lends itself to slander. It is right, therefore, to separate as well as one can the greater and more serious evil from its opposite. As a rule, in fact, the use of the names in question as terms of abuse allows a distinction: the term “shield-flinger” would not properly be applied in every case, but rather the term “arms-dropper.” For the man who is stripped of his arms by a fair amount of violence will not be a shield-flinger in the same way as the man who has voluntarily thrown them away; rather, there is a vast difference between the two cases. So let the law declare this: If a man is overtaken by his enemies while he has his arms, and instead of turning and defending himself, voluntarily drops his arms or flings them away, so gaining for himself a shameful life by speed of foot rather than a noble and blessed death by bravery, a trial shall be held concerning arms flung away in a loss of this kind; but the judge shall pass over in his inquiry a case of the kind described earlier. For one must always punish the bad man, in order to make him better, but not the unlucky man, since that does no good. What, then, would be a fitting penalty for the man who has turned such powerful weapons of defense to the opposite purpose? It is said that a god once changed Caeneus the Thessalian from a woman’s form into a man’s; but it is beyond human power to do the opposite. Otherwise the reverse transformation — changing him from a man into a woman — would perhaps be the most fitting of all penalties for a shield-flinger.

944e–945e

Athenian: As it is, to come as close as possible to this, because the man loves life at any price, and to make sure that for the rest of his life he will run no risk but will live with this disgrace hanging over him as long as possible, the law dealing with such cases shall be this: If any man is convicted on a charge of shamefully throwing away his military weapons, no general or other military officer shall ever employ him as a soldier or assign him to any rank. Otherwise, the examiner shall fine the officer who assigns the coward 1,000 drachmae if he belongs to the highest property class, five minas if to the second, three minas if to the third, and one mina if to the fourth. And the soldier who is convicted of the charge, besides being released, as his own nature requires, from manly risks, shall also pay back his wages: 1,000 drachmae if he belongs to the highest class, five minas if to the second, three if to the third, and one mina if to the fourth, just as in the previous cases. As for examiners, what would be the proper thing for us to say, since some of the magistrates are appointed by the chance of the lot and for one year, while others are appointed for several years and chosen from a list of preselected candidates? Who will be a competent examiner of such officials, if any one of them says anything crooked, or, bent under the weight of his office and his own inability to bear it worthily, acts at all crookedly? It is by no means easy to find an official over officials who surpasses them in excellence; but we must still try to find examiners of a divine quality. In fact, the situation is this. The dissolution of a political order, like that of a ship or of some living creature, depends on many critical points. In the case of a ship, though these are one in nature, they are distributed through many parts, and we call them by many names, such as stays, undergirders, and bracing cords of sinew. For the preservation of a political order, or for its dissolution and disappearance, the office of examiner is one such critical point, and of the gravest kind. For if those who examine the magistrates are better men than they are, and act blamelessly with blameless justice, then the whole State and country flourishes and is happy. But if the examination of the magistrates is carried out in any other way, then the bond of justice that holds all the political elements together as one is dissolved, and as a result every office is torn apart from every other. They no longer all tend toward the same end, and so they turn one State into many, fill it with civil strife, and quickly bring it to ruin. That is why the examiners must above all be men of admirable and complete virtue.

945e–946e

Athenian: Let us arrange for them to come into being in some such way as this. Every year, after the summer solstice, the whole State must assemble at the common precinct of Helios and Apollo, to present to the god three men from among their own number. Each citizen shall nominate the man, not less than fifty years old, whom he considers the best in every respect, apart from himself. From those so nominated they shall choose the ones who have won the most votes: half of the total number nominated if that number is even; but if it is odd, they shall drop the one with the fewest votes and keep the remaining half, separating them according to the number of votes received. If several have an equal number of votes, so that the upper half becomes too large, they shall remove the excess by dropping the youngest. Keeping the rest on the list, they shall vote again on them, and they shall continue the same process until three are left with unequal numbers of votes. If, however, all of these, or two of them, have equal votes, they shall entrust the matter to good fortune and chance, decide by lot who is first, second, and third, and crown them with olive wreaths. When they have awarded these distinctions, they shall make this public proclamation: “The State of the Magnesians, which by God’s grace has once again been kept safe, has presented to Helios the three best of its own men, and it now dedicates them, according to the ancient law, as a joint offering of its choicest first fruits to Apollo and Helios, for as long as they carry out their task of judgment.” Twelve such examiners shall be appointed in the first year, to serve until each of them reaches the age of seventy-five; after that, three shall be added every year. They shall divide all the public offices into twelve sections and examine them, using every test befitting free men. As long as they are serving as examiners, they shall live within the precinct of Apollo and Helios, where they were chosen. When they have judged the officials of the State — each examiner sometimes alone, sometimes in consultation with the others — they shall publish, by posting written records in the marketplace, what each official is to suffer or pay according to the examiners’ decision. If any official claims that he has not been judged justly, he shall summon the examiners before the select judges. If he is acquitted of the examiners’ charges, he may, if he wishes, prosecute the examiners themselves. But if he is convicted, then if the penalty the examiners imposed on him is death, he shall simply be put to death (since only one death is possible); and in the case of other penalties that can be doubled, he shall pay double. As for the examination of these examiners themselves, we must hear what it is to be and how it is to be conducted.

946e–947e

Athenian: During their lifetime, these men who have been judged worthy of the highest distinction by the whole State shall have the front seats at every festival. From their number, too, shall be chosen the leaders of every sacred delegation sent out to take part in any public sacrifices, gatherings, or other such sacred assemblies of the Greeks. These alone of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel. All of them shall be priests of Apollo and Helios, and each year the one among them judged first of those appointed that year shall be high priest; they shall inscribe his name at the head of the year, so that it may serve as a measure for dating as long as the State endures. When they die, their laying out, funeral procession, and burial shall differ from those of other citizens. Only white clothing shall be used, and there shall be no dirges or lamentations. A chorus of fifteen girls and another of boys shall stand around the bier, and they shall take turns singing a hymn in verse in praise of the priests, celebrating their blessedness in song all day long. At dawn the next day, the bier itself shall be carried to the tomb by a hundred of the young men who attend the gymnasia, chosen by the relatives of the dead man. The procession shall be led by the unmarried young men, each wearing his proper military equipment — cavalry with their horses, hoplites with their weapons, and the rest likewise. Around the bier itself, the boys, walking in front, shall sing their ancestral hymn, and behind them shall follow the girls, singing, together with all the women who are past childbearing. After them shall follow the priests and priestesses, as to a tomb that is pure, even though they are barred from approaching all other tombs — provided that the voice of the Pythian priestess approves of this arrangement. Their tomb shall be built underground, in the form of an oblong vault of porous stone, as long-lasting as possible, fitted with stone couches set side by side. When they have laid the one who has gone to his blessed rest there, they shall heap up a mound in a circle over it and plant a grove of trees around it, except on one side, so that at that point the tomb may be enlarged for all time, in case additional mounds are needed for those buried there. And every year contests in music, gymnastics, and horse racing shall be held in their honor.

947e–948e

Athenian: These shall be the rewards for those who have passed the examiners’ scrutiny. But if any of these examiners, relying on the fact of his election, shows his human frailty by becoming bad after his election, the law shall direct that anyone who wishes may indict him, and the trial shall take place in court in the following way. The court shall consist first of Law-wardens, next of the living members of the body of examiners themselves, and in addition of the court of select judges. The prosecutor shall state in his indictment that the person in question is unworthy of his distinctions and his office. If the defendant is convicted, he shall be deprived of his office, his tomb, and the other honors granted to him; but if the prosecutor fails to win one-fifth of the votes, he shall pay twelve minas if he belongs to the highest class, eight if to the second, six if to the third, and two minas if to the fourth. Rhadamanthus deserves admiration for the way, we are told, he judged lawsuits. He saw that the people of his time clearly believed in the existence of gods — naturally enough, since most people at that time were the offspring of gods, he himself among them, as the story goes. He probably thought that he should entrust lawsuits not to any human being but only to gods, from whom he obtained verdicts that were both simple and quick. For he had the disputing parties swear an oath on each matter in dispute, and in this way secured a quick and safe settlement. But nowadays, when, as we say, some people do not believe in gods at all, others hold that they pay no attention to us human beings, and a third group, made up of the most numerous and worst of people, suppose that in return for small offerings and flatteries the gods help them commit large robberies and often free them from great penalties — under such conditions the method of Rhadamanthus would no longer be suitable in lawsuits for people as they now are. Since, then, people’s opinions about the gods have changed, their laws must change as well. In lawsuits, laws framed with intelligence ought to bar both litigants from taking oaths. A person bringing an action against anyone ought to write down his charges but swear no oath, and the defendant, in the same way, ought to write down his denial and hand it to the magistrates without an oath. For surely it is a terrible thing to know full well that, since lawsuits are frequent in a State, nearly half the citizens are perjurers, even though they have no qualms about associating with one another at common meals and at other public and private gatherings.

948e–949e

Athenian: So it shall be laid down by law that a judge shall take an oath when he is about to give judgment; and oaths shall likewise be taken by anyone who is appointing public officials, whether by voting under oath or by bringing his ballot from a sacred place; by the judge of choruses or of any musical performance; and by the presidents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, or of any matters that, in human estimation, bring no profit to the one who commits perjury. But in all cases where it clearly appears that a large profit will come to the person who flatly denies a claim and swears he knows nothing, all the contending parties shall be judged by trials without oaths. And in general, during a trial, the presidents of the court shall not permit anyone to speak under oath for the sake of being believed, or to call down curses on himself and his family, or to resort to undignified pleading and sobbing like a woman, but only and always to state and to hear what is just in proper language. Otherwise, the magistrate shall stop him for straying from the point and bring him back to the matter at hand. In the case of resident aliens dealing with aliens, they shall be allowed, as now, to give and receive binding oaths from one another, if they choose; for these people will not grow old in the State, nor, as a rule, will they make their nest in it and raise others like themselves to become naturalized in the country. And in the private actions they bring against one another, they shall all have the same privilege during the trial. In all cases where a free man disobeys the State, not in acts deserving blows, imprisonment, or death, but in matters such as attendance at festivals, processions, or other public ceremonies of a similar kind — matters involving either a sacrifice in peacetime or a contribution in time of war — in all such cases the first necessity is to assess the penalty. In case of disobedience, the officials whom the State and the law appoint to exact the penalty shall take a pledge. If anyone disregards the taking of pledges, the items pledged shall be sold, and the proceeds shall go to the State. And if a greater penalty is required, the appropriate official in each case shall impose suitable penalties on the disobedient and summon them before the court, until they agree to do what they have been ordered. For a State that makes no money except from the produce of its land, and does not engage in commerce, it is necessary to decide what it should do about its citizens’ travel to foreign countries and the admission of foreigners from elsewhere. In giving advice on these matters, the lawgiver must begin by using persuasion, as far as he can.

949e–950e

Athenian: The mixing of States with States naturally produces a blending of characters of every kind, as strangers introduce new customs among strangers. This would cause enormous damage to peoples who enjoy a good political order under right laws. But most States are by no means well governed, so for them it makes no difference if their population becomes mixed through the citizens receiving strangers and through their own members visiting other States whenever any one of them, young or old, wishes to go abroad, at any time or to any place. On the other hand, for the citizens to refuse altogether either to admit others or to go abroad themselves is not a possible policy at all; and besides, it would seem to the rest of the world both rude and harsh, since they would get a reputation for using harsh language, such as that of the so-called Aliens Expulsion Acts, and for methods both tyrannical and severe. And one’s reputation in the eyes of others, whether for goodness or the opposite, is something that should never be taken lightly. For most people, however far they may be from real goodness themselves, are not equally lacking in the ability to judge whether others are bad or good. Even in the wicked there is a divine and accurate intuition, by which a great many even of the extremely wicked distinguish correctly, in what they say and think, between the better people and the worse. Accordingly, for most States it is good advice to value a good public reputation highly. The most correct and most important rule is this: the man who pursues a good reputation should himself be truly good, and he should never pursue it without goodness, if he is to be a truly perfect man. Furthermore, it would be fitting for the State we are founding in Crete to win for itself, in the eyes of the rest of the world, the best and finest reputation possible for goodness. And if it develops according to plan, there is every reason to hope that, as is natural, it will be one of the few well-ordered States and countries that the Sun and all the other gods look down upon. So with regard to travel abroad to other lands and places, and the admission of foreigners, we must act as follows. First, no man under forty years old shall be permitted to go abroad to any place whatever. Next, no one shall be permitted to go abroad in a private capacity; but in a public capacity, permission shall be granted to heralds, embassies, and certain inspection missions. It would not be appropriate to count military expeditions in war among official visits abroad.

950e–951c

Athenian: It is right to send delegations to Apollo at Pytho, to Zeus at Olympia, and to Nemea and the Isthmus, to take part in the sacrifices and games held in honor of these gods. It is right, too, that the delegates sent should be, as far as practicable, as numerous, noble, and good as possible — men who will win the State a high reputation at the sacred gatherings of peacetime and give it a glory to rival that of its warriors. When they return home, these men will teach the young that the political institutions of other countries are inferior to their own. They should also send out other observers, once they have obtained permission from the Law-wardens, of the following kind. If any of the citizens wish to study the affairs of the outside world at their leisure, no law shall prevent them. For a State that has no experience of bad people and good could never, because of its isolation, become fully civilized and perfect, nor could it preserve its laws unless it grasped them not by habit alone but also by conviction. Among the mass of people there are always some divinely inspired individuals — though only a few — whose company is of the greatest value, and they spring up in badly governed States just as much as in well-governed ones. It is always right for someone who lives in a well-ordered State to go out by sea and by land in search of such people, provided he himself is incorruptible, so as to confirm those of his native laws that are rightly enacted and to correct any that are deficient. For without this observation and inquiry a State will never remain perfect, nor will it if the observation is badly conducted.

951c

Clinias: How, then, could both these aims be achieved? Athenian: In this way. First, our overseas observer shall be more than fifty years old. Second, he shall have proven himself a man of high reputation in military matters as well as in other affairs, if he is to be sent into other States with the approval of the Law-wardens. But once he is past sixty years of age, he shall no longer serve as an observer. When he has observed for as many of the ten years as he wishes and has returned home, he shall go to the synod of those who supervise the laws. This synod shall be a mixed body of young and old men, required to meet every day from dawn until sunrise. It shall consist, first, of the priests who have won the award of merit, and second, of the ten most senior Law-wardens. It shall also include the most recently appointed Supervisor of Education, together with his predecessors in that office. None of these members shall go alone; each shall bring with him a companion, a young man between thirty and forty years old whom he has chosen himself.

951e–952e

Athenian: Their meetings and discussions shall always concern laws and their own State, any important information bearing on this subject that they may have learned elsewhere, and any branches of study that seem likely to help their inquiry, since learning them helps toward a clearer view of legal matters, while ignorance of them leaves that view dim and blurred. Whatever the older members approve among these studies, the younger members shall learn with all diligence. If any of the young men invited to attend is judged unworthy, the whole synod shall criticize the member who invited him. But those of the young men who are well thought of shall be watched over by the rest of the citizens, who shall pay special attention to them and observe them carefully, honoring them when they do right, but dishonoring them more than others if they turn out worse than most. The person who has inspected the legal institutions of other peoples shall go to this synod immediately after his return home. If he has found any people able to declare any oracle regarding legislation, education, or upbringing, or if he has brought back observations of his own, he shall share them with the whole synod. If it appears that he has come back in no way worse, though also no better, than when he left, he shall still be commended for his great zeal; but if it appears that he has come back much better, he shall be commended much more highly during his life, and when he dies, fitting honors shall be paid to him by the authority of the synod. If, on the other hand, such an observer appears to have come back corrupted, despite his claims to wisdom, he shall be forbidden to associate with anyone, young or old. If he obeys the magistrates in this, he shall live as a private person; but if not, he shall be put to death — that is, if he is convicted in a court of law of meddling in education and the laws. And if, when such a person deserves to be brought to trial, none of the magistrates brings him to trial, this shall count against the magistrates when the awards of merit are decided. This, then, shall be the character and conduct of the person who travels abroad. Next, we must deal in a friendly way with the visitor from abroad. There are four types of foreign visitor that call for comment. The first, and the one who cannot be avoided, is the visitor who as a rule chooses summer for his yearly visits, like migratory birds — and, like birds, most of these cross the sea as though they had wings, to make money by trade, and fly over to foreign cities during the summer season.

952e–953e

Athenian: When this visitor comes to the city, he must be received at the markets, harbors, and public buildings outside the city by the officials in charge of them. They shall take care that no such visitors introduce any innovation, and they shall administer justice to them properly and have as much dealing with them as is necessary, but as little as possible. The second type of visitor is an observer in the literal sense, one who comes to see with his eyes and also to hear with his ears everything that belongs to musical performances. For all such visitors, lodgings must be provided at the temples to offer them friendly hospitality, and the priests and temple keepers must look after them and attend to their needs until they have stayed a reasonable length of time and have seen and heard everything they intended. After that, if they have neither done nor suffered any harm, they shall be sent on their way. The priests shall act as their judges if anyone wrongs one of them, or one of them wrongs anyone else, provided the claim does not exceed fifty drachmae; but if any larger claim is made, such visitors must be tried before the market stewards. The third type of visitor who requires a public reception is the one who comes from another country on some public business. He must be received only by the generals, hipparchs, and taxiarchs, and the care of a visitor of this kind shall rest entirely with the official with whom he lodges, acting together with the prytaneis. The fourth type of visitor comes rarely, if ever. But if at some time an observer like those we send abroad comes from another country, he shall come on these conditions. First, he shall be not less than fifty years old; second, his purpose in coming must be to see some fine thing that surpasses in beauty anything to be found in other States, or else to show another State something of the same kind. Every visitor of this kind shall go without invitation to the doors of the rich and wise, since he himself is both rich and wise. He shall also go to the residence of the General Supervisor of Education, confident that he is a fitting guest for such a host, or to the house of one of those who have won a prize for virtue. When he has spent time with some of these, giving and receiving information, he shall depart, honored as a friend by friends with suitable gifts and distinctions. These are the laws by which they must receive all foreigners, of either sex, from another country, and send out their own citizens, so honoring Zeus, Protector of Strangers, instead of driving strangers away by means of foods and ceremonies (as the nurslings of the Nile now do), or by savage proclamations.

953e–954e

Athenian: If anyone gives security for another, he shall do so in explicit terms, setting out the whole transaction in a written record, and he shall do this in the presence of not less than three witnesses if the amount is under 1,000 drachmae, and not less than five if it is over 1,000. The broker in a sale shall act as security for the seller if the seller has no lawful right to the goods sold or is wholly unable to guarantee their possession, and the broker shall be legally liable just as the seller is. If anyone wishes to search a man’s premises, he shall do so either naked or wearing only a short tunic without a belt; and after first swearing by the gods appointed by law that he truly expects to find the object, he shall make his search. The other man shall allow him to search his house, including things both sealed and unsealed. But if a man wishes to search and the other party refuses permission, the one prevented shall take legal action, setting a value on the object sought; and anyone convicted in such a case shall pay damages of twice the assessed value. If the master of the house happens to be away from home, the occupants shall let the claimant search whatever is unsealed, and the searcher shall add his own seal to whatever is sealed and appoint anyone he chooses to guard it for five days. If the master is away longer than that, the claimant shall call in the city stewards and make his search in their presence, opening what is sealed as well, and then sealing it up again in the same way in the presence of the household and the city stewards. In cases of disputed ownership there must be a time limit, after which it will no longer be possible to dispute the claim of the person in possession. In our State no dispute is possible concerning land or houses. But in the case of anything else a man has acquired, if the possessor is seen using it in the city, the marketplace, and the temples, and no one lays claim to it, then if someone says he has been looking for it all this time, while the possessor has clearly made no attempt to hide it, and if this goes on for a year, with the possessor still keeping the article and the other still searching, then once the year has passed, no one shall be allowed to lay claim to it. And if a man uses an article openly in the countryside, though not in the city or the marketplace, and no claimant confronts him within five years, then once the five years have passed, no claim to such a possession shall be allowed. If a man uses an article indoors in the city, the time limit shall be three years; if he keeps it in a concealed place in the countryside, it shall be ten years; and if it is in a foreign country, there shall be no time limit for making a claim, whenever it is found.

954e–955e

Athenian: If anyone forcibly prevents any person — either a party himself or his witnesses — from appearing at a lawsuit, then if that person is a slave, whether his own or someone else’s, the suit shall be null and void. If the person so prevented is free, then in addition to the annulment of the suit, the offender shall be imprisoned for a year and shall be liable to prosecution for kidnapping by anyone who chooses. If anyone forcibly prevents a rival competitor in a gymnastic, musical, or other contest from appearing, anyone who wishes shall report it to the presidents of the games, and they shall allow the person who wishes to compete to enter the contest freely. But if they prove unable to do so, then if the one who prevented the competitor wins, they shall give the prize to the man who was prevented and inscribe his name as victor in whatever temples he chooses; the one who prevented him shall be forbidden to set up any votive tablet or inscription concerning such a contest, and he shall be liable for damages whether he is defeated in the contest or wins. If anyone knowingly receives any stolen article, he shall be liable to the same penalty as the thief; and the penalty for harboring an exile shall be death. Everyone shall regard the friend or enemy of the State as his own personal friend or enemy. If anyone makes peace or war with any parties privately and without public consent, the penalty in his case too shall be death. And if any section of the State makes peace or war with any parties on its own account, the generals shall bring those responsible for this action before the court, and the penalty for anyone convicted shall be death. Those who perform any service for their country must do it without accepting gifts; and it shall be no excuse, nor any acceptable argument, to say that a man ought to accept gifts for good deeds, though not for bad ones. To judge wisely, and to stand firmly by one’s judgment, is no easy thing, and the safest course is to listen to and obey the law, which says: Perform no service for gifts. Whoever disobeys, if convicted by the court, shall simply be put to death. As for contributions of money to the public treasury, every man’s property must be valued, for many reasons, and the members of each tribe must also submit to the country wardens a written record of the year’s produce. In this way the Treasury may use whichever of the two existing methods of contribution it prefers, deciding year by year whether to require a share of the whole assessed value or a share of the current year’s income, not counting the payments made for the common meals.

955e–957a

Athenian: As for votive offerings to the gods, it is proper for a reasonable man to present offerings of reasonable value. The land and the hearth are in every case already sacred to all the gods; so no one shall consecrate a second time what is already sacred. Gold and silver, which in other States are found both in private homes and in temples, are possessions that invite envy; ivory, which comes from a body the soul has left, is not a pure offering; and iron and bronze are instruments of war. But a man may offer in the public temples whatever he wishes made from a single piece of wood, and likewise of stone, and of woven fabric an amount not exceeding one woman’s work for a month. For woven fabric and other materials, white is the color fitting for the gods; dyes shall not be used, except for military decorations. The most godlike gifts are birds and images such as a single painter can complete in one day; and all other votive offerings shall be modeled on similar lines. Now that we have stated in detail how many and what divisions the State as a whole must have, and have also stated, as well as we can, the laws concerning all the most important business transactions, it will be proper to deal next with judicial procedure. Of the law courts, the first shall consist of judges chosen jointly by both plaintiff and defendant; these shall be called arbitrators, since that is a more suitable name for them than judges. The second court shall be made up of villagers and tribesmen (the tribes being divided into twelve parts). If the case is not decided in the first court, the parties shall come before these judges to contest a case involving a greater penalty; and if the defendant loses at this second trial, he shall pay, as an additional penalty, one-fifth of the assessed amount of the penalty recorded. If, dissatisfied with his judges, he wishes to contest his case before a court a third time, he shall bring it before the select judges; and if he loses again, he shall pay one and a half times the assessed amount. Again, if the plaintiff loses in the first court and is not satisfied, but goes on to the second court, then if he wins he shall receive the fifth part, but if he loses he shall pay the same fraction of the penalty. And if, dissatisfied with the earlier verdict, they proceed to the third court, the defendant, if he loses, shall pay one and a half times the penalty, as we have said, and the plaintiff one-half of it. As for the assignment of courts by lot, the filling of vacancies, the appointment of attendants for the various boards of magistrates, the times set for carrying out each of these duties, the recording of votes, adjournments, and all other necessary judicial arrangements — such as the drawing of lots for the order of trials, rules about counter-pleadings and counter-attendances, and all related matters — we have dealt with all these before. Still, it is a good thing to repeat what is true twice, or even three times.

957a–957e

Athenian: The old lawgiver, however, may pass over all such legal practices as are trivial and easy to work out, and the young lawgiver shall fill in what he has left out. For the private courts this method would be reasonable. But in connection with the public courts of the State, and all those the officials must use in managing the business of their various offices, many States already have a good number of admirable ordinances made by capable men. From these the Law-wardens must construct a code suited to the political order we are now framing, partly by comparing and correcting them, partly by testing them through experience, until each such ordinance is judged satisfactory. When they have been finally approved and sealed as completely unchangeable, the magistrates shall put them into practice for the rest of their lives. All the rules regarding silence and restrained speech on the part of the judges, and the opposite of these, and everything else that differs from the rules prevailing in other States about justice and goodness — some of this has been stated, and some will be stated at the end. Anyone who intends to be a righteous and just judge must pay attention to all these matters, and must study the written account of them that he possesses. For of all studies, the study of legal regulations, provided they are rightly framed, will prove the most effective in making the learner a better man; if it were not so, it would be in vain that our divine and admirable law bears a name akin to reason. Moreover, of all other writings and speeches — whether speeches of personal praise or blame, composed in verse or prose, written down or spoken day by day at some gathering, whether in argument or in agreement (often of a very empty kind) — of all such writings and speeches the writings of the lawgiver will serve as a test. Since the good judge possesses these within himself as a talisman against other writings and speeches, he will guide both himself and the State rightly. For the good he will secure both the preservation and the increase of what is just; and for the bad, as great a change as possible from their ignorance, intemperance, and cowardice, and, in short, from all their injustice — that is, for all the bad whose opinions are curable.

957e–958e

Athenian: But for those whose opinions are truly fixed by Fate, if such judges and leaders of judges assign death as the cure for souls in this condition (a statement that deserves to be repeated often), they will deserve praise from the whole State. When all the lawsuits for the year have been finally decided, we must have laws for the execution of the verdicts, to this effect. First, the magistrate who acted as judge shall award to the winning party all the property of the convicted party, except what the latter must necessarily keep. He shall do this in each case immediately after the vote, by means of a herald’s proclamation made in the hearing of the judges. And if the loser has not settled with the winner to their mutual satisfaction by the end of the month following the months in which the courts sit, the magistrate who tried the case shall, at the winner’s request, hand over the loser’s property to him. If the means are not available, and the shortfall is not less than one drachma, the loser shall be barred from suing anyone else until he has paid his whole debt to the winner in full; but others may bring valid actions against him. If anyone who has been condemned obstructs the court that condemned him, the officials so wrongfully obstructed shall bring him before the court of the Law-wardens, and anyone who loses such a case shall be punished with death, as guilty of subverting the whole State and its laws. Next, when a man has been born and brought up, has himself fathered and raised children, has taken a reasonable part in business dealings, paying or receiving compensation for wrongs as the case may be, and has thus grown old in due course in a law-abiding life, his end will come in the course of nature. Concerning the dead, male or female, the Interpreters shall have final authority to declare what sacred rites must be performed in honor of the gods of the underworld or of this world. No tombs, however, shall be placed on land that is farmed, whether the monument is small or great. Instead, they shall fill those places where the land is naturally suited only for this purpose — namely, to receive and hide the bodies of the dead with the least harm to the living. But as for all the places in which the earth, as our mother, naturally wishes to bring forth food for human beings, no one, living or dead, shall deprive us, the living, of them.

958e–959e

Athenian: They shall not pile up a mound higher than five men can make in five days, nor set up stone pillars larger than is needed to hold, at most, a eulogy of the dead man’s life of no more than four lines of heroic verse. As for the laying out of the body, first, it shall remain in the house only as long as is needed to establish that the person is not merely in a faint but really dead; accordingly, in a normal case, the third day will be the proper day for carrying it out to burial. As in other matters it is right to trust the lawgiver, so too we must believe him when he declares that the soul is entirely superior to the body, and that in this life what makes each of us what he is is nothing other than the soul, while the body is a likeness that accompanies each of us. So it is well said that the bodily corpses are images of the dead, but that the real self of each of us, which we call the immortal soul, departs into the presence of other gods, there, as the ancestral law declares, to give its account — a prospect to be faced with courage by the good, but with the deepest dread by the wicked. No great help can be given to the man who is dead. It was while he was alive that all his relatives should have helped him, so that in life he might live as justly and as piously as possible, and after death he might be free, in the life that follows this one, from the punishment for wickedness and sin. That being so, one should never spend extravagantly on the dead by supposing that the mass of flesh being buried is, in the truest sense, one’s own relative. Rather, one should believe that the real son or brother — or whoever else it is that a man imagines he is burying in mourning — has departed to further and fulfill his own destiny, and that it is our duty to make wise use of what we have and to spend in moderation, as though on a soulless altar to the gods below. And what counts as moderation the lawgiver will most fittingly divine. So let this be the law: Spending on the whole funeral of no more than five minas for a man of the highest property class, three minas for one of the second class, two for one of the third, and one mina for one of the fourth class shall be considered a moderate amount. The Law-wardens must necessarily perform many other duties and supervise many other matters, but by no means the least of their duties is to spend their lives keeping a constant watch over children, men, and people of every age. And above all, at the end of each person’s life, some one Law-warden must take charge of him — the one whom the relatives of the dead man call in as overseer. It shall be to his credit if the arrangements for the dead man are carried out properly and with moderation, and to his discredit if they are not.

959e–960c

Athenian: The laying out of the body and the other arrangements shall be carried out according to custom in such matters, but it is right for custom to give way to the following regulations of State law. To command or to forbid weeping for the dead is improper; but we shall forbid loud mourning and lamentation outside the house, we shall prohibit carrying the dead out onto the open roads and lamenting while the body is carried through the streets, and the funeral party must be outside the city limits before daybreak. These shall be the legal regulations on such matters. Whoever obeys them shall be free from penalty; but whoever disobeys any single one of the Law-wardens shall be penalized by all of them, with the penalty decided by all in common. All other burials of the dead, and the disposal of corpses without burial in the case of parricides, temple robbers, and all such criminals, have been dealt with and laid down in law earlier, so our task of legislation has nearly come to an end. But in every case, the full end does not consist in doing, acquiring, or founding something. Rather, we should hold that only when we have found a lasting and complete means of salvation for what we have created are we finally justified in believing that we have done all that ought to be done; until then, we must believe, the whole of our creation is incomplete.

960c

Clinias: Well said, Stranger; but explain to us still more clearly what you mean by your last remark. Athenian: Clinias, many sayings from ancient times have been finely expressed, and not the least of them, I would say, are the titles given to the Fates. Clinias: What titles do you mean? Athenian: That the first of them is Lachesis, the second Clotho, and Atropos the third, the savior — she who gives the destinies ratified by Clotho the quality of irreversibility. It is she who must also provide the State and its citizens not only with health and salvation for their bodies but also with good order under law in their souls — or rather, with the salvation of the laws. And this, it seems clear to me, is what our laws still lack: a right way of implanting this irreversible quality in them by nature.

960d–960e

Clinias: The point you raise is a serious one, if it really is impossible to find a way for everything to acquire some such quality.

960e

Athenian: But it is possible, as I now see quite clearly. Clinias: Then let us by no means give up until we have secured this very quality for the laws we have laid down; for it would be ridiculous for us to have spent all this labor on something and then not set it on any firm foundation. Athenian: You are right to urge us on, and you will find me just as ready as you are to proceed. Clinias: Very good. Then what do you say will be a means of salvation for our political order and its laws, and how will it work?

961a–961c

Athenian: Did we not say that our State must have a synod of the following kind? The ten most senior members of the body of Law-wardens at any given time shall form the synod, together with all who have won the award of merit. Moreover, those observers who have gone abroad to find out whether they could hear of anything relevant to the safekeeping of the laws, and who, believing they have succeeded, have come safely home again, shall, after undergoing a searching test, be judged worthy to take part in the synod. In addition, every member must bring with him one of the young men, not less than thirty years old, whom he has first judged suitable by both nature and training. After choosing him, he shall introduce him to the other members; if they also approve, he shall keep him as a colleague, but if they disapprove, the fact that he was originally chosen must be kept secret from everyone else, and especially from the young man who was rejected. The synod must meet early in the morning, when everyone has the most time free from other business, private or public. Was it not something like this that we described in our earlier discussion?

961c

Clinias: It was. Athenian: Returning, then, to the subject of this synod, I will say this: if someone were to set it down as an anchor for the whole State, with all the conditions it requires, then, I affirm, it would secure the salvation of everything we desire. Clinias: How so? Athenian: Now is the time for us to show no lack of zeal in stating truly what follows. Clinias: Excellently said! Go ahead as you intend.

961d

Athenian: Clinias, with regard to every object, we ought to observe what serves as its proper savior in each of its activities — as, for example, in a living creature the soul and the head are preeminently such by nature. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: Surely it is the excellence of those parts that provides salvation for every living creature. Clinias: How? Athenian: Through the presence of reason in the soul, in addition to all its other qualities, and the presence of sight and hearing in the head, in addition to everything else. So, to sum the matter up, it is the combination of reason with the finest senses, and their union into one, that would most justly be called the salvation of each living creature. Clinias: That certainly seems likely.

961e

Athenian: It does. But what kind of reason is it that, combined with the senses, will provide salvation for ships in stormy weather and in calm? On board ship, is it not the pilot and the sailors who, by combining their senses with the pilot’s reason, secure salvation both for themselves and for everything that belongs to the ship? Clinias: Of course. Athenian: There is no need for many examples to illustrate this. Consider, for instance, what target a general should rightly set himself to aim at in the case of an army, or the medical profession in the case of a human body, if they were aiming at salvation. Would not the general make victory and mastery over the enemy his target, while the target of doctors and their assistants would be providing health for the body?

962a

Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: But if a doctor were ignorant of the bodily condition we have just called health, or a general ignorant of victory, or anyone ignorant of the other matters we have mentioned, could he possibly be thought to possess reason about any of these things? Clinias: How could he? Athenian: Now, what shall we say about a State? If a man were plainly ignorant of the political target to be aimed at, would he, first of all, deserve the title of magistrate, and, secondly, would he be able to secure the salvation of something whose aim he knows nothing about at all?

962b

Clinias: How could he? Athenian: So now, in our present case, if our settlement of the country is to be finally completed, there must, it seems, be some element in it that knows, first, what this political aim we are speaking of really is, and, secondly, in what way it may attain this aim, and which of the laws, first of all, and then which of the people, give it good or bad advice. But if any State lacks such an element, it will not be surprising if, being thus without reason and without sense, it always acts at random in everything it does.

962c

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: In which, then, of the parts or institutions of our State do we now have anything so constructed as to prove an adequate safeguard of this kind? Can we answer that question? Clinias: No, Stranger, at least not clearly. But if I have to guess, it seems to me that this argument of yours is leading up to that synod which, as you said just now, has to meet at night.

962d

Athenian: An excellent answer, Clinias! And, as our present argument shows, this synod must possess every virtue. The first virtue is not to keep shifting its aim among many objects, but to keep its eye always fixed on one particular target and, so to speak, to shoot all its arrows continually at that one target. Clinias: Most certainly. Athenian: So now we shall understand that it is not at all surprising if the legal customs of States keep shifting, since different parts of the legislation in each State look in different directions. And in general, it is not surprising that for some statesmen the aim of justice is to enable a certain group of people to rule in the State, whether they are actually better or worse; for others the aim is how to become rich, whether or not they are someone’s slaves; and others again direct their efforts toward winning a life of freedom. Still others make two objects at once the joint aim of their legislation — gaining freedom for themselves and mastery over other States; while those who, in their own opinion, are the wisest of all aim not at one object only but at all of these and similar objects together, since they cannot name any one object of preeminent value toward which they would want everything else to be directed.

963a

Clinias: Then, Stranger, wasn’t the view we stated long ago the right one? We said that all our laws must always aim at one single object, and we agreed that this is quite rightly named virtue. Athenian: Yes. Clinias: And we said that virtue consists of four things. Athenian: Certainly. Clinias: And that the leader of all four is reason, at which the other three, as well as everything else, should aim. Athenian: You follow us admirably, Clinias; now follow us in what comes next as well. In the case of the pilot, the doctor, and the general, reason is directed, as we said, toward the one object of aim that is proper in each case. Now we have reached the point of examining reason in the case of a statesman, and, addressing it as if it were a person, we shall question it like this: “My admirable friend, what is your aim? Medical reason can state clearly the one single object at which it aims. Will you, then, be unable to state your one object — you who are superior, as you would perhaps say, to all the wise?” Megillus and Clinias, can you two define that object on his behalf and tell me what you say it is, just as I, on behalf of many others, defined their objects for you?

963c

Clinias: We are entirely unable to do so. Athenian: Well then, can you say that we need to make an earnest effort to discern both the object itself as a whole and the forms it takes? Clinias: Give an example of what you mean by the forms you speak of. Athenian: For example, when we said that there are four forms of virtue, it is clear that, since there are four, we must say that each is a separate one. Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: And yet we call them all by one name. We say that courage is virtue, and wisdom is virtue, and the other two likewise, as though they were really not a plurality but solely this one thing — virtue.

963d

Clinias: Very true. Athenian: Now it is not hard to explain how these two, and the others, differ from one another and how they have come to have two names; but to explain why we have given the one name “virtue” to both of them, and to the others, is no longer an easy matter. Clinias: What do you mean? Athenian: It is not hard to make my meaning clear. Let one of us take the role of questioner and the other of answerer. Clinias: How so?

963e

Athenian: Ask me this question: why, when we call both of them by the single name of virtue, did we again speak of them as two, courage and wisdom? Then I shall tell you the reason. It is that one of them, courage, has to do with fear, and beasts share in it too, as do the characters of very young children; for a courageous soul comes into being naturally and without reasoning. But without reasoning there has never yet come into being, nor is there now, nor will there ever be, a soul that is wise and rational, since it is a different kind of thing. Clinias: That is true.

964a–964b

Athenian: You have now learned from my answer how they differ and are two. So now it is your turn to tell me how they are one and the same. Imagine that you are also going to tell me how, although they are four, they are still one; and then, once you have shown me how they are one, ask me in turn how they are four. After that, let us consider whether the person who has full knowledge of any objects that have both a name and a definition ought to know only the name and not the definition, or whether it is not shameful for a man of any worth to be ignorant of all these points in matters of surpassing beauty and importance.

964b

Clinias: It certainly seems so. Athenian: For the lawgiver and the Law-warden, and for the man who thinks he surpasses everyone in virtue and has won prizes for just these qualities, is there anything more important than the very qualities we are now discussing — courage, self-control, justice, and wisdom? Clinias: Impossible. Athenian: In these matters, is it not right that the interpreters, the teachers, and the lawgivers, as the wardens of the rest, should surpass all others in the skill of teaching the nature of vice and virtue and explaining it fully, whether they are dealing with someone who needs knowledge and information, or with someone who needs punishment and rebuke for his wrongdoing? Or is some poet who comes into the State, or someone who calls himself a trainer of the young, to be considered plainly superior to the man who has won prizes for every virtue? In a State like that, where there are no wardens competent in both word and deed and possessing an adequate knowledge of virtue — is it surprising, I ask, if such a State, unguarded as it is, suffers the same fate as many of the States that exist today?

964d

Clinias: Not at all, I would say. Athenian: Well then, must we do what we are now proposing, or what? Must we arrange for our wardens to have a more precise grasp of virtue, in both word and deed, than most people have? Otherwise, how will our State resemble the head and senses of a wise man, on the ground that it has a similar kind of wardenship within itself? Clinias: What is this resemblance we are speaking of, and in what does it consist?

964e

Athenian: Clearly we are comparing the State itself to the skull; and, among the wardens, the younger ones, who are chosen as the most intelligent and quick-witted in every part of their souls, are set, as it were, like the eyes at the top of the head, and survey the State all around. Athenian: As they keep watch, they pass on their perceptions to the organs of memory — that is, they report to the older wardens everything that happens in the State — while the old men, who are compared to reason because of their outstanding wisdom in many important matters, act as counselors and make use of the young men as their assistants and also as colleagues in their deliberations. In this way both groups, by working together, truly secure the salvation of the whole State. Is this the way it should be, or should we arrange something else? Should the State, do you think, have all its members equal, instead of having some who are more highly trained and educated?

965a

Clinias: No, my good friend, that would be impossible. Athenian: We must go on, then, to set out a kind of education more rigorous than the one described before.

965b

Clinias: I suppose so. Athenian: Will the kind we hinted at just now prove to be the one we need? Clinias: Certainly. Athenian: Did we not say that a first-class craftsman or warden in any field must not only be able to pay attention to the many but must also be able to press on toward the One, so as to recognize it, and, having recognized it, to survey and organize everything else with a single eye to it? Clinias: Quite right.

965c

Athenian: Can anyone get a more accurate vision and view of any object than by being able to look from the many and dissimilar things to the one unifying form? Clinias: Perhaps not. Athenian: It is certain, my friend, not merely probable, that no one can possibly have a clearer method than this. Clinias: I trust you, Stranger, and I agree; so let us use this method in the rest of our discussion. Athenian: Naturally, then, we must compel the wardens of our divine political order too to see precisely, first of all, what the common element is that runs through all four virtues — the element that, since it exists as a unity in courage, self-control, justice, and wisdom, may justly be called, as we say, by the single name of virtue. This, my friends, if we are willing, we must now hold onto very tightly and not let go until we have adequately explained the essential nature of the object we must keep in view — whether, that is, it exists by nature as a unity, or as a whole, or as both, or in some other way. Otherwise, if this escapes us, can we possibly suppose that we will adequately grasp the nature of virtue, when we cannot say whether it is many, or four, or one? So if we follow our own advice, we will find some way or other to make sure that this knowledge exists in our State. If, however, we decide to drop the matter entirely, then drop it we must.

965e

Clinias: No, Stranger, by the god who protects strangers, we must by no means drop a matter like this, since what you say seems to us entirely true. But how is this to be arranged?

966a

Athenian: It is too early to explain how we are to arrange it. Let us first make sure that we agree among ourselves whether or not we ought to do so. Clinias: Well, surely we ought, if we can. Athenian: Very well, then. Do we take the same view about the beautiful and the good? Should our wardens know only that each of these is a plurality, or should they also know how and in what way each is a unity? Clinias: It is fairly obvious that they must also understand how these are a unity.

966b

Athenian: Well then, should they understand it but be unable to demonstrate it in words? Clinias: Impossible! The state of mind you describe is that of a slave. Athenian: Well then, do we take the same view about all forms of goodness — that those who are to be real wardens of the laws must really know their true nature, and be able both to explain it in words and to follow it in action, judging fine actions and shameful ones according to their real character? Clinias: Certainly.

966c–966d

Athenian: And is not one of the finest things the doctrine about the gods that we set out so earnestly — knowing both that they exist and how great a power they evidently possess, as far as a human being is capable of learning these matters? So while we should pardon the mass of the citizens if they merely follow the letter of the law, we must exclude from office anyone eligible for wardenship who does not work hard to grasp every proof there is about the existence of gods. This exclusion from office consists in never choosing as a Law-warden, or counting among those approved for excellence, a man who is not himself divine and has not labored over divine things.

966d

Clinias: It is certainly just, as you say, that the man who is lazy or incapable in this subject should be strictly kept out of the ranks of the noble. Athenian: Are we sure, then, that among the things we discussed earlier there are two that lead to belief in the gods? Clinias: Which two? Athenian: One is our doctrine about the soul — that it is the oldest and most divine of all the things whose motion, when it has developed into becoming, provides an ever-flowing source of being. The other is our doctrine concerning the ordered motion of the stars and of all the other bodies under the control of reason, which has made a cosmos of the All.

966e–967a

Athenian: For no one who has studied these things seriously, and not in a careless or amateurish way, has ever proved so godless as not to be affected by them in exactly the opposite way from what most people expect. For they imagine that those who study these things through astronomy and the other necessary allied sciences become atheists, because they observe, as they suppose, that all things come into being by necessary forces and not by the mental energy of a will aiming at the fulfillment of good.

967a

Clinias: What, in fact, is the real situation? Athenian: The situation now, as I said, is exactly the opposite of what it was when those who studied these objects thought them soulless. Even then they were objects of wonder, and all who studied them precisely suspected what is now the accepted conviction: that if they were soulless, and therefore without reason, they could never have used such marvelously precise calculations. Even in those days some dared to risk the claim that reason is what orders everything in the heavens. But these same thinkers, mistaking the nature of the soul and imagining that she is later than the body instead of earlier, turned the whole universe upside down again, so to speak, and themselves most of all. For as far as the visible objects before their eyes were concerned, everything that moves through the heavens seemed to them to be full of stones, earth, and many other soulless bodies, which distribute the causes of the whole cosmos. These were the views that, at that time, brought these thinkers many charges of atheism and much hostility, and that also prompted the poets to abuse them, comparing philosophers to dogs howling in vain, along with other senseless slanders. But today, as we have said, the situation is quite the opposite.

967d

Clinias: How so? Athenian: It is impossible for any mortal man to become steadfastly god-fearing unless he grasps the two truths now stated: that the soul is the oldest of all things that share in generation, that it is immortal, and that it rules over all bodies. In addition to this, he must also grasp the reason that, as we have often said, governs what exists among the stars, together with the necessary preliminary sciences. He must also see the connection of music theory with these, and apply it harmoniously to the institutions and rules of ethics; and he must be able to give a rational account of everything that admits of one.

968a–968b

Athenian: Anyone who cannot master these sciences, in addition to the ordinary civic virtues, will never make a competent magistrate of the whole State, but only an assistant to other magistrates. And now, Megillus and Clinias, it is at last time to consider whether, in addition to all the laws we have already stated, we shall add this one as well: that the nocturnal synod of magistrates shall be legally established, sharing in all the education we have described, to keep watch over the State and secure its salvation. Or what are we to do?

968b

Clinias: Of course we shall add this law, my excellent friend, if we can possibly do so, even to a small extent. Athenian: Then truly, let us all strive to do so. In this you will find me a most willing helper, given my very long experience and study of this subject; and perhaps I shall find other helpers besides myself. Clinias: Well, Stranger, we most certainly must go forward along the path on which God too, it seems, is leading us. But what is the right method for us to use? That is what we must now discover and state.

968c

Athenian: At this stage, Megillus and Clinias, it is not possible to enact laws for such a body until it has been properly organized; once it has been, its members must themselves lay down what authority they should have. But it is already clear that what is needed to form such a body, if it is to be formed rightly, is teaching through long and frequent discussions. Clinias: How so? What are we to understand by this remark? Athenian: Surely we must first draw up a list of all those who are suited for the office of warden by age, intellectual ability, and moral character and habits. But as for the next point, the subjects they should learn, it is neither easy to discover these for oneself nor easy to find someone else who has discovered them and learn from him. Moreover, with regard to time limits — when and for how long they ought to receive instruction in each subject — it would be pointless to lay down written regulations. For not even the learners themselves could be sure that they were learning at the right time until each of them had acquired some knowledge of the subject in question within his soul. Accordingly, although it would be wrong to call all these matters indescribable, they should be called imprescribable, since prescribing them in advance does nothing to clarify the question under discussion.

968e

Clinias: Then what must we do, Stranger, in these circumstances? Athenian: It seems, my friends, that, as the saying goes, we must take our chance with the crowd; and if we are willing to stake the whole political order on a throw of the dice and, as people say, roll three sixes or three aces, then that is what must be done. I will share the risk with you by stating and explaining my views on education and upbringing, the subject that our discussion has now raised again. But truly, the risk will be no small one, nor comparable to any other. And you, Clinias, I especially urge to pay close attention to this matter. For as for the State of the Magnesians — or whatever other name the god gives your State — if you set it up rightly, you will win the very highest renown, or at any rate you will inevitably gain the reputation of being the boldest of all who come after you. If this divine synod actually comes into being, my dear colleagues, we must hand the State over to it; and practically none of today’s lawgivers would dispute this. Then we shall have as an accomplished fact and a waking reality what we touched on only a little while ago in our discussion as a mere dream, when we sketched a kind of picture of the union of reason and the head — if, that is, we have the members carefully selected and suitably trained, and after their training settled in the acropolis of the country, and so finally made into wardens whose equal in excellence at safeguarding we have never before seen in our lives.

969c

Megillus: My dear Clinias, from everything that has now been said, it follows that either we must give up the idea of founding the State, or else we must keep this Stranger here and, by entreaties and every possible means, secure his partnership in the task of founding the State. Clinias: That is perfectly true, Megillus. I will do as you say, and you must help me yourself.

969d

Megillus: I will help you.