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Honoring the Soul

Athenian
A stranger from Athens
Clinias
A Cretan from Knossos
Megillus
A Spartan

Athenian

726a Let everyone who has just heard the rules about the gods and our dear ancestors now listen. Of all a man’s own possessions, the most divine, after the gods, is his soul, since it is most truly his own. For everyone, a man’s own possessions are always of two kinds. The stronger and better are the ruling elements, and the weaker and worse are those that serve. So among one’s own possessions one must always honor those that rule above those that serve.

Athenian

727a–727e That is why, when I urge people to honor their own souls second, after the gods who rule and the divinities who follow them, I am giving correct advice. But hardly any of us honors the soul correctly, although we think we do. For honor is something divine and good, and nothing evil is worthy of honor. A man may think he can exalt his soul by words or gifts or concessions while doing nothing to make it any better than it was. He thinks he is honoring it, but in fact he is not doing so at all. For example, every boy, as soon as he has grown to be a man, considers himself capable of learning everything. He supposes that he honors his soul by praising it and by eagerly letting it do whatever it likes. But by acting this way, as we now declare, he is not honoring his soul but harming it; whereas, we maintain, he ought to honor it second, after the gods. Again, a man may always hold others, not himself, responsible for his own sins and for most of his evils, including the greatest, and always exempt himself from blame. He imagines that he is honoring his own soul in this way, but he is very far from honoring it, since he is doing it harm. Again, when a man gives in to pleasures contrary to the counsel and approval of the lawgiver, he is in no way honoring his soul. Rather, he dishonors it by filling it with evils and remorse. Again, take the opposite case, when toils, fears, hardships, and pains are recommended, and a man flinches from them instead of enduring them firmly. Then by flinching he does his soul no honor, for by all such actions he makes it dishonored. Again, when a man regards life at any price as a good thing, then too he does not honor his soul but dishonors it. For when his soul imagines that everything in Hades is evil, he gives in to it instead of resisting. He does not teach his soul and convince it that, for all it knows, the realm of the gods below may, on the contrary, hold the greatest of all our blessings. Again, when a man honors beauty above goodness, this is nothing other than a real and complete dishonoring of the soul. Such a view claims that the body is more honorable than the soul, and the claim is false, since nothing born of the earth is more honorable than the things of heaven. Whoever thinks otherwise about the soul does not realize that what he possesses in it, and neglects, is a most admirable thing.

Athenian

727e–728e Again, a man may be eager to acquire wealth dishonorably, or feel no scruple about acquiring it that way. He does not then honor his soul with his gifts. Far from it! For he is trading away what is honorable and noble in it for a handful of gold; yet all the gold on the earth or under it is not worth as much as goodness. To put it briefly: the lawgiver lists and classifies certain things as shameful and evil on the one hand, and others as noble and good on the other. Whoever refuses to avoid the first kind by every means, and to practice the second kind with all his strength, does not realize what he is doing. Anyone who acts this way is treating his soul, that most divine of things, in the most dishonorable and disgraceful manner. Hardly anyone takes into account what people call the greatest judgment on wrongdoing. That greatest judgment is this: to grow like men who are wicked, and in growing like them, to shun good men and good counsels and cut oneself off from them, while clinging to the company of the wicked and following after them. And whoever is joined to such men inevitably does and suffers what such men by nature do to one another, and says what they say. Now this resulting condition is not a judgment, since justice and judgment are honorable things. It is a punishment, a suffering that follows on injustice. Both the man who undergoes it and the man who does not are equally wretched: the one because he remains uncured, the other because he is destroyed so that many others may be saved. So we declare that honor, generally speaking, consists in following what is better, and in doing our utmost to improve what is worse, when it is capable of improvement. Nothing a human being possesses is better suited by nature than the soul to avoid evil, to track down and seize what is best of all, and, once it has seized it, to live in fellowship with it for the rest of life. That is why the soul is placed second in the order of honor. As for the third place, everyone would realize that it naturally belongs to the honor due to the body. But here again one has to examine the various forms of honor, to see which of them are genuine and which are counterfeit; and this is the lawgiver’s task. Now, as I suppose, he declares that the honors are these and of this kind. The honorable body is not the beautiful body, nor the strong, nor the swift, nor the large, nor even the body that is healthy, although many believe it is. Nor is it a body of the opposite kind to any of these. Rather, the bodies that hold the middle position between all these opposite extremes are by far the most balanced and the most stable. For the one extreme makes souls puffed up and arrogant, and the other makes them lowly and spiritless.

Property, Children, and Social Duties

Athenian

728e–729e The same holds for the possession of money and property, and these are to be valued on a similar scale. In each case, when they are excessive, they produce hostilities and feuds both in States and in private life, while when they are deficient they generally produce servitude. And no one should love riches for the sake of his children, in order to leave them as wealthy as possible; for that is good neither for them nor for the State. For the young, the most harmonious and best fortune of all is one that attracts no flatterers yet does not lack necessities. It is in tune and in harmony with us, and so it makes our life free of pain in every respect. A man should leave his children an abundance of modesty, not of money. We imagine that the way to leave them this is to scold the young for their shamelessness. But no such result comes from the advice commonly given to the young nowadays, when people tell them that the young must show reverence to everyone. Instead, the prudent lawgiver will urge the older people to show reverence to the young. Above all, he will urge them to take care that none of the young ever sees or hears any of them doing or saying anything shameful; for where the old are shameless, the young are bound to be extremely impudent too. The most effective way to train the young, and the older people themselves as well, is not by admonition. It is by visibly practicing throughout one’s own life the admonitions one gives to others. A man may honor and revere his kindred and everyone who shares in the worship of the tribal gods and is sprung from the same blood. In proportion to his piety, he will win the goodwill of the gods of Birth toward the fathering of his own children. Moreover, a man will find his friends and companions kindly disposed toward him in the dealings of life if he rates the value and importance of the services they do him more highly than they do themselves. At the same time, he must count the favors he does them as worth less than his friends and companions themselves consider them. With regard to his State and fellow citizens, by far the best man is the one who would prefer a reputation for victory in service to the laws of his homeland to a victory at Olympia or in any other contest of war or peace. He would want to be known as the one man above all others who has served those laws with distinction throughout his life. Further, a man should regard contracts made with strangers as especially sacred. For practically all the sins committed by strangers and against strangers, compared with those among citizens, are more closely tied to an avenging god.

Athenian

729e–730e For the stranger, since he has no companions or kindred, is more to be pitied by men and gods. So the one who is most able to avenge him comes to his aid most readily. And the most able of all, in every case, is the strangers’ daemon and god, and these follow in the train of Zeus Xenios. Anyone, then, who has even a little forethought will take the greatest care to go through life to the very end without committing any offense against strangers. Of offenses against strangers or natives, the one involving suppliants is in every case the gravest. When a suppliant has obtained a pledge with a god as witness and is then cheated of it, that god becomes the special guardian of the one who is wronged. So he will never suffer wrong without vengeance being taken for his wrongs. As for a man’s social relations with his parents, himself, and his own possessions, and with the State, friends, and kindred, whether foreign or domestic, our account is now fairly complete. It remains next to describe the character that contributes most to a noble life. After that we shall have to state all the matters that are subject not to law but rather to praise and blame. These are the means by which individual citizens are educated and made more manageable and well disposed toward the laws that are to be imposed on them. Of all good things, for gods and men alike, truth comes first. Every man who intends to become blessed and happy should share in it from his earliest days, so that he may live as a truthful man for as long as possible. Such a man is trustworthy; but the man who loves the voluntary lie is untrustworthy, and the man who loves the involuntary lie is senseless, and neither of these two is to be envied. For everyone who is either faithless or foolish is friendless. Since, as time goes on, he is found out, he is preparing for himself in his miserable old age, at the close of life, a complete solitude. In it his life becomes almost equally desolate whether his companions and children are living or dead. The man who does no wrong is indeed worthy of honor. But the man who, in addition, does not allow wrongdoers to do wrong is worthy of more than twice as much honor as he. For the first counts as one man, but the second counts as many, since he informs the magistrates of the wrongdoing of the others. And let the man who also helps the magistrates punish, as far as he is able, be publicly proclaimed the Great Man of the State, the perfect man, the winner of the prize for excellence. The same praise should be given to self-control and to wisdom, and to all the other good things that their possessor can not only keep for himself but also share with others.

Sharing Virtue and Restraining Self-Love

Athenian

730e–731e The man who shares these goods in this way should be honored as highest in merit, and the man who would gladly share them but cannot, as second. But a man may be jealous and unwilling to share any good things with anyone in a friendly spirit. Then the man himself must be blamed, but what he possesses must not be valued any less because of its possessor; rather, one should strive to gain it with all one’s might. Let every one of us be ambitious to gain excellence, but without jealousy. For a man of this kind enlarges a State, since he strives hard himself and does not hold others back by slander. The jealous man, however, thinks that slandering others is the best way to secure his own superiority. He makes less effort himself to win true excellence, and he disheartens his rivals by getting them unjustly blamed. In this way he leaves the whole State poorly trained for competing in excellence and, for his part, makes it smaller in good repute. Every man ought to be both passionate and gentle in the highest degree. On the one hand, other men’s wrongdoings may be cruel and hard to remedy, or even wholly incurable. Then there is no escaping them except by fighting and defending oneself victoriously and by punishing with the utmost rigor; and no soul can do this without noble passion. On the other hand, when men commit wrongs that can be remedied, one should first recognize that every wrongdoer does wrong involuntarily. For no one anywhere would ever voluntarily take on any of the greatest evils, least of all in his own most precious possessions. And the most precious possession of every man, in very truth, is the soul, as we have said. No one, therefore, will voluntarily take the greatest evil into this most precious thing and live with it all his life long. Now in general the wrongdoer and the person who has these evils are to be pitied. But it is permissible to show pity to the man whose evils are curable, to restrain one’s passion and treat him gently, and not to keep on raging like a scolding wife. In dealing with the man who is completely and obstinately perverse and wicked, however, one must give free rein to anger. That is why we say that the good man must always be both passionate and gentle. There is an evil, greater than all others, which most people have implanted in their souls. Each of them excuses it in himself and makes no effort to escape it. It is the evil expressed in the saying that every man is by nature a lover of self, and that it is right for him to be so. But the truth is that the cause of all sins, in every case, lies in a person’s excessive love of self.

Athenian

731e–732e For the lover is blind about the object of his love, so he judges badly what is just and good and noble. He thinks that he should always value what is his own more than what is true. But the man who is to attain the title of Great must be devoted neither to himself nor to his own possessions, but to what is just, whether it happens to be done by himself or rather by someone else. And it is from this same sin that everyone has also derived the notion that his own folly is wisdom. As a result, though we know practically nothing, we imagine that we know everything. And since we will not entrust to others the doing of things we do not understand, we necessarily go wrong in doing them ourselves. So every man must avoid excessive self-love and always follow someone better than himself, never letting any shame hold him back from doing so. There are precepts less important than these, which are often repeated but are no less useful. A man should repeat them to himself as reminders. For where there is a constant outflow, there must also be a matching inflow, and when wisdom flows away, the proper inflow is recollection. So people must refrain from untimely laughter and tears. Every man must urge every other man to try to conceal all display of extreme joy or sorrow, and to conduct himself with decorum, both when their guardian spirit stands with them in prosperity and when spirits oppose their actions, as though they were facing high, steep ground. They should always hope that God, by the blessings he gives, will lessen the troubles that fall on them, and will change their present evils for the better. As for their blessings, they should hope that these, on the contrary, will be increased with the help of good fortune. Every man should live in these hopes and in the recollection of all such truths, sparing no effort. He should constantly recall them clearly both to himself and to his neighbor, at work and at play alike. So, with regard to the right character of institutions and the right character of individuals, we have now laid down practically all the rules that have divine sanction. Those of human origin we have not yet stated, but state them we must, since our conversation is with men, not gods. Pleasures, pains, and desires are by nature especially human. Every mortal creature, so to speak, necessarily hangs from them and depends on them by the strongest cords of influence.

Pleasure and the Virtuous Life

Athenian

732e–733e So one should praise the noblest life not merely because it is superior in form with respect to good reputation. It is also because, if a man is willing to taste it and does not run from it in his youth, it is superior as well in what all people seek, namely an excess of joy and a shortage of pain throughout the whole of life. That this will clearly be the result, if a man tastes it rightly, will at once become fully evident. But what does this rightness consist of? That is the question we must now consider, taking our Argument as our guide. We must compare the more pleasant life with the more painful, and consider in the following way whether one mode is natural to us and the other unnatural. We want pleasure for ourselves, but pain we neither choose nor want. The neutral state we do not want in place of pleasure, but we do want it in exchange for pain. We want less pain with more pleasure, but we do not want less pleasure with more pain. And when the two are evenly balanced, we cannot state any clear preference. Now all these states, in their number, quantity, intensity, and equality, and in their opposites, either do or do not influence desire in governing its choice of each. Since these things are necessarily ordered in this way, we want the life in which the feelings are many, great, and intense, with those of pleasure predominating. But we do not want the life in which the feelings of pain predominate. Conversely, we do not want the life in which the feelings are few, small, and gentle if the painful ones predominate; but if the pleasurable ones predominate, we do want it. Further, we must regard the life in which pleasure and pain are evenly balanced in the same way that we regarded the neutral state before. We want the balanced life insofar as it exceeds the painful life in what we like, but we do not want it insofar as it exceeds the pleasant lives in the things we dislike. All our human lives must be regarded as naturally bound up with these feelings, and we must determine what kinds of life we naturally want. If we claim to want anything else, we say so only out of ignorance and inexperience of lives as they really are. What, then, are the lives, and how many are there, in which a man may live as happily as a human being can? I mean a man who has chosen the desirable and voluntary in preference to the undesirable and involuntary, and has made this a private law for himself by choosing what is at once congenial and pleasant and best and noblest. Let us declare that one of them is the life of self-control, one the wise, and one the brave, and let us count the healthy life as one; 733e–734e and against these let us set four others: the foolish, the cowardly, the licentious, and the diseased. Whoever knows the life of self-control will describe it as gentle in every respect, offering mild pains and mild pleasures, moderate appetites, and desires free of frenzy. But the licentious life he will describe as violent in every direction, offering extreme pains and pleasures, intense and maddening appetites, and the most frenzied desires possible. In the life of self-control the pleasures outweigh the pains, whereas in the licentious life the pains exceed the pleasures in size, number, and frequency. It necessarily follows that the one life is naturally more pleasant to us and the other more painful. It is no longer possible for a man who wants a pleasant life to live licentiously by choice. Instead, it is now clear, if our argument is right, that no one can possibly be licentious voluntarily. It is because of ignorance or lack of self-control, or both, that the great mass of humankind lives without self-control. Similarly, with regard to the diseased life and the healthy life, one must observe that both have pleasures and pains. But in health the pleasures exceed the pains, while in disease the pains exceed the pleasures. Our wish in choosing lives is not that pain should predominate; the life we have judged the more pleasant is the one in which pain is exceeded by pleasure. We will say, then, that the life of self-control has its feelings smaller, fewer, and lighter than the licentious life, and the wise life than the foolish, and the brave than the cowardly. And since the one life surpasses the other in pleasure but falls short of it in pain, the brave life defeats the cowardly and the wise defeats the foolish. Consequently, the one set of lives ranks as more pleasant than the other: the self-controlled, brave, wise, and healthy lives are more pleasant than the cowardly, foolish, licentious, and diseased. To sum up, the life of bodily and spiritual virtue, compared with the life of vice, is not only more pleasant but also far surpasses it in nobility, rightness, virtue, and good reputation. So it makes the man who lives it live far more happily than the one who lives the opposite life. This is as far as we have taken the prelude to our laws, and here let that statement end. After the prelude the tune must necessarily follow, or rather, to be strictly accurate, a sketch of the organization of the State.

Selecting the Citizens

Athenian

734e–735e Now, in a piece of webbing or any other woven article, it is not possible to make both the warp and the woof from the same materials. The stuff of the warp must be of better quality, since it is strong and is made firm by its twisting, whereas the woof is softer and shows a proper degree of flexibility. From this we may see that in some such way we must mark out those who are to hold high offices in the State and those who are to hold low offices, after applying an adequate educational test in each case. For there are two divisions of State organization: one is the appointment of individuals to office, and the other is the assignment of laws to the offices. But in fact, before we deal with all these matters, we must observe the following. When dealing with a flock of any kind, the shepherd or cowherd, or the keeper of horses or of any such animals, will never attempt to care for it until he has first applied to each group of animals the appropriate purge. That is, he separates the sound from the unsound and the well-bred from the ill-bred, sends the latter off to other herds, and keeps the former under his own care. For he considers that his labor would be pointless and endless if it were spent on bodies and souls that nature and bad rearing have combined to ruin. These animals themselves bring ruin on a stock that is sound and clean in both habits and body, whatever the kind of beast, unless a thorough purge is made in the existing herd. In the case of other animals this matters less and deserves mention only as an illustration. But in the case of human beings it is of the highest importance for the lawgiver to investigate and declare what is proper for each class, both with regard to purging and with regard to all other kinds of treatment. For instance, with regard to purging a State, it would go like this. Of the many possible ways of purging, some are milder and some more severe. A lawgiver who was also a despot might be able to carry out the most severe and best of them. But a lawgiver without despotic power might be well content if, in establishing a new political order and laws, he could carry out even the mildest of purgings. The best purge is painful, like all drastic medicines. It is the purge that drags people to punishment through justice joined with vengeance, crowning the vengeance with exile or death. As a rule, it gets rid of the greatest criminals when they are incurable and do serious damage to the State.

Athenian

735e–736e A milder form of purge is of the following kind. Because of a scarcity of food, people may be in need and show that they are ready to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the wealthy. Then the lawgiver regards all such people as a disease rooted in the body politic and ships them abroad as gently as possible, giving their removal the euphemistic name of emigration. Every lawgiver must do this in one way or another at the beginning, but in our case the task is even simpler now. For at present we have no need to devise either a form of emigration or any other purging selection. Instead, it is as when floods from many sources, some from springs and some from torrents, flow together into a single pool. We have to take careful precautions to make the water as pure as possible, in some cases by drawing it off and in others by cutting channels to divert its course. Even so, it would seem that toil and risk are involved in every exercise of statecraft. Since, however, our present efforts are in words rather than in deeds, let us assume that our gathering of citizens is now complete and that its purity has been secured to our satisfaction. For we shall test thoroughly, by every kind of test and over a long period, the wicked among those who try to enter our present State as citizens, and so prevent them from arriving. The virtuous, on the other hand, we shall welcome with all possible graciousness and goodwill. And let us not fail to notice this piece of good luck. We said that the colony of the Heraclidae was fortunate in escaping fierce and dangerous strife over the distribution of land and the cancellation of debts, and we are similarly lucky. For when a State is forced to settle such strife by law, it can neither leave established interests unchanged nor alter them in any way. No path is left except what one might call pious hope and cautious change, little by little, over a long period. And that path is this: there must already be a supply of men to bring about the change who themselves, on each occasion, own plenty of land and have many people in their debt. They must be kind enough to want to share these things with those of their debtors who are in need, partly by canceling debts and partly by making distributions. They make a kind of rule of moderation, believing that poverty consists not in decreasing one’s property but in increasing one’s greed.

Population and the Division of Land

Athenian

736e–737e For this is the main foundation of a State’s security, and on it, as on a firm base, it is possible to build whatever civic order may later be built suited to the arrangement described. But if the foundation is rotten, the political operations that follow will prove by no means easy for any State. This difficulty, as we say, we avoid. Still, it is better for us to explain how we might have found a way of escape if we had not in fact avoided it. Let it be said, then, that the way consists in renouncing greed with the help of justice, and that there is no other way of escape, broad or narrow, besides this device. So let this stand fixed for us now as a kind of pillar of the State. The citizens’ properties must be established somehow on a basis secure from internal disputes. Otherwise people who have long-standing disputes with one another will not willingly go any further with political construction, if they have a grain of sense. But consider those to whom God has given, as he has given to us now, a new State to found, one still free of internal feuds. For such founders to stir up hostility against themselves over the distribution of land and houses would be a folly combined with utter depravity of which no human being could be capable. What, then, would be the plan of a right distribution? First, we must set the total number of citizens at the right figure. Next, we must agree on how they are to be distributed, into how many sections and of what size each. And among these sections we must distribute the land and the houses as equally as we can. A suitable figure for the population could not be given without reference to the territory and to the neighboring States. We need as much land as can support so many inhabitants with moderate habits, and we need no more. As for population, we need a number large enough to defend themselves against injury from adjoining peoples, and also able to give some help to their neighbors when they are injured. We shall settle these matters, both in word and in fact, once we have inspected the territory and its neighbors. For now, however, our argument will proceed to complete only an outline sketch of our legislation. Let us assume that there are 5,040 men, as a suitable number, who are to hold land and defend their plots. And let the land and houses likewise be divided into the same number of parts, each man and his allotment forming one unit together. First, let the whole number be divided into two, and next into three; after that, in natural order, come four and five, and so on up to ten.

Athenian

737e–738e Regarding numbers, every lawmaker must understand at least this much: what number, and what kind of number, will be most useful for all States. Let us choose the one that contains the most numerous and most consecutive divisions. Number as a whole admits every division for every purpose. The number 5,040, however, can be divided into no more than 59 sections, consecutive from one up to ten, for purposes of war and, in peace, for all purposes connected with contributions and distributions. Those whom the law appoints to grasp these facts about numbers must grasp them firmly and with deliberate attention. They are exactly as we have stated them, and the reason for stating them when founding a State is this. Consider gods and shrines, the temples to be set up in the State for the various gods, and the gods and daemons the temples are to be named after. No sensible person, whether he is framing a new State or reforming an old one that has become corrupt, will attempt to change the advice from Delphi or Dodona or Ammon, or the advice of ancient sayings in whatever form they take, whether derived from visions or from some reported inspiration from heaven. On this advice people instituted sacrifices combined with rites, whether of native origin or imported from Etruria or Cyprus or anywhere else. By means of such sayings they consecrated oracles and statues and altars and temples, and marked off sacred precincts for each of them. The lawgiver should not alter the least bit of any of these. To each section he should assign a god or daemon, or at least a hero. In distributing the land he should first assign to these divinities choice estates with everything that belongs to them. Then, when the assemblies of each section take place at the appointed times, they may provide an ample supply of everything needed, and the people may become friendly with one another at the sacrifices and come to know one another well. Nothing benefits a State more than this mutual acquaintance. For where people hide their ways from one another in darkness rather than light, no one will ever rightly obtain either the honor or the office he deserves, or the justice that is due him. So every man in every State must above all strive to show himself always true and sincere toward everyone, never a fraud, and also never to let himself be deceived by any such person.

The Best and Second-Best Constitutions

Athenian

739a–739e The next move in our setting up of the laws might cause surprise when first heard, because it is unusual, like a checkers player moving a piece off his sacred line. Even so, it will be clear to anyone who reasons it out and draws on experience that a State will probably have a constitution no better than second in excellence. Perhaps someone might refuse to accept this because he is unfamiliar with lawgivers who are not also despots. But in fact the most correct plan is to describe the best political order, and the second best, and the third, and after describing them to leave the choice to the individual in charge of founding the settlement. Let us adopt this plan now. Let us state the political orders that rank first, second, and third in excellence, and let us hand the choice over to Clinias. We also hand it to anyone else who may at any time wish, in proceeding to choose among such things, to take over, according to his own disposition, what he values in his own country. The first State and political order, and the best laws, are found where the old saying is observed as fully as possible throughout the whole State: that friends really have all things in common. Consider this condition, whether it exists anywhere now or ever will exist. In it, wives are held in common, and children, and all property, and everything called private is rooted out of life everywhere and by every means. As far as possible, it is arranged that even things naturally private have become common in some way: eyes, for instance, and ears and hands seem to see, hear, and act in common. All people, as far as possible, are united in the praise and blame they give, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and they honor with all their heart those laws that make the State as unified as possible. No one will ever lay down any other definition truer or better than these conditions in point of supreme excellence. In such a State, whether it is inhabited by gods or by children of gods, more than one of them, they live there pleasantly, spending their lives in this way. So one should not look elsewhere for a model of a constitution, but should hold fast to this one and with all one’s power seek the constitution that is as much like it as possible. The constitution we are now engaged on, if it came into being, would be very near to immortality and would rank second in merit. The third we shall work out later, God willing. For now, however, what is this second-best political order, and how would it come to have such a character?

Allotments and the Number of Households

Athenian

739e–740e First, let them divide up the land and houses and not farm in common, since such a course is beyond the capacity of people with the birth, rearing, and training we are assuming. And let the division be made with this intention. The man who receives a portion should still regard it as the common property of the whole State. He should tend the land, which is his homeland, more devotedly than a mother tends her children, since the land, being a goddess, is mistress over its mortal population. And he should have the same attitude toward the local gods and daemons as well. So that these things may remain this way forever, the following further rules must be observed. The number of hearths, as we have now fixed it, must remain unchanged and must never become either more or fewer. This will be securely achieved in every State in the following way. The holder of an allotment shall always leave behind one son, whichever he pleases, as heir to his dwelling. That son is to succeed him in caring for the gods, the family, and the State, attending both to their living members and to those who have already died. As for the rest of a man’s children, when he has more than one, he should marry off the daughters according to the law that is to be laid down. The sons he should hand over to those citizens who have no male offspring, by friendly arrangement if possible. But such arrangements may prove insufficient, or a family may have too many daughters or too many sons, or on the other hand too few, because of infertility. In all these cases the magistrates whom we shall appoint as the highest and most distinguished shall consider how to deal with the excess or shortage in families. They shall devise means as best they can to ensure that the 5,040 households remain unchanged. Many devices are possible. Where fertility is high, there are ways of checking it. Conversely, there are ways of encouraging and stimulating the birth rate, through honors and dishonors and through admonitions addressed by the old to the young, which can produce the required effect in every way. Finally, as a last step, we may be in complete desperation about the unequal state of our 5,040 households and faced with an oversupply of citizens, because of the mutual affection of those who live together, which drives us to despair. Even then there still remains that ancient device we have often mentioned: sending out colonies, in a friendly way from a friendly nation, made up of such people as are judged suitable.

Athenian

740e–741e On the other hand, the State may at some time be struck by a flooding wave of disease or by ruinous wars, and the households may fall far below the appointed number through bereavement. We should not then willingly bring in new citizens trained with a bastard training; but, as the proverb says, not even God himself can force necessity. So let us suppose that our present discussion gives the following advice: My most excellent friends, do not be slack in honoring, as Nature ordains, likeness and equality and sameness and agreement, with respect to number and to every power that produces things fair and good. Above all, now, first of all, guard the stated number throughout your lives. Next, do not dishonor the due measure of the height and size of your property, as it was originally apportioned, by buying and selling among yourselves. Otherwise neither the apportioning Lot, which is divine, will fight on your side, nor will the lawgiver. For now, in the first place, the law lays this command on the disobedient. It has given warning that whoever wishes should accept or refuse an allotment on this understanding: first, that the land is sacred to all the gods, and further, that prayers shall be offered by the priests and priestesses at the first, second, and third sacrifices. Therefore the man who buys or sells the house plot or land plot allotted to him shall suffer the penalty attached to this sin. The officials shall write records on tablets of cypress wood for future reference and shall place them in the shrines. Furthermore, they shall put the enforcement of these matters in the hands of the magistrate who is judged to be the most sharp-sighted. In this way all violations of these rules may come to their notice, and they may punish the man who disobeys both the law and the god. The ordinance now described, when the appropriate organization accompanies it, proves to be a great blessing to all the States that obey it. How great a blessing it is, as the old proverb says, no evil man will ever know, but only the man who has become experienced and practiced in virtuous habits. For in the organization described there is no excessive money-making. It also entails that no one should or can be given any opportunity to make money by any illiberal trade, since what is called contemptible vulgarity corrupts a liberal character. And no one should ever claim the right to pile up riches from any such source.

Money, Wealth, and Happiness

Athenian

741e–742e Furthermore, after all this there follows a law that forbids any private person to own any gold or silver. He may own only coin for the kind of everyday exchange that craftsmen almost have to use, and that all who need such things must use to pay wages to hired workers, whether slaves or immigrants. For these reasons we say that our people should own coined money that is legal tender among themselves but worthless elsewhere. As for the common Hellenic currency, it is needed for military expeditions and visits abroad, and for embassies or any other missions necessary for the State, if someone must be sent abroad. For such purposes as these the State must always possess Hellenic money. If a private citizen ever finds that he must go abroad, he may do so after first getting permission from the magistrates. If he comes home with any foreign money left over, he shall deposit it with the State and receive an equivalent amount in local currency. But if anyone is found keeping it for himself, the money shall be confiscated. The man who knows of it and fails to report it, together with the man who brought it in, shall be subject to cursing and reproach and, in addition, to a fine no less than the amount of foreign money brought in. In marrying or giving in marriage, no one shall give or receive any dowry at all. No one shall deposit money with anyone he does not trust, nor lend at interest, since the borrower shall be permitted to refuse entirely to pay back either interest or principal. One would rightly see that these are the best practices for a State to follow by viewing them in relation to the primary intention. The intention of the wise statesman, we say, is not at all what the majority would attribute to him. They would say that the good lawgiver should want the State for which he is benevolently legislating to be as large and as rich as possible, to possess silver and gold, and to rule over as many people as possible both by land and by sea. And they would add that, if he is a true legislator, he should want the State to be as good and as happy as possible. Of these aims, some can be achieved and some cannot. The organizer of the State will want those that are possible; the impossible ones he will neither want in vain nor attempt. That happiness and goodness should go together is almost inevitable, so he will want the people to be both good and happy. But it is impossible for them to be both good and excessively rich, rich at least as most people count riches; 742e–743e for they count as rich those rare few who possess goods worth a great deal of money, and these even a wicked man might possess. Since this is so, I would never concede to them that the rich man is truly happy if he is not also good. And if a man is exceptionally good, it is impossible for him to be exceptionally rich as well. Why is that? someone may ask. Because, we would answer, the gain from both just and unjust sources is more than double the gain from just sources alone. Meanwhile, the spending of those who refuse to spend either nobly or shamefully is only half the spending of those who are noble and are willing to spend on noble objects. Consequently, the men whose conduct in both respects is the exact opposite will never exceed in wealth the men who double their gains and halve their spending. Now of these men, the one is good, and the other is not bad so long as he is frugal, but at other times he is utterly bad, and, as we have just said, he is at no time good. The man who takes both justly and unjustly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, is rich, provided he is also frugal; while the utterly bad man, being extravagant as a rule, is very poor. But the man who spends on noble objects and gains by just means only is unlikely ever to become either exceptionally rich or extremely poor. Accordingly, what we have said is true: the very rich are not good, and since they are not good, they are not happy either. Now the fundamental aim of our laws was this: that the citizens should be as happy as possible and united in the highest degree in mutual friendship. Citizens will never be friendly where they have frequent lawsuits against one another and frequent wrongdoing, but rather where these are as few and as minor as possible. We say that in the State there must be neither gold nor silver. Nor must there be much money-making through vulgar trading or lending at interest or the fattening of castrated livestock. There must be only such profit as farming gives and yields, and of this only so much as will not drive a man, in his money-making, to neglect the things for which money exists. These things are the soul and the body, which without athletic training and the other branches of education would never become worth anything. That is why we have said, and more than once, that the pursuit of money is to be honored last of all. Of the three things that concern every human being, concern for money, rightly directed, comes third and last; concern for the body comes second; and concern for the soul comes first.

Property Classes and the Division of the City

Athenian

743e–744e Accordingly, if the political order we are describing ranks its honors in this order, its laws are correctly laid down. But suppose any of the laws enacted in it clearly makes health more honored in the State than self-control, or wealth more honored than health and self-control. Then it will plainly be a wrong enactment. So the lawgiver must often ask himself: What is it that I intend? And am I succeeding in this, or am I missing the mark? In this way he might perhaps get through the work of legislation himself and spare others the trouble of it; but in no other way could he ever possibly do so. The man who has received an allotment shall hold it, as we say, on the terms stated. It would indeed have been a splendid thing if each person had also had everything else equal when he entered the colony. Since this is impossible, however, and one man will arrive with more money and another with less, there must be unequal valuations of property. This is necessary for many reasons, and for the sake of equal opportunity in public life. In this way offices, contributions, and distributions may be assigned according to the assessed valuation in each case. They will be framed in proportion not only to the moral excellence of a man’s ancestors or of himself, or to his bodily strength and good looks, but also to his wealth or poverty. Then, by a rule of symmetrical inequality, people may receive offices and honors as equally as possible and may not quarrel. For these reasons we must create four classes, graded by size of property and called first, second, third, and fourth, or by some other names. This holds both when individuals stay in the same class and when, by changing from poverty to wealth or from wealth to poverty, each moves into the class to which he belongs. The kind of law that I would enact as proper to come next after the foregoing would be this. A State that is to avoid the greatest of plagues, which would be better called disruption than dissension, must, as we maintain, have none of its citizens in a condition of either painful poverty or wealth, since both these conditions produce both these results. So the lawgiver must now declare a limit for each of these conditions. The limit of poverty shall be the value of the allotment. This must remain fixed, and no magistrate should overlook any reduction of it in any particular case, nor should any other citizen who aspires to goodness.

Athenian

744e–745e Having set this as the inferior limit, the lawgiver shall allow a man to possess twice this amount, or three times, or four times. Someone may acquire more than this, whether by finding it, or by gift, or by money-making, or by gaining a sum beyond the proper measure through some other such piece of luck. If he hands the surplus over to the State and to the gods who keep the State, he shall be well regarded and free from penalty. But if anyone disobeys this law, anyone who wishes may inform against him and receive half, and the man who is convicted shall pay an equal amount out of his own property, and the other half shall go to the gods. All of every man’s property beyond his allotment shall be publicly recorded in writing and kept by the magistrates appointed by law. In this way lawsuits concerning all matters of property may be easy to decide and perfectly clear. Next, the lawgiver must first place his city as near the center of the country as possible. He must choose a site that also has all the other advantages a city needs, which are easy enough to perceive and specify. After this he must divide off twelve portions of land, first setting apart a sacred precinct for Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, which he shall name the acropolis and enclose with a ring wall. Starting from this, he must divide both the city itself and the whole country into the twelve portions. The twelve portions must be made equal by making those of good land small and those of poorer land larger. He must mark off 5,040 allotments, and he must cut each of these in two and join two pieces to form each separate allotment, so that each contains a near piece and a distant piece. The piece next to the city is joined with the piece farthest away, the second nearest with the second farthest, and so on with all the rest. In dealing with these separate pieces, they must use the device we mentioned a moment ago about poor land and good, securing equality by making the assigned portions larger or smaller. He must also divide the citizens into twelve parts, making all twelve parts as equal as possible in the value of the rest of their property, after a census of everyone has been taken. After this they must also set aside twelve allotments for the twelve gods, and name and consecrate the portion allotted to each god, giving it the name phyle. They must also divide the twelve sections of the city in the same way as they divided the rest of the country. And each citizen must receive as his share two dwellings, one near the center of the country and the other near the outskirts. In this way the settlement shall be completed.

The Model City and Its Practical Limits

Athenian

745e–746e But we must by all means notice this: all the arrangements now described are unlikely ever to meet with conditions so favorable that the whole program can be carried out as planned. That would require citizens who will raise no objection to living together in this way. They would have to tolerate being restricted for life to fixed and limited amounts of property and to the numbers of children we have stated, and being deprived of gold and of the other things that the lawgiver is clearly bound, by our regulations, to forbid. They would also have to accept the arrangements he has laid down for the country and the city, with dwellings set in the center and around the circumference. It is almost as if he were telling nothing but dreams, or molding, so to speak, a city and citizens out of wax. These criticisms are not altogether unfair, and the lawgiver should reconsider the points that follow. So the one who is legislating speaks to us again like this: Do not suppose, my friends, that in these discourses of mine I fail to see the truth of what this criticism now sets out. But in dealing with all plans for the future, I think the fairest course is this. The person who displays the pattern on which the undertaking is to be modeled should leave out no detail of perfect beauty and truth. But where any detail is impossible to realize, he should leave that particular detail aside and not carry it out. Instead, he should contrive to carry out whichever of the remaining details comes closest to it and is by nature most closely related to the right course. He should let the lawgiver express his ideal completely. When this is done, then and only then should they both consult together about how far their proposals are useful and how much of the legislation is impracticable. For even the maker of the most trivial object, if he is to be of any worth, must make it consistent with itself in every respect. So now, after deciding on our division into twelve parts, we must try to see how the divisions that come next to these and spring from them, down to the final figure of 5,040, are to be arranged. These divisions determine the phratries and demes and villages, as well as the military companies and platoons, and also the coinage system, dry and liquid measures, and weights. How, I say, are all these numbers to be fixed by the law so as to be of the right size and consistent with one another?

Athenian

746e–747e Moreover, the lawgiver should not hesitate, for fear of what might seem petty detail, to prescribe that none of the utensils the citizens may own shall be allowed to be of improper size. He must recognize as a universal rule that the divisions and variations of numbers are useful for every purpose. They apply to their own arithmetical variations, to the geometrical variations of surfaces and solids, and also to those of sounds and of motions, whether in a straight line up and down or in a circle. The lawgiver must keep all these in view and instruct all the citizens to hold fast, as far as they can, to this organized numerical system. For in household management, in politics, and in all the arts, no single branch of educational knowledge has as much influence as the study of numbers. Its chief advantage is that it wakes up the man who is by nature drowsy and slow-witted and makes him quick to learn, retentive, and sharp, so that he progresses beyond his natural capacity by a divine art. All these subjects of education will prove fine and fitting, provided that you can remove illiberality and greed, by means of other laws and institutions, from the souls of those who are to acquire them adequately and benefit from them. Otherwise you will find that you have unintentionally produced a cheat, as we call him, instead of a wise man. We can see examples of this today in the effect that the illiberal character of their property and their other institutions has had on the Egyptians and Phoenicians and many other nations. These results may be due to their having had a bad lawgiver, or to some adverse fortune that happened to them, or perhaps to some natural disadvantage. For that too, Megillus and Clinias, is a point we must not fail to notice: some districts are naturally better than others for producing people of a good or bad type, and we must not legislate in conflict with this natural difference. Some districts are badly or well suited because of a variety of winds or because of sunshine, others because of their waters, and others simply because of the produce of the soil. The soil offers produce either good or bad for their bodies, and it is equally able to produce similar effects in their souls as well. Of all these, by far the best districts would be those that have a kind of heavenly breeze, and where the portions of land are under the care of daemons. So they receive those who come at any time to settle there either graciously or ungraciously. The wise lawgiver will examine these districts, as far as a mere human being can examine such matters, and he will try to frame his laws accordingly. And you too, Clinias, must follow the same course: when you intend to colonize the country, you must attend to these matters first.

Clinias

747e Athenian stranger, what you say is excellent, and I must do as you advise.

Book 6

Connections in Laws, Book 5

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