Mishnah
1 There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds. There are two kinds of awareness of impurity which are four kinds. There are two kinds of carrying objects out on the Sabbath which are four kinds. There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds.
Halakhah
“There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Two which are four for liability and two which are four for no liability, or four for liability and four for no liability? Consider the following: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Rabbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “there are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” isn’t that about liability? And similarly, “there are two kinds of carrying objects out on the Sabbath which are four kinds,” because there is liability. Rabbi Abba said, there, all the cases concern liability, but here we state both liability and exemption. This implies four cases of liability and four of exemption. But didn’t we state, the doors of the Temple hall were two which are four? Can you say, liability and no liability? Should we state twelve cases of exemption? We state cases of exemption that correspond to cases of exemption. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, what does “no liability” mean here? Permitted! Rabbi Yose said, the poor man and the rich man are one but the Sages counted them as two. Carrying something out or bringing it in are two but the Sages counted them as one. Carrying objects out on the Sabbath does not include carrying them in. Carrying something out of a domain does not include carrying it in. Doesn’t someone who carries something out of one domain into another also carry it in? In addition, from what Rabbi Yasa said in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Someone who brings in half the volume of a dried fig and carries out half the volume of a dried fig is liable. And how do we know that carrying something out is called work? Rabbi Samuel in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: “Moses ordered, they made a public proclamation in the campExodus 36:6,” etc. The people refrained from taking objects out from their houses to give them to the collectors, who also did not take out anything from them to bring into the office. Rabbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rabbi Aḥa inferred it from the following: “do not bring out any load from your houses on the Sabbath day, and do no workJeremiah 17:22.”
Rabbi Mana said it without attribution. Rabbi Abin in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: We stated two principles that are not comparable. “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds.” One has to bring four sacrifices. “There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds.” One has to bring two sacrifices. Rabbi Eleazar in the name of Rabbi Abin explained it differently: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds” was said by Rabbi Aqiba. “there are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds” by Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Ḥaggai asked Rabbi Yose: why must I follow Rabbi Ishmael? Doesn’t it also follow Rabbi Aqiba’s view? Knowing and forgetting about impurity of the Sanctuary is the same as knowing and forgetting about impurity of sacred offerings. He told him, doesn’t Rabbi Ishmael include forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary, and we want to follow Rabbi Aqiba? Sometimes a person forgets impurity and forgets the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. How is this? If one became impure, realized it, then forgot about impurity, entered the Sanctuary, and left. Then he became aware. Here a person forgets impurity and forgets the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. Sometimes there are many instances of forgetting impurity and many of forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. How is this? If one became impure and realized it, then forgot and while unaware of his impurity entered the Sanctuary and left. Then he became aware. He said, there is no sacrifice due for this impurity. Again he became impure and realized it, then forgot and while unaware of his impurity entered the Sanctuary and left even several times. In the end he became aware. Here are many instances of forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice.
“There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds.” “Rabbi Yose said, Joshua the son of Rabbi Aqiba asked Rabbi Aqiba. He said to him, why did they say, ‘There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds’? He answered him, if that wasn’t how they put it, what should they have said? He said to him, they could have said ‘from eggshell white upward, it is impure.’ He said to him, to tell you that anyone who is not an expert in them and their names may not examine skin lesions.”
How do we know that they can be combined? Rabbi Mana said, the Sages counted them as two and counted them as four. Just as two can be combined, so can four. Rabbi Eleazar in the name of Rabbi Abin: If it can be combined with something of another kind, all the more with something of its own kind. Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Bun said, it is not written “they will be” but “it will be.” This teaches that they can be combined. Ḥizqiah stated: It is not written “skin diseases” but “skin disease.” This teaches that they can be combined. “He said to him, they could have said ‘from eggshell white upward, it is impure’ but should not have said, ‘there are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds.’ He answered him, it teaches that they are not ranked one above the other.” Couldn’t they be ranked one above the other? If you say so, you would have said the darkened one is impure, the very darkened is impure. But the Torah said, the diseased spot darkenedLeviticus 13:6. The darkened one is impure but the much darker one is pure. This follows what Rabbi Ḥanina said, it is comparable to two kings and their two lieutenants. One king is greater than the other king, one lieutenant is greater than the other lieutenant. But the first one’s lieutenant is not greater than the other king. Samuel said, it is comparable to two kings and two of their ambassadors. One king is greater than the other king, one ambassador is greater than the other ambassador. But the first one’s ambassador is not greater than the other king. Rabbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: A king, and his army commander, and the Arghabeṭa and the Head of the Captivity. Rabbi Eleasar ben Rabbi Yose said to Rabbi Yose: The Mishnah implies that one is no greater than the other. If sʾet whose very darkened spot is pure has a second color, the shiny spot, whose very darkened spot is impure, will certainly have a second color. He answered him, look at what you are saying. It has a second degree. Shouldn’t it also have a third? What causes you to say that the very white spot, whose very darkened spot is impure, is the sʾet? The color of sʾet is like eggshell. “שְׂאֵ֤תLeviticus 13:2, this is sʾet. בַהֶ֔רֶת, this is the shiny spot. סַפַּ֨חַת֙ is secondary to the shiny spot. The diseased spot’s look is deepenedLeviticus 13:3, secondary to sʾet. What is the etymology of sʾet? Elevated. As the shadow looks raised compared to a sunny spot. What is the etymology of deepened? It is deep, as a sunny spot looks lower than the shadow. What is the etymology of סַפַּ֨חַת֙? Adjunct. As it says, please attach me to one of the priesthoods1 Samuel 2:36, etc.” Rabbi Eleazar said, these are the words of Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Aqiba. But the words of the Sages are that sʾet and the shiny spot are one. Sappaḥat is secondary to either one. The Mishnah says so: “Mispaḥat is turned into sʾet or strong mispaḥat.”
Mishnah
2 In any case where there is knowledge at the start and knowledge at the end but forgetting in between there is a sacrifice scaled to the person’s means. If there was knowledge at the start but no knowledge at the end, the male goat whose blood is brought inside and the Day of Atonement suspend judgment until he knows for certain and brings one scaled to his means.
Halakhah
“In any case where there is knowledge at the start,” etc. How do we know that we require knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between? The verse says, it was forgotten, it was forgottenLeviticus 5:2-3 two times. This implies that he had knowledge at the start and at the end but forgetting in between. That explains Rabbi Aqiba’s view. What about Rabbi Ishmael’s? For Rabbi Ishmael argues like Rabbi. As Rabbi said, it was forgotten by him, this implies that he knows. “But he knewLeviticus 5:3,” knowledge is mentioned twice. So Rabbi Ishmael argues like Rabbi, and Rabbi like Rabbi Ishmael. This also fits Rabbi Aqiba’s view. Knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of the Sanctuary are the same as knowledge and forgetting about the impurity of sacred offerings. But some infer it from the following: He knew and felt guiltyLeviticus 5:3. Wasn’t it already said, he became impure and felt guiltyLeviticus 5:2? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end.
Rabbi Bun asked, if he did not know at the end, how could he bring a sacrifice? But if it does not refer to knowledge at the end, let it refer to knowledge at the beginning. They objected: Isn’t it written, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bringLeviticus 4:23? Then if it does not refer to knowledge at the beginning, let it refer to knowledge at the end! Explain it as referring to people obligated to bring purification offerings or definite reparation offerings who must still bring them after the Day of Atonement has passed, while those obligated for suspended reparation sacrifices are no longer liable. The verse says, or his transgression came to his knowledge, he has to bring even after the Day of Atonement.
And how do we know that it speaks only about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings? He gave a warning and a punishment for impurity and required a sacrifice for impurity. Since punishment and warning spelled out later on refer to impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings, so when He made someone liable to bring a sacrifice, it also concerns impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, since it says, I did not eat from it in my deep mourningDeuteronomy 26:14, I could think that an Israelite who ate a tithe in deep mourning should bring a sacrifice. The verse says, from theseLeviticus 5:4. For some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. I will exclude tithe which is not punishable by death but will not exclude the priestly contribution which is punishable by death, as it says, they would die from it for they desecrated itLeviticus 22:9. The verse says from these. For some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. Or since there one speaks about the priestly contribution, here too it concerns the priestly contribution. But didn’t you learn this from idolatry? Idolatry teaches a rule about all transgressions in the Torah. Its distinctive feature is that intentional transgression makes someone liable to be cut off, and unintentional transgression requires a sacrifice. This excludes the priestly contribution which is only punishable by death.
Rabbi Ḥanina said to Rabbi Mana: Did you learn this from idolatry? Then one should learn from idolatry that every case requires only one instance of awareness! He told him, idolatry requires a fixed-value sacrifice, but impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings requires one scaled to a person’s means. One cannot draw an inference about a fixed-value sacrifice from one scaled to a person’s means, or about one scaled to a person’s means from a fixed-value one. How did you conclude that the verse speaks about impurity of the Sanctuary’s sacred offerings? Here it says an impure animalLeviticus 5:2 and further on it says an impure animalLeviticus 7:21. Since an impure animal mentioned there is about impurity of the Sanctuary’s sacred offerings, so an impure animal mentioned here is about impurity of the Sanctuary’s sacred offerings. Not only the Sanctuary’s sacred offerings. How do we know this includes impurity of the Sanctuary? “The verse says: his impurity is on himLeviticus 7:20. How did you interpret it? About an impure person who ate pure meat, or a pure person who ate impure meat? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rabbi says, he ate, his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rabbi Ḥiyya says, sacred offerings are mentioned in the plural but impurity is mentioned in the singular. How can I understand his impurity is on him? Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rabbi Meïr says, the verse only speaks of one from whom impurity separates. This excludes meat from which impurity does not separate.”
If so, how does the Day of Atonement help him? Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Bun said, the Day of Atonement acts for him as a suspended reparation sacrifice. If he died before the Day of Atonement, the sin remains in the person. After the Day of Atonement it has already been atoned for.
“He will atone for the Sanctuary from the impurities of the people of IsraelLeviticus 16:16, etc. In this respect, there are three kinds of impurity. The impurity of idolatry as it says, to defile My SanctuaryLeviticus 20:3. Sexual offenses as it says, not to follow abominable practicesLeviticus 18:30. Bloodshed as it says, do not defile the LandNumbers 35:34. I could think that this male goat atones for all these impurities, the verse says, from the impurities, not all impurities. We find that the verse treated the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings separately. Here too we treat only the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings separately, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Simeon says, the context decides the matter, as it says, he will atone for the Sanctuary from the impurities of the people of Israel, any impurity in the Sanctuary. I could think that this male goat atones for these impurities, the verse says, and their crimes. These are the rebellions, for it says, the king of Moab rebelled against me2 Kings 3:7.”
Mishnah
3 If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end, the male goat brought outside or the Day of Atonement atone as it says, in addition to the atoning purification offeringNumbers 29:11. What one atones for, the other atones for. Since the one inside atones only for matters which were known, the outside one should also atone only for matters which were known.
Halakhah
“If there is no knowledge at the start,” etc. What leads you to say this? Does the one inside suspend and the one outside atone, or the one outside suspend and the one inside atone, or both of them suspend, or both of them atone? What about it? Rabbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, I witnessed something. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish was questioning Rabbi Joḥanan and asked him, what are the differences in atoning? I do not know what he answered him. Rabbi Zeʿira said to him, maybe it is the following: How did you interpret it? About an impure person who ate pure meat, or a pure person who ate impure meat? The verse says: his impurity is on himLeviticus 7:20. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Or both of them atone? What about it? He should confess sins over itLeviticus 16:21, these are intentional sins, their crimes, these are rebellions, their mistakes, these are unintentional sins. Then He said, he will atone. Rabbi Immi said in the name of Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish, the male goat will carry all their sinsLeviticus 16:22, he included intentional sins and left out unintentional sins, to indicate that just as intentional sins do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice, so those unintentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. And why are they mentioned here? Rabbi Ila in the name of Rabbi Yasa, to suspend judgment. Could it be understood to suspend judgment for those who eat abominations and crawling things? Rabbi Samuel in the name of Rabbi Zeʿira: Their mistakes, their mistakes. Since their mistakes mentioned there are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice, also their mistakes mentioned here are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice. This excludes intentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. The Day of Atonement suspends judgment for what the male goat brought inside leaves out. What did it leave out? If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end.
Mishnah
4 But in cases where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, the male goats of the holidays and the male goats of the Days of the New Moon atone, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Simeon says, the male goats of the holidays atone but not the male goats of the Days of the New Moon. What do the male goats of the Days of the New Moon atone for? For the pure person who ate impure food. Rabbi Meïr says, the atonement of all male goats is the same, about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings. Rabbi Simeon used to say, the male goats of the Days of the New Moon atone for the pure person who ate impure food. Those of the holidays atone for cases where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, and those of the Day of Atonement where there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end. They asked him, could they be brought one for the other? He told them, they may be brought. They asked him, since their atoning is not the same, how can they be brought one for the other? He told them, all of them serve to atone for the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings.
Halakhah
“But in cases where there is no knowledge,” etc. “Rabbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rabbi Eleazar in the name of Rabbi Hoshaia: Rabbi Judah’s reason is “and one goat’s male goat sin offering for the EternalNumbers 28:15.” This male goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. This gives me the male goat of the Day of the New Moon. How do we know that this includes the male goats of the holidays? Rabbi Zeʿira said, and a male goat, the connecting word adds to the previous subject. Rabbi Zeʿira and Rabbi Eleazar in the name of Rabbi Hoshaia, Rabbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregationLeviticus 10:17. What case are we discussing? If it concerns Naḥshon’s male goat, it atoned for his tribe. If it concerns the male goat of the Day of Inauguration, there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must be discussing the male goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? Here it says “lifting sin” and there it says “lifting sin,” “Aaron will lift the sin of the sacred offeringsExodus 28:38.” Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of those bringing them, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of those bringing them. What led you to say, “for the pure person who ate impure food,” maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure food? Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Bun said, Rabbi Judah splits the argument of Rabbi Meïr. Rabbi Simeon splits the argument of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Joḥanan agrees that the male goat brought inside does not atone. Rather it suspends. This corresponds to Rabbi Jonah in the name of Rabbi Zeʿira, he will make it a purification offeringLeviticus 16:9. He designated it to suspend judgment, so its purpose could not be changed.
A male goat which was not brought on the holiday should be brought on the Day of the New Moon. If it was not brought on the Day of the New Moon it should be brought in the future since from the start public sacrifices were dedicated only to be brought on the outside altar.
But didn’t the Day of Atonement already atone? Rabbi Mana said, since it is written, the pilgrimage of Unleavened Bread, the pilgrimage of Weeks, and the pilgrimage of TabernaclesDeuteronomy 16:16, it is as if they all provided the same atonement. Rabbi Bun said, since they all atone for the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings, it is as if they all provided the same atonement.
Rabbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rabbi Yasa: The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday does not need to mention the New Moon. Rabbi Aḥa bar Pappus said, it was stated as follows: “The one who stands before the Ark on New Year’s holiday in the morning, the House of Shammai say, he prays eight benedictions, but the House of Hillel say seven. For the additional prayer, the House of Shammai say ten benedictions, but the House of Hillel say nine benedictions.” Shouldn’t he say eleven? Rabbi Yose said, where do they disagree? In a matter which needs a separate benediction. But here even on a weekday he simply includes it. Then he should mention it in “Service.” Rabbi Yose asked, since the two male goats of New Year’s day come because of the New Moon, why do you say that he does not have to mention the New Moon? Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Bun said, isn’t Rabbi Abba bar Mamal’s question correct? As it was stated: “The two lambs of Pentecost and the two male goats of New Year’s Day.” If the first atoned, what does the second atone for? For impurity that happened between them. Isn’t that Rabbi Simeon’s view? And Rabbi Simeon distinguishes kinds of atonement. But if both of them were for the New Moon? Rabbi Abba Mari said, you cannot do that, since it is written, in addition to the elevation offering of the monthNumbers 29:6. In addition, from what we have stated, “twelve for the twelve months of the year.” A patrician stood before the Ark and did not mention the New Moon. They praised him. Rav Hoshaia asked: consider this, if they slaughtered both of them simultaneously? What impurity happened between them? Rabbi Bun said, if all of Israel acted properly, would they not bring what the Torah prescribed for them?
“They asked him, could they be brought one for the other,” etc. Rabbi Joḥanan said, the words of the Sages imply that one may change. The words of Rabbi Simeon imply that one may not change. The words of the Sages imply that one may change, and you say “could they be brought one for the other”? They objected to him according to his argument. According to your argument, since you say that one may not change, could they be brought one for the other? Rabbi Yose said, public sacrifices are designated only when they are used. Rabbi Yudan said, it was stated as follows: “From the beginning, it was sanctified for the purpose of the sacrifice for which it is brought.”
Mishnah
5 Rabbi Simeon ben Judah said in his name, the male goats of the New Moon Days atone for the pure person who ate of impure sacrifice. Those of the holidays add to them in that they atone for the pure person who ate impure sacrifice and for infractions of which there was knowledge neither at the start nor at the end. Those of the Day of Atonement add to them in that they atone for the pure person who ate impure sacrifice and for infractions of which there was knowledge neither at the start nor at the end and those for which there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was at the end. They said to him, didn’t the teacher use to say that they may be sacrificed one for the other? He said, yes. They said to him, if so, then those of the Day of Atonement could be brought on the Days of the New Moon. But how could those of the Days of the New Moon be brought on the Day of Atonement to provide an atonement that is not theirs? He told them, all of them serve to atone for the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings.
Halakhah
“They said to him, didn’t the teacher use to say,” etc. Rabbi Yose the Southerner said to Rabbi Jonah: Shouldn’t it have stated, if so, then those of the Days of the New Moon could be brought on the Day of Atonement since one increases holiness but does not diminish it. But those of the Day of Atonement cannot be brought on the Days of the New Moon since one does not diminish holiness. Rabbi Eleazar in the name of Rabbi Bun gave another explanation: if so, then those of the Day of Atonement could be brought on the Days of the New Moon, for their atonement includes the atonement of the Days of the New Moon, but those of the days of the New Moon cannot be brought on the Day of Atonement, for they provide only their own atonement. For if anybody ate five olive-sized pieces of fat and dedicated four sacrifices, under the impression that he had dedicated five, did he atone? Or if he ate four olive-sized pieces of fat, dedicated five sacrifices, under the impression that he had dedicated four, wouldn’t that be all the more so? And so “Rabbi Simeon used to say, thirty-two male goats are brought for the public every year. Thirty-one outside, they are eaten. One inside which is not eaten. And the scapegoat. Twelve for the twelve months of the year. Eight on Tabernacles, seven on Passover, two on Pentecost, one for the day and one for the bread. One on New Year’s Day and one on the Day of Atonement.” When Moses heard this he said, it follows that anyone who becomes unsure whether they committed a transgression should bring all these sacrifices! Rabbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish: When the Holy One, praised be He, said to Moses, he will confess on itLeviticus 16:21 etc., he started and said, A Song of confessionPsalms 100:1, inspired by he will confess on it.
Mishnah
6 Intentional impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings is atoned for by the male goat whose blood is brought inside and the Day of Atonement. For the remaining transgressions mentioned in the Torah, minor or serious ones, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive commandments and prohibitions, offenses punishable by being cut off and capital crimes, the scapegoat atones.
Halakhah
“Intentional impurity of the Sanctuary,” etc. That means it atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional.
Aren’t minor sins positive commandments and prohibitions, and aren’t serious ones offenses punishable by being cut off and capital crimes? Rav Judah said, this is how the Mishnah should read: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or committed them unintentionally. Those intentional ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Serious ones, offenses punishable by being cut off and capital crimes. Just as the male goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional, the same holds for the scapegoat.”
It is understandable if it did not come to his knowledge. But if it did come to his knowledge? Wasn’t it stated: “How do we know that those obligated to bring purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, must bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable?” Rabbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, whether or not he knew about it on that day, didn’t the Day of Atonement already atone? Rabbi Simeon in the name of Levi Sokhia, the Mishnah speaks of one who rebels against the Day of Atonement. Why did he not say, if it was not known to him on the Day of Atonement? His words imply that even if it was not known to him on the Day of Atonement, the Day of Atonement atones.
A positive commandment, even if he did not repent. A prohibition? Rabbi Samuel in the name of Rabbi Zeʿira, only if he repented. If one said, “the elevation offering does not atone,” does the elevation offering not atone? It atones even against his will. If one said, “the Day of Atonement does not atone,” does the Day of Atonement not atone? It atones even against his will. “I do not accept its atonement for me,” it does not atone against his will. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Rabbi Hillel said, the opposite is reasonable. It is not up to a person to tell the King, “you do not reign.”
The elevation offering atones for thoughts. What is the reason? What rises in your spirits will not beEzekiel 20:32. Rabbi Levi said, the elevation offering atones for your spirits. And so in Job he says, maybe my children sinned and cursed God in their heartsJob 1:5. This implies that the elevation offering atones for thoughts.
Rabbi says, the Day of Atonement atones for all sins against the Torah except for someone who throws off the yoke, breaks the Covenant, or denies the Torah’s divine origin. For such a person, it atones if he repented, but not otherwise. Rabbi Yasa asked: Does Rabbi think that the Day of Atonement atones without repentance? Rabbi Ashian, Rabbi Jonah, Rabbi Abba, and Rabbi Ḥiyya came in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: The Day of Atonement atones without repentance, and death cleanses without repentance. We have stated the following: The day of death equals repentance. Who stated this? Rabbi! Then what we stated, “death and the Day of Atonement atone with repentance,” does not follow Rabbi.
Rabbi Mattithiah ben Ḥarash asked Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, have you heard the four types of atonement which Rabbi Ishmael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, rebellious childrenJeremiah 3:22, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He will pardon youLeviticus 16:30, etc. And another verse says, I will punish their crime with the rodPsalms 89:32, etc. And another verse says, the guilt of this people will not be atoned for until you dieIsaiah 22:14. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there he will be forgiven. About this one it says, return, rebellious children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for on that day, He will pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed sins punishable by being cut off or by death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone for half, and suffering atones for half. About this one it says, I will punish their crime with the rod, and their sins with plagues. But for someone who desecrated the Name of Heaven, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in suffering to cleanse. But repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death cleanses with suffering. About this one it says, the guilt of this people will not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death cleanses.
Rabbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rabbi Ishmael, and Rabbi Aqiba. But the Sages say that the scapegoat pardons. How does it pardon? Rabbi Zeʿira said, little by little. Rabbi Ḥanania said, at the end. What is the difference between them? If somebody died in between. In the opinion of Rabbi Zeʿira, he had already been pardoned. In the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rabbi Zeʿira said, a baraita supports Rabbi Ḥanina: There is a power in the male goat that is absent from the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement that is absent from the male goat: The Day of Atonement pardons without a male goat, but the male goat does not atone without the Day of Atonement. The male goat pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rabbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rabbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it as a case where they intended to bring another male goat but they did not bring it. Rabbi Yose said, but does the Holy One, praised be He, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.
Rabbi Jeremiah said that Rabbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Justice protects the one on the straight pathProverbs 13:6. Evil deeds will pursue the sinnerProverbs 13:21. He will watch over the feet of His pious ones1 Samuel 2:9. While He makes scoffers targets of scoffingProverbs 3:34. Fences are made into fences and doors into doors. Do fences really make fences and doors make doors? Rather, this is the meaning: Rabbi Jeremiah in the name of Rabbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: If a person is careful the first, second, and third times not to commit a sin, then the Holy One, praised be He, will watch over him, as it is said, all this God will do twice, three times with a manJob 33:29. Rabbi Zeʿira said, but only if the person does not revert to sin. What is the reason? It does not say the triple thread “will never snap” but rather will not quickly snapEcclesiastes 4:12. If you keep working on it, it will split.
Rabbi Huna said in the name of Rabbi Abbahu: The Holy One does not forget, but for Israel He becomes forgetful. What is the reason? As it is said, Who is a Power like You, who forgives sinMicah 7:18. “He forgets” is written. And so David said, You forgot Your people’s sinPsalms 85:2.
Mishnah
7 Israel, priests, and the Anointed Priest are all included. What is the difference between Israel and a priest or the Anointed Priest? Only that the blood of the bull atones for priests in matters of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings. Rabbi Simeon says, just as the blood of the male goat which is brought inside atones for Israel, so the blood of the bull atones for the priests. Just as the confession of the scapegoat atones for Israel, so the confession of the bull atones for priests.
Halakhah
“Together Israel, priests,” etc. But we did not state “the Anointed.” Why did we not state “the Anointed”? If you say that we are discussing matters that do not entail an obligation to bring a sacrifice, it is correct not to state “Anointed.” If you say that we are discussing matters that entail an obligation to bring a sacrifice, why do we not state “Anointed”? It was found stated “also the Anointed Priest.” This implies that we are discussing matters that do not entail an obligation to bring a sacrifice. Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Abun said, even if you say that we are discussing matters that entail an obligation to bring a sacrifice, it was done intentionally. As you say, an intentional offense needs atonement and the atonement of the Day of Atonement, so here too it needs atonement and the atonement of the Day of Atonement.
It will be kept standing aliveLeviticus 16:10. This teaches that in the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Until he finishes atoning for the SanctuaryLeviticus 16:20, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Simeon says, until the moment of confession. In Rabbi Judah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rabbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rabbi Judah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rabbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rabbi Judah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rabbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he fulfill his obligation with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat. Must he cast lots a second time or did he fulfill his obligation with the first confession?
Mishnah
1 The kinds of awareness of impurity are two which are four. If one became impure and realized it, then forgot his impurity but remembered sacred offerings, or forgot sacred offerings but remembered his impurity, or forgot both, and ate a sacred offering, then realized it after eating, he must bring a sacrifice scaled to his means. If one became impure and realized it, then forgot his impurity but remembered the Sanctuary, or forgot the Sanctuary but remembered his impurity, or forgot both, and entered the Sanctuary, then realized it after leaving, he must bring a sacrifice scaled to his means.
Halakhah
“The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rabbi Jeremiah asked: For the final awareness, it is obvious that he must know he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the initial awareness? Consider the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, was sprinkled with purification water repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary. He is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is the view of Rabbi Ishmael, who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rabbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said this about someone who knew he was impure, then forgot his impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not about someone who was uncertain whether he was impure or pure, forgot the Sanctuary, and entered it. Since Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is the view of Rabbi Ishmael, who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was uncertain whether he was impure or pure. Rabbi Joḥanan said, everyone agrees, since uncertain awareness counts as awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.
In Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, if one became impure but was uncertain about it, would this count for him as forgetting, which makes him liable? Each maintains his own view, as in their disagreement:
Someone ate five olive-sized portions. He became separately aware that each might have been forbidden. Afterward he learned this for certain. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, awareness of his doubt determines his sacrifices. Rabbi Joḥanan said, awareness of his doubt does not determine his sacrifices. Rabbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rabbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest awareness of his doubt does not determine his purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offeringLeviticus 7:7. Awareness of his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. Awareness of his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.
The argument of Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inconsistent. There he says, awareness of his doubt determines his transgression. But here he says, awareness of his doubt does not determine his transgression. There, his reparation offering determines it. Here what do you have?
The argument of Rabbi Joḥanan seems inconsistent. There, he said, if part of the sin was atoned for, all of it was atoned for. And here he says so? Rabbi Joḥanan said this only for the last realization which does not require any sacrifice.
Rabbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow someone to act on that ruling. But didn’t we state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for the priestly contribution is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for the priestly contribution the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water. Either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rabbi Zeʿira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice. What Rabbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgressed and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rabbi Joḥanan are inconsistent. There, he says, if he transgressed and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgressed and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish are inconsistent, the arguments of Rabbi Joḥanan are inconsistent, since they disagreed: A Nazirite became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Nazirite does not shave, but Rabbi Joḥanan said, the Nazirite has to shave. This is because Rabbi Joḥanan said that uncertain awareness counts as awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.
Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it, and through a crawling animal and did not know it. The minor impurity is not mentioned with the severe impurity. Somebody became impure through a corpse and did not know it, and through a crawling animal and did not know it. Then he became aware of the crawling animal, and afterward of the corpse. Since he first became aware of the crawling animal, is there minor impurity together with the severe one, or since the impurity of the corpse preceded, should the impurity of the crawling animal and the knowledge about it be pushed aside so that the minor impurity would not be mentioned with the severe impurity? Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it, and through a crawling animal and did not know it, and entered the Sanctuary. When he was unaware of the corpse he is liable. When he was unaware of the crawling animal he is not liable. If he went to immerse himself for the severe impurity and a minor impurity was added, it is counted also for the minor impurity. In what respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is not liable.
If he went to immerse himself for a minor impurity and a severe impurity was added, it does not count for him for the severe impurity. In what respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is liable. So it does not count if he immersed himself for a severe impurity and another severe impurity was added. Nor does it count if he immersed himself for a minor impurity and another minor impurity was added. If he went to immerse himself for severe impurity and tree limbs and wall extensions were added are these like severe impurity since Rabbi Joḥanan said that for the priestly contribution all of them are impure from the Torah, or are they like minor impurity since the Nazirite does not shave because of them?
A person with both male and female sex characteristics who saw whitish effluent and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red effluent and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rabbi Joḥanan said, this is Rabbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, was sprinkled with purification water repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one and entered the Sanctuary. He is liable. Rabbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rabbi Simeon ben Judah in the name of Rabbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” The case of the person with both male and female sex characteristics is understandable, for whitish effluent you declare him to be a woman, for red effluent you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rabbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it as a case where he forgot the first. Rabbi Yose asked, what case are we discussing? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Abun said, Rabbi Simeon parallels Rabbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rabbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he became impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rabbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he became impure by red effluent or by whitish. That case is understandable, since he said that uncertain awareness counts as awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.
Rav Ḥisda asked: What is the situation if he entered the Sanctuary thinking it was a synagogue? Rabbi Yose said, this is what we are saying: One knew that impurity exists in the world but he did not know whether one is liable for a sacrifice because of it, that certainly is awareness. But the case we are discussing is the following, if it was clear to him that he was impure but he had forgotten the Sanctuary, and he entered the Sanctuary. The same applies if it was clear to him that this was the Sanctuary, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary.
Rabbi Yose asked: If one ate half the volume of an olive while aware of the Sanctuary but unaware of his impurity and another half the volume of an olive while aware of his impurity but unaware of the Sanctuary, do the instances of forgetting combine?
Mishnah
2 Whether one entered the courtyard or the addition to the courtyard, for one adds to the city and the Temple courtyards only with a king and a prophet, and Urim and Tummim, and the Sanhedrin of Seventy-One, and two thanksgiving offerings, and song, with the Court walking and the two thanksgiving offerings after them. The inner one is eaten but the outer one is burned. If an addition was not made with all these, someone who entered it is not liable.
Halakhah
“Whether one entered the courtyard,” etc. Rav said, originally: David went up following Gad’s word2 Samuel 24:19, that is, king and prophet. Solomon started to build the Temple of the Eternal in Jerusalem2 Chronicles 3:1, these are Urim and Tummim. And his father David2 Chronicles 3:1, this is the Sanhedrin, ask your father and he will tell youDeuteronomy 32:7. Song: after them went Hoshaia and the officersNehemiah 12:32. Thanksgiving sacrifices: I put up two thanksgiving sacrificesNehemiah 12:31. Rabbi Samuel bar Rabbi Yudan said, what is written, walking? No, being in procession.
Because it was the vulnerable spot of Jerusalem, it could be conquered from there.
Mishnah
3 If one became impure in the Temple courtyard, then forgot his impurity but remembered the Sanctuary, or forgot the Sanctuary but remembered impurity, or forgot both. If he prostrated himself, or waited long enough to prostrate himself, or left on a lengthy path, he is liable. But on the shortest path he is not liable. This is the positive commandment in the Sanctuary about which they are not liable.
Halakhah
“If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rabbi Ḥizqiah, Rabbi Immi in the name of Rabbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the EternalNumbers 19:13, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the EternalNumbers 19:20. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became impure inside and one who became impure outside. If he became impure outside he is liable only if he brings his head and most of his body inside. If he became impure inside he is liable only if he stays long enough to prostrate himself. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Consider the following: “If he prostrated himself, or waited long enough to prostrate himself.” If he waited, isn’t that as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he waited long enough to prostrate himself.” And here, only if he waited long enough to prostrate himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rabbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must be discussing the last.
There, we have stated: “They removed the cup and the censer for him.” About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the last. Rabbi Yose told them, one says to him, enter, and you say about the last? But we must be discussing the first.
The distance corresponding to prostration is ten cubits. How is this? Suppose the longer path was twenty cubits and the shorter one ten. He went five cubits. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, fifteen. Rabbi Yose said, he never becomes liable unless the lengthy path exceeds the short one by ten. How is that? Suppose the longer path was thirty cubits and the shorter one ten. He went five cubits. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, twenty-five. How long does prostration take? Rabbi Simon in the name of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi: the time it takes for one person to greet another. Abba bar Huna in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: the time it takes for a student to greet his teacher, “peace be with you, my teacher.”
Mishnah
4 What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman? If he was having sex with a woman who was ritually pure and she said to him, I became impure, if he separates immediately he is liable, for his separation is as pleasurable to him as his entry.
Halakhah
“What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end, with forgetting in between? Rabbi Samuel ben Eudaimon raised an objection to Rabbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rabbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value offerings, here also about fixed-value offerings.
Mishnah
5 Rabbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he forgotLeviticus 5:2, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rabbi Aqiba says, and he forgot while he was impureLeviticus 5:2, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rabbi Ishmael says, and he forgot, and he forgotLeviticus 5:2-3, twice to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary.
Halakhah
“Rabbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rabbi Joḥanan said, they differ over how to interpret the verse. There are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rabbi Eliezer seems inconsistent. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinnedLeviticus 4:23, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impureLeviticus 5:2, in all cases. Rabbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rabbi Joshua seems inconsistent. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rabbi Eliezer interpret by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.
Mishnah
1 There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds. An oath that I will eat, or that I will not eat, that I ate, or that I did not eat. If he swore “I will not eat” and ate even the smallest amount, he is liable, the words of Rabbi Aqiba. They said to Rabbi Aqiba, where else do we find someone liable for eating even the smallest amount, so that this person should be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice? Yet this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!
Halakhah
“There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. We understand “that I will eat, or that I will not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? What case are we discussing? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he thought that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rabbi Abba, Rav Judah in the name of Rav: If he is mistaken about the sacrifice it requires, or knows about that sacrifice. But “I thought that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he acted intentionally but was mistaken about the sacrifice. Didn’t Rabbi Abbahu say in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: If he intentionally eats forbidden fat but is mistaken about the sacrifice, he is warned, flogged, and required to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rabbi La said in the name of Rabbi Eleazar: This is how Rabbi Ishmael answered Rabbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where an intentional violation makes someone liable for a false oath, and a forgotten oath makes them liable for a spoken oath? Shouldn’t Rabbi Aqiba reply, we find a situation where someone is liable for an intentional false oath and brings a sacrifice? But here we are discussing a case where he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Doesn’t this concern someone who said this was not an oath? There he says this is not an oath. Here he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
What case are we discussing? If someone said, an oath that I will eat according to Torah standards, even Rabbi Aqiba will agree. And if someone says, an oath that I will not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we are discussing tiny amounts. Does eating tiny amounts count as eating? Explain it following Rabbi Aqiba who said that a tiny amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I will eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a tiny amount. In the opinion of Rabbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I will not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a tiny amount. In the opinion of Rabbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. The same applies to spoken oaths: “An oath that my wife may not have any benefit from me if I eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a tiny amount. In the opinion of Rabbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden to have benefit, in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I will not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a tiny amount. In the opinion of Rabbi Aqiba his wife is permitted to have benefit, in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. The same applies to property. “An oath that my property will be forbidden to me if I eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a tiny amount. In the opinion of Rabbi Aqiba it is forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his property is permitted. “That I will not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a tiny amount. In the opinion of Rabbi Aqiba his property is permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis it is forbidden.
Doesn’t the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where else do we find someone who speaks and brings a sacrifice, so that this person should speak and bring a sacrifice? Rabbi Abba from Carthage asked, isn’t Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inconsistent? There he said, for Rabbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rabbi Aqiba. Rabbi La in the name of Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaim following the opinion of Rabbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
Mishnah
2 If he swore “I will not eat” and ate and drank, he is liable only once. If he swore “I will not eat or drink” and ate and drank, he is liable twice.
Halakhah
“An oath that I will not eat, when he ate,” etc. Drinking is included in eating, but eating is not included in drinking. Rabbi Jonah inferred all this from: Therefore, I told the people of Israel, none of you may eat bloodLeviticus 17:12. What case are we discussing? If it concerns congealed blood, wasn’t it stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? ... And wasn’t it stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. How does Rabbi Jonah explain this? It is not food for purposes of food impurity, or fluid for purposes of fluid impurity. Rabbi Jonah changed his explanation of the Mishnah: You may spend the money for anything you desireDeuteronomy 14:26. What case are we discussing? If it concerns someone who flavors a cooked dish with wine, doesn’t that spoil its taste? But we are discussing everything, and the Merciful One called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it as referring to gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.
Rabbi Yose inferred all this from the following: “An oath that I will not eat, when he ate and drank he is liable only for one.” The colleagues said to Rabbi Yose, but it is said following this, “an oath that I will not eat nor drink, when he ate and drank” should he be liable only for one? Rabbi Yose told them, if somebody said, an oath that I will not eat this loaf, and he continued, an oath that I will not eat this other loaf, when he ate both of them wouldn’t he be guilty on two counts?
Rabbi Ḥanina in the name of Rabbi Phinehas inferred all this from the following: “An oath that I will not eat, when he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids, he is not liable.” Therefore if he ate edible food and drank drinkable fluid he is liable.
Rabbi Abba inferred all this from the following: “If he ate and drank during one period of forgetting he is liable only once.”
Rabbi Ḥinena inferred all this from the following: I did not eat from it in my mourningDeuteronomy 26:14, but did I drink?
So far, this concerns someone who said, that I will not eat, but he drank. If he said, that I will not drink, but he ate? Drinking is included in eating, but eating is not included in drinking.
Mishnah
3 An oath that I will not eat, when he ate wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable only once. An oath that I will eat neither wheat bread, nor barley bread, nor spelt bread, when he ate wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable for each single one. An oath that I will not drink, if he drank many kinds he is liable only for one. An oath that I will drink neither wine, nor oil, nor date syrup, if he drank he is liable for each single one.
Halakhah
“An oath that I will eat neither,” etc. “An oath that I will not eat bread” and he wrapped it in reed leaves or grape leaves and ate, he is liable only once. “An oath that I will not eat bread nor grape skin nor grape seeds,” and he wrapped it in grape skins and grape seeds, he is liable for each one, and if he was a Nazirite he is liable for three. Rabbi Joḥanan said, if the oath is comprehensive. But if it names specific acts, oaths do not apply to already prohibited acts. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even comprehensive oaths do not apply to already prohibited acts.
Mishnah
4 An oath that I will not eat, when he ate inedible food and drank undrinkable fluids, he is not liable. An oath that I will not eat, when he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling animals, he is liable. Rabbi Simeon declares him not liable. If he said, a qonam that my wife may not benefit from me if I had eaten today, if he had eaten carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling animals, his wife is forbidden to benefit from him.
Halakhah
“An oath that I will not drink,” etc. In this case, Rabbi Simeon declares him not liable. Rabbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rabbi Simeon says, any amount, but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rabbi Simeon told them, don’t you agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, a grain of wheat is also a creature.” In Rabbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rabbi Simeon declare not liable? Rabbi Zeʿira said, Rabbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rabbi Simeon: You must deprive yourselvesLeviticus 16:29, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.
Rabbi Abba bar Mamal asked: According to Rabbi Joḥanan, who said that comprehensive oaths apply to already prohibited acts, shouldn’t we state “an oath that I will not eat, when he ate”? Rabbi Zeʿira said, throughout the life of Rabbi Abba bar Mamal we did not find an answer. After he had died, we found an answer. What case are we discussing? If one said, an oath that I will not eat meat, including Passover, that I will not eat during these ten days, including the Day of Atonement, then the oath applies to already prohibited acts. Rabbi Yose said, we can infer from this that if he had before him olive-sized pieces of slaughtered meat and one of carcass meat and he said, an oath that I will eat these ten olive-sized pieces, since he is not liable for the carcass meat, he is not liable for the rest either.
Rabbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Why did he not say, “an oath that I will eat of the slaughter of X”? Isn’t there forbidden fat? If he slaughters deer. Isn’t there the hip sinew? About fowl. Isn’t there blood?
Rabbi Ḥinena asked: Why did he not say, “an oath if I eat from X,” without specifying what? Because of Rabbi Simeon. But if it follows Rabbi Simeon, how could we state the Day of Atonement, since Rabbi Simeon stated, you must deprive yourselvesLeviticus 16:29 of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you. But one requires a fixed-value sacrifice, the other a sacrifice scaled to a person’s means.
They objected, doesn’t impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings require a sacrifice scaled to a person’s means, and didn’t the Tanna mention it? We state only offenses punishable by being cut off. Oaths do not carry that penalty.
They objected, theft is not punishable by being cut off, yet it was mentioned! We state only things which cannot become permitted after being forbidden. Oaths may become permitted after being forbidden. This implies that there are no categories of work for the Day of Atonement, for if anybody violated all of them during one period of forgetting he is liable only for one sacrifice for all of them. But if anybody violated each of them separately, wouldn’t he be liable for each single one?
In the opinion of Rabbi Joḥanan, if one said, “an oath that I will not eat unleavened bread,” he is forbidden to eat unleavened bread on Passover night. “That I will not eat unleavened bread on Passover night,” he is flogged and eats unleavened bread. “That I will not sit in the shade,” he is forbidden to sit in the shade of a booth. “That I will not sit in the shade of a booth,” he is flogged and sits in the shade of a booth.
Not only unspecified, but even “X.” Not only comprehensive but even in detail. Not only in the future but also in the past. Not only the rabbis but even Rabbi Aqiba. Not only carcass and torn meat but even dust.
Mishnah
5 Whether the oath concerns himself or others, material or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I will give to X, or that I will not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I will sleep, or that I will not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I will throw a pebble into the sea, or that I will not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rabbi Ishmael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause harm or benefitLeviticus 5:4. Rabbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing harm or benefit. How do we include matters that do not involve harm or benefit? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other.
Halakhah
He wants to create a pretext for himself. “Whether the oath concerns himself,” etc. Rabbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rabbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause harm or benefitLeviticus 5:4. Just as doing good is optional, so doing harm is optional. This excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything one will utterLeviticus 5:4, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting of his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will have forgotten the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him. He is liable for forgetting the oath. He is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rabbi Ishmael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause harm or benefit. Just as doing good is optional, so doing harm is optional. I will exclude someone who swears to harm another, so that he is not liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave him food.
How does Rabbi Ishmael explain the verse? Or a person who swears, uttering with his lipsLeviticus 5:4, a general statement. To cause harm or benefit, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail. The general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing harm or benefit! Rather, this is the argument: To cause harm or benefit, a detail. Anything a person will utter, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included. This adds matters directed toward the past. Rather, this is the argument: Or a person who swears, uttering with his lips, a general statement. To cause harm or benefit, a detail. Anything a person will utter, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you infer only cases similar to the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing harm or benefit, how do we include matters that do not involve harm or benefit? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rabbi Hila said in the name of Rabbi Eleazar: This is how Rabbi Ishmael answered Rabbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but liable for a spoken oath if it was forgotten? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing harm or benefit, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing harm or benefit, does the text mention them except as matters of causing harm or benefit? Therefore never for the past.
Mishnah
6 If he swore not to observe a commandment but observed it, he is not liable. If he swore to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, which he was not sworn to at Mount Sinai, isn’t it logical that he should be liable about a commandment which he was sworn to at Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for a permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes,” can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but observed it, is not liable.
Halakhah
“If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rabbi Mani said, this is how the Mishnah reads: “He is liable, the words of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra.” What Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I will eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I will eat,” and he ate. If you say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You say this about an oath for a permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no,” can you say this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?
Where is the prohibition against breaking an oath for a permitted purpose? Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Abun said, he must not treat his word as profaneNumbers 30:2, he must not make his words profane.
Mishnah
7 “An oath that I will not eat this loaf, an oath that I will not eat it, an oath that I will not eat it,” he is liable only once. This is a spoken oath. An intentional violation makes someone liable to flogging, and an unintentional one to a sacrifice scaled to their means.
Halakhah
“An oath that I will not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I will eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rabbi Joḥanan and Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable, but for different reasons. Rabbi Joḥanan’s reason is that he cannot be properly warned. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason is that it is a prohibition without an action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be properly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.
Rabbi Phinehas asked, what if he was too weak to eat? Since it is not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past.
Rabbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I will not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Bun said, consider the following: “‘An oath that I will not eat this loaf, an oath that I will not eat it, an oath that I will not eat it,’ he is liable once.” Because he specified “this loaf.” Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.
Abime the brother of Ḥefa said, I had studied Nedarim and Shevuot. Ḥefa wanted to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat this loaf. He then said, these two. He then said, these three. He then said, these four. He then said, these five. Then he ate the first. He said to him, he is liable for each single one. He answered, he is liable only once, for when he mentioned the first he made it like carcass meat. The later oaths apply to something already prohibited, and oaths cannot apply to already prohibited acts.
Ḥefa continued to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat these five loaves. He then said, these four. He then said, these three. He then said, these two. He then said, this one, and ate the first one. He said to him, he is liable only once. He answered, he is liable for each one. If somebody said “an oath if I eat five loaves” and he ate four, isn’t he free from liability?
Rabbi Yose said, Ḥefa’s brother seems correct in the second case, and Ḥefa in the first.
Mishnah
8 For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged. If it was a mistake, one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is commonly known, about a stone pillar that it is made of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we will not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries. These are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution if unintentional.
Halakhah
“For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged,” etc. There, we have stated: “If I did not see on this road crowds like those who left Egypt.” Is it impossible that crowds like those who left Egypt went by? But we are dealing with one look. Wasn’t it the case that when Diocletian went there, 1,200,000 men went with him? But we must be dealing with one look.
“If I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press.” Didn’t the snake of King Shapur swallow camels and carts? When they wanted to kill it, they filled camel bags with straw and put glowing coals inside. It swallowed them and died. Rabbi Judah bar Pazi said, I saw the hide of a snake stretched across eight spaces between pillars. Rabbi Samuel ben Jacob said, I saw the hide of a snake covering a state coach. Samuel said, square. If it means square, he could mention even a small one. Rabbi Yudan the father of Rabbi Mattaniah said, so it is. This Tanna always uses large examples, as we have stated: “A flying camel.” Couldn’t he have stated, “a flying rat”?
It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, nothing created during the six days of creation is square. Rabbi Berekhiah objected: Didn’t we state: “The body of baheret is like a square Cilician grit. The place for a grit is nine lentils. The space for a lentil is four hairwidths, making 36 hairwidths.” Rabbi Bisna said, that itself shows that nothing is naturally square. Why was it stated “squared”? So that he should make its area square. And כגעה? It is full of knots. But there is the bunch of pila! It is round below. Some wanted to say, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said this only about creatures. Food can be square, but creatures cannot.
“An oath that we do not know testimony for you,” they are flogged for an oath of testimony. “An oath that we will not testify for you,” they are flogged for a spoken oath.
“An oath that I will eat this loaf,” etc. Vain and untruth both were said together, which is impossible for the ear to hear and the mouth to say. Whoever desecrates it must be put to deathExodus 31:14 and on the Sabbath day two sheepNumbers 28:9 were said together. Do not wear šaʿaṭnezDeuteronomy 22:11, make fringes for yourselvesDeuteronomy 22:12, both were said together. The nakedness of your brother’s wifeLeviticus 18:16 and her brother-in-law must come to herDeuteronomy 25:5 were said together. You must not move propertyNumbers 36:9, and any daughter inheriting real estateNumbers 36:8 both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. And so it says, God spoke once, I heard two things from thisPsalms 62:11. And it says, isn’t My word like fire, says the EternalJeremiah 23:29.
A vain oath contradicts what is commonly known. A false oath substitutes a false claim. Rabbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a false oath, and to three it is vain. Rabbi La in the name of Rabbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he swore falsely before two persons, threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath, in the opinion of Rabbi Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rabbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in Rabbi Eleazar’s opinion he is not flogged, and in Rabbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is flogged. Rabbi Abba in the name of Rav Judah, even an egg and a pearl. What does “even” mean? Rather, for example, an egg and a pearl.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But wasn’t it stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rabbi Jeremiah in the name of Rabbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist. Here it concerns someone who intends his oath to apply to his property, “an oath that my property should be forbidden to me.” Then his property is forbidden to him. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as bargaining vows are permitted, so bargaining oaths are permitted. It is the same case: if he intends his oath to apply to his property, “an oath that my property should be forbidden to me.” Then his property is forbidden to him. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.
Ḥizqiah said: someone who swears that two are two is flogged for a vain oath. Rabbi Menahem in the name of Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish: Someone who saw rain falling and said Κύριε πόλυ βρέξον is flogged for a vain oath. Rabbi Onias, Rabbi Jacob ben Rabbi Abun in the name of Rabbi Samuel ben Naḥman: 24 city councils were in Judea and they all were destroyed because of true vain oaths, as it is written: In vain I struck your sonsJeremiah 2:30.
Mishnah
9 “An oath that I will eat this loaf, an oath that I will not eat it.” The first one is a spoken oath, the second a vain oath. If he ate it he violated a vain oath, if he did not eat it he violated a spoken oath.
Halakhah
“A spoken oath,” etc. “‘An oath that I will not eat this loaf, an oath that I will not eat it,’ he is liable only once.” Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. This was not said about that case, but about the following: “Whether the oath concerns himself or others,” as Rabbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y.” If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his power for the future it is not in his power for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I will not eat, I will not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.
“An oath that I will eat this loaf, an oath that I will not eat it.” The first one is a spoken oath, the second a vain oath. How does one deal with him? One tells him to eat. It is better to break a vain oath than a spoken one.
“An oath that I will not eat this loaf, an oath that I will eat it.” The first one is a spoken oath, the second a vain oath. How does one deal with him? One tells him not to eat. It is better to break a vain oath than to break a vain and a spoken one.
“An oath that I will eat this loaf today, an oath that I will not eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rabbi Joḥanan said, he kept the first oath and invalidated the second. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he invalidated the first one and did not keep the second.
“An oath that I will not eat this loaf today, an oath that I will eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rabbi Joḥanan said, he invalidated the first oath and kept the second. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he invalidated the first one. One tells him to keep the second with another loaf.
“An oath that I will eat this loaf today, an oath that I will eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rabbi Joḥanan said, he kept both of them. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he kept the first one and one tells him to keep the second with another loaf.
“An oath that I will not eat this loaf today, an oath that I will not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rabbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable twice. Is he liable only once in Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.
Mishnah
10 A spoken oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for an unintentional violation to bring a sacrifice scaled to their means. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for an unintentional violation he is not subject to prosecution. In both cases, someone called on to swear by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.
Halakhah
“A vain oath,” etc. A person, a person. Since the word “person” used for an oath of testimony makes someone called on to swear equivalent to someone who swears, the word “person” used for an oath about a deposit likewise makes someone called on to swear equivalent to someone who swears.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes. Substituting implies speech and action. What is the source for someone who swears falsely? Rabbi Joḥanan in the name of Rabbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanseExodus 20:7, but the judges will cleanse him. What is the source for someone who curses another person by the Name? Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rabbi Hoshaia: To fear the NameDeuteronomy 28:58, etc. In Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, what is the source for someone who swears falsely? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. In Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, what is the source for someone who curses another person by the Name? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rabbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two punishments. In Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
Mishnah
1 An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones. It applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they deny knowing testimony in court, the words of Rabbi Meïr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they deny knowing testimony in court. They are liable both for intentional violation of the oath and for an erroneous one, and for intentional refusal of testimony, but one is not liable for an unintentional refusal. What is one liable for if intentional? A sacrifice scaled to the person’s means.
Halakhah
“An oath about testimony,” etc. RamsLeviticus 16:5. The minimum number implied by “rams” is two. Why does the verse say two? So that they are equal.
SheepExodus 29:38. The minimum number implied by “sheep” is two. Then why does the verse say two? So that both are equal.
The minimum number implied by “birdsLeviticus 14:4” is two. Then why does the verse say two? So that both are equal.
The minimum number implied by “trumpetsNumbers 10:2” is two. Then why does the verse say two? So that both are equal.
Rabbi Ḥaggai objected to Rabbi Yose. Isn’t it written: The two men must standDeuteronomy 19:17? Now, isn’t two the minimum of “men”? Why does the verse say two? So that both are equal? But it is written: Do not pervert justice for the convert or the orphanDeuteronomy 24:17, ... That means that a convert can have a lawsuit against one who is not a convert, an orphan may have a lawsuit against one who is not an orphan, a widow against a married woman. Then why does it say two? The word is available for comparison and for drawing a verbal analogy. It is said here two and it is said there two men were leftNumbers 11:26. Since there one speaks of men but not women or minors, here too it means men, excluding women and minors. From this we learn that a woman may not be a judge. Consequently a woman may not be a witness.
Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Abun, Rabbi Huna in the name of Rabbi Yose. It is said here two and it is said there by the mouth of two witnessesDeuteronomy 19:15. Since there it must be by the testimony of two witnesses, also here by the testimony of two witnesses. Then why does the verse say two? So that one does not stand while the other sits, or one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. He is patient with one but unfriendly to the other.
Rabbi Judah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. What is forbidden is for one to stand while the other sits, or for one to say everything he has to say while the other is told, make your statement short. Rabbi Ishmael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.
Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna: The witnesses have to stand while testifying. What is the reason? The two men must standDeuteronomy 19:17. Rabbi Jeremiah in the name of Rabbi Abbahu: The parties also have to stand at the moment the verdict is given. What is the reason? Who have the quarrel before the EternalDeuteronomy 19:17.
It is written: Fathers must not be put to death because of sonsDeuteronomy 24:16. Isn’t it already written, each one must be put to death for his own crime? Why does the verse say, fathers must not be put to death because of sons? Fathers must not be put to death on the testimony of sons, and sons must not be put to death on testimony of fathers. This teaches that witnesses must not be related to the accused.
How do we know witnesses may not be related to one another? Consider this: if they were found to have committed perjury, wouldn’t each be put to death on the other’s testimony? How do we know witnesses may not be related to the judges? Consider this, if one of them were found to have committed perjury, he could not be killed unless the other was also found to have committed perjury. If you say so, wouldn’t he be put to death by the other’s sentencing?
How do we know judges may not be related to one another? The Torah said, put to death on the testimony of witnesses, put to death on the sentence of judges. Since witnesses may not be relatives of one another, neither may judges be relatives of one another.
So far, this applies only to fathers and sons. How do we include other relatives? Rabbi Zeʿira says, and sons includes the remaining relatives.
So far according to Rabbi Aqiba.
How is this derived according to Rabbi Ishmael? Rabbi Ishmael stated: The congregation must judge between the attackerNumbers 35:24, etc. The congregation must be related neither to the murderer nor to the victim. Rabbi Yose said, otherwise you would say that the court is pursuing a vendetta. This implies that the judges may not be related to the accused. And how do we know witnesses may not be related to the accused? The Torah said, put to death on the testimony of witnesses, put to death on the sentence of those who vote. Since judges may not be related to the accused, neither may witnesses be related to the accused. How do we know witnesses may not be related to one another? Consider this: if they were found to have committed perjury, wouldn’t they be put to death on each other’s testimony?
How do we know witnesses may not be related to the judges? Consider this: if one of them were found to have committed perjury, he could not be killed unless the other was also found to have committed perjury. If you say so, wouldn’t he be put to death by his sentence?
“To qualified but not to disqualified ones.” For it is said, if he does not tell, he has to bear his punishmentLeviticus 5:1. If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“Before the court.” To exclude a single witness. If they told him that they would accept his word as if there were two witnesses, what is the rule? The verse says, if he was a witness, had seen or known, if he does not tell he must bear his punishmentLeviticus 5:1. This applies to someone qualified to testify by biblical standards. It excludes a single witness who is not qualified to testify.
“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishmentLeviticus 5:1. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
How do we know this means two witnesses? And he is a witnessLeviticus 5:1, this makes two. Following Rabbi Ishmael, who said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further specification it implies two witnesses, unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rabbi Ishmael: “Two witnesses.” Can a single witness be found guilty of a spoken oath? Since it is possible to say that one person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, you could find him liable for an oath of testimony. How could you find him guilty of a spoken oath?
Should a relative be found guilty of a spoken oath? Does this follow what Rabbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given. Since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rabbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a spoken oath. Rabbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a spoken oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
Rabbi Ishmael stated: He has to bear his punishmentLeviticus 5:1, a sacrifice. How do we know a court is required? “Telling, telling.” Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rabbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rabbi Jeremiah, Rabbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rabbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of possessory rights. Rabbi Abba in the name of Rabbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back, and the other says, I saw two hairs on his side. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing. Even more so his back and his side. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back, and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Bun and Rabbi Hoshaia ben Rabbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. The one who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. The one who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back, and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rabbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rabbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid testimony. Rabbi Yose says, this is disputed. Rabbi Yudan said, this is disputed. Rabbi Yose said to Rabbi Ḥaggai, doesn’t Rabbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I disagree with his teacher, so I certainly disagree with him. Rabbi Mana said, Rabbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person testified to two, and another testified to the other two, and the document was challenged, is that worth anything? Doesn’t each signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rabbi Ḥanina derives it from the years required to establish possessory rights. If one witness testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Doesn’t each year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Mishnah
2 What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you,” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath about this,” if they said “Amen,” they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath, when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and they refused, they are liable only once. Rabbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.
Halakhah
“What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rabbi Meïr explains the verbal analogy which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the verbal analogy which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
Rabbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rabbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?
Rabbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by his own formulation before the court. Wouldn’t he be liable for each instance separately? Rabbi Yose said, isn’t this the Mishnah: “Rabbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit?” But here, since they can come back and admit, they are liable for each single instance.
Rabbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what is the rule? Since Rabbi Meïr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should follow this case: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecationLeviticus 5:1. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a sacrifice scaled to the person’s means?
Rabbi Abba, Rav Judah in the name of Rav: A mistaken oath requires a sacrifice, and so does an intentional one. But if he said, I thought that this oath does not exist, he is not liable. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without qualification you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture informs you that it is unintentional.
Mishnah
3 If both of them disavowed simultaneously, both of them are liable. If one after the other, the first is liable but the second is not liable. If one reneged but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable. If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group disavowed and after this the second, both are liable since testimony could be upheld by either one of them.
Halakhah
“If both of them deny testimony simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to deny testimony in court. This is what Rabbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his Nazirite vowNumbers 6:21. His Nazirite vow must precede his sacrifice, rather than his sacrifice preceding his Nazirite vow. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if their sin preceded their sacrifice, or, since they are liable only in court, as if their sacrifice preceded their sin?
This is how the Mishnah reads: “If one disavowed but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable.” Rabbi Yose said, our Mishnah concerns a case where the second changed his mind immediately after the first spoke. Because if the first changed his opinion, his statement would be accepted. Then the second would become the first.
What if there were ten? There are Tannaim who state, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable. There are Tannaim who state, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable. The one who said, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable, follows the view that, the testimony can be verified by the remaining witnesses. The one who said, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable, follows the view that, testimony that was partially invalidated is totally invalidated. Rabbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “if there were two groups of witnesses.” He only said “two.” Therefore if there had been one, testimony that was partially invalidated is totally invalidated.
Mishnah
4 “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you,” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object,” they are liable for each single one. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you,” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt,” they are liable for each single one.
Halakhah
“I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. How do we know this refers only to monetary claims? Rabbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, the “or” used here also only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide would refute this since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the homicide cannot refute this since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman would refute this since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a priest from similar “or.” The “or” of the deviant woman cannot refute this since they are accompanied by a priest. The “or” of uttered speech would refute this since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or.” The “or” of uttered speech cannot refute this since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rabbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liableLeviticus 5:5, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable. For non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rabbi Simeon says, He imposed liability here and He imposed liability for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
Mishnah
5 “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that X owes me full damages or half damages, double restitution or quadruple and quintuple restitution, that X raped or seduced my daughter, or that my son hit me, or that my neighbor injured me, or that he set fire to my grain stack on the Day of Atonement,” these are liable.
Halakhah
“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knewLeviticus 5:1, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But didn’t you admit before X and Y?” “Let them testify, and I will pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But didn’t I count them for you in a meeting with X and Y?” “Let them testify, and I will pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What does it mean to follow the majority of orchards? Rabbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him. If the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rabbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
Mishnah
6 “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I am a priest, that I am a Levite, that I am not the son of a divorcee, that I am not the son of a woman who underwent ḥalîṣah, that X raped or seduced his daughter, or that my son injured me, or that my neighbor injured me or set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath,” these are not liable.
Halakhah
“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. A person who would sin, a person who would sinLeviticus 5:1; Leviticus 6:2 as a verbal analogy. Since “a person who would sin” used further on refers to an active monetary claim, “a person who would sin” here must also refer to an active monetary claim.
“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Doesn’t this disagree with Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, there is no money when there is flogging. He explains it following Rabbi Meïr who said, he is flogged and he pays. In any case he did not make him lose money. Since he wanted to give to him but did not, isn’t that as if he made him lose money?
Mishnah
7 “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for a monetary claim similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you must come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you must come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.
Halakhah
“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rabbi Yose, Rabbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: If somebody wanted to change his mind after he had promised a gift to another person, he may change his mind. Rabbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked Rabbi Abbahu: Didn’t He say “a true yesLeviticus 19:36”? At the moment when he said it, it was a true yes.
Why? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the only possible reason is that he does not intend to ask them.
Mishnah
8 If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you, X and Y, that you must come and testify for me if you know testimony for me, but they knew from another witness, or one of them was a relative or disqualified. These are not liable.
Halakhah
“If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rabbi Mana inferred it from the following, “or one of them was a relative or disqualified.” Therefore, unless one of them was a relative or disqualified, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them. Rabbi Yose inferred it from the preceding, “since the oath preceded the testimony.” Therefore, if the oath did not precede the testimony, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them.
Mishnah
9 If he sent through his slave or the defendant said to them, “I am putting an oath on you that you must come and testify for him,” they are not liable unless they hear from the mouth of the claimant.
Halakhah
“If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rabbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell, he has to bear his guiltLeviticus 5:1? Not, from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rabbi Eleazar said, and what Rabbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If our Mishnah had stated its rule but Rabbi Eleazar had not stated his, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rabbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rabbi Eleazar had stated his rule but our Mishnah had not stated its own, we would have taught that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rabbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.
Mishnah
10 “I put an oath on you, I command you, I bind you,” these are liable. “By Heaven and Earth,” they are not liable. “By א-ד, by י-ה, by the Almighty, by Sabaoth, by the Gracious and Merciful, by the Forbearing and Most Kind,” and all substitute names, they are liable. One who curses by any of these is liable, the words of Rabbi Meïr. But the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses his father or mother by any of these is liable, the words of Rabbi Meïr. But the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition. “May God punish you, so may God punish you,” this is the imprecation mentioned in the Torah. “May He not punish you, may He bless you, may He do well with you,” Rabbi Meïr declares them liable but Rabbi Judah declares them not liable.
Halakhah
“I put an oath on you,” etc., to the end. “I put an oath on you” without specifying more, they are liable. “I am binding you, I am roping you in,” they are liable.
Rabbi Joḥanan in the name of Rabbi Yannai, as our Mishnah. But some say, Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan, this is how our Mishnah reads: “Rabbi Meïr declares them liable but Rabbi Judah declares them not liable.” Rabbi Meïr follows his own opinion and Rabbi Judah follows his own opinion, as we have stated: “If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rabbi Meïr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution.”
“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rabbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But don’t substituting an offering and swearing falsely also involve prohibitions without an action?
Rabbi Yasa in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Rabbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive. “May He not punish you if you come and testify for me.” Therefore, if you do not come and testify for me He will punish you. There is not only an imprecation accompanied by an oath. How do we know one without an oath is like one accompanied by an oath? The verse says, and heard an imprecation, and heard a voiceLeviticus 5:1, to make one without imprecation like one with an imprecation. Therefore not an imprecation without an oath. Rabbi Yasa in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: There is no difference. An imprecation without an oath is the same as an oath without an imprecation.
Mishnah
1 An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, by his own words. When someone else calls on him to swear he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rabbi Meïr. But the Sages say, whether he swears in his own words or others call on him to swear, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for an intentional oath violation, or a mistaken oath with intentional denial of the deposit, but he is not liable for a mistake about the deposit. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering worth two shekels.
Halakhah
“An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation? In his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rabbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person,” everything is here and everything is there. Rabbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rabbi Meïr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow manLeviticus 6:2, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of the partners. It excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rabbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and guarantors for one another,” they are responsible and guarantors for one another. But one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Shouldn’t he be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭah, doesn’t this result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭah? What is the rule here? If someone swore again and again, wouldn’t he bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭah? There, each oath refers to a peruṭah’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭah’s worth.
Rabbi La: Rabbi Joḥanan and Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, there is no “witnesses” here. Why? Because they might die. But couldn’t a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed on his own, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah applies if he does not know that there are witnesses. He teaches you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rabbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” It is understandable that the second group becomes liable. Why the first? Not because they might forget their testimony? Here too, because they might forget their testimony.
He denied itLeviticus 6:3, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of cases involving lost property. One who knows about it and its finder, about it but not about its finder, neither about it nor about its finder.” Rabbi Onias in the name of Rabbi Jeremiah: All of them are exempt from liability. Rabbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rabbi Yose: This is not so. Rabbi Yose asked, why should it exempt someone from liability? Rabbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder, about it but not about its finder, neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is the case we are discussing. But it must be about one who denies knowledge about it and its finder, about its finder but not about it, about it but not about its finder. This is how the baraita reads: “About it and its finder.”
Mishnah
2 What is an oath about a deposit? He said to him, “give me the deposit which you hold for me.” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours,” or that he said to him, “I am holding nothing of yours,” “I am putting an oath on you” and he said “Amen,” this one is liable. If he made him swear five times whether in court or out of court and he denied, he is liable for each single one. Rabbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because he may return and admit.
Halakhah
“What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rabbi Meïr explains the verbal analogy at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. The rabbis also explain the verbal analogy which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
Rabbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative exempt for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we infer it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, they are also exempt here? Rabbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.
Rabbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by the formulation of others out of the court. Wouldn’t he be liable only once? Rabbi Yose said, isn’t this the Mishnah: “Rabbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they can come back and admit?” But here, since they cannot come back and admit, they are liable only once.
Rabbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times, since Rabbi Meïr considered “by his own words” as in court, would this determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should follow this case: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. He pays the value plus a fifth and brings a reparation sacrifice for two tetradrachmas, unlike an oath about testimony.”
Would he be “not liable” when others call on him to swear for real estate? When others call on him to swear, would he be liable for a reparation sacrifice worth two shekels?
Mishnah
3 If five people were claiming from him and said to him, give us the deposit which you are holding for us. “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours,” he is liable only once. “An oath that I am not holding anything belonging to you, or to you, or to you,” he is liable for each one separately. Rabbi Eliezer says, on condition that he repeats “an oath” at the end. Rabbi Simeon says, only if he repeats “an oath” for each single one.
Halakhah
“If five people were claiming from him,” etc. Could I think that for an oath about a deposit, He did not treat someone assenting to an oath like someone making an oath? Rabbi Eleazar said, this is not so. But for an oath about a deposit too, we are treating one assenting to an oath like one formulating an oath.
Rabbi Joḥanan said: Rabbi Eleazar’s statement applies only if he mentioned “oath” at the start and at the end. The Sages’ statement applies if he mentioned “oath” at the start but not at the end. Or if he mentioned it at the end but not at the start in the opinion of the rabbis he brings a sacrifice for each single one, in Rabbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one sacrifice for everything. If he mentions “oath” at the start but did not mention it at the end, does the oath apply to those in the middle? Consider this: If he had mentioned it at the start and the end, did he mention it for the middle ones? But you are saying that it is valid. So here it is valid.
Rabbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that I am holding neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it the same for a spoken oath? “An oath that I will not eat, I will not eat, an oath?” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rabbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rabbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It would only be a problem if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat, I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices. In Rabbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one.
Rabbi Abbahu, Rabbi Jeremiah asked: If one said, “an oath wheat and wheat I am not holding,” what is the rule? Consider the following: “Not from place X, not from place Y,” he is liable. Rabbi Yose said, they considered multiple places like multiple kinds. If he had said, not from this place, not from this place, it would have been useful.
Rabbi Ḥaggai asked: “10 oaths that I am not holding,” what is the rule?
Rabbi Yose asked: “An oath, an oath that I am not holding for you,” what is the rule? Rabbi Yose said, consider the following: “‘An oath that I will not eat this loaf, an oath that I will not eat it.’ Then he ate it. He is liable only once.” Because he mentioned “this.” Therefore, had he not mentioned “this” he would be liable for each one. Is it the same for a spoken oath? “An oath that I will eat carcass meat, and wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread.” Since he is not liable for carcass meat he is not liable for the remainder.
Mishnah
4 “Give me the deposit, the loan, the robbery, and the lost object which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours,” he is liable only once. “An oath that I am holding for you neither a deposit, nor a loan, nor a robbery, nor a lost object,” he is liable for each separate item. “Give me the wheat, and the barley, and the spelt, which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything for you,” he is liable only for one. “An oath that I am not holding wheat, and barley, and spelt, for you,” he is liable for each single one. Rabbi Meïr says, even if he says, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each single one.
Halakhah
“Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rabbi Joḥanan said, Rabbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rabbi Abba said, even Rabbi Judah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does the oath refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rabbi Zeʿira said, it does. Rabbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a Nazirite vow and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I,’ the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved the vow for her, the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state.” Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, doesn’t it apply all the more? What Rabbi Joḥanan said, Rabbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he links them: If he says, my obligation for barley will be like that for wheat, my obligation for spelt will be like that for wheat.
The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve the vow for the first woman and she violated her vow, she is flogged. Can the second be flogged? Rabbi Yose said, since one is flogged, the other also is flogged. Rabbi Yudan said, is this a stipulation of the court? Shouldn’t the second be treated as one who said, “I will become a female Nazirite after thirty days?” Rabbi Simeon follows his own opinion, for he said, it depends on the collection.
“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rabbi Joḥanan said, Rabbi Judah’s statement implies one sacrifice for a collective oath and three for an oath specifying each item. How is this? A separate mention of wheat, a separate mention of barley, a separate mention of spelt. One sacrifice for a collective oath, three for an oath specifying each item. Separate mentions of a third of wheat, a third of barley, a third of spelt, are these taken together? Consider this: although he holds many separate items, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In what respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. Even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rabbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What does “collectively” mean? Rabbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What does “collectively” mean? Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rabbi Zeʿira said, Rabbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the prescribed text and witnesses for each one separately. Rabbi Joḥanan’s support comes from the following: “‘I will not benefit from this one, a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rabbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rabbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, only the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”
Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rabbi Meïr is the general statement for Rabbi Judah. The detailed statement for Rabbi Judah is the general statement for Rabbi Meïr. Rabbi Samuel said in the name of Rabbi Zeʿira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rabbi Meïr is not the general statement for Rabbi Judah and the detailed statement for Rabbi Judah is not the general statement for Rabbi Meïr, as Rabbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. “I am greeting X,” he only signed for the greeting. If you say that the detailed statement for Rabbi Meïr is the general statement for Rabbi Judah, even if he said “I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed everything? Rabbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rabbi Judah is not the general statement for Rabbi Meïr, as we have stated: “Rabbi Meïr says, even if he says, ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt,’ he is liable for each single one,” and nobody says “even” unless he agrees to an earlier statement. Rabbi Ḥinena said, in Rabbi Meïr’s opinion, whether he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” or “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement and details. In Rabbi Judah’s opinion, if he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” it is a general statement and details. If he said “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement without details.
Mishnah
5 “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rabbi Simeon exempts him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and loss of value by his own admission.
Halakhah
“You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rabbi Zeʿira, Rabbi Yasa in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: The words of Rabbi Simeon imply that the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages. Rabbi Illa said, Rabbi Simeon’s statement applies if he claims the fine, shame and loss of value. The Sages’ statement applies if he claims shame, loss of value, and fine. The rabbis say, Rabbi Simeon’s statement applies if he advances three claims. The Sages’ statement applies if he advances one claim. Rabbi Zeʿira asked Rabbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rabbi Joḥanan, or did you infer it from his words? Rabbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rabbi Mana said, even if he is of Rabbi Illa’s opinion, Rabbi Simeon’s statement applies if he advances one claim. The Sages’ statement applies if he advances three claims. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, how do we include double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the slanderer? The verse says, everything about which one would swear falselyLeviticus 6:5.” Isn’t the slanderer’s payment a fine? Rabbi Jeremiah says, this follows Rabbi Simeon, who said, all depends on the collection.
Mishnah
6 “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal,” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it,” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill,” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill,” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you,” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye,” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable. But anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
Halakhah
“You stole my ox,” etc., to the end of the chapter. Rabbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave,’ but he says ‘he did not kill,’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen,’ he is not liable.” Rabbi Ḥaggai said to Rabbi Yose: Explain it as a case where he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son,’ but he says ‘he did not kill,’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen,’ he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rabbi Ezra said to Rabbi Mana: Explain it according to the one who said, he must pay the ransom for his lifeExodus 21:30, referring to the injured person. He said to him, if it follows the one who said, he must pay the ransom for his life, referring to the injured person, all is a fine.
Does one tell him, settle your obligation to Heaven? Consider the following: “It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out a tooth of his slave Tabi. He came to Rabbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tabi. He told him, you have no grounds to do so. Fines are imposed only through witnesses and in court.” This implies that one does not tell him, settle your obligation to Heaven. Rabbi Gamliel ben Rabbi Illai asked Rabbi Mana, does Rabban Gamliel follow the one who says, one is permitted to free? He told him, the account itself shows that it is forbidden to free, for otherwise he should have freed him immediately.
Mishnah
1 A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah. If the acknowledgment is not of the kind of the claim he is not liable. How is this? “You are holding two silver coins for me.” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is not liable. “You are holding two silver coins and a peruṭah for me.” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am not holding anything for you,” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is liable. “You are holding a mina for my father,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is not liable since he is like one returning a lost object.
Halakhah
“A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rabbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by at least a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by at least a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves free, without silverExodus 21:11. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rabbi Abun in the name of Rabbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rabbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person gives to his neighborExodus 22:7, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels. Since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rabbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rabbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels.” But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels,” since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.
Rabbi Abba, Rav Judah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two witnesses make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two witnesses make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two witnesses make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two witnesses make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath,” any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.
“And the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Rabbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims that another had stolen, the latter is not liable unless he partially admits. But all his colleagues differ from him. How do the colleagues explain for this is itExodus 22:9? If he claims money from him. If he claims money from him, is that double he shall pay to his neighbor? But this is a mixture of paragraphs.
Rabbi Zeʿira said, he is not liable unless the denial is of two silver coins not counting the acknowledgment of one peruṭah. This follows Rabbi Joḥanan’s colleague.
“ ‘You are holding a mina for me,’ ‘I am not holding anything for you,’ he is not liable.” Even “you are holding a lot for me,” “I am not holding anything for you,” he is not liable? But the following: “You are holding a mina for me.” “I am holding only a peruṭah for you.” He is liable. Rav and Rabbi Joḥanan both are saying: Only if he made the loan in the presence of witnesses. But if he made the loan not in the presence of witnesses, he could tell him, you gave me a loan but I returned half of it. Rabbi Yudan said, in money matters one does not argue “because.” Because he could have told him, you did not give me a loan, he could tell him, you gave me a loan but I returned half of it? The Mishnah disagrees with Rabbi Joḥanan: “ ‘You are holding a mina for me.’ he said ‘yes.’ The next day he said, ‘return it to me,’ ‘I returned it to you.’ he is not liable. ‘I am not holding anything for you,’ he is liable.”
“‘You are holding a mina for me,’ ‘I am not holding anything for you.’ ” Issy said, one who gives a loan to another in the presence of witnesses should claim repayment only in the presence of witnesses. Rabbi Avin said, the word of Issy: If one gives a loan to another in the presence of witnesses, the debtor should not repay except in the presence of witnesses. The Mishnah disagrees with him: “ ‘You are holding a mina for me.’ he said ‘yes.’ The next day he said, ‘return it to me,’ ‘I returned it to you.’ he is not liable. ‘I am not holding anything for you,’ he is liable.”
Mishnah
2 “You are holding a mina for me.” he said “yes.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you.” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me.” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of witnesses.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you.” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses.
Halakhah
“You are holding a mina for me.” etc. Rabbi Abun said, it is usual for people to give loans to others not in the presence of witnesses but to ask for repayment in the presence of witnesses.
“You are holding a mina for me.” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of X and Y.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you.” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses. Think of it, if he said, I returned it in the presence of witnesses. Bar Kappara stated: “when X and Y are standing there.” Think of it, if he said, “when X and Y are standing there.” Rabbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rabbi Ada bar Ahava in the name of Rav: A case came before Rabbi, and he said, let X and Y come.
If somebody produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Rabbi says, it should be judged by the document. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Rabbi Zeʿira in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A case came before Rabbi Judah following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Jeremiah asked before Rabbi Zeʿira: How? Did Rabbi switch his opinion? There he said, it should be judged by the document. But here he said it should be judged by ḥazaqah. Would we say, before he changed his opinion? Even if you say, after he changed his opinion. Rabbi only wanted to determine the truth of the matter. “If somebody occupied real estate on the basis of a document of sale and it was found invalid, this is not ḥazaqah.” Rabbi Jeremiah said, in dispute. Rabbi Samuel said, Rabbi Zeʿira, Rabbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rabbi Abinna: it is everybody’s opinion. Rabbi Yose said, there if one produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Here if he came with a document. Rabbi Yudan said, there if he presented two groups of witnesses. Here one who contradicts his own proofs.
Rabbi Marinus was guarantor for his daughter-in-law. They went to court before Rabbi Ḥama the father of Bat Qappara and Rabbi Hoshaia. After he had admitted he said to him, I gave. They asked the Elder Rabbi Ḥiyya. Rabbi Ḥiyya asked Rabbi: One who became liable in court cannot be trusted. What is the meaning of “he cannot be trusted”? Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: If he pays on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I gave. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted. Rabbi Abun bar Cahana said, also for oaths it is the same. What is the meaning of “also for oaths it is the same”? Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: If he swears on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I swore. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted.
Mishnah
3 “You are holding for me a pound of gold,” “I am holding for you only a pound of silver.” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a gold denar,” “I am holding for you only a silver denar, or a tressis, or a dupondius, or a peruṭah,” he is liable since all kinds of coin are one.
Halakhah
“You are holding for me a pound of gold,” etc. “Eight of gold I have in the wallet and one finds there eight gold denarii. Or fifty tetradrachmas and one finds 200 denar. Or 200 denar and one finds 50 tetradrachmas. These are unconsecrated. Eight gold denarii I have in the wallet and one finds fifty tetradrachmas. Or 200 denar and one finds 50 tetradrachmas, these are Second Tithe.” “ ‘You are holding for me a pound of gold,’ ‘I am holding for you only a pound of silver.’ he is not liable. ‘You are holding for me a gold denar,’ ‘I am holding for you only a silver denar.’” Rabbi Jacob bar Abinna said, earlier, we were saying, “a gold denar” is a detail. “Gold denarii” are not detail. If he had said, “a gold denar, a gold coin” it would have been correct. It was found stated, “a gold coin of a denar,” he is not liable.
Mishnah
4 “You are holding for me a kor of grain.” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes.” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a kor of produce.” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes.” he is liable since legumes are subsumed under produce. If one sued for wheat and the other acknowledged barley, he is not liable, but Rabbi Simeon declares him liable. Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and the other admitted to pitchers, Admon says since he admitted of the kind of the claim he has to swear. But the Sages say, the admission is not of the kind of the claim. Rabban Gamliel said, I accept the words of Admon. If somebody sued for both vessels and real estate. If the other admitted the vessels but denied the real estate, or the real estate and denied the vessels, he is not liable. If he admitted part of the real estate he is not liable. Part of the vessels he is liable since non-guaranteed property obligates guaranteed property to be sworn about.
Halakhah
“You are holding for me a kor of grain.” etc. Rabbi Immi in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley. But if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rabbi Abbahu said about that of Rabbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rabbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rabbi Abbahu said, so argued Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rabbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate. If he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, all the more so for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he admitted oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rabbi Zeʿira and Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. It is understandable: vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rabbi Eleazar in the name of Rabbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.
So is the Mishnah: If he denied part of the real estate he is liable, part of the vessels he is not liable.
Mishnah
5 One does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor. One does not put an oath on a minor but one swears for a minor and the Temple.
Halakhah
“One does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor,” etc. It is written: If a man gives to his neighborExodus 22:7, to exclude the minor. So far if a minor gave to him and the minor requested from him. If he gave it as a minor and requested it as an adult? The verse says, his neighbor. Only if giving and requesting are equal. Rabbi Abba bar Mamal said, is that not obvious by what Rabbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of theft in respect of his neighbor’s lost object is liable? “Where is my lost object?” He told him, it was stolen. Rabbi Abba said, explain it if he told him, you already asked me when you were underage and I was freed from swearing for you. An oath of the Eternal shall be between both of themExodus 22:11, to exclude the heir. Rabbi Illa in the name of Rabbi Yasa: The baraita is about the heir.
Between both of themExodus 22:11 it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath falsely, at the end it will fall on him. If the one swearing swears falsely, at the end it will fall on him. What is the reason? I will take it out, declares the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My NameZechariah 5:4, etc. Rabbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking thereJob 2:2. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stonesZechariah 5:4. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rabbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rabbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rabbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to her house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she knew of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.
Mishnah
6 About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple. The unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay. Rabbi Simeon says, one swears about things for which he is responsible if they are alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they are alienated. Rabbi Meïr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “I handed over ten bearing vines to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rabbi Meïr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.
Halakhah
“About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rabbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath. Rabbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rabbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rabbi Joḥanan answer Rabbi Eleazar. No. If you said this about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath. Here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.
Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheepExodus 22:10. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I will exclude real estate but will not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I will exclude slaves but will not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rabbi Ishmael explained: Or a person, if he would swearLeviticus 5:4, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, originating from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. Originating from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath. Who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.
Somebody tears up another’s documents without the latter’s agreement. Rabbi Ḥanania and Rabbi Mana, one said, he is liable. The other said, he is not liable. The one who said he is liable, as a fine. The one who said he is not liable: he is like one who obstructs the depositions of witnesses. A widow who grabs documents is like a person who ties up the mouths of witnesses.
Rabbi Immi said, those who write, “on condition that I have the right to seize movables,” cannot collect. Rabbi Mana said, if he writes and declares, “even though the Court will not enforce,” he collects.
“Rabbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sacred offerings. About any sacred offerings for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied. But about any sacred offerings for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied.” Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sacred offerings, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied. But if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied but not against his neighbor and he lied.
Mishnah
7 One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count. How is that? “I handed over to you a full house. Or I handed over to you a full wallet,” But the other says, “I do not know. Take what you left with me.” he is not liable. One says, up to the gutter. The other says, up to the window. He is liable.
Halakhah
Rabbi Ḥanina said, One says, a large candelabra, but the other says, a small candelabra. He is liable since we have stated: “One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count.” Rabbi Abba bar Mamal said, explain it if it was a candelabra composed of sections. One says, a large belt. The other says, a small belt. Rabbi Ḥiyya stated something but we do not know what he stated. If you say “liable,” a Mishnah disagrees, as we have stated: “One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count.” If you say “not liable,” a Mishnah disagrees, as we have stated: “If one says the adult one and the other says the underage one, let the seller swear that he sold the underage one. If both say that they do not know, they split it.”
Mishnah
8 One gave a loan to another on a pledge and the pledge was lost. He told him, “I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel,” but the other one says “no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth a tetradrachma.” He is not liable. “I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel,” but the other one says “no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth three šeqel.” he is liable. “You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,” and the other says “no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma.” he is not liable. “You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,” and the other says “no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth five denar.” he is liable. Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge, so that one does not swear and then the other produce the pledge.
Halakhah
Rabbi Joḥanan said, the lender can be believed if he said, I lent to you up to the value of the pledge. The Mishnah says, also the borrower can be believed, as we have stated: “He told him, ‘I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel,’ but the other one says ‘no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth a tetradrachma.’ He is not liable.” A person encountered another in the market and said, you owe me two denarii and your pledge is worth two denarii. He answered, I owe you one denar but my pledge is worth two denarii. The case came before the judges of Nahardea. They said, since everybody agrees that it is worth two denarii, he has to bring witnesses on the other denar. They had not heard that Rabbi Joḥanan said, the lender can be believed if he said, I lent to you up to the value of the pledge.
A person encountered another in the market and took away his linen cloth saying, “this sheet will not leave my hand until you give me what you are holding for me.” It came before Samuel. He told him, return his linen cloth to him and sue him. Does Samuel follow the judges of Nahardea? There, the pledge was held by him, here the pledge was not held by him.
Samuel says, the oath does not move away from between them. If the lender swears, he swears and takes. But if the borrower swears, the other will present the pledge. “Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge.” Rav and Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish say, about the first part: “ ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,’ and the other says ‘no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma.’ he is not liable. ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it,’ ” etc. “And the other says, ‘I do not know.’” Rabbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: You do not know, the other knows. Rabbi Joshua the Southerner asked before Rabbi Jonah: There you say, you do not know, the other knows. But here you say so? There is desecration of an oath, here there is no desecration of an oath.
Mishnah
1 All who must swear by Torah standards swear and do not pay. The following swear and collect: The journeyman, a person robbed or injured, and one whose opponent is suspected of perjury, and the grocer on his account book. How does the journeyman do it? He tells him, “give me my wages which you are holding.” he says, “I gave.” He swears and collects. Rabbi Judah says, only if there is partial admission. How is this? He tells him, “give me my wages of fifty denarii which you are holding.” but he says, “you received from these a gold denar.”
Halakhah
“All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between themExodus 22:11, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to payExodus 22:11? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rabbi Ḥaggai asked before Rabbi Yose: Is this only following Rabbi Meïr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rabbi Assi say in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Rabbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rabbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rabbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive. Where do they disagree? In everyday speech.
Rabbi Abin said, since the householder has many occupations they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect. ... Similarly they instituted for the householder that if its deadline had elapsed, he cannot swear and collect. Rabbi Ḥiyya stated, if there are witnesses that he claimed it in time, he swears and collects even after a year. Rabbi Yose said, he has only that single day. Rabbi Jonah said, Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Ḥanina and Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day. If in the night he has only that night. But the other said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I will give, the presumption is that he gave. We do not know who said what. Since Rabbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish: if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day. If in the night he has only that night, therefore Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Ḥanina is the one who said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I will give, the presumption is that he gave. Rabbi Mana said, sometimes he claims after its time and it is considered as in time. How is this? He claimed from him and he said to him, did I not say to you that I gave at that date? That date becomes as if it were yesterday. One gives him one measure.
If he paid him in advance. In that case he swears and collects. If a pledge was in his hand. In that case he collects without swearing. If he was a slave. Would the court admit a slave to an oath? If he was suspect? Would the court admit a suspect person to an oath? If both were suspect, it is the dispute between Rabbi Meïr and Rabbi Yose: “If both were suspect, the oath returns to its origin, the words of Rabbi Yose. Rabbi Meïr says, they split the difference.”
It is obvious: If the householder dies, the journeyman swears to his heirs. Even if the journeyman dies, do his heirs swear to the householder’s heirs? They made this ordinance only for the journeyman. Maybe for his heirs? Rabbi Eleazar said, if he claimed before witnesses. But if he claimed without witnesses, he can tell him, I paid your wages. Rabbi Joḥanan said, does one not argue “because” in money matters? Because he can say to him, I did not hire you, he can tell him, I hired you and paid your wages. A baraita disagrees with Rabbi Eleazar: “When was this said? If he said, I gave, but the other said, I did not take. I gave you your wages, but he says, I did not take. You hired me, but he says, I did not hire you. The burden of proof is on the claimant.” It is difficult for Rabbi Eleazar, if he hired him before witnesses, how can this one say, I did not hire you?
Rabbi Abba from Carthage asked: “You worked for me one day and I paid you.” But the other says, “I worked for you for two days and you did not give anything to me.” It is obvious that he takes for the first day without oath. The second is the disagreement between Rabbi Joḥanan and Rabbi Eleazar. “I hired you for a tetradrachma and gave it to you.” But the other says, “you hired me for two tetradrachmas and did not give me anything.” It is obvious that he takes the first tetradrachma without an oath. The second is the disagreement between Rabbi Joḥanan and Rabbi Eleazar.
Rav Huna said, if after he swore he brought witnesses that it was standing at the feeding trough, the oath already had robbed it. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Huna: “ ‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, it was lost. ‘I am putting an oath on you,’ and he said Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed on his own, he pays the value, an additional fifth, and a reparation offering.” The Mishnah if he ate it and only later swore to him. What Rav Huna said, if he swore to him and only later ate it.
Rabbi Judah’s argument seems inverted. There he says, even if he does not know. But here he says, not unless he knows. There since it is not in the form of a biblical oath even if he does not know. But here it is in the form of a biblical oath.
May one roll over a biblical oath on a biblical oath? Consider the following: One rolls over a biblical oath on a biblical oath, an instituted oath on an instituted oath, a biblical oath on an instituted oath. An instituted oath on a biblical oath? There, one swears and pays, but here in one case he swears and collects, in the other he swears and does not pay.
Mishnah
2 How about a person robbed? There were witnesses that he entered another’s house to take a pledge without authorization. He said to him, give me my vessels which you took but he answers, I did not take. This one swears and takes. Rabbi Judah says, only if there is partial admission. How is this? He tells him, you took two of my vessels but he says, I took only one.
Halakhah
“How about a person robbed,” etc. “In another’s house,” not in his courtyard. “To take a pledge,” not for another purpose. Rabbi Isaac said, and only by witnesses. If two entered to take pledges from him? It should come like the following: “If he was injured between the two ...” But if both were entitled to take pledges? What should be seen there? If they saw two men hitting him with sticks.
If they saw him throwing pebbles and broken vessels were found there, he collects without oath.
May one claim extraordinary things? One may, following what Rabbi Joḥanan said, a person may be rich on the market place and poor in his house. Rich in his house and poor in the market place. There is one who poses as rich and has nothing, poses as poor and has great wealthProverbs 13:7. Rabbi Abba told: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died. The case came before Rabbi Ishmael ben Rabbi Yose. Would one not say that all that Bar Ziza’s sharecropper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza’s sons came. He said, the adult ones should take half and when the underage grow up they should take half. Rabbi Ishmael ben Rabbi Yose died. The case came before the Elder Rabbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing since there are people who do not advertise themselves. It should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rabbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underage ones is only comparable to a gift given to them.
Mishnah
3 The injured one, how? They were testifying against him that one came to his hand whole and left injured. He says, you injured me, but the other says, I did not injure. This one swears and collects. Rabbi Judah says, only if there was a partial admission. How is this? He said to him, you injured me twice but the other says, I injured you only once.
Halakhah
“The injured one, how,” etc. “Rabbi Judah was calling them beaters. Any time they are rubbing one another, he swears and collects. If he was bitten at a place where he could not bite himself, he collects without oath. At a later time if one says, you injured me, but the other says, I did not injure, this is like any other claim.”
Mishnah
4 And if the opposing party was suspected of perjury, how? Equally oaths about testimony, or oaths about deposits, or even vain oaths, if one of them was a dice-player, a lender on interest, a participant in pigeon contests, or a dealer in sabbatical produce, the opposing party swears and collects. If both of them were suspect, the oath returns to its place, the words of Rabbi Yose. Rabbi Meïr says, they split it.
Halakhah
“And if the opposing party was suspected of perjury,” etc. The dice player is the one who plays with small stones. “Not only the player with stones, even one who plays with shells of nuts or pomegranates one does not accept unless he breaks his stones, and is checked out, and repents in complete repentance.” One who lends on interest one does not accept unless he tears up his IOUs, and is checked out, and repents in complete repentance.
Participants in pigeon contests, that is one who bets on pigeons. Whether one bets on pigeons or bets on any domesticated animal, wild animal, or bird, he is not accepted unless he breaks his tools of the catch and repents in complete repentance.
Dealers in sabbatical produce, that is the sabbatical trader. “Who is a sabbatical trader? One who sits idle all the years of a sabbatical cycle. In the sabbatical year he becomes active and trades in sabbatical produce. One does not accept him before another sabbatical year starts and he can be checked out that he repented in complete repentance.” Rabbi Yose stated, two sabbatical periods. “Rabbi Nehemiah says, repentance in money, not repentance in words. That he says to them, here are 200 denars, distribute them to the poor, for I earned them from forbidden produce.” They added shepherds, extortionists, and any who are suspect in money matters, that their testimony is invalid. Rabbi Abbahu said, shepherds of small animals.
Rav Huna said: Who is the Tanna of “participants in pigeon contests”? Rabbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “Participants in pigeon contests are disqualified from testimony.” Rabbi Mana said before Rabbi Yose: Is that statement in Sanhedrin Rabbi Eliezer’s? He told him, it is everybody’s opinion. So said Rabbi Yose: We knew that he was disqualified for testimony in money matters. What does he come to testify about? For as he is disqualified in money matters, so he is disqualified to testify in criminal trials. The witnesses for the New Moon are held to the standards of criminal trials, as we have stated: “Any testimony for which a woman is not qualified, they are not qualified for.” Who stated this? The rabbis! Do the rabbis follow Rabbi Eliezer? They agree with him and disagree with him. Rabbi Huna in the name of Rabbi Jonah said: It follows Rabbi Eliezer in everything. It turns out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as it was stated: A perjured witness is disqualified for any and all testimony required by the Torah, the words of Rabbi Meïr. Rabbi Yose said, when has this been said? When he was found perjured in criminal matters. But if he was found perjured in money matters, he is disqualified only from that particular testimony. It turns out that Rabbi Yose parallels the rabbis and Rabbi Meïr Rabbi Eliezer.
When does one accept one who is suspect in matters of oaths? From when he comes to the court and says, I am suspect. Where do we hold? If one who stands here and is obligated to swear for another, does the court deliver an oath to a suspect person? But we must hold about one who has a suit at a court where he is unknown and tells them, this man is suspect. Also about one who stands and another owes him an oath and he forgives it.
Rav Hoshaia said before Rabbi Immi in the name of the rabbis there: the oath returned to Sinai. Rabbi Joḥanan in the name of Rabbi Yannai: the oath returned to the parties. He who said, the oath returned to Sinai, it is as if there was no testimony. The burden of proof is on the claimant. He who said, the oath returned to the parties, since that man is suspect and cannot swear for me, get up and pay me.
Mishnah
5 The grocer on his account book, how? Not that he says to him, it is written in my account book that you owe me 200 denars, but he said to him, give my son two se’ah of wheat, or my worker small change for a tetradrachma. He says, I gave, but they say, we did not take. He swears and collects, and they swear and collect. Ben Nannas said, how? Both are induced to swear falsely! But he takes without an oath and they take without an oath.
Halakhah
“The grocer on his account book,” etc. “Was ‘the grocer on his account book’ not said about one extending credit? For he can tell him, you wrote with this hand, erase with the other hand.”
Rabbi says, I am saying that these have to swear in the presence of those because of the embarrassment.
That is to say, only if he did not introduce them. But if he introduced them, the householder has no liability, following what Rabbi Judah bar Shalom said: One did introduce the porters to the food merchants. They came, but they sent them away without giving them anything. The case came before Rabbi Shammai. Since if the food merchants had said that they took, would at the end not these and those collect? Therefore, they collect immediately.
Mishnah
6 He said to the grocer, give me produce for a denar. That one delivered and said, give me the denar. He said to him, I gave it to you and you put it into anpalē: the householder has to swear. If he gave him the denar and said, give me the produce. He said to him I delivered them to you and you brought them to your house: the grocer has to swear. Rabbi Judah says, the one in possession of the produce is advantaged. He said to the money changer, give me oboloi for a denar. That one delivered and said, give me the denar. He said to him, I gave it to you and you put it into anpalē: the householder has to swear. If he gave him the denar and said, give me the oboloi. He said to him I delivered them to you and you threw them into your wallet: the money changer has to swear. Rabbi Judah says, it is not the practice of money changers to give an as before he took the denarii.
Halakhah
“He said to the grocer, give me produce for a denar.” etc. Rabbi Ḥanina said, it is to be differentiated: “Rabbi Judah said, when? If the container was lying between them. But if it was in the possession of one of them ...”
Also this needs to be differentiated. It is said about a stranger. But to a fellow town dweller he will give an as before he takes his denar.
Mishnah
7 If she had compromised her ketubah, she cannot collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that the ketubah was paid, she cannot collect without an oath. From encumbered property, or from orphans’ property, she cannot collect without an oath. If she collects in his absence, she cannot collect without an oath. Similarly, the orphans can collect only by an oath. “An oath that our father did not instruct us, our father did not tell us, and we found nothing in our father’s documents that this note of indebtedness was paid.” Rabbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa testified that even if the son was born after the father’s death he swears and collects. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, if there are witnesses that the father said on his deathbed that this note of indebtedness was not paid, he collects without oath.
Halakhah
Rabbi Zeʿira said, this came down in the manner of biblical oaths. And a woman’s ketubah is not from the start in her hand for collection, but only for collection from now on and in the future. Since she claims a document about 200 paid and she says, it is only one mina, she collects without oath.
There, we have stated: “If she had compromised her ketubah, she cannot collect without an oath. How is this? If her ketubah was a thousand denars and he says to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received only one mina, she cannot collect without an oath.” It was stated, one who had compromised, not one who had diminished. Rav Ḥisda said, because he went two steps ... Because he compromised it in court you say, he cannot collect?
“Similarly, the orphans can collect only by an oath.” etc. Rabbi Joḥanan in the name of Rabbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only if interest is due. Rabbi Nathan says, also a woman’s ketubah. Rabbi Mana said, because of her sustenance. Rabbi Mattania said, who is worried about sustenance? Rabbi Simeon! Since Rabbi Simeon said, all depends on the female. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Rabbi Nathan said, also for robbery and torts. Rabbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from minor orphans’ property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from minor orphans’ property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated, the son shall stand in the father’s place. One estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable? Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Abun said, explain it as everybody’s opinion about testamentary dispositions.
Here you say, “one does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor.” But there you say, “one swears for a minor and the Temple.” If one pays from the minor’s property. But can one collect from a person in his absence? Rabbi Jeremiah said, explain it about a contract for which interest is due. Would the court collect interest? Explain it that it was guaranteed for a Gentile.
Alexis said before Rabbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way. We have the heralds announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in a distant place. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rabbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.
You find that one may say that Ḥanan and Rabbi Simeon said the same thing. Just as you say that practice follows Ḥanan, so practice follows Rabbi Simeon.
Rav said, if the debtor died, the creditor swears to his heirs. Even if the creditor died, the creditor’s heirs swear to the debtor. But if the debtor died first and after him the creditor, the creditor already was obligated for an oath to the debtor’s sons and nobody makes his sons inherit his oath. Rabbi Joḥanan heard and said, should that one eat and enjoy it?
Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: A document produced by the creditor in the creditor’s handwriting is invalid, for I am saying that he has practiced writing documents. This implies that in the hand of another it would be valid. Rabbi Abinna in the name of Samuel: It is always invalid unless it is in the creditor’s possession but in the debtor’s handwriting. What about this? Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Bun said, explain it according to everybody about a testamentary gift.
Mishnah
8 The following have to swear without a claim: Partners, and sharecroppers, and trustees, and a wife trading in the house, and a family member. If he says, what do you claim from me? “I want you to swear to me,” he is liable. After partners or sharecroppers distributed, he cannot force them to swear. If an oath was rolled over to him for another cause, one may roll everything over to him. The Sabbatical year remits an oath.
Halakhah
Rabbi Yose said, this means if he trades without account. It does not apply if there are accounts. Also the family member trades without accounts. Rabbi Zeʿira agrees with Rabbi Yose. A man came for judgment before Rabbi Zeʿira who required him to swear for two denars. He told him, do I not owe you two denars? Here they are thrown to you. He answered him, and cloth of fine wool X and Y. Rabbi Zeʿira said, either you give him everything he claims from you or you swear to him everything which he rolls over to you. How far does one roll over? Rabbi Joḥanan said, until he says to him, you are my slave. Think of it, could he be a Cohen and a Hebrew slave? Is there such a slave today?
Rabbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, watch it for it is otherwise. What do we say? Watch it, for it is not negligible. “Owner,” “owner.” Since the owner mentioned there is subject to annulment, so also here he is subject to annulment. The Sabbatical annuls things which are his hand’s loans and annuls the corresponding oaths. The Sabbatical does not annul things which are not his hand’s loans, nor does it annul the corresponding oaths. “For anything which the Sabbatical annuls it annuls the corresponding oath. Anything which the Sabbatical does not annul it does not annul the corresponding oath.”
Mishnah
1 There are four kinds of keepers: The unpaid trustee and the borrower, the paid keeper, and the renter. The unpaid trustee swears about everything. The borrower pays for everything. The paid keeper and the renter swear about breakage, abduction, and death, but pay for the lost and the stolen.
Halakhah
“There are four kinds of keepers,” etc. Rabbi Joḥanan said, there are four kinds of keepers and they become liable only through acquisition. Rabbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rabbi Eleazar: Also in matters of robbery they become liable only through acquisition. Rabbi Yose ben Rabbi Bun said, a baraita said so: “one who contracts with another for a field,” etc. Rabbi Ḥananiah said, Rabbi Abun, also in theft cases they become liable only through acquisition. Rabbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rabbi Phineas, our Mishnah said so: “If he was pulling it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had it led outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.” If he lifted it inside the owner’s property it is as if he had taken it out of the entire property of the owner. If he was pulling it and it left, only after it left the entire property of the owner. Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: If it was standing at his feeding trough. Rabbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If it was standing at his feeding trough then even if he did not pull it! But we must deal with the case that it was standing in the public domain. Does Rabbi Abun bar Ḥiyya follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “he shall be hit by less or more”? How do we hold? If it was standing in the public domain and he intended to rustle it when it died, according to everybody he became liable by that intention. If he did not start to pull it, according to everybody he is not liable. But we must hold that it was standing at a feeding trough on his property. As Rabbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, following the House of Shammai. Rabbi Abun said, there he acquired without the knowledge of its owner. But here when he acquires with the knowledge of its owner.
It is written: If a man gives to another, etc., to keepExodus 22:7. To keep, not to tear it up. To keep, not to throw it away. To keep, not to give it away as a gift. Rabbi Yose said, only if he said to give it to anyone he likes. But if he said, to X, since he is obligated to keep it is as if he kept it for him.
It was stated: If it was stolen from the man’s houseExodus 22:7. Not from his roof. Rabbi Eleazar said, that means, from an unprotected roof. But a fortified roof is like a house.
It was stated, if it was stolen from the man’s houseExodus 22:7. Not from the borrower’s house. If it was stolen from the man’s house. Not from the house of the paid keeper or the renter? Since he is obligated to watch it, it is as if it referred to him. For you may say that there are three paragraphs. The last one about the borrower, the middle one about the paid keeper and the renter, the first one about the unpaid keeper. The borrower who profits from all pays everything. The paid keeper or the renter, because he profits partially and gives partial profit, swears about part and pays part. The unpaid keeper who does not profit at all swears and leaves. What does he swear? I did not commit anything. What is the situation if others know that he did not commit anything? Consider the following: If the thief was found but has nothing with which to pay, may he say to him, swear to me that you were not thinking to take it? Consider the following: If the thief was not foundExodus 22:8. Therefore, if he was found he is not liable.
It is written, if a man gives to his neighbor a donkey, or an ox, or a sheepExodus 22:10 etc. An oath before the Eternal shall be between the two of themExodus 22:11. Stolen, if it was stolen stealing from himExodus 22:12. Lost, and if, to include the lost one. So far following Rabbi Aqiba. Following Rabbi Ishmael? Rabbi Ishmael stated: Since you say that he pays for theft which is close to duress, for loss which is not close to duress, all the more so?
For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument from minor to major which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or diedExodus 22:14. And it is said there, it dies or was brokenExodus 22:10. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rabbi Aqiba. Following Rabbi Ishmael? Rabbi Ishmael follows Rabbi Nathan. Rabbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rabbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rabbi Nathan, for Rabbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.
Rabbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it. Does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rabbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter.” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument from minor to major which is questionable.” Rabbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument from minor to major which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument from minor to major which cannot be challenged.
It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to payExodus 22:15. Does he have to swear? Rabbi Zeʿira said, he swears. Rabbi Ḥanina and Rabbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rabbi Ḥanina and Rabbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable. Loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not a fortiori that the borrower is not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rabbi Ḥanina in the name of Rabbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rabbi Zeʿira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable. The paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rabbi Zeʿira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him. If the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner is with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner is with him? Rabbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rabbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we will treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.
What is the reason of the House of Shammai? Any word of criminality. How do the House of Hillel explain the reason of the House of Shammai? “Criminality,” any word of criminality. Explain it if he appropriated it through an agent.
Rabbi Yose bar Ḥanina asked, what was said, to take? Took? Did not Rabbi Hoshaia state, “it broke.” If it turned into vinegar he pays for everything? It turned into vinegar only because of its spoilage. Rabbi Samuel, Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Eleazar. “Grabbing” which was mentioned for the unpaid keeper makes him liable only if he diminished. Rabbi Samuel asked before Rabbi Abbahu: What has been said about taking? That he diminished or even if he did not diminish? He said to him, is that not Rabbi Yose bar Ḥanina’s question, to take, took? If you say “to take,” even if he did not diminish. If you say “took,” only when he diminished. If you say “to take,” if he returned it either to its former place or to another place he is not liable. If you say “took,” if he returned it to its former place he is not liable, to another place he is liable.
Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: “Guarding” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “guarding” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not similar to “guarding” mentioned for the recipient of a fee. “Guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper. If he guarded it sufficiently he is not liable. For a paid keeper one estimates it only relative to his body. Therefore one judges him. If the guarding was appropriate he is not liable, otherwise he is liable. One does not say, if another had been there, he could have saved. If he saved, he is not liable. If he did not save, he is liable.
Rabbi Eleazar in the name of Rabbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he moves it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rabbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he moves it. Rabbi Immi in the name of Rabbi Eleazar: But did not Rabbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he moves it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable unless he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee. From the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rabbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he moves it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he moves it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he moves it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict. From the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Mishnah
2 He said to the unpaid keeper, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear.” he answered “Amen.” He is not liable.
Halakhah
“He said to the unpaid keeper,” etc. Rav said, he is not liable for a keeper’s oath but is liable because of a blurted oath. Rabbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In Rav’s opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
Rabbi Joḥanan asked: May the oath of a deviant woman be liable for a blurted oath? Where do we hold? If she is in error in sin and oath she is not deviant. If she is intentional in sin and error there is no sacrifice. Rav follows Rabbi Aqiba. If Rabbi Ishmael would argue like Rabbi Meïr it would follow, since Rabbi Meïr said: “Amen that I was not defiled, Amen that I will not be defiled.” But you may question this.
Mishnah
3 “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you saying?” But if it had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear.” he answered “Amen.” He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was lost.” “I want you to swear.” he answered “Amen.” Witnesses testify that he ate it: he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was stolen.” “I want you to swear.” he answered “Amen.” Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. He said to a person on the market, “where is my ox which you stole?” This one says, “I did not steal,” but witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. If he saw that witnesses appeared and said, “I stole but did neither slaughter nor sell,” he only pays its value.
Halakhah
“He said to the borrower, ‘where is my ox,’” etc. Rabbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “He claimed a claim of loss, swore, and confessed. Whether before witnesses came or after witnesses came he pays the value, a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. If he claimed a claim of thief, swore, and confessed before witnesses came he pays the value, a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. When after witnesses came he pays double restitution and a reparation sacrifice. The fifth is counted for him in the double payment, the words of Rabbi Jacob. They said to Rabbi Jacob, where do we find a reparation sacrifice without fifth? He said to them, if he swore, and swore, and swore, we find a reparation sacrifice without fifth. But the rabbis say, there is a fifth for the capital. There is no fifth for oaths.”
Another explanation: He shall pay the whole worth and add its fifths to itLeviticus 6:5. Rabbi Zeʿira said, it was stated thus: “He claimed a claim of loss, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would be sanctified, it is sanctified here. He claimed a claim of thief, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would not be sanctified, it is not sanctified here, but following Rabbi Jacob it would be sanctified.”
Rabbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims against another a claim of thief he pays double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. There, they say, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rabbi Pedat in the name of Rabbi Hoshaia: There we state and it supports Rabbi Joḥanan: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was lost.’ ‘I want you to swear.’ he answered ‘Amen.’ Witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” Is there eating without slaughtering? Rabbi Ḥaggai said, explain it if another slaughtered. And the following said so: He said to one in the market place, “where is my ox which you stole?” He says, “I did not steal.” “I want you to swear,” and he says “Amen.” He is liable. Because he is one in the market place. But if he said it to one of the keepers, that one would not be liable. The baraita when he ate it and then swore. What Rabbi Joḥanan said, if he swore and after that ate it.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rabbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rabbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rabbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rabbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rabbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rabbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rabbi Zeʿira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rabbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rabbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rabbi Zeʿira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear.’ he answered ‘Amen.’ Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter. He is liable.
Rabbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he saw that witnesses to the theft were approaching and he said “I stole,” since his confession is inoperative he is liable. If he saw that witnesses to the slaughter were approaching and he said “I slaughtered,” since his confession is not operative he is not liable. Rabbi Zeʿira asked: that witnesses to rape were approaching and he said “I raped”? Rabbi Ḥanina said, the Mishnah follows Rabbi Simeon who said the main claim is for the fine. Therefore his confession is inoperative and he is liable. But the rabbis say, the main claim is not for the fine. Therefore his confession is operative and he is not liable.
Mishnah
4 He said to the borrower, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear.” he answered “Amen.” He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you saying?” But if it had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear.” he answered “Amen.” He is liable. He said to the recipient of a fee or to a renter, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke or was abducted. “It broke,” but it died or was abducted. “It was abducted,” but it died or broke. “It was stolen,” but it was lost. “It was lost,” but it was stolen. “I want you to swear.” if he said “Amen,” he is not liable. “It died, or it broke, or it was abducted,” when it was stolen or lost. “I want you to swear.” if he said “Amen,” he is liable. “It was lost, or stolen,” when it died, or broke, or was abducted. He is not liable. This is the principle: Anybody who swears to his benefit is liable, to his detriment is not liable.
Halakhah
It was stated: If it was neither to his benefit nor to his detriment, he is liable. Rabbi said, a baraita says so: “If he said to the borrower, the unpaid trustee, the recipient of a fee, or the renter, ‘where is my ox?’ This one said, ‘it died.’” May he tell him, “come and swear to me that you never thought of rustling it”? In any case he would not pay. What could he say? “Even if you would pay me a lot, I want from you what is mine.”
Intertextual Commentary on Jerusalem Shevuot
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